I know the Leo2SG is a fairly new platform in the SAF arsenal. However, given the recent announcement of the Hunter AFV, I begin to wonder where Singapore's land forces arms developments will go next. Could we see Singapore taking lessons from the AMX-13 and the Leo 2 to design their own tank for use in Singapore, the way that the Israelis did with the Merkava? Or are MBTs still beyond Singapore's capabilities of developing and building? I fully admit that I don't know too much about the infrastructure and logistics required to perform the task.
Made in Singapore Equipment
- Thread starter Firn
- Start date
1. @CheeZe, the 1st question I would ask is:
2. The 2nd question I would ask is:
4. The 3rd question I would ask is:
Is it: the MTU MB-837 Ka501 engine pack (where Germany is the world leader), the gun system and its sights, or the active protection system (where Israel is the world leader)?
5. Given that Singapore imports all our steel (as there is no local steel forge), I hold the view that it is not necessary for the SAF to build our own main battle tanks (MBTs) — the Japanese (MHI Type-10), the Koreans (K2), Indians (Arjun Mk. 2) and Turks (Altay) have their own MBT designs but zero export success. IIRC our tank range on Singapore is so small that we can only fire a sub-caliber for the 120mm main gun and the SAF would have to do all live-fire testing of a new MBT’s main gun and sights overseas.
6. The 4th question I would ask is:
IIRC 62 of the Leopard 2A7Q was supplied to Qatar for USD2.2 billion between 2013 to 2018. This tank has a number of changes, that are not found of the Danish (44), German (250 to 328) and Hungarian (44) Leopard 2A7 tanks. Most European armies each have around 200 MBTs. Of these 3,500 are Leopard 2, with 1,000 expected to be upgraded to the latest 2A7V standard — with the L55A1 gun and new DM73 ammo, as much more capable than the 2A4. If you look at the international MBT arms market today, it is so small and competitive. Buyers are spoilt for choice.
7. In today’s market, even UK, the original inventors of tank warfare, would struggle to win a single order for their latest version of the Challenger 2. UK first introduced tanks to the battlefield at the Somme on 15 September 1916.
8. The SAF is the process of buying the 120 mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System Mk. II (SRAMS Mk. II) for its motorised infantry battalions that is installed in the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle. Compared to the original SRAMS Mk. I (that fires over the rear arc with elevation limits from +45° to +80°, and a traverse of 40° left and right), the Mk. II will have an all-electric 180 degree traverse and elevation hydraulic system— this is a great product with sales potential.
9. The focus is not on a single platform, rather, it is on delivering a capability for Singapore (supported by ISR, a range of sympathetic platforms, like the Bronco, the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle and so on). If you ask me, in the next 5 years, I would rather the SAF spend the money to buy the Bronco 3 (and develop these as a UAV and loitering munition carrier) to support the Hunter IFV equipped armoured battalions or develop a replacement to the now dated SAR-21. It is difficult enough to retain Singapore’s sovereign capability to make all our own 155mm guns, with the Advanced Mobile Gun Systems project that is still ongoing. IMHO, better to have some focus in arms developmental efforts.
Q1: Why would Singapore want to spend billions to develop a new MBT (when there are many world class manufacturers to choose from)?
2. The 2nd question I would ask is:
Q2: Where is the low hanging fruit for potential export success in the armoured vehicle market?
3. The very expensive Japanese MHI Type-10 tank with a crew of three, and an automatic ammunition loading system, is close to (but does not meet), Singapore’s requirements to replace the AMX-13S1. The 44 to 48 ton MHI Type-10 tank is armed with a 120 mm smoothbore gun, made by Japan Steel Works. The MHI Type-10 autoloader is located in the turret bustle and fires newly developed armor-piercing ammunition that is compatible with all standard 120 mm NATO tank ammunition. MHI Type-10 main battle tank is also fitted with a state-of-the-art semi-active hydropneumatic suspension. The tank can "sit", "stand", "kneel" or to "lean" in any direction. This feature gives a number of advantages, especially operating in mountainous terrain, with some tanks also fitted with a front-mounted dozer blade.4. The 3rd question I would ask is:
Q3: What is Singapore’s core competence in tank design going to be?
Is it: the MTU MB-837 Ka501 engine pack (where Germany is the world leader), the gun system and its sights, or the active protection system (where Israel is the world leader)?
5. Given that Singapore imports all our steel (as there is no local steel forge), I hold the view that it is not necessary for the SAF to build our own main battle tanks (MBTs) — the Japanese (MHI Type-10), the Koreans (K2), Indians (Arjun Mk. 2) and Turks (Altay) have their own MBT designs but zero export success. IIRC our tank range on Singapore is so small that we can only fire a sub-caliber for the 120mm main gun and the SAF would have to do all live-fire testing of a new MBT’s main gun and sights overseas.
6. The 4th question I would ask is:
Q4: Where would a made Singapore tank stand in the international arms market?
IIRC 62 of the Leopard 2A7Q was supplied to Qatar for USD2.2 billion between 2013 to 2018. This tank has a number of changes, that are not found of the Danish (44), German (250 to 328) and Hungarian (44) Leopard 2A7 tanks. Most European armies each have around 200 MBTs. Of these 3,500 are Leopard 2, with 1,000 expected to be upgraded to the latest 2A7V standard — with the L55A1 gun and new DM73 ammo, as much more capable than the 2A4. If you look at the international MBT arms market today, it is so small and competitive. Buyers are spoilt for choice.
7. In today’s market, even UK, the original inventors of tank warfare, would struggle to win a single order for their latest version of the Challenger 2. UK first introduced tanks to the battlefield at the Somme on 15 September 1916.
8. The SAF is the process of buying the 120 mm Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System Mk. II (SRAMS Mk. II) for its motorised infantry battalions that is installed in the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle. Compared to the original SRAMS Mk. I (that fires over the rear arc with elevation limits from +45° to +80°, and a traverse of 40° left and right), the Mk. II will have an all-electric 180 degree traverse and elevation hydraulic system— this is a great product with sales potential.
9. The focus is not on a single platform, rather, it is on delivering a capability for Singapore (supported by ISR, a range of sympathetic platforms, like the Bronco, the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle and so on). If you ask me, in the next 5 years, I would rather the SAF spend the money to buy the Bronco 3 (and develop these as a UAV and loitering munition carrier) to support the Hunter IFV equipped armoured battalions or develop a replacement to the now dated SAR-21. It is difficult enough to retain Singapore’s sovereign capability to make all our own 155mm guns, with the Advanced Mobile Gun Systems project that is still ongoing. IMHO, better to have some focus in arms developmental efforts.
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Lone Ranger
Member
@CheeZe , based on the timeline released by Mindef, the next Army project to be unveiled is likely to be either Next Generation Howitzer or Next Generation Infantry Battalion.
For the MBT, beside considering the technical perspective, there are also opportunity/market perspective (@OPSSG covered extensively), procurement perspective (cost effectiveness) and operation/strategic perspective.
IMO, Hunter, given its drive-by-wire design, fully digitized platform with open architecture allowing new capability to be added with ease, is more sophisticated than the original Leo2A4 that the SAF has acquired. Should there be a long term requirement for MBT; Singapore is likely and able to come up with one that is decent, given the level of industry collaboration that Singapore Defence Tech Community can muster. Hence the challenge is more on establishing the needs and requirement of the SAF, ie is there a real need for MBT or is MBT the Armour's future?
Let assume there is a requirement or need, the next consideration will be which is the most cost effective options available to the SAF? Military/Government-of-the-shelf (new/upgrade) or in-house development? Taking the Leo2A4 “fire sale” from Germany as an example, my take is, it provides the SAF with a low cost opportunity to bring up Armour’s capability and maintain its deterrence posture while buying time for the SAF to develop the Armour Next Generation - one that can take advantage of the digital space.
Now let takes a look at the development for AFVs in general. By comparing the new MBT model vs new IFV model in the Western world, we can have a rough picture, ie there is no new MBT introduced since the 90s (other than Russian’s) but for IFV, there are CV90, ASCOD, Puma, Ajax, Lynx, and not to mention the 8x8s. This tells us Armour doctrine is changing and IFVs are likely the main stay, why put resources in area whereby everyone (if not most) are cutting back. Just my 2 cents.
Lastly, Singapore Armour is basically an IFV heavy formation, not tank or MBT heavy. This can also be noted from one of the Hunter’s introduction video, Chief Armour Officer said, "the Hunter AFV, the centerpiece of our Army Next Generation transformation…..", i.e. to say Hunter, not a MBT or Leo2SG, will form the main thrust of the Army.
However, should there be extra resources and a need for big calibre gun to provide low cost demolition capability, instead of MBT, I would like the SAF to look into Fire Support Vehicle that share the same weight class as Hunter. Having 2 difference weight-classes in a manoeuvre formation is not ideal; especially if the support group is heavier than the main body.
My 2 cents.
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Lone Ranger
Member
Follow-on to the above post, I would like to share this infographic, it provides a summary on Hunter's capabilities. What captured my attention is the large unmanned turret (SAMSON RWS ALL-IN-ONE) covering the overhead of both crews and AI compartment, it provides good protection against top attack ammunition for the members in the vehicle.
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@Lone Ranger one thing to keep in mind is that a lot of armies, especially NATO & other western, have been fighting insurgencies in the last 20 years, so tanks have not been at the forefront of their minds. It's only in the last 12 months that the US Army has suddenly realised that it has a couple of peer competitors, quite capable of giving it a bloody nose, and it's still in COIN mode with 1980s and 1990s gear.
Lone Ranger
Member
@ngatimozart , agrees with you. Beside focusing on fighting the insurgencies, "peace dividend" from the 90s also led to some countries cutting back their defence posture and shrinking of their armoured forces, creating the gap.
With regards to armoured threat from peer competitors, although there are projects and initiatives (eg Rheinmetall NG 130 mm tank gun) aim to bridge the gap, I suspect the answer may not lies with having another new MBT. For years, many countries (like UK, US and others) are finding ways to revolutionize how battle is fought, and now with battlefield-digitization as witness from the rolling out of Ajax, Hunter and Carmel projects together with system like Fire Weaver, this has open up solutions beyond a single approach - ie armour vs armour. As @OPSSG suggested, Bronco 3 with UAV and loitering munition to support armoured forces can also be a possibility. My humble take.
With regards to armoured threat from peer competitors, although there are projects and initiatives (eg Rheinmetall NG 130 mm tank gun) aim to bridge the gap, I suspect the answer may not lies with having another new MBT. For years, many countries (like UK, US and others) are finding ways to revolutionize how battle is fought, and now with battlefield-digitization as witness from the rolling out of Ajax, Hunter and Carmel projects together with system like Fire Weaver, this has open up solutions beyond a single approach - ie armour vs armour. As @OPSSG suggested, Bronco 3 with UAV and loitering munition to support armoured forces can also be a possibility. My humble take.
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Part 1
There's obviously an answer to why Singapore is bothering to develop and produce platforms domestically. But for some reason, you aren't saying it explicitly and expecting me to either know it already or read your mind. I came looking for an explanation or clarification. If it can't be or done or makes no sense to be done, say so and explain.
Again, if there are so many wonderful choices out there as you claim, and there is no domestic steel production, why has Singapore bothered making the Formidable-class or the Hunter? If the idea is to develop arms and platforms that are tailored for the SAF's evolving needs, wouldn't an eventual replacement to the Leopard 2 be required? Or is your implication that the MBT market is so small that Singapore would never need to bother with a designing replacement because you assume someone else will create a "good enough" platform in the future? That is the problem with answering my questions with more questions. I don't know what point you're trying to drive.
A: I don't know. Why would Singapore spend billions to create things like the Bionix, Primus, Terrex, Hunter, etc. when there are many world class manufacturers to choose from? I ask from a place of ignorance. Your response comes across as rhetorical as if I would know the answer. Why build its own warships when they could keep buying from Germany or France? Why manufacture the SAR-21 and BR-18 if you can just buy "insert modern 5.56 rifle/carbine here"? If, as you are trying to hint with questions as answers, that it is illogical to develop an MBT because there are already plenty of good options, then so too are all the other local developments listed above. Why bother with weapons R&D at all when you can leave it to the bigger countries with established and experienced arms industries?
There's obviously an answer to why Singapore is bothering to develop and produce platforms domestically. But for some reason, you aren't saying it explicitly and expecting me to either know it already or read your mind. I came looking for an explanation or clarification. If it can't be or done or makes no sense to be done, say so and explain.
Is the point of weapons development by MinDef for export purposes? Or is it to develop platforms which are tailored to the SAF's needs? I had presumed the latter but your comment, again trying to hint at something which isn't clear to me, indicates that Singapore does want to export its hardware now.
Wasn't that also true in the 90s when they developed the Bionix? Zero experience but they still did it. If the underlying assumption is, "We can't do it because there are good enough platforms out there already," then why did Singapore even bother embarking on developing its own armaments industry?
You seem to be very condescending in your reply. I do not know if that is your intention but that is how I perceive it. As far as the international market is concerned, I repeat again that I was unaware that Singapore cared about its presence in the international market. The Japanese Type 10, which you referenced earlier, can stand as an example - the Japanese know they're not going to be exporting it because of (to my knowledge) existing laws prohibiting arms sales. So, it is more likely going to be a Japanese tank for the JGSDF. Could not the same logic apply to the SAF's developments? Isn't that how the Israelis treat the Merkava? The perfect tank for Israel's needs.
Again, if there are so many wonderful choices out there as you claim, and there is no domestic steel production, why has Singapore bothered making the Formidable-class or the Hunter? If the idea is to develop arms and platforms that are tailored for the SAF's evolving needs, wouldn't an eventual replacement to the Leopard 2 be required? Or is your implication that the MBT market is so small that Singapore would never need to bother with a designing replacement because you assume someone else will create a "good enough" platform in the future? That is the problem with answering my questions with more questions. I don't know what point you're trying to drive.
Part 2
So, if a future MBT is not required while a big-gun fire support vehicle is, would the SAF buy something off the self or simply develop off the Hunter or whatever the current IFV platform of the day is? OPSSG's roundabout answer isn't very clear since he seems to be trying to hint that Singapore doesn't have the steel to build tanks or the land to test them. At the same time, Singapore is very obviously domestically developing IFVs (which must be tested SOMEWHERE) and maintains a MBT fleet at present. We must getting the steel from someone if we're producing our IFVs locally, so it can't be too much of a constraint in the R&D side.
Again, I reiterate, if there is a point to OPSSG's post, it is not clear to me and he needs to clarify it with statements and explanations. Asking me questions which I cannot answer doesn't answer my original questions. So, I really don't know what his point is.
EDIT: On a totally different note - are we not allowed to send other members or staff members personal messages anymore? I can't seem to figure that out after being away for some time.
@Lone Ranger - Thank you. Your reply was far more informative. I am certainly not proposing that the SAF create a replacement for the Leo 2SG anytime soon. I was asking on the theoretical side whether such an undertaking was feasible, given that Singapore has built larger or similar platforms already. It seems the answer is "Yes it could, but modern armour trends make it unlikely."
So, if a future MBT is not required while a big-gun fire support vehicle is, would the SAF buy something off the self or simply develop off the Hunter or whatever the current IFV platform of the day is? OPSSG's roundabout answer isn't very clear since he seems to be trying to hint that Singapore doesn't have the steel to build tanks or the land to test them. At the same time, Singapore is very obviously domestically developing IFVs (which must be tested SOMEWHERE) and maintains a MBT fleet at present. We must getting the steel from someone if we're producing our IFVs locally, so it can't be too much of a constraint in the R&D side.
Again, I reiterate, if there is a point to OPSSG's post, it is not clear to me and he needs to clarify it with statements and explanations. Asking me questions which I cannot answer doesn't answer my original questions. So, I really don't know what his point is.
EDIT: On a totally different note - are we not allowed to send other members or staff members personal messages anymore? I can't seem to figure that out after being away for some time.
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@CheeZe, no intention to be condescending — it’s just a discussion. I am certain that you don’t start from a place of ignorance. Once you think carefully on the constraints — the manufacturer will prefer to choose the most profitable or least expensive route to success. You can’t wish away reality — that Singapore makes weapons on the hope that the domestic demand/requirements can trigger international sales (with a bit of customisation).
1. To maintain sovereign capability, we should make what we need most and buy what we choose not to make — every dollar we spend in development is a dollar less from production (unless we win in export sales — like the Bronco 2 that served in IED rich Afghanistan, with zero fatalities). Where should the priority be? For every 50 MBTs Singapore acquires, the SAF needs to be supplied with another:
2. If it is an exotic demand (for a secret edge), such as making our own 155mm guns, the SAF has to pay a huge premium for it to be made in Singapore (but tested abroad). Making artillery pieces locally is a LHL vanity project on lean manning — the FH88 is problematic. I spoke to the arty guys — it was unreliable and the design was poor. But the Singapore arty design team learnt from these failures and kept trying to improve the design which resulted in the FH-2000. The FH-88 is an example of product failure. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, the size of Singapore’s defence industry should be determined by:
3. In my prior post, I am conducting a SWOT analysis of the MBT market and simply saying that Singapore tends to build for local needs, with export potential in mind. For both the Bionix and Terrex, they were designed with export potential in mind. And both platforms did compete for the US market — in both cases they lost in the respective competitions. I have a good engineer friend who did systems design work for the Bionix (but has since moved away from the defence sector for greener pastures).
4. The trick to export success is to keep improving the product. Don’t try to do everything and focus on improving existing products until it is compelling for foreign buyers.
5. You asked can Singapore make it? The answer must be yes. If I gave a one word reply, would you be happier?
6. Instead of simply replying yes or no, I asked you why. Why does Singapore have to make it?
7. To have a conversation, we must clarify the context and talk about actual considerations. Likewise do me the courtesy and try to answer that question.
8. If our enemy kills a Leopard 2SG, how many Singapore sons die? The answer is 4. If our enemy kills a M113 or Bionix, how many Singapore sons would die? The answer is at least 10. The SAF’s goal is to reduce casualties — it cannot be surprising that Singapore decided to place priority on building our own IFVs and ICVs, first. I would not be surprised if a Hunter 2 is in our plans. Serial development is key to out foxing the enemy, who is constantly trying to develop counter measures to any new weapon system made by Singapore.
1. To maintain sovereign capability, we should make what we need most and buy what we choose not to make — every dollar we spend in development is a dollar less from production (unless we win in export sales — like the Bronco 2 that served in IED rich Afghanistan, with zero fatalities). Where should the priority be? For every 50 MBTs Singapore acquires, the SAF needs to be supplied with another:
(i) 135 to 180 IFVs (be it Hunter or Bionix) and another 90 to 150 support vehicles (like the Bronco) for armoured infantry guys; and
(ii) 135 to 405 ICVs (Terrex) and another 250 to 500 protected vehicles (like the Belerax). The unique SAF requirement for the Terrex (that we can’t buy as military off-the-shelf), is that it must be heavily protected and yet able to swim — and this capability was demonstrated for the US Marines (up to sea state 3). This swim capability is enabled by Kinetics Drive Solutions’ infinitely variable transmission technology (IVT). IVT is also used in the Trailblazer, Counter-Mine Vehicle, that enables the vehicle to switch power to the mine flail system. A subsidiary of Singapore Technologies owns a patent to IVT and it is paid when others use IVT in their platform.
2. If it is an exotic demand (for a secret edge), such as making our own 155mm guns, the SAF has to pay a huge premium for it to be made in Singapore (but tested abroad). Making artillery pieces locally is a LHL vanity project on lean manning — the FH88 is problematic. I spoke to the arty guys — it was unreliable and the design was poor. But the Singapore arty design team learnt from these failures and kept trying to improve the design which resulted in the FH-2000. The FH-88 is an example of product failure. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, the size of Singapore’s defence industry should be determined by:
(i) the size of domestic defence market for products made by these companies in their relevant market segment (which is affected by a country's defence spending levels); and
(ii) the export potential for the product made (which is determined by how much tech is inside the product).
3. In my prior post, I am conducting a SWOT analysis of the MBT market and simply saying that Singapore tends to build for local needs, with export potential in mind. For both the Bionix and Terrex, they were designed with export potential in mind. And both platforms did compete for the US market — in both cases they lost in the respective competitions. I have a good engineer friend who did systems design work for the Bionix (but has since moved away from the defence sector for greener pastures).
4. The trick to export success is to keep improving the product. Don’t try to do everything and focus on improving existing products until it is compelling for foreign buyers.
5. You asked can Singapore make it? The answer must be yes. If I gave a one word reply, would you be happier?
6. Instead of simply replying yes or no, I asked you why. Why does Singapore have to make it?
7. To have a conversation, we must clarify the context and talk about actual considerations. Likewise do me the courtesy and try to answer that question.
8. If our enemy kills a Leopard 2SG, how many Singapore sons die? The answer is 4. If our enemy kills a M113 or Bionix, how many Singapore sons would die? The answer is at least 10. The SAF’s goal is to reduce casualties — it cannot be surprising that Singapore decided to place priority on building our own IFVs and ICVs, first. I would not be surprised if a Hunter 2 is in our plans. Serial development is key to out foxing the enemy, who is constantly trying to develop counter measures to any new weapon system made by Singapore.
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@CheeZe part of the reasoning for Singapore building its own military vehicles and naval ships is sovereign capability, which @OPSSG has already touched on. Part of it is costs, because sometimes it can be cheaper to build your own if your labour costs, overheads etc., are lower than say a European and North American manufacturer. Part of it is also you can build bespoke items that a foreign manufacturer may not be suitable to manufacture because of security reasons, or they don't want to do a bespoke short run etc. Part of it is pure politics playing to domestic political narratives.
If you look at Singapores IFVs there is a political and foreign policy dimension at play. Say it decided to acquire 300 German IFVs plus ancillary equipment all sourced from Germany. Normally no problems because Singapore and Germany have a good relationship. However one day the PRC does something to really annoy Singapore so Singapore decides to invade the PRC in order to give it a good thrashing and teach it a lesson in manners. Germany chokes on its beer, is very put out by Singapores actions, and slaps an arms embargo on Singapore, meaning no ongoing support of any kind for its 300 German built and maintained IFVs. Hence these expensive examples of high quality German engineering are parked up, about as useful as electric coat hangers and Singaporean Army is short 300 IFVs. Most of the scenario is fantasy apart from the fact that Germany does slap arms embargoes on nations that it believes are in the wrong, such as committing aggressive war, abusing human rights etc. Saudi Arabia is its favourite target at the moment. So by building it's own IFVs etc., it negates most of those problems. That's just one example.
If you look at Singapores IFVs there is a political and foreign policy dimension at play. Say it decided to acquire 300 German IFVs plus ancillary equipment all sourced from Germany. Normally no problems because Singapore and Germany have a good relationship. However one day the PRC does something to really annoy Singapore so Singapore decides to invade the PRC in order to give it a good thrashing and teach it a lesson in manners. Germany chokes on its beer, is very put out by Singapores actions, and slaps an arms embargo on Singapore, meaning no ongoing support of any kind for its 300 German built and maintained IFVs. Hence these expensive examples of high quality German engineering are parked up, about as useful as electric coat hangers and Singaporean Army is short 300 IFVs. Most of the scenario is fantasy apart from the fact that Germany does slap arms embargoes on nations that it believes are in the wrong, such as committing aggressive war, abusing human rights etc. Saudi Arabia is its favourite target at the moment. So by building it's own IFVs etc., it negates most of those problems. That's just one example.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Another, significant factor to consider (which has also been mentioned previously on the forum) is the significant R&D costs and infrastructure required to efficiently design and build modern, front line MBT's. Even more so if a nation does not have an already established R&D complex for designing an MBT AND developing the major components like the armour composition.
The costs associated with modern MBT development and production, at least for MBT's comparable to the M1 Abrams, Leo 2, Challenger 2, Ariete and Leclerc, etc. are significant to the point that of these listed designs, AFAIK only the M1 Abrams and Leo 2 were produced in sufficient numbers to have reached the break even point. If the serial production runs for the UK, France, and Italy were too small to permit much in the way of economies of scale, then Singapore with both a smaller defence budget and requirement for MBT's would be hard pressed to justify spending the kind of coin required to design and then build a domestic modern MBT. France, Italy and the UK did engage in what were sort of prestige projects to maintain their existent domestic MBT design and production capabilities.
Singapore could engage in the development of the systems required for a modern MBT and then design and produce one, however the total cost of such a programme would likely be significantly higher per MBT than what Singapore paid for the Leo 2's. There would also be the matter of either losing the R&D and production capabilities once production was completed, or finding/placing more orders than needed for the orbat to keep things running. To get some additional perspective, the Leclerc production line (~800 tanks built) was closed in 2008 with the lines for the Challenger 2 and Ariete were both closed in 2002 or nearly two decades ago. WIth all that in mind, I just do not see Singapore making effective use of limited defence funding by a domestic MBT build.
The costs associated with modern MBT development and production, at least for MBT's comparable to the M1 Abrams, Leo 2, Challenger 2, Ariete and Leclerc, etc. are significant to the point that of these listed designs, AFAIK only the M1 Abrams and Leo 2 were produced in sufficient numbers to have reached the break even point. If the serial production runs for the UK, France, and Italy were too small to permit much in the way of economies of scale, then Singapore with both a smaller defence budget and requirement for MBT's would be hard pressed to justify spending the kind of coin required to design and then build a domestic modern MBT. France, Italy and the UK did engage in what were sort of prestige projects to maintain their existent domestic MBT design and production capabilities.
Singapore could engage in the development of the systems required for a modern MBT and then design and produce one, however the total cost of such a programme would likely be significantly higher per MBT than what Singapore paid for the Leo 2's. There would also be the matter of either losing the R&D and production capabilities once production was completed, or finding/placing more orders than needed for the orbat to keep things running. To get some additional perspective, the Leclerc production line (~800 tanks built) was closed in 2008 with the lines for the Challenger 2 and Ariete were both closed in 2002 or nearly two decades ago. WIth all that in mind, I just do not see Singapore making effective use of limited defence funding by a domestic MBT build.
Lone Ranger
Member
@CheeZe, many of us are on the same page, just different ways of expression.
Todjaeger brought up a good point, many countries pursuit domestic MBT design, to some extent, for prestige . As it is regarded to be the pinnacle of land system. However that is not the way Mindef conduct its doing. It doesn’t aim to collect “trophy”, but to build capabilities for tomorrow, ie DSTA does not aim to build everything (in Singapore) but to be a smart buyer and smart system integrator - Leo2SG is a great example.
Modern warfare with all the high tech stuff, during peace time, is a resource burning affair. To ensure Singapore can stay head of peers, Mindef need to know its limits and work smart.
For the Fire Support Vehicle, actually ST Eng and SAIC (US) participated in US Army’s MPF (Mobile Protected Firepower) programme using Hunter’s hull as the baseline, but couldn’t make it to the selection. Given it is built on Hunter's platform and with a ready blue print, I hope to see a version of it in the SAF Armour’s orbat. It will be a capability much desired. IMO.
Todjaeger brought up a good point, many countries pursuit domestic MBT design, to some extent, for prestige . As it is regarded to be the pinnacle of land system. However that is not the way Mindef conduct its doing. It doesn’t aim to collect “trophy”, but to build capabilities for tomorrow, ie DSTA does not aim to build everything (in Singapore) but to be a smart buyer and smart system integrator - Leo2SG is a great example.
Modern warfare with all the high tech stuff, during peace time, is a resource burning affair. To ensure Singapore can stay head of peers, Mindef need to know its limits and work smart.
For the Fire Support Vehicle, actually ST Eng and SAIC (US) participated in US Army’s MPF (Mobile Protected Firepower) programme using Hunter’s hull as the baseline, but couldn’t make it to the selection. Given it is built on Hunter's platform and with a ready blue print, I hope to see a version of it in the SAF Armour’s orbat. It will be a capability much desired. IMO.
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@Lone Ranger, that you for educating me on the choices and MINDEF’s thinking process but I do suspect that the American Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle (including APS) program will fail.
I will explain why I suspect it will not survive US DOD infamous “night court” budgeting process another day. As US Secretary of Defense Esper said, “I’m looking for programs that don’t have as much value relative to another critical war-fighting capability, absolutely.”
Looking at the evolution of urban warfare since 2006, I am inclined to believe that the way forward is developing a systems approach to even more precise killing supported by the greater use of armoured combat engineers to section off parts of city before the arrival of loitering munitions —The SAF has had a close up view of the 2017 Battle of Marawi and immediately stocked up or purchased certain types of ammo, including 2,000 XM395 Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) rounds. The American made APMI rounds have a CEP of 5 metres as a stop gap measure. By 2019, ST Engineering Land Systems introduced a new munition called the PM120 precision-guided mortar bomb (PGMB), with option warheads including the Extended Range High Explosive (ERHE), ER Infrared Red Phosphorous (IRRP), and ER Illuminating. The new PM120 munition has a CEP of 10 metres.
Hamas's strong performance during the 50 day, Operation Protective Edge in 2014, appears to be its emulation of the tactics of Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah. The IDF suffered 67 fatalities and another 463 soldiers were wounded during the operation. As a result, Fire Weaver was developed and demonstrated in 2018 at a battalion level exercise and is scheduled to become operational in 2022 — it provides the tactical forces with a GPS-independent geo-pixel-based tactical common language among all the sensors and shooters — it calculates the optimal shooter for each target, while minimizing collateral damage.
For background on the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle program, I note that General Dynamics Land Systems (GD) and BAE Systems have to begin delivering 12 prototypes at end of 1Q2020. BAE Systems will use a M8 Buford Armored Gun System (using a 105 mm M35 gun) with new capabilities and components. GD submitted an offering that puts a version of its latest Abrams turret together with a chassis that uses past work on the United Kingdom’s AJAX program.
I will explain why I suspect it will not survive US DOD infamous “night court” budgeting process another day. As US Secretary of Defense Esper said, “I’m looking for programs that don’t have as much value relative to another critical war-fighting capability, absolutely.”
Looking at the evolution of urban warfare since 2006, I am inclined to believe that the way forward is developing a systems approach to even more precise killing supported by the greater use of armoured combat engineers to section off parts of city before the arrival of loitering munitions —The SAF has had a close up view of the 2017 Battle of Marawi and immediately stocked up or purchased certain types of ammo, including 2,000 XM395 Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) rounds. The American made APMI rounds have a CEP of 5 metres as a stop gap measure. By 2019, ST Engineering Land Systems introduced a new munition called the PM120 precision-guided mortar bomb (PGMB), with option warheads including the Extended Range High Explosive (ERHE), ER Infrared Red Phosphorous (IRRP), and ER Illuminating. The new PM120 munition has a CEP of 10 metres.
Hamas's strong performance during the 50 day, Operation Protective Edge in 2014, appears to be its emulation of the tactics of Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah. The IDF suffered 67 fatalities and another 463 soldiers were wounded during the operation. As a result, Fire Weaver was developed and demonstrated in 2018 at a battalion level exercise and is scheduled to become operational in 2022 — it provides the tactical forces with a GPS-independent geo-pixel-based tactical common language among all the sensors and shooters — it calculates the optimal shooter for each target, while minimizing collateral damage.
For background on the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle program, I note that General Dynamics Land Systems (GD) and BAE Systems have to begin delivering 12 prototypes at end of 1Q2020. BAE Systems will use a M8 Buford Armored Gun System (using a 105 mm M35 gun) with new capabilities and components. GD submitted an offering that puts a version of its latest Abrams turret together with a chassis that uses past work on the United Kingdom’s AJAX program.
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SouthernSky
Member
A fair amount of time spent in the rum store required if I'm to get my head around this scenario.
Lone Ranger
Member
@OPSSG, if major programs like Future Combat System, Ground Combat Vehicle and Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle can be canned, so can MPF (Mobile Protected Firepower) and I won't be surprised. I just find that they are still kinda lost on how they want to fight their next war, at least on paper. Their vision and tech space just don't seem to meet.
Urban warfare will be heavily weighted in the next phase of the SAF development and I shared your view. It will likely be a system approach whereby the focus will be placed on integrated-network-precision strike. System like FIRE WEAVER (not sure if there will be a SAF version) and autonomous vehicles (both land and air) will likely be some of the enablers. Precision strike ammunition (SPIKE LR2, XM395 & ST PM120) with limited collateral damage will be weapons of choice as they will allow more freedom of action.
Now I am curious, how will the Next Gen Infantry Battalion look like and how it will effects other formation like Armour.
Urban warfare will be heavily weighted in the next phase of the SAF development and I shared your view. It will likely be a system approach whereby the focus will be placed on integrated-network-precision strike. System like FIRE WEAVER (not sure if there will be a SAF version) and autonomous vehicles (both land and air) will likely be some of the enablers. Precision strike ammunition (SPIKE LR2, XM395 & ST PM120) with limited collateral damage will be weapons of choice as they will allow more freedom of action.
Now I am curious, how will the Next Gen Infantry Battalion look like and how it will effects other formation like Armour.
@SouthernSky and @ngatimozart, no need to drink or think hard on the near impossible scenario. Lol.
1. Singapore is not going to fight China. By geography, there is only 1 country where the SAF can conduct its forward defence — only if they miscalculate and cross any of the 3 red lines that make war inevitable.
2. There are too many of the SAF’s German made trucks (in the thousands) in service, including:
(i) the Rheinmetall MAN HX45M wheeled recovery vehicles; and
(ii) the 500 strong fleet of MAN Light Transporters under Project Ethan (derivatives of the civilian MAN TGM 18.280 twin-axle, 4x4 cargo truck), are of German origin. A key difference from the SAF’s older MAN 5-tonners is the noticeably longer wheelbase. This allows the MAN Light Transporters - known as Ethans by army personnel - to carry a 20 foot container with ISO twist-locks on its cargo bed.
An arms embargo by the Germans would in the medium term cripple our army’s logistics arm, until an alternative is stood up. More important than the 180 Leopard 2 tanks acquired thus far (that were locally upgraded), is the life-time support required for the 4 new Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines that Singapore is in the process of acquiring. Any hint of a German arms embargo will see the Singapore Navy crawling back to Sweden.
3. For a vehicle fleet, there are 3 considerations to manage. One, short term embargo risk. Two, medium to long term sustainment risk. Lastly, obsolescence risk. Some of the short term embargo risk is managed by stocking enough spares.
4. Diversification of suppliers is another form of risk management, for the medium to long term.
(i) As part of this diversification efforts, in Sept 2018, South Africa's Paramount Group and Singapore's ST Engineering Land Systems arm announced a commitment to joint marketing of the 20 ton weight class Belrex (4x4) family of wheeled Mine Resistant Ambushed Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
(ii) Each vehicle of this MRAP family is powered by a Cummins ISBe4-300 Diesel engine and the family comprises 10 variants (namely, security, engineer, reconnaissance, logistics, fuel, medical, mortar, signal, maintenance and mortar ammunition carrier) and is based on the Paramount Marauder (4x4) MRAP.
(iii) The 10 Belrex variants leverage ST Engineering experience in the design, development and production of armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) mobility platforms as the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle (PCSV), which was officially commissioned into the Singapore Army in November 2016. Paramount delivered twelve vehicles to Singapore between 2013 and 2014 for trials and system integration by ST Kinetics.
5. Beyond embargo risk management, vehicle fleet life-cycle management is also about keeping obsolescence risk at bay. This means Singapore needs to have unrestricted rights to resell old vehicles into the international market.
6. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) is prepared to move forward with product development and weapon system projects should Western embargoes limit those efforts, the CEO told Defense News. “We have signed more than 25 agreements with foreign partners, so we have multiple opportunities to acquire alternative technologies from other partners where there are no limitations. There is no risk that any limitation of a single country or government can block Saudi Arabia from getting a full localized portfolio of products,” Andreas Schwer said during the Dubai Airshow in Nov 2019. To that end, in Jun 2019 SAMI signed a MoU with ST Engineering that will entail introducing the 8x8 Terrex 2 platform to the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), developing a next-generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) for RSLF, and exploring partnership in MRO capability for commercial and military customers. In addition, it will include building ships and naval crafts, examining scope for participation in C-130 upgrade and development of a new transport aircraft, and helping modernize the Saudi electronics manufacturing industry.
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Thank you to everyone who posted in reply to my questions. My apologies for any brusqueness or offense caused, @OPSSG. I find it difficult sometimes to tell tone on internet forums.
I hadn't heard about the Next Gen Infantry Battalion and second @Lone Ranger 's question. And may I ask what are the three red lines which must not be crossed? I think I can guess two of them (water and independence) but I can't think of a 3rd off the top of my head.
I hadn't heard about the Next Gen Infantry Battalion and second @Lone Ranger 's question. And may I ask what are the three red lines which must not be crossed? I think I can guess two of them (water and independence) but I can't think of a 3rd off the top of my head.
You are correct that cutting off water supply from Johor is 1 of the 3. More importantly, directly cutting off water supply from Johor gives Singapore Casus belli — a right to war. The Malaysians do try to test the redline below the threshold for war and regarding the supply of water, they have done a variation of this, by allowing pollution levels to rise to the extent that PUB stopped the import of raw water. See: PUB's Johor River Waterworks temporarily shut down in 7 pollution incidents since 2017: Masagos
Before I stop going further off-topic, let me share 4 additional points for context, to assist your understanding.
One, if you don’t mind, I don’t want to express all 3 redlines in an open source matter — just in case a radical/terror group in Malaysia wants to be deliberate in crossing it to force war — by Aug 1991, the Malaysian Government under Dr M understood roughly where these 3 redlines were and did not dare to cross any of them (based on their own understanding).
Two, independence is the 2nd core foreign policy principle, rather than a redline (but you are close) — DIPLOMACY OF LITTLE RED DOT: PAST AND PRESENT
Three, as you are well aware, on 23 May 2008, the ICJ ruled that Singapore had sovereignty over Pedra Branca, while Middle Rocks was awarded to Malaysia and South Ledge belonged to the state in whose territorial waters it is located. There are developments after the ICJ ruling that you may not have noticed.
(i) I note that Malaysia filed two applications after the ruling - one on 2 Feb 2017, and a second on 30 Jun 2017 (that they have discontinued), sought an interpretation of the same ICJ judgment. It requested that the ICJ declare the waters surrounding Pedra Branca to be Malaysia’s and in turn, the sovereignty of South Ledge belongs to Malaysia – a move that Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described as “puzzling”, “unnecessary and without merit”.
(ii) It is the second application that concerns me — where Malaysia is engaging in lawfare. And lawfare is the misuse of the legal system and its principles in an attempt to damage or delegitimise them, by tying up their time or trying to win a public relations victory.
Four, to prevent further Malaysian attempts at lawfare over Singapore’s port waters off-Tuas, the Singapore Government filed a declaration under Article 298(1)(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 12 Dec 2018. This declaration means that other States Parties to UNCLOS cannot unilaterally commence third party arbitration or adjudication against Singapore in respect of maritime boundary disputes. Singapore likewise cannot unilaterally commence third-party arbitration or adjudication against other UNCLOS States Parties for such disputes.
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Lone Ranger
Member
We know that the the real bad ass of the SAF will not be shown in parade or exhibitions but some tell-tale signs can possibility provide hints for an educated (or bad) guess.
Based on a EDR report on Hunter AFV during Singapore Airshow 2020, it was mentioned that Hunter's turret was selected by the Singapore Army and the choice went for a customised version of the Samson Mk II remotely controlled turret, designed and produced by Rafael of Israel. Based on Rafael's site, Samson 30 RWS All-in-One (similar to what appears on Hunter AFV) comes with TROPHY APS and ST Engineering had also confirmed (to EDR) that Hunter’s vetronic architecture allows third parties' active protection systems to be integrated. It could likely means that should there be a need and with the maturity of the technology, we could likely see Hunter AFV operating with one of these systems available ( TROPHY APS? ).
Beside the above, from some records, we know that ST Engineering has close working relationship with IBD for protection system, eg armour for Bionix, Terrex, Bronco and etc. Based on this article, IBD has been working for years on their ADS to meet the high safety standard of an unidentified Southeast Asia customer.
From the above picture, one can't help but to note the unusual (or unique) protrusion from HUNTER's side armour, similar to the drawing showing IBD's SMART PROTect solution. Could we be seeing the possibility of HUNTER having both TROPHY APS (covering the top attacking munition) and SMART PROTect solution (for the hull or side protection)? Maybe time will tell but let not hope for it...
Based on a EDR report on Hunter AFV during Singapore Airshow 2020, it was mentioned that Hunter's turret was selected by the Singapore Army and the choice went for a customised version of the Samson Mk II remotely controlled turret, designed and produced by Rafael of Israel. Based on Rafael's site, Samson 30 RWS All-in-One (similar to what appears on Hunter AFV) comes with TROPHY APS and ST Engineering had also confirmed (to EDR) that Hunter’s vetronic architecture allows third parties' active protection systems to be integrated. It could likely means that should there be a need and with the maturity of the technology, we could likely see Hunter AFV operating with one of these systems available ( TROPHY APS? ).
Beside the above, from some records, we know that ST Engineering has close working relationship with IBD for protection system, eg armour for Bionix, Terrex, Bronco and etc. Based on this article, IBD has been working for years on their ADS to meet the high safety standard of an unidentified Southeast Asia customer.
What's more interesting was the introduction of SMART PROTech in 2018. It builds on the countermeasure from ADS. From the article relating to ADS, we know this ASEAN customer is very concerned about collateral damage and ERA don't work for them. Both ADS and SMART PROTech uses “distributed” active protection system. They have small charges distributed all around the vehicle. One of these charges then blasts the incoming missile at point-blank range just a fraction of a second before it impacts. That creates an explosion right next to the armored vehicle they’re protecting. Since the blast is not the highly focused (like armor-piercing blast of an anti-tank warhead), it’s generally safe for the vehicle. It’s also generally safe for the infantry nearby as the safety feature of the distributed charges are usually positioned to shoot either straight down or upward, so any shrapnel either absorbed by the ground or away from the ground.
From the above picture, one can't help but to note the unusual (or unique) protrusion from HUNTER's side armour, similar to the drawing showing IBD's SMART PROTect solution. Could we be seeing the possibility of HUNTER having both TROPHY APS (covering the top attacking munition) and SMART PROTect solution (for the hull or side protection)? Maybe time will tell but let not hope for it...
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@Lone Ranger, @CheeZe, @Gambit79, @ELSS_26 and @traveller29071985, I believe that Israeli APS tech is not standing still. The APS tech needs a little more time to mature (within the next 5 to 8 years).
In 2018, the U.S. Army contracted with Leonardo DRS to provide the Trophy system for M1 MBT, with the total funded value increased to US$200 million in 2019 (with eventual plans to outfit four brigades of MBTs). Leonardo DRS, Rafael, and the vehicle manufacturer were charged with making the APS work on vehicles already maxed out in terms of interior space and power. This limited fielding Israeli APS tech has motivated US defence companies to one-up Rafael in this area. So I believe that there is no harm in waiting for Trophy 2.0 before we buy the tech for wide spread implementation (beyond a trial AI battalion for concurrent APS tactics development).
It is more important that our Hunter IFV fleet has the power reserves and wiring in place for rapid upgrade (within 6 to 9 months) if the regional security environment deteriorates. This way, the SAF can spend less on the vehicle fleet, as part of fleet obsolescence management. Look at the long 7 year gap between the Terrex (2009) and Belrex (2016) roll out — which is best explained by the SAF’s fleet obsolescence management planning cycles.
I would wait for the SMART PROTech to mature before investing in it as a potential Terrex 4, Bronco 3 and Leopard 2SG upgrade option. Some diversity in protection systems in the SAF’s vehicle fleet complicates planning for our enemy.
I am a huge fan of IBD’s mature passive armour tech but I am less impressed by new and evolving SMART PROTech (as a ‘smart’ ERA).
In 2018, the U.S. Army contracted with Leonardo DRS to provide the Trophy system for M1 MBT, with the total funded value increased to US$200 million in 2019 (with eventual plans to outfit four brigades of MBTs). Leonardo DRS, Rafael, and the vehicle manufacturer were charged with making the APS work on vehicles already maxed out in terms of interior space and power. This limited fielding Israeli APS tech has motivated US defence companies to one-up Rafael in this area. So I believe that there is no harm in waiting for Trophy 2.0 before we buy the tech for wide spread implementation (beyond a trial AI battalion for concurrent APS tactics development).
It is more important that our Hunter IFV fleet has the power reserves and wiring in place for rapid upgrade (within 6 to 9 months) if the regional security environment deteriorates. This way, the SAF can spend less on the vehicle fleet, as part of fleet obsolescence management. Look at the long 7 year gap between the Terrex (2009) and Belrex (2016) roll out — which is best explained by the SAF’s fleet obsolescence management planning cycles.
I would wait for the SMART PROTech to mature before investing in it as a potential Terrex 4, Bronco 3 and Leopard 2SG upgrade option. Some diversity in protection systems in the SAF’s vehicle fleet complicates planning for our enemy.
I am a huge fan of IBD’s mature passive armour tech but I am less impressed by new and evolving SMART PROTech (as a ‘smart’ ERA).
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