Littoral Combat Ships are they useful?

Back to the LCS. The surface warfare mission module will include NSLOS. Here are a couple of videos of the Pam NLOS...for the army. Imagine what a naval unit will do...

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9rZPisSU6I"]YouTube- Future Weapons: Non Line of Sight - Launch System (NLOS-LS)[/nomedia]

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ou0lA77hlqk"]YouTube- Crysis NLOS-LS Variations[/nomedia]


One of the reasons why LCS has gone over budget is its equipped with new technology and weapons designed with littoral warfare in mind....
 
Here is another video of the LCS ASW mission module package. Again useful in the littorals as well at sea... More new technology with the LCS...

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8am7miqeANI"]YouTube- LCS ASW Mission Pkg Video[/nomedia]

And not to forget the minehunting mission module. The US Navy is so confident of this system they have already decommissioned and sold many of the Osprey class coastal minehunters....

[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9IVrfyC5KA"]YouTube- Remote Minehunting System (RMS)[/nomedia]
 
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NLOS - the current situation

Army's latest NLOS results as of February 2010 - supposedly the first operational test flight for the weapon:

50 % miss rate on IR seeker heads for tests two years in a row. Six out of seven launches aborted because of nav system issues. Two misses as large as 8.5 miles off target.

Lots of work to do - it will be unclear for a while what the real cost will be to remediate.

Details Emerge On Army’s Failed NLOS-LS Missile | Defense Tech

I don't think cautiously optimistic is applicable at this time; although the missile at least can fly...:cool:
 
Osprey Decomm

Was the Osprey class really decommissioned because LCS proved itself before it's even had the MCM module? The Avenger class is still active. A couple of Ospreys were retired out right and the rest were sold to allies to enable or enhance their mine-hunting capabilities - seems to be more a casualty of "right-sizing" rather than confidence in a mission package that hasn't even seen IOC.
 
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Juramentado said:
Army's latest NLOS results as of February 2010 - supposedly the first operational test flight for the weapon:

50 % miss rate on IR seeker heads for tests two years in a row. Six out of seven launches aborted because of nav system issues. Two misses as large as 8.5 miles off target.

Lots of work to do - it will be unclear for a while what the real cost will be to remediate.

Details Emerge On Army’s Failed NLOS-LS Missile | Defense Tech

I don't think cautiously optimistic is applicable at this time; although the missile at least can fly...:cool:
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You hit the nail on the head, the first operational test. I am sure during development there will be gremlins to weed out. I posted a video. Nothing more....

As I recall recently the British have not worked out all of the gremlins with their Sampson radars either... A work in progress....
 
Sea Toby said:
You hit the nail on the head, the first operational test. I am sure during development there will be gremlins to weed out. I posted a video. Nothing more....

As I recall recently the British have not worked out all of the gremlins with their Sampson radars either... A work in progress....
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That wasn't my point. :) My point is that the systems integration of the various mission packages is pushing UP the net cost per-unit of LCS, and it wasn't anticipated. Again, by the time you get to IOC with a complete mission package of any kind, the outlay will likely approach what the Navy could have paid for a Navantia, Gibbs & Cox or other design that's being delivered today. I'm not suggesting switching to foreign makes, but even the staunchest LCS supporters cannot possibly say with a straight face that one of the primary successes of this program is that per-hull costs are cheaper than doing a straight replacement of the OHP with a updated conventional frigate design.
 
Everything you say is true. The US does have development programs with every new generation of weapon systems. Its the price we pay attempting to stay on the leading edge.

I am sure the whole world could build Fletcher class WWII destroyers for much less...

I also know that back during the late nineteenth century the US became so involved with Manifest Destiny after the Civil War the country failed to build a new warship over a twenty year period.. When the Samoan crisis flared up our warships were no match to English and German warships. If it hadn't been for the Samoan debacle, the new steel navy would not have been built to win the Spanish-American war...
 
Sea Toby said:
Everything you say is true. The US does have development programs with every new generation of weapon systems. Its the price we pay attempting to stay on the leading edge.
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And in order to continue to do that in the future, we as the taxpayers and interested parties have to hold the DOD, shipbuilders, and component makers to a higher standard. Otherwise we'll spend ourselves into the ground for naught.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not wishing failure on LCS. On the contrary, the Navy and the DOD cannot afford another weapons system upgrade crisis. Zumwalt gets cut to two hulls before the lead ship is even wet. The Marines are still trying to get a working acceptable upgrade to their AAVs. No one knows if CG(X) will even make it off the blueprint board. The other services aren't faring in their procurement programs any better. If LCS proves to be even the slightest hint of a boondoggle, the Navy would be lucky to end up with National Security Cutters for all the money that Congress and whoever is in office won't allocate to the budget. It's imperative that LCS proves itself, if nothing else, to preserve the confidence of the pursestring holders so that we can get other programs completed. Let's just hope that all of LCS works when the schwerpunkt is exposed.
 
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Juramentado said:
And in order to continue to do that in the future, we as the taxpayers and interested parties have to hold the DOD, shipbuilders, and component makers to a higher standard. Otherwise we'll spend ourselves into the ground for naught.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not wishing failure on LCS. On the contrary, the Navy and the DOD cannot afford another weapons system upgrade crisis. Zumwalt gets cut to two hulls before the lead ship is even wet. The Marines are still trying to get a working acceptable upgrade to their AAVs. No one knows if CG(X) will even make it off the blueprint board. The other services aren't faring in their procurement programs any better. If LCS proves to be even the slightest hint of a boondoggle, the Navy would be lucky to end up with National Security Cutters for all the money that Congress and whoever is in office won't allocate to the budget. It's imperative that LCS proves itself, if nothing else, to preserve the confidence of the pursestring holders so that we can get other programs completed. Let's just hope that all of LCS works when the schwerpunkt is exposed.
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I am not an expert on USN procurement, however I do agree the LCS concepts do seem very expensive for what they are. Equally the Zumwalt and CG(X) look like they will be expensive on another level and I'm sure people will ask the question of the value of such ships over a developing the Burke or more F35s. However what is refreshing is the fact the USN is prepared to invest in breaking new ground. I for one think in the future the LCS-2 concept and ships like the Sea Fighter will be seen as milestones similar to the move from paddle to screw in the 19th Century.
 
1805 said:
I am not an expert on USN procurement, however I do agree the LCS concepts do seem very expensive for what they are. Equally the Zumwalt and CG(X) look like they will be expensive on another level and I'm sure people will ask the question of the value of such ships over a developing the Burke or more F35s. However what is refreshing is the fact the USN is prepared to invest in breaking new ground. I for one think in the future the LCS-2 concept and ships like the Sea Fighter will be seen as milestones similar to the move from paddle to screw in the 19th Century.
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You do know that the word "boondoggle" is a twentieth century word. The first boondoggle in world history was building the Panama Canal. Up to twenty five percent of the US budget at that time was spent on the canal. Not many at that time ever thought the canal would ever break even or show a profit. So don't throw that word around to freely...

During the 1950s the interstate highway system and highway trust fund were considered boondoggles as well. Many thought they would never be finished, and some thought the fund couldn't pay for the highways. Those many wanted toll roads instead...
 
Sea Toby said:
You do know that the word "boondoggle" is a twentieth century word. The first boondoggle in world history was building the Panama Canal. Up to twenty five percent of the US budget at that time was spent on the canal. Not many at that time ever thought the canal would ever break even or show a profit. So don't throw that word around to freely...

During the 1950s the interstate highway system and highway trust fund were considered boondoggles as well. Many thought they would never be finished, and some thought the fund couldn't pay for the highways. Those many wanted toll roads instead...
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I looked it up in the Macquarie dictionary fourth edition not found, must be an American slang or something or not in general use anymore. Or i am too young not part of my generation.
 
Have to confess I had not heard of the term but then I am a Brit, but I found this definition on Wiki;

A boondoggle is a project that wastes time and money. The term arose from a 1935 New York Times article that claimed over $3 million had been spent on recreational activities for the jobless as part of the New Deal. Among these activities were crafts classes, where the production of "boon doggles" (described in the article as various utilitarian "gadgets" made with cloth or leather) was taught.

I do know where you are coming from, the Forrestals where excessively large for the time but it paid off when jet got fast/heavier, and the USN got nearly 50 years out of them eventually.

I like the LCS-2 design, I actually would have liked to see the DDG based something similar, maybe like the DCNS Swordfish concept ship. I am less keen on the LCS-1 because it just looks very expensive for a fairly average ship
 
Sea Toby said:
You do know that the word "boondoggle" is a twentieth century word. The first boondoggle in world history was building the Panama Canal. Up to twenty five percent of the US budget at that time was spent on the canal. ...
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The canal spending was spread over ten years, 1904-1914. During those years, annual US federal spending rose from $630 million to $1000 mn. Total cost of the canal up to 1914 was $375 mn, including $40 mn to buy out the French. Doesn't add up: there can't have been a single year in which canal spending was anywhere near 25% of the US budget.
 
Sea Toby said:
You do know that the word "boondoggle" is a twentieth century word.
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Yes, and yet it meets the requirements. The etymology of the term is not agreed to at large, but most definitions point to it being a) a term to describe a craft method of plaiting or knotting using materials such as leather strips to form decorative shapes (refer to the French term Scoubidou), or b) a New Deal economic initiative in FDR's first term that called for jobless to participate in crafts or recreation classes creating things similar to Scoubidou. The implication in definition b is that there was very little economic recovery or benefit to having these the jobless build such items when there was no potential in their getting paid for such work. In essence, I am using boondoggle to describe an initiative that has significant cost-overruns and/or benefit shortfalls. :) Enough of that, back to the topic.

To my point about affordability and scope creep; it would behoove future procurement initiatives to post-mort the decision behind the acceptance of the launcher platform without a working up-round. There's real money behind that decision - it's not just a paper checkbox that says, yep, got that and then all monies get settled at the very end. Every milestone officially acknowledged as complete and accepted by the DOD involves paying the various contractors what's owed for that step based on the contract. Having done a stint at low-level supply and support to several initiatives at NUSC (now NUWC) Newport many years ago, I have seen the foibles of contracting and deliverables in weps programs. Believe me, contractors want to get paid, and fast, because most of their costs are up-front, with the exception of what's agreed to as GFE. :) Boy I don't miss those days at all.

So the government took acceptance of one-half of an unproven system, and they paid for it? Bad contracting skills on part of the procurement team, and there really should have been a linkage between the launcher and round being proven and accepted before a payment is made. If that's not a boondoggle step, I can't imagine what it would be at that point. And here's the icing on the cake...

Updated: The program is dead - http://defensetech.org/2010/04/23/army-cancels-nlos-ls-missile-system/#axzz0mDUsrbNA

DoD Buzz | NLOS-LS Dies; Just Cost Too Much

The Pentagon is almost certain to kill the Non-Line of Sight Launch System, leaving little left of the once enormous Future Combat System and raising questions about how the Navy and Army will deliver highly accurate steel on distant targets.

“This thing just costs too much,” said a source familiar with the decision. “It really has come down to affordability.” The technical side of the recommendation to kill the program came from two studies that considered the Army’s precision fire needs and capabilities. “If you look at if from precision fires only we’ve got some helo rockets, Excalibur artillery, MLRS and precision mortars. But, can you get those into an environment that’s mountainous and difficult to get to and self deploy them and resupply them, then the answer is no. So if you look at it from the operational capability standpoint the waters get a little more muddied,” said the source.
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The Army’s cancellation of the program could have serious implications for the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship program as the NLOS-LS was to provide a substitute for the ship’s lack of vertical launch system cells — which can handle anti-ship, anti-aircraft or land attack missiles — that larger surface ships carry. The only weapon the LCS currently carries is single 57mm rapid-fire cannon that can range out to nine miles.

A decision should be made in the next week or so by Ash Carter and the Office of Secretary of Defense about the decision to cancel. The Navy is aware of the Army’s likely decision and probably would not oppose it, the source familiar with the debate said.

Analysts have pointed to the LCS’ lack of organic fires as a serious shortcoming that might limit its operational effectiveness. One of LCS’ primary missions is to screen battle fleets and help them fight off fast attack boat “swarms.” That’s where the NLOS-LS was supposed to come in, with a Loitering Attack Missile that could range out to 124 miles.
 
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Post NLOS: Where from here?

So rather than continue the discussion ad nauseum :cool: of the cost overruns of this program - a more meaty topic now emerges - what are the Navy's options for the SuW package in light of the Army's NLOS cancellation? I see a couple of paths here:

* The Navy strikes out on it's own and builds a purely navalized NLOS (highly unlikely given the total program cancellation but let's leave that in)
* Backfit an existing weapon system into the same space (SM/VLS is probably not an option)
* Augment with closer range weapons like Hellfire or DAGR and accept loss of reach
* Other?

Secondly, how will the selection change the mission capabilities?
 
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A smaller missile like Hellfire would leave the LCS without an ability to reach out and touch any possible land targets which are not located very close to the shore.

It would still retain the ability to attack multiple small targets like speedboats or FACs but at much closer range. So targets spotted by the organic helicopter or other assets might very well be out of range and the LCS has to maneuver to get within range. This also means that the threats might come within range of their own weapons systems.

Also a Hellfire is much more limited in terms of the seeker. One might have a Longbow one or a laser guided one but not both seekers in one package and no GPS guidance at all.
 
Juramentado said:
So rather than continue the discussion ad naseum :cool: of the cost overruns of this program - a more meaty topic now emerges - what are the Navy's options for the SuW package in light of the Army's NLOS cancellation? I see a couple of paths here:...
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Buy Fire Shadow from the UK, of course! It'd need navalising, but that's already been proposed for the RN (which seems interested), & for export.

It's been ordered for the British army.
 
swerve said:
Buy Fire Shadow from the UK, of course! It'd need navalising, but that's already been proposed for the RN (which seems interested), & for export.

It's been ordered for the British army.
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and soon to be battle tested as its going to Astan next year. Remarkable the speed of the development and the quickness of the results. I mentioned it as the obvious replacement on US Navy thread.
 
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