Korean Peninsula Developments

[John Fedup]

Perhaps the US absence is the only way to actually get these two players to resolve things once and for all. IIRC, it isn’t just WW2 claims but also for stuff going all the way back to the first decade of the 20th century. Good luck with that. Haven’t read about much compensation by European countries regarding their colonial issues.

 

[OPSSG]

If I may over simplify the complex situation a little — South Korea’s President Moon Jae-In is a politician from the left. A quarrel with Japan improves his street credibility with his leftist supporters; so I can see how his Minjoo Party of Korea benefits from this tension. The Minjoo Party of Korea supports an appeasement policy toward North Korea (= Sunshine Policy), and there is a bit of a left-wing nationalist inclination. See this KEIA pdf article to set the scene. South Korean politics faces lots of blaming, renaming, claiming, laming, gaming, "same-ing," but not taming — which is bottom feeding politics. Bottom feeding (or win-lose politics) is fine for a domestic audience but the Koreans need to learn to dial down the hate Japan rhetoric as part of their national identity, at the right time — to have a functioning state to state relationship with Japan, if they are to take the North Korean threat seriously. Below is a list of North Korean missile launches in late July to mid-Aug 2019 and a video to set the context:

Jul 25: KN-23 / Hodo peninsula

Jul 30: MLRS / Wonsan

Aug 2: MLRS / Kumya county, South Hamgyong province

Aug 6: KN-23 / Kwail county, South Hwanghae province

Aug 10: SRBM / Hamhung

Aug 16: (?) / Tongchon county, Kangwon province

Instead of concern with the hostile North Korean behaviour, President Moon, from the Minjoo Party of Korea are successful at demanding a response from Japan. They got what they wanted — a Japanese response that demonstrates the harm the Koreans can do to themselves by promoting hate in their form of nationalism.

To better understand choices, please note 2 additional criteria on diplomacy and its effective conduct. One, if Korea-Japan diplomacy is consistently experiencing "one step forward/two steps backward," then the policy must be acknowledged as failing and in need of adjustment. Two, diplomats must be pragmatic and satisfice rather than optimize. By these 2 criteria, it is fair to say that South Korea-Japan diplomacy is an utter failure. Each side is seeking maximalist goals with an unwillingness to compromise. South Korea's decision to renege on the 2015 comfort women agreement; the court's ruling on Japanese businesses compensating Korean workers; Japan's delisting of South Korea from the export whitelist; and South Korea's retaliatory de-listing on have taken relations not one step backward but five steps backward. As CSIS has noted (see link below), the US should appoint a special envoy who would call on Japan to engage with South Koreans and who would discourage Seoul from more public maximalists statements like "We will not lose to Japan again," which leaves no room for compromise. Now the Koreans need to learn how to climb down from their position and transition to a working bilateral relationship with an ally.

CFR has a backgrounder: What's the Status of North Korea's Nuclear Program?

Perhaps the US absence is the only way to actually get these two players to resolve things once and for all. IIRC, it isn’t just WW2 claims but also for stuff going all the way back to the first decade of the 20th century.

Not only are Japanese interests hurt in the Korean-Japan storm in a tea cup, American interests are also being hurt. While Trump may not care or understand the issues and dispute, the US Foreign Policy establishment will use this incident to judge how reliable Korea is a partner for the Americans going forward — which has geo-political implications. See this CSIS article: Finding a Way Out from the Japan-Korea Crisis

Differences between Seoul and Tokyo over the North Korea problem have only deepened. Japan’s interests rarely overlap with South Korea’s when it comes to negotiating denuclearization. Similarly, Korea’s President Moon’s desire to relax sanctions on Pyongyang to move negotiations forward runs counter to Abe’s insistence on maintaining an international coalition to force Kim Jong-un to end his nuclear program. Tokyo has worked hard to persuade a coalition of UN members to support sanctions and work to ensure they are complied with. The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Canada have all worked with Japan to monitor sanctions implementation through maritime patrols and surveillance. For Tokyo, abandoning this hard won international coalition would be tantamount to giving up on the UN’s role in international security—a premise of multilateral cooperation that is a pillar of Japan’s own national strategy. Seoul and Tokyo want different things from Washington when it comes to negotiating with North Korea. The larger difference that shapes Seoul and Tokyo’s relationship, however, is over China. On the surface, it might seem that both nations would want to double down on deterrence and on their alliances with the US. And yet each sees the other as amplifying each other’s vulnerabilities in their long-term ability to manage China. See: Seoul and Tokyo: No Longer on the Same Side

When Seoul and Beijing join in their criticism of Tokyo’s prewar behavior, it grates deeply in Japan.

Everybody in the Indo-Pacific is hedging with the rise of China. With Trump’s unpredictability, there is strong incentive for Japan and Australia, as G20 members, to grow closer bilateral defence and economic ties (see: Japan – Australia Summit Meeting)— this long term bi-partisan development in Australia. Strategic hedging intersects with defensive realist precepts in that balancing against a potential threat, conducting a restrained policy and to boost defence capabilities to enhance security. The shared aim is to avoid the repercussions of a security dilemma situation. Hedging strategies enable bandwagoning including economic and or socio-political cooperation with the threatening power to try to side-step future conflict with it. Likewise Australia, Indonesia and ASEAN have enhanced military and economic ties and have grown closer (see: Australia-Indonesia Relations: Strategic Partners in a Time of Change - AIIA and Reinforcing Indonesia–Australia defence relations: The case for maritime recalibration)— again a long term trend despite the differences.

Where is Korea as a G-20 member and it’s geo-strategic thinking? The CSIS article is damming on Korea’s lack strategic thinking and it’s inability to engage in strategic hedging. If no external party in the G-20, including the Americans, know how to work with the Koreans, how can the Korean work with others in Asia and Oceania to address their concerns about North Korea?

 

[OPSSG]

On 22 August 2019, South Korea announced that it is scrapping its military intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan, the latest escalation in a trade dispute that threatens global supply chains for smartphones and other gadgets. Kim You-geun, first deputy director of the Blue House National Security Office, said the move was in retaliation to Japan's decision to exclude South Korea from its list of trusted trading partners. This is a move that in the long run hurts Korea more than Japan in the event conflict breaks out with the North. So short sighted.

By way of clarification, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), administers the country’s export-control regime. METI’s actions do not amount to an export ban, as some Korean commentators have asserted, but a return to the status quo ante of case-by-case approval of export licenses for controlled items. Even if South Korea loses "white country" status, it would simply be on the same footing as China, Taiwan and Singapore, said Ken Sasagawa, a major chipmaking machinery supplier to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. "We have been able to deliver a substantial quantity of machines to these countries in a timely and precise fashion," he told reporters.

South Korea's politicians are encouraging the anti-Japan sentiment, betting it will help boost their popularity ahead of general elections next year. Cho Kuk, a high-ranking official in the Moon administration, leads the trend. "Japan's state power is apparently stronger than that of South Korea," Cho said in a Facebook post. "But let's not be afraid of this. South Korea's state power has grown up to the level that cannot be compared to 1965 when the South Korea-Japan treaty was signed."

Seoul’s toleration of consumer boycotts of Japanese products validates Tokyo’s claim that the Korean reaction has been overly emotional.

 

[John Fedup]

Samsung, LG, and other significant industrial players had better start educating the electorate on how stupid Moon’s government actions are wrt the economy. The military needs to point out how this stuff threatens SK security. US suggestions would be useful, preferably from the few remaining smart people in the Trump Administration.

 

[ngatimozart]

You know sometimes I wonder who gains the most out of this; NK, PRC, Russia, or a combination thereof? Could be somebody has very well placed spook(s) / mole(s) running an excellent operation in SK that would do Markus Wolf proud. Col Gen Wolf ran the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security - Stasi) of East Germany. He was a brilliant spymaster and had the West German govt thoroughly penetrated. Wouldn't surprised me if he penetrated the KGB as well. You just never know.

 

[OPSSG]

Chris Lee @oldtype on has a 15 point twitter discussion from a Korean perspective on why this is bad for Korea:

1. What is GSOMIA? Why is canceling the agreement the worst possible thing President Moon could have done? And why does it have nothing to do with Japan and everything to do with the US? /thread

2. This is not going to be a thread about how GSOMIA is critical to national security. I don't think it is. It's also not going to be about how Japan doesn't "deserve" this. I want the ROK to "win" this dispute. But I think today's decision will prompt quiet celebrations in Tokyo

3. Its no secret that the US has pushed for stronger trilateral military ties. It's also no secret that a lot of Koreans hate the idea. The trick for ROKG has always been to signal to USG that it remains open-minded about future cooperation without actually committing to anything

4. GSOMIA is perfect for this. It's a symbolic agreement that doesn't cost the ROK anything now, but leaves the door open for things in the future. This is why the Obama Admin zeroed in on it as an "easy" deliverable when more substantive trilat efforts hit a brick wall

5. Why is GSOMIA "easy?" Because it's basically a boilerplate treaty that sets up procedures for the sharing of military information: it just says "if we share anything, this is how we do it." It does not require that anybody actually share anything. It's entirely non-substantive

6. Because GSOMIA involves no actual commitment, it's usually the first piece of paper we sign when opening military ties. We pass them out like candy. The ROK has GSOMIA-like deals with 33 countries and NATO. They have one with Russia, and are negotiating one with China.

7. In practice, GSOMIA turned out to be not so "easy." Liberal politicians ran a disinformation campaign that painted it as a shady military pact that would force us to give away secrets to Japan. Public outrage ensued. Proposed in 2010, GSOMIA would not get signed until 2016

8. But Pres. Moon and the liberals would eventually come around. Why? Because in practice, not much information was ever shared. More important was the symbolic purpose: showing the US that for the sake of the Alliance, the ROK was at least willing to listen on trilateral issues.

...

10. Cancelling GSOMIA, on the other hand, is a slap in the face to the US. It basically says "Fuck you, we value the Alliance so little relative to our need to bloody up Japan that we're not even going to keep this costless, symbolic agreement you spent 6 years mediating."

....

12. Take last year's defense cost-sharing negotiations for example. We were able to get away with a nominal one-year increase because at some point, the US negotiators had a come-to-jesus moment and said "look, let's just figure out something that will placate our boss for now."

...

14. We've already lost POTUS. Losing the desk officers and assistant secretaries, the colonels and brigadiers could genuinely be the end of the Alliance. And as we rapidly approach the cost-sharing negotiations cliff, that unfortunately looks to be where we're headed.

...

 

[John Fedup]

You know sometimes I wonder who gains the most out of this; NK, PRC, Russia, or a combination thereof? Could be somebody has very well placed spook(s) / mole(s) running an excellent operation in SK that would do Markus Wolf proud. Col Gen Wolf ran the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security - Stasi) of East Germany. He was a brilliant spymaster and had the West German govt thoroughly penetrated. Wouldn't surprised me if he penetrated the KGB as well. You just never know.

Maybe terminating this intel agreement with Japan might actually be in Japan’s best interests as it is very likely NK has significant penetration into SK’s military, intelligence, industrial sectors, and the government itself. Perhaps the US needs to think about this as well but the Pentagon has criticized Moon’s decision nevertheless.

Pentagon slams South Korean president for ending intel-sharing agreement with Japan

 

[OPSSG]

Relations between South Korea and Japan began to deteriorate late last year following a diplomatic row over compensation for wartime forced laborers during Japan's occupation of Korea. They soured further when Japan tightened its curbs on exports of high-tech materials needed by South Korea's chip industry, and again this month when Tokyo said it would remove South Korea's fast-track export status.

South Korea also said it would seek to compensate for the GSOMIA expiry by improving cooperation with the US, and its deputy national security adviser Kim Hyun-chong said Seoul would revert back to an older system of sharing intelligence with both America and Japan through a three-way channel. Nonetheless, the Pentagon expressed “strong concern and disappointment” over the collapse of the agreement.

I think in terms of objective consequences a defeat from Japan is potentially preferable to a victory over North Korea. All of that having been said, are there any indications that SK is actually prepared to go to war with Japan?.

Yes, for a limited scenario. On 25 Aug 2019, Korea began two days of war games to practise defending disputed islands off its east coast against an unlikely attack from Japan. The drill - re-named "East Sea territory defence training" - will solidify the Korea’s military's resolve to defend the Dokdo islands and the area surrounding, the navy said. While a Japanese attack is deemed highly unlikely, South Korea first staged the drills in 1986 and has conducted them twice a year - usually in June and December (Read more at South Korea begins annual war games to defend against Japan). The latest exercise included significantly more South Korean forces than previously involved and spanned a wider area in the sea between South Korea and Japan, a South Korean navy official told Reuters. For the first time the drills included an Aegis-equipped destroyer and army special forces, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Maybe terminating this intel agreement with Japan might actually be in Japan’s best interests...

While I agree with this, I agree not for the reason you stated. The Koreans and Japanese are playing to a domestic audience.

...it is very likely NK has significant penetration into SK’s military, intelligence, industrial sectors, and the government itself.

Due to the lack of attractiveness of the North Korean system, I don’t agree that the South is penetrated to any significant degree.

Both Japan and Korea are US allies and should not go to war with each other. The only scenario is where Korea where this can occur, is when Korea is no longer an ally of the US. If I am not wrong, some misguided analysts have suggested that Korea is seeking to be a client state of China, in some of its behaviour — a point which I don’t agree with. IMO, Koreans just want the Americans to side it, in its disputes with Japan — irregardless of how unreasonable they are.

 

[Feanor]

Both Japan and Korea are US allies and should not go to war with each other. The only scenario is where Korea where this can occur, is when Korea is no longer an ally of the US. If I am not wrong, some misguided analysts have suggested that Korea is seeking to be a client state of China, in some of its behaviour — a point which I don’t agree with. IMO, Koreans just want the Americans to side it, in its disputes with Japan — irregardless of how unreasonable they are.

This presupposes a world run by US-led alliance systems. But that's the very geo-strategic arrangement that's currently strained pretty hard in some areas, and downright breaking in other areas. I think that if this crisis had come 20 years ago, US leadership would have likely resolved it, but in this day and age it's less likely and that itself shows the changes in international arrangements. Those changes have not necessarily become obvious or open yet, but there are definite shifts.

I agree with your assessment vis-a-vis South Korea and China, but I suspect that given their powerful economy South Korea might seek a bigger regional role as an independent actor rather then a great power client state. I certainly don't doubt that South Korea wants the USA to side with them, I'm just not sure that this is the primary driver behind their behavior.

On a side note, remember my original point about compromise? What would constitute a reasonable compromise here in your opinion?

 

[OPSSG]

South Korea’s President Moon Jae-In and his sunshine policy towards the North is doomed to failure. Pyongyang will not be playing nice with Seoul anytime soon. These hard-nosed North Koreans know they need investments, aid, and trade. All of which Moon cannot deliver with UN sanctions remaining.

As I said above, Tokyo has worked hard to persuade a coalition of UN members to support sanctions and work to ensure they are complied with. The United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Canada have all worked with Japan to monitor sanctions implementation through maritime patrols and surveillance. For Tokyo, abandoning this hard won international coalition would be tantamount to giving up on the UN’s role in international security—a premise of multilateral cooperation that is a pillar of Japan’s own national strategy.

...the very geo-strategic arrangement that's currently strained pretty hard in some areas, and downright breaking in other areas. I think that if this crisis had come 20 years ago, US leadership would have likely resolved it, but in this day and age it's less likely and that itself shows the changes in international arrangements. Those changes have not necessarily become obvious or open yet...

This I agree.

The Americans under the civilian Trump Administration are no longer part of the solution to Asia’s problems. As others like Robert Kelly have noted on Twitter, Trump’s engagement with North Korea is random, thrown-together, and shallow. He is an increasingly faustian bargain for North Korea doves, who seek a real deal. Trump’s substance-free pseudo-diplomacy will tarnish diplomacy as an option in the future.

On a side note, remember my original point about compromise? What would constitute a reasonable compromise here in your opinion?

I think dragging in the GSOMIA issue is a bridge too far by the South Koreans — it uses up too much military to military working level goodwill — Pentagon’s statement where it expressed “strong concern and disappointment” is clear disapproval at the military to military working level.

IMO if Japan removes Korea from their white list, Korea should mirror that but protest the fake Japanese excuse. The Koreans need to be measured in their response — rather than emotional. The latest drill - re-named "East Sea territory defence training" is a useful tool to show resolve from a Korean domestic perspective but Japanese politicians do not really care — they will phone in the usual diplomatic protest.

It is important to note that this Korea-Japan storm in a tea cup is driven by domestic politics and both parties need to manage their mutual dislike for each other, while seeking common ground on managing North Korea; and keeping in the random Trump-Kim bromance in check.

 

[Feanor]

South Korea’s President Moon Jae-In and his sunshine policy towards the North is doomed to failure. Pyongyang will not be playing nice with Seoul anytime soon. These hard-nosed North Koreans know they need investments, aid, and trade. All of which Moon cannot deliver with UN sanctions remaining.

I think that the DPRK knows that no security guarantees mean much in the long run, while a stable nuclear arsenal and reliable delivery capability mean nearly everything. So I don't see them ever giving up their nuclear arsenal without some giant internal upheaval to make it possible.

This I agree.

The Americans under the civilian Trump Administration are no longer part of the solution to Asia’s problems. As others like Robert Kelly have noted on Twitter, Trump’s engagement with North Korea is random, thrown-together, and shallow. He is an increasingly faustian bargain for North Korea doves, who seek a real deal. Trump’s substance-free pseudo-diplomacy will tarnish diplomacy as an option in the future.

I don't want to take this too far down the politics road, but I don't think this started with Trump. I think this started ~20 years ago, and the US-centered alliance network has been in a very slow and very gradual decline ever since. Trump is worse, and has certainly accelerated it, but issues with US leadership arose during the buildup for Iraq, and during the response to the 5 day war (8.8.8). Without a Soviet threat to unite, and with the increasing economic development of many of these countries, they are less dependent on the US for security or economic support.

I think dragging in the GSOMIA issue is a bridge too far by the South Koreans — it uses up too much military to military working level goodwill — Pentagon’s statement where it expressed “strong concern and disappointment” is clear disapproval at the military to military working level.

IMO if Japan removes Korea from their white list, Korea should mirror that but protest the fake Japanese excuse. The Koreans need to be measured in their response — rather than emotional. The latest drill - re-named "East Sea territory defence training" is a useful tool to show resolve from a Korean domestic perspective but Japanese politicians do not really care — they will phone in the usual diplomatic protest.

It is important to note that this Korea-Japan storm in a tea cup is driven by domestic politics and both parties need to manage their mutual dislike for each other, while seeking common ground on managing North Korea; and keeping in the random Trump-Kim bromance in check.

This seems logical, and unfortunately strikes me as a lost opportunity by the SK to steer this towards a compromise, though (in my opinion) not helped by Japan's stance. I mean they can still mirror the move, but they've already sunk the GSOMIA, right? Or do you think this can still be backpedaled?

 

[OPSSG]

1. Yes, the General Security of Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA would have lapsed on 23 Nov 2019 after South Korea announced in August 2019 its decision not to renew the pact in response to Japan's tightening of export controls — with this expected lapse in Nov 2019, the Koreans would close a chapter on American hope (after 6 years of American effort) of future Japan-Korea cooperation with increased Korean participation in the American led regional security architecture (see: Diplomatic Rift Between Japan, South Korea Makes U.S. Intel Gathering Harder - USNI News). The latest decision of South Korea is highly likely to give an unintended message to both the US and Japan. Tokyo may misunderstand it as Seoul’s intention to completely halt bilateral cooperation while Washington may get it as a warning sign that Seoul could put the alliance structure in Northeast Asia in danger. This is why Korea as a middle power, sandwiched between Chinese on one-side and the Americans and Japanese on the other side, finds itself between a rock and a hard place.

2. For peaceful reunification with North Korea to occur (should the dictatorship in the North collapse) many in South Korea value improved ties with China. At the same time, the Koreans are happy to depend on the Americans to protect them, while refusing to understand the profound changes in Japan and their concerns with the rise of China. In a survey on South Koreans’ reaction to their government’s decision on GSOMIA showed that 54.9%, felt it was ‘Good job!’ and only 38.4%, felt that ‘That’s a mistake!’, making the decision popular.

Edit: Two updates to note:

One, on 22 Nov 2019, South Korea opts not to terminate an intel-sharing pact with Japan and it will temporarily extend the GSOMIA, hours before its planned expiration.

Two, US President Donald Trump is demanding that Seoul pay vastly more to support the American military presence in its country. Two years ago, South Korea agreed to pay just under US$1 billion annually, about 20 per cent of the US cost. This year Trump is demanding more than five times that. To rub salt in the wound, the US delegation summarily walked out of the last set of negotiations, apparently in a theatrical gesture to convey its pique at Seoul balking at what looks and feels like a shakedown. This isn't just belligerent or unreasonable. It seems intentionally designed to be politically impossible, especially when South Korea has just paid 90 per cent of the US$11 billion price of a new US military base at its largest overseas installation, Camp Humphreys. Underlying all of this, of course, is Trump's history of insisting that US troops ought to be entirely withdrawn from South Korea. That is the most obvious explanation for why he might be making impossible demands.​

3. But if history and geography has anything to tell us, the current Korean leftist-nationalist approach is a poor way to manage defence and diplomacy for the promotion of its own vital national security interests — especially when you consider their tertiary air force, capable navy, large and modern standing army and superb defence industrial base; as a middle power and G-20 member. Sovereignty brings with it responsibilities, and many of these Korean interests are maritime in nature. Due to Korea’s state support for race based nationalism in the last 20 years, South Koreans have come to view positive achievements as being a result of inherent racial characteristics, whereas negative events are attributed to the incompetence, and inherent inferiority of the South Korean state. How the Koreans view themselves, will affect their view of what they want to protect or promote when statecraft and the international rules-based order break down. China has come to perceive South Korea as a possible weak link in the American alliance architecture in Northeast Asia. China retaliated against South Korea for the 2017 U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in the South in response to growing North Korean missile capabilities. Chinese maritime and air patrols are testing South Korea’s exclusive economic zone and the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone with increasing regularity. China’s more muscular approach toward regional security raised concerns among the South Korean public, which prior to 2016 held a relatively rosy view of China’s future influence and impact on the region.

4. Geopolitical trends suggest that the question of Korean’s place in the world (as part of Korea’s race based nationalism) is likely to become more pressing rather than less. Because of President Moon’s preoccupation with his Sunshine Policy with North Korea, his leftist nationalist politics and desire for winning more votes in the next election, he has not adequately factored in the vast changes in the international situation. Namely, that China is not so much a rising power; it has risen; and in many ways it now challenges the US across a number of military domains, including cyber and space. This is the conclusion of a new report from the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney in Australia alleges. China’s counter-intervention systems (or anti-access/area denial capabilities), along with her geographic proximity is designed to undermined America's ability to project power into the Indo-pacific, raising the risk that China could use limited force to achieve a fait accompli victory before America can respond, challenging US security guarantees in the process.

5. Further, we cannot rule out a Kim dynasty miscalculation or mishap that would have serious repercussions on Korean peninsular and the geo-politics of the wider North East Asian region. Keeping in mind North Korea’s (i) 29 June 2002 attack on two Chamsuri-class patrol boats that resulted in the sinking of PKM-357; (ii) 26 March 2010 sinking of ROKS Cheonan; and (iii) 23 November 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong, with the Northern Limit Line (NLL) remaining as a serious flashpoint for conflict. In October 1973, North Korea began a concerted effort to draw attention to its displeasure with the NLL. The NLL has a habit of leaping into the headlines periodically as crises occur but the dispute has a long, complicated history (see: The Origins of the Northern Limit Line Dispute and https://apjjf.org/-Man-bok-Kim/3485/article.pdf). The possibility that a conflict in the West Sea might lead to the outbreak of a second Korean War emerged as a realistic concern. Because of the Cheonan Incident, South Korea suspended aid to North Korea, discontinued relations, and accused North Korea of a “torpedo attack” before the UN Security Council.

6. To watch the situation more carefully for negative trends, some understanding of Moon Jae-In as a politician from the left and how his Minjoo Party of Korea benefits from this tension with Japan is necessary. IMO, the Minjoo Party of Korea ideologically supports an appeasement policy with the North despite the fact that the timing in wrong for a deal. With regard to rocket launches, Pyongyang will not be playing nice with Seoul anytime soon. Right now, Pyongyang has valid reasons to make sure that President Moon Jae-In feels uncomfortable, and this is exactly what they are doing.

 

[John Fedup]

Happened upon this article about SK considering nuclear subs. Would certainly stir things up in the region but given the the timeframe to develop an SSN, other events might eclipse this.

Navy Seeking to Secure Nuclear-Powered Submarines for Self-Defense Capabilities

 

[ngatimozart]

Happened upon this article about SK considering nuclear subs. Would certainly stir things up in the region but given the the time frame to develop an SSN, other events might eclipse this.

Navy Seeking to Secure Nuclear-Powered Submarines for Self-Defense Capabilities

It will. The Chicoms will throw an absolute hissy fit, spit the dummy and throw all their toys out of the cot. The Japanese will make the usual diplomatic protest and advance their own plans, causing the Chicoms to throw another hissy fit, spit the dummy and throw all their toys out of the cot again like spoilt toddlers.

Also, SK is to acquire 20 more F-35, but hasn't confirmed which variant. However, it is thought that it will be the B variant - note story states A, but they've got their As & Bs mixed up. South Korea to buy 20 more F-35 jets This will annoy the Chicoms even more.

 

[Ananda]

Happened upon this article about SK considering nuclear subs. Would certainly stir things up in the region but given the the timeframe to develop an SSN, other events might eclipse this.

ROKN submarine development so far seems follow rules of 9. They built Chang Bogo KSS1 (209 derivative) with 9 vessels then follow KSS2 (214 derivative) also with another 9 . So far seems the KSS3 will also aim to be another 9 boats.

Unless they plan to go nukes with some of KSS3, just like Brazil do with SSN on modified Scorpene using indigenous reactor. However so far there are no news on ROK Program on submarine nukes reactor. They have technology to do that, but still they need to have definite program for that first.

 

[John Fedup]

A couple of carrier designs under possible consideration by SK. The larger option is comparable to the QEC but appears to be a catobar. If they actually wanted a large catobar carrier then maybe a QEC modified with a catobar system could be an option, especially if the pictures are concepts as opposed to preliminary designs.

These aircraft carrier designs are being considered by South Korea

 

[Ananda]

That second design is interesting, only 238 meters but with angle deck and catapults..the last carrier on that length with angle deck and catapults was Hermes. Unless they modified their FA-50 for Carrier use, I don't think any carrier fighter available in the market currently can do with only that length.

However they say it's 41000 tons, and this should be close to the size of De Gaule. If this true, then dimensions should be on 255-265 meters. Then it can handle modern carriers aircraft.
Reading some Korean media, they understand that current Dokdo design is not going to be enough even for VTOL carriers. Dokdo is in the same size with Japanese Hyuga, so many Korean forumers think their next carrier will be in the size of Izumo.

If they go with the first design, then it's close to Liaoning size.
Interesting if they go with CATOBAR..since so far the speculation that come out from Korean media and forums are VTOL carriers with F-35B.

Japan already go with F-35B, and with they already committed for 44 (or 48 ?), Seems even if they plan next batch of flat top after Izumo's..they are going to go with F-35B also. Will be interesting if Korea do go with F-35C instead.

 

[t68]

A couple of carrier designs under possible consideration by SK. The larger option is comparable to the QEC but appears to be a catobar. If they actually wanted a large catobar carrier then maybe a QEC modified with a catobar system could be an option, especially if the pictures are concepts as opposed to preliminary designs.

These aircraft carrier designs are being considered by South Korea

I don't think its going to be Cat and Traps but I could be wrong has there been any interest in acquiring E2 Hawkeyes?

My thinking would be along the lines of having an angled deck even with F35B would be a good thing as depending on the width of it using STOVL and SRVL will give them a deck that can be used concurrently.There is quite a size differential between the two which suggest to myself the roles they envisage will be different pending which design they use with the larger of the two a strike carrier and the smaller more of an ASW carrier.

I think they will opt for the smaller of the two as I believe it will have a more useful and economic impact when working with the Allies I have said it a number of times over the years that the USN needs more ASW groups focused to protect the big CBG its an area where others like SK JPN and I even put it to the RAN in that area can have a big impact.

 

[OPSSG]

North Korea Tests First Missiles of 2020 | Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org

1. On 28 Mar 2020, North Korea conducts yet another missile test by launching two suspected ballistic missiles into the sea, South Korea and Japan said — as part of their Mar 2020 missile testing campaign.

2. Due to the aggressive missile testing by North Korea in March, US President Trump has even sent a letter to Kim Jong-Un that the US supports aid to North Korea for fighting the Coronavirus — which was rejected.

Korea Races To Export Test Kits After Trump Asks Moon For Help Fighting COVID-19

South Korean manufacturers of testing kits for COVID-19 are gearing up for exports worldwide, notably to the U.S., after having produced them for testing more than 300,000 Koreans since the first cases in the country were confirmed in January.

www.forbes.com

3. It is reported that South Korea with 9,976 infected, is to export millions of high-quality, rapidly produced coronavirus tests.

4. Since its first confirmed case of COVID-19 in late January, South Korea has shown a determination in the face of the virus that appears to be paying off. From a sudden spike in the number of cases to its decision to implement widespread testing, South Korea has shown itself able to respond quickly and decisively. “We acted early. But much of it surprised us – especially how fast it moves,” the Foreign Minister explains. The first 30 cases identified in South Korea were handled in a steady and diligent manner. But that all changed with the appearance of Patient 31.

5. In the days before her diagnosis, Patient 31 travelled to crowded spots in the city of Daegu and the capital, Seoul. She was then involved in a minor traffic accident and checked into hospital, and while a patient there she attended church services on two occasions and went for lunch in a hotel with a friend, despite developing a fever. In just a few days after she was diagnosed with the coronavirus, hundreds of people at the church she had attended and in the surrounding areas tested positive.

6. South Korea's aggressive testing and contact tracing may make it unnecessary to impose the sort of lockdowns to which China and Italy have resorted, although health officials insist that all options remain on the table in dealing with the epidemic. One Seoul test center consists of four trailerlike offices with white canopies in front. Doctors in full protective suits and goggles take the driver's temperature with an infrared thermometer and hand out a questionnaire to fill out. If you're running a fever and, in the doctor's opinion, may be at risk based on where you've been or whom you've contacted, you're eligible for a test. Only the driver is tested — passengers are not. Experts credit the emphasis on testing with reducing case numbers and fatalities.

(i) Date of First #COVID19 diagnosis​

January 20 (South Korea)​

January 21 (United States)​

​

(ii) Number of #COVID19 tests run since first diagnosis​

>300,000 (South Korea)​

~59,000 (United States)​

7. On 16 Mar 2020, President Moon Jae-in said he was increasingly confident the country would overcome the coronavirus as the rate of new infections continued to drop, although the authorities noted another large cluster had emerged in the greater Seoul area.

Over 100 countries ask South Korea for coronavirus testing help: official

South Korea has received requests from 121 countries for help with coronavirus testing, a foreign ministry official said on Wednesday, as authorities around the world come under intense pressure to curb the spread of the disease.

mobile.reuters.com

8. The tests sum up the differences between the two Koreas — we should remember that tensions in hotspots like Korea and the threat of terrorism have not gone away even as COVID-19 ravages both countries.

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1274701334281846785

1. In President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, Kim Jong-Un found interested partners. On North Korea, Moon is the most dovish president in the history of South Korea. Trump, too, in practice, is the most dovish U.S. president when it comes to North Korea. After threatening war in 2017, Trump swung toward negotiation. Multiple summits among the three leaders followed. Trump even walked around inside North Korea. But the actual negotiations stalled almost from the start. The recent North Korean facility destruction was not about South Korean leafletting, but over the refusal of President Moon Jae-in of South Korea to turn on the Americans and President Trump’s refusal to offer anything commensurate to North Korea for giving up some of its nukes and missiles.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1274179347377647617

2. It is not only NATO that is in trouble. All US alliances are in trouble, including the US Japan Alliance. President Trump kept complaining about US troops in Korea. John Bolton says even Secretary of State Pompeo feared Trump wanted to leave the Korean Peninsula. Trump’s comments about Korea echoed what he said about Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria.

3. In his recent book, former National Security Advisor John Bolton confirms that President Trump was desperate to have the June 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong-Un at any price because it would be “great theater,” “an exercise in publicity.” There was no detailed preparation, no formal agenda. He was prepared to sign a “substantive free Communique.” When leaving the meeting, Kim Jong-Un said he was “glad that he and President Trump had agreed to follow the ‘action for action’ approach” and asked if lifting UN sanctions would be next. President Trump said he was open to it and wanted to think about it. So Kim Jong-Un left with optimistic expectations.

4. On US-South Korean joint military exercises, President Trump repeatedly complained about how expensive and provocative they are; he saw them as waste of money. So when Kim Jong-Un said he wanted the US to reduce or eliminate exercises, President Trump said he would override the generals and do so. Neither the White House Chief of Staff Kelly, Secretary of State Pompeo, nor Bolton—who were sitting right there!—were consulted and of course not Secretary of Defense Mattis (who was not there). No consultations with South Korea either. President Trump just gave in to Kim Jong-Un without consulting or notifying anyone.

5. The South Korean unification minister has offered his resignation over the sharp rise in tensions with the North. Kim Yeon-chul said he took responsibility for the worsening of inter-Korean relations. It comes a day after North Korea blew up a symbolic liaison office near the border which was built to improve ties with the South. The office was opened in 2018 - a year of intense diplomacy - to help the two sides communicate. But earlier this month, the North expressed its anger at the cross-border propaganda and then cut all communication with the South. The North Korean army meanwhile has said it will send troops into disarmed areas along the border.