Methinks you have been sucking on oxygen for way too long Spaz, it changes the world and Munchkins appear way too often.double post - this forum is weird - honestly.
There's not really a simple answer to that; but in general terms most ships require 440V 60Hz which is then transformed to other voltages on board. However, some prefer to also get 110V 60Hz if they can. 240V 50Hz is not normally required as shore supply for warships these days. Much depends on what is available in the port concerned (if there's nothing suitable you stay flashed up, stokers don't need leave....); and even stuff which is nominally 440V may vary wildly in voltage (and sometimes in frequency).That appears to be solely for aircraft, my post was more directed at shore connections for hotel loads whilst in port no engines running. Do ships have a universal hotel load voltage?
Anyway stokers topside are a menace and they are allergic to fresh air anyway.There's not really a simple answer to that; but in general terms most ships require 440V 60Hz which is then transformed to other voltages on board. However, some prefer to also get 110V 60Hz if they can. 240V 50Hz is not normally required as shore supply for warships these days. Much depends on what is available in the port concerned (if there's nothing suitable you stay flashed up, stokers don't need leave....); and even stuff which is nominally 440V may vary wildly in voltage (and sometimes in frequency).
Bringing in an another in service, existing platform is going to be a hell of lot easier than something new. The LHD's have proven their worth, have doable crewing requirements and would tap into existing support networks and logistics. There are valid reasons for getting one beyond operating F-35's from them. It goes back to the original ARG concept, which was cut down to fit onto a 2 x LHD + LPD. With 3 x LHD, you could surge a full US style ARG. Surging is unlikely, but developing and training an ARG of that size certainly is a real thing. The failure of the US at RIMPAC again highlights the regional need for a ship of this level of capability, not just for Australia, for the region.It could be a lot easier to argue the case for a third LHD now that there are already two in service.
Transferring Choules to HADR and using funds (if any) budgeted for the HADR ship to acquire a third replenishment ship makes sense.Australia is looking at either a new replenishment ship or Logistics support ship around the late 20s. This has an accompanying budget of up to $2 billion so they are anticipating a fairly substantial ship.
Australia is now also looking at a specialised HADR vessel.
My solution would be to transfer the Choules to HADR, use the money budgeted for the HADR ship to replace the Choules with a third refueler and purchase a third LHD in the late 20s.
Firstly, sorry for posting this a couple of days late. Whilst the crux of your post may have been towards fuel security, some of these articles and commentaries need to be taken with a pinch of salt when looking at proof for Australia to establish a naval air arm. For example Steve George’s post (posts as 'Engines' I believe on a couple of other boards, generally extremely knowledgeable and well regarded) makes some errors of fact regarding recent operations that do not support his argument in the cold light of day.@SpazSinbad an interesting reply to that article you posted, via Putting F-35B on the Canberra Class LHDs: The Debate Continues - Steve George
I have been saying something along the same lines for some time about offshore oil dependency, considering how lot of our fuel inports come from Asia
Thus ensuring a rota of one ship doing HADR, instead of three which cover the task now. She'd better be reliable, assuming that this transfer is to whatever non-naval force is to do the task, and the civvies that have been proposed in these fora as substitutes for actual naval personnel had better be dedicated enough to be available 365 days or numerous enough to provide relief crewsTransferring Choules to HADR and using funds (if any) budgeted for the HADR ship to acquire a third replenishment ship makes sense.
Bringing in an another in service, existing platform is going to be a hell of lot easier than something new. The LHD's have proven their worth, have doable crewing requirements and would tap into existing support networks and logistics. There are valid reasons for getting one beyond operating F-35's from them. It goes back to the original ARG concept, which was cut down to fit onto a 2 x LHD + LPD. With 3 x LHD, you could surge a full US style ARG. Surging is unlikely, but developing and training an ARG of that size certainly is a real thing. The failure of the US at RIMPAC again highlights the regional need for a ship of this level of capability, not just for Australia, for the region.
But with a third, you could seriously openly talk about F-35 deployment, without compromising the Amphibious capability. With three potential carriers, surge capability, or continued deployment capability would be extremely significant. Again if we went down this road, we wouldn't have to do it all ourselves, our Spanish friends could operate with the USMC and do a lot of the ground and operational aspects. You could deploy RAN and RAAF people today to get familiarity with operating with harriers on the LHD and F-35's on the USMC. We have Marines stationed in Darwin, and we aren't that far from Hawaii. We wouldn't just turn up one day and have to reinvent the wheel. If Japan goes through with this, we would then have another regional partner to develop alongside. Its not just about F-35's pounding the LHD decks either.. Momote (1800m) and Christmas Island (2000m and on a hill), both are remote and probably beyond just flying aircraft in (as a loaded A330 would really struggle at landing/taking off at both of those). There are other options of course to resolve these issues, but it does identify a change in need and the issues around it.
What Australia is more finding itself in is as a peace maker and intermediary. There is a growing believe that Australia might be the sort of sensible country that is big enough to lead on issues without antagonizing and escalating (in this polarising environment, us or them), particularly as countries find it more and more difficult to deal with both the US and China (which the EU seems to be on the edge of imploding and has its own issues and limited capability in Asia-Indo-Pacific).
5 years ago, I would have thought the geopolitical need for Australia to look at that sort of capability was pretty remote. I think this has changed. What was a dream in 2008 is probably closer to a reality in 2020.
It would mean most likely giving up Choules to some other role or nation. We would need probably 50-80 more crew. It would increase costs, B is more expensive to operate than A, and a LHD is more expensive to operate than LPD, but we are talking about number that are in the realm of possible. Sustaining a single type and training crews would likely decrease. Slightly increasing budgets, not pulling multi billions, millions of hours of training and hundreds of men out of thin air.
As for other types of carriers, I am not sure Australia will ever be interested enough to go down that road. A dedicated catapult carrier would be a unicorn and of limited use and be very man power intensive and expensive. With limited availability and limited length of deployment. Do we really need that level of capability. We want something that will deter risky adventures from a far away power and facilitate and secure a significant deployment. We won't be pounding nations into submission with it.
Instead we could have 3 amphibs capable of a significant level of F-35 operations. If we wanted to, we could deploy two for fixed wing operations and sustain that for a significant period. If we went down this road I think it would be highly likely Singapore would join us and we would be an ideal location to train, maintain and operate F-35Bs (they are probably considering this aircraft even without a carrier of their own).
It worth proper assessment. At the proper time, and I think we are getting closer to that point where Australia would have to make a definite yes or no.
This is doable and financially a great return on dollars spent.Australia is looking at either a new replenishment ship or Logistics support ship around the late 20s. This has an accompanying budget of up to $2 billion so they are anticipating a fairly substantial ship.
Australia is now also looking at a specialised HADR vessel.
My solution would be to transfer the Choules to HADR, use the money budgeted for the HADR ship to replace the Choules with a third refueler and purchase a third LHD in the late 20s.
Firstly, sorry for posting this a couple of days late. Whilst the crux of your post may have been towards fuel security, some of these articles and commentaries need to be taken with a pinch of salt when looking at proof for Australia to establish a naval air arm. For example Steve George’s post (posts as 'Engines' I believe on a couple of other boards, generally extremely knowledgeable and well regarded) makes some errors of fact regarding recent operations that do not support his argument in the cold light of day.
As a first example the fact that the US / French naval air groups were based in the eastern med still meant they had about 1 hour transit of friendly nations airspace to get to the fight (either through Israel and Jordan to the south of Syria, or Turkey to the North). E-Med Naval air would have sortie lengths and transit times similar to the RAF operating from RAF Akrotiri. They have effectively flown 30 minutes past Jordanian and Turkish air bases to get to the fight; (e.g. Mufwaq Salti where USAF and other coalition assets are based, or Icirlik in Turkey). So whilst they do not require HN support for basing, they required it for safe passage and are subject to the same diplomatic whims; and in some instances were actually further from the fight than land based assets.
The weapon employment was almost wholly at the discretion of the ground commander (CAS). If the ground commander did not want / need weapons then the crew didn't get an opportunity to employ weapons (hence the stated average of about 1 weapon per mission for the RAAF, despite the fact the jets were routinely carrying 4 weapons). Thus the choice of basing location was not a factor to weapon employment for RAAF crews on Okra, regardless of if they had been forward deployed to Erbil, Al Asad or Kuwait (where Canadian Hornets were based, incidentally again closer to much of the fighting than the EMed).
One absolute: Regardless of basing location, all fast air platforms were dependant on big wing tankers to achieve their mission.
I'm all for the flexibility and firepower an Aircraft Carrier can bring to the fight. However due to a lack of familiarity with the current operating environment Mr George has failed to demonstrate (through using Inherent Resolve / Okra) any significant advantage Naval air offered in this instance over land based platforms as a whole.
The comment that is copied and pasted by t68 regarding the number of aircraft for a continuous DCA presence is also inaccurate; it does not bear relation as to how a DCA Vul would likely be planned and/or manned. As he states, the numbers are 'very rubbery' although DCA at extended ranges is a difficult mission to plan and implement well. One does have to wonder what effect having 4-6 F-35B sitting on the deck at an Alert state would have on the ability for rotary wing to then use the platform in an amphibious manner.
Get the RCN personnel mailing list, should have no trouble getting recruits considering we can’t get ships built for the RCN.Thus ensuring a rota of one ship doing HADR, instead of three which cover the task now. She'd better be reliable, assuming that this transfer is to whatever non-naval force is to do the task, and the civvies that have been proposed in these fora as substitutes for actual naval personnel had better be dedicated enough to be available 365 days or numerous enough to provide relief crews
And reducing the Navy's amphibious element to two ships instead of three, the minimum required to have one more or less guaranteed to be available.
Elsewhere we have the notion that another LHD, a light carrier or USN sized LHD can be easily crewed. Easily purchased maybe, if you can convince the voter to be excited about spending a couple extra billion, but where do we find 1,000 extra crew What other ships disappear to find the numbers? For reference, look at what has happened to the RN, whose new carriers have left them with too few experienced crew to operate anywhere near as many escorts as most seem to think necessary. How do we do it, from a smaller pool of serving sailors and potential recruits, making a proportionally greater increase in numbers?
I know that we're busy playing paper fleets, but they need some basis in reality.
oldsig
Operation Okra, Med, ME and other constrained ops are not the type of strategic circumstance Naval air would find in the Indo Pacific area. Those operations were constrained by a large list of airspace and sovereignty issues so naturally the freedom of movement was denied to the CVs.Firstly, sorry for posting this a couple of days late. Whilst the crux of your post may have been towards fuel security, some of these articles and commentaries need to be taken with a pinch of salt when looking at proof for Australia to establish a naval air arm. For example Steve George’s post (posts as 'Engines' I believe on a couple of other boards, generally extremely knowledgeable and well regarded) makes some errors of fact regarding recent operations that do not support his argument in the cold light of day.
As a first example the fact that the US / French naval air groups were based in the eastern med still meant they had about 1 hour transit of friendly nations airspace to get to the fight (either through Israel and Jordan to the south of Syria, or Turkey to the North). E-Med Naval air would have sortie lengths and transit times similar to the RAF operating from RAF Akrotiri. They have effectively flown 30 minutes past Jordanian and Turkish air bases to get to the fight; (e.g. Mufwaq Salti where USAF and other coalition assets are based, or Icirlik in Turkey). So whilst they do not require HN support for basing, they required it for safe passage and are subject to the same diplomatic whims; and in some instances were actually further from the fight than land based assets.
The weapon employment was almost wholly at the discretion of the ground commander (CAS). If the ground commander did not want / need weapons then the crew didn't get an opportunity to employ weapons (hence the stated average of about 1 weapon per mission for the RAAF, despite the fact the jets were routinely carrying 4 weapons). Thus the choice of basing location was not a factor to weapon employment for RAAF crews on Okra, regardless of if they had been forward deployed to Erbil, Al Asad or Kuwait (where Canadian Hornets were based, incidentally again closer to much of the fighting than the EMed).
One absolute: Regardless of basing location, all fast air platforms were dependant on big wing tankers to achieve their mission.
I'm all for the flexibility and firepower an Aircraft Carrier can bring to the fight. However due to a lack of familiarity with the current operating environment Mr George has failed to demonstrate (through using Inherent Resolve / Okra) any significant advantage Naval air offered in this instance over land based platforms as a whole.
The comment that is copied and pasted by t68 regarding the number of aircraft for a continuous DCA presence is also inaccurate; it does not bear relation as to how a DCA Vul would likely be planned and/or manned. As he states, the numbers are 'very rubbery' although DCA at extended ranges is a difficult mission to plan and implement well. One does have to wonder what effect having 4-6 F-35B sitting on the deck at an Alert state would have on the ability for rotary wing to then use the platform in an amphibious manner.
Not sure about the most successful capability, but I largely agree with you. Just highlighting that one of the links cited on page 35 and again referenced on 36 was flawed.Operation Okra, Med, ME and other constrained ops are not the type of strategic circumstance Naval air would find in the Indo Pacific area. Those operations were constrained by a large list of airspace and sovereignty issues so naturally the freedom of movement was denied to the CVs.
The geography of our area is less complex, there are only a few (the old French Indo China) states where transit restrictions may apply. The rest is wide open Ocean with littoral areas owned by single states and as such the Med analogy does not apply and the advantages of Naval air are overwhelming and without the need for Big tankers.
I’m not suggesting the example you have used is inaccurate, I’m simply stating that each strategic situation is unique and that Naval air has been and always will be the most successful capability in the vast regions of our part of the world.
Not convinced with this specific statement: what the ME has shown is that to have any reasonable endurance on station or radius of action that Air (land or naval) is reliant on Big Wing (non-organic) tankers.The rest is wide open Ocean with littoral areas owned by single states and as such the Med analogy does not apply and the advantages of Naval air are overwhelming and without the need for Big tankers.
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