There is, however, no certainty that even with such support that the RAN will always conduct operations as part of a superior force. Consequently, ADF planning must allow for operations in which sea control cannot be guaranteed, or where it remains contested throughout a mission.
The main planning factors in such operations will be the weighing of risk against the importance of achieving the objective. A failure to achieve a sufficient level of sea control, before attempting either to project maritime power ashore or provide protection of sea lines of communication, will almost inevitably expose one’s forces to greater potential losses. For a small maritime force every unit is likely to be high-value, and the loss of any one may be a serious or even a crippling blow.
The risk of loss must be accepted as a part of the cost of conflict......The RAN’s main focus must therefore be on the competence and toughness of our people, so that we can rely on sensors and weapons being used to maximum effect.
The Role of Air Power in Achieving Sea Control
...........The RAN, in particular, must rely on others to provide broad area air, surface and under-sea surveillance as well as any air combat capability for counter air or strike operations.
.........Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, reliance on foreign military services for the provision of air power may carry some operational risks. For example, if RAN units are integrated with US Navy forces they may well benefit from the embarked air power of a carrier battle group. In the event of working with multinational partners without embarked air power, however, an Australian maritime task group must necessarily rely on land-based air power.
There are several limitations associated with reliance on land-based air power. For operations away from the Australian mainland, ongoing air-to-air refuelling (AAR) or secure forward operating bases relatively close to the area of operations will be needed. Unfortunately the use of AAR to support aircraft beyond their unrefuelled range introduces an additional level of vulnerability while, even with such basing, assured air power will still only be available when the maritime operation enjoys a high priority for the allocation of resources. Without forward basing, the situation becomes even more problematic.
Moreover, the further aircraft have to transit from land bases and the more they will need to rely on AAR, the more they will be limited in the weapons and stores they can carry. This will affect both their time on task and their effectiveness while there. Responsiveness also becomes an issue, and the provision of a combat air patrol for a deployed maritime force is more challenging as the distance from land bases increases. The ability to respond immediately to a demand for air cover could be vital for the success of an operation and can depend on adequate threat warning. Such warning may itself depend on the availability of land-based surveillance aircraft.
A lack of available air power may, in some cases, greatly hinder or entirely compromise deployed operations. Without either surveillance or combat aircraft, or even both, surface forces must depend almost completely on their own resources. This implies a potential loss of warning time against low-flying threats and an associated dependence upon short-range detection and rapid reaction. Although the Hobart-class destroyers will have a reasonable capability to deal with such threats, particularly when networked with remote sensors, there are few of these vessels.
The absence of friendly tactical combat aircraft provides much greater freedom of action for an adversary’s air power. This translates into more thorough and accurate enemy surveillance and ultimately more attack options for an opposing force. Consequently, it also demands changes in the mode of operations for friendly surface forces, perhaps constraining where and how they operate. In extreme situations, surface operations may need to be curtailed.