China is developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) for theater warfighting and strategic attack. These cruise missiles seem to have a relatively high development priority to ensure that Chinese forces will have greater conventional firepower. Long-range cruise missiles probably will also be used to bolster the viability of Chinese military deterrence. The first LACM design produced probably will be air-launched from Chinese bombers and might become operational early in the 21st century. China could develop a sea-launched version for use on either submarines or surface combatants. Some reports claim that a long-range land attack cruise missile will be fired from the torpedo tubes of the new Chinese Type 093 attack submarines.
Almost no hard data is available concerning these new weapon systems, though various sources have provided fragmentary accounts of uncertain reliability.
Chinese LACM R&D is aided by an aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise missile technology, particularly from Russia. China also seeks enabling technologies and subsystems from the United States and other foreign countries. It has been reported that that China transported cruise missile production facilities from Russia to a location in the vicinity of Shanghai in 1993, and recruited cruise missile engineering specialists from Russia in 1995 and. It is also reported that China has obtained technical data concerning a Russian cruise missile guidance system.
The guidance system represents the most significant challenge for a long-range cruise missile program. China would require an extensive database of accurate topographic information to use terrain comparison (TERCOM) guidance. But TERCOM would probably be relatively ineffective in areas such as the South China Sea, which present few navigational reference points. Published reports suggest that GPS would initially be used as the primary guidance system, possibly to be supplemented subsequently with TERCOM.
The potential use of the American GPS system would render this system vulnerable to jamming of the unencrypted civil signal (CA code) from GPS satellites within view of the Chinese area of operations, or to local jamming and spoofing in the target area. Chinese cruise missiles could still find their targets using intertial navigation system [INS] technology, but without GPS updates they would be significantly less accurate.
The X-600 long range cruise missile project is believed to have started as early as 1977. In the mid-1980s, a 8359 Research Institute was established for cruise missile development, and also a Cruise Missile Institute of China. The Cruise Missile Institute is probably a new name for the Hai Ying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy, which had developed the Hai Ying -1 and Hai Ying-2 (Silkworm) family of anti-ship missiles.
Reports of uncertain reliability claim that China is working on several advanced ground-based LACMs: the Changfeng ["Long Wind"] CF-1 and CF-2 [also termed Chang Feng and Chang Feng-JIA], and Hong Niao (HN)-1 and HN-2 missile, with a range between 400 km and 1,800 km, with conventional and possibly nuclear warheads. The ground-launched Hong Niao missiles are fitted with tandem solid-rocket boosters.
In 1995 it was reported that China was funding Israeli development of an air-launched cruise missile based on the Israeli Delilah anti-radiation attack drone, with a 230-mile range. The new missile reportedly was to be larger than the Delilah, while retaining its basic configuration.
The range and CEP of the Chang Feng air-launched LACM are claimed to be 600km and 15m, respectively, and Chang Feng -JIA 1300km and 5m. Similar accuracy claims are made for the Hong Niao family of missiles, though these would appear to be rather optimistic.
In May 2001 an air-to-surface missile was reportedly launched from a B-6 bomber. The test, reportedly the first time China had launched the new cruise missile, was apparently deemed successful by US defense and intelligence agencies. The missile, reportedly an extended-range version of the C-802 anti-ship missile, was assessed as being capable of carrying a 500-kilogram warhead to a range of at least 150 kilometers.
The first operational long range Chinese cruise missile, the Hong Niao ("Red Bird") may have entered service as early 1992. The HN-1 was reportedly tested in mid-1999 to a range of 600km. The Hong Niao reportedly derived from the Russian KH-65SE/SD, a short-range version of the Russian Kh-55 [AS-15 KENT] 3,000-kilometer-range strategic cruise missile. The HN-1 apparently has straight folding wings at the mid-body, with a folding tailplane rear assembly. The engine is mounted in the rear of the missile, with an air inlet under the fuselage. Some sources suggest that this missile features inertial guidance with a terrain following radar altimeter, and scene-matching terminal guidance. The missile is variously reported to be able to carry a nuclear, high explosive, or cluster munition warhead.
Reportedly the HN-2 version, with an improved engine and range extended to at least 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), was introduced as early as 1996. In February 2000, Lin Chong-pin, vice chairman of the cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council, stated that Beijing had also developed a mid-range "Hongniao 2" cruise missile. According to an August 2001 report of doubtful reliability, PLA Navy vessels involved in June 2001 exercises test-fired for the first time the Hongniao-2 cruise missiles, which was claimed to have a range of 1,000 km. According to some reports, the HongNiao-II may have a range of 1,800km, with an inertial and terrain-following guidance system.
Lin Chong-pin also stated in February 2000 that Beijing was developing a long-range "Hongniao 3" cruise missile, with a range of 2,500 kilometers, similar to the Tomahawk cruise missile. Other reports claim that the HN-3 is a 3,000-km-range strategic LACM, capable of both ground-based deployment and of installation on old H-6 bombers and the new-generation HJ-7/FBC-1 bombers. This missile might enter service after 2005.