So does on U 209 deal with Korea. They want to raise questions why the administrations not choosing HDW, since HDW that really owned the technology and not Korea of 209.
It is not so simple. The Korean submarines have their own modifications, to suit their local conditions - with the plus that their facilities are a shorter distance away from Indonesia. From my point of view, capability does not come just from technology. The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) must set-up the right training facilities and courses, to enable the submarine crews to operate the new submarines to be acquired. This means looking at it from raise, train and sustain terms, rather than just at acquisition for the TNI-AL. While the German Navy has a great training program for their submarine crews, and is world class; they are not from this region.
The Koreans, as a
noteworthy middle power in Asia (with Indonesia sitting on important shipping choke-points), must develop a stronger and more comprehensive military-military relationship with Indonesia over time. Export sales also help with reducing cost of having an indigenous submarine building program, which is why Daewoo is so keen to price the 'U-209' right, for Indonesia. The Korean Navy needs to know how capable is the Indonesian Navy at submarine warfare in tropical waters; and what better way to learn than to build the U-209 platform for the TNI-AL for operations in tropical waters. With the contract win, the Koreans are most likely to provide additional/advanced submarine crew training for TNI-AL. The TNI-AL already has the ability to conduct its own basic submarine warfare training for its existing submarine crews.
Submarines need to be maintained and every 6 to 7 years, major work at a shipyard needs to be done. This would be an opportunity to insert new technology, into an existing platform, at each of these cycles. In respect of periodic technology inserts, the Germans are very capable (and often on the leading edge). The Korean Navy will have their own plans and cycles for technology inserts, and are developing a blue water navy. The Korean desire to improve their submarines is something that the TNI-AL can take advantage of in future (especially since not everything is for sale and you need relationships to get access to buy).
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), for example, did consider buying German and even sent naval officers to attend their courses, but in the greater scheme of things, the Swedish offer was 'better' (whose submarine yard is now owned by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH). The question is better in what way? That is what everybody is silent on.
The issues involved in a submarine platform selection are not simple. It is not just which is 'better'. Swedish prior relationship with the RSN was a factor. I believe, the RSN looked at it from a total value proposition, nature of the working relationship, and trust. The Swedish were able to offer RSN 2nd hand submarines to bring down the total acquisition cost (in the first batch RSN bought 4 2nd hand submarines and 1 spare hull), and gave us first right of refusal for two more more advanced submarines (the two Archer Class submarines). They may have sold the submarines at a cheap price but their Kockums gets steady work to refurbish 4+2 submarines for Singapore until the launch of their
A26 program. Their discount, keeps their shipyard working and they have started design work on the A26, which will have the Stirling AIP system integrated as the main propulsion system for this class of submarines. IIRC the A26 is designed for littoral operations but capable of operating in cold waters, in
tropical waters and even in blue water conditions. The A26 will have a modular mast and a multi-mission portal, enabling Special Forces, unmanned vehicles and other type of sensors and equipment to operate from the A26. There is dedicated outboard equipment storage space and a large inboard flexible payload space to host a substantial number of weapons, unmanned vehicles and other types of equipment. If Singapore joins the A26 program with an order of 2 or 3, Sweden will get a longer production run that will reduce cost for all buyers of the A26.
The Swedish have been more than flexible in helping Singapore with periodic technology inserts and customisation to suit tropical waters; and the bilateral relationship is built on the basis of mutual trust (where we need them, as much as they need us). Bilateral relationships between supplier and buyer needs to be cultivated over a long period of time, requiring
million dollar investments, on either side, along with years of training and technology transfer. Likewise, I am sure long term Korean-Indonesian ties in the submarine communities are being developed as we speak.
Further in 2012, Singapore and Indonesia have signed
a submarine rescue pack, to further develop TNI-AL capabilities and reduce total cost of ownership (by not having to invest in sub-rescue).
Assides the value of ToT they want to raise questions on the quality of 209 build by Korea, compared to 209 build by HDW.
Hard to say, which is 'better' with so little info.
On Leo 2, local oppositions on the deal basically already more tone down this days. In short the info in Indonesia on the merit, progress and value of those projects, being clouded by politically motivated information. Claim and counter claim now circulated, which for public raise questions where the real situations really laid.
It is a non-issue, in that every country in Asia that is serious about defence operates MBTs; and Leopard 2s are useful in many roles (including urban warfare). Commonality with the SAF means, TNI can save on simulator costs and just go to Singapore for some aspects of Leopard 2 training; and the first batch of TNI Leopard 2 instructors have been trained in Singapore. See also the
pictures from Exercise Chandrapura 2013.
If you look at the
Singapore Navy Picture thread, I am happy to note that the Singapore command team for CTF-151 deployed with a number of international officers, with at least one from Indonesia (and he just got promoted in the middle of the deployment).
Well that the price of democracy in Indonesia
Indonesia and its elites are noted in having a strategic world view, which is why it leads ASEAN. Where Indonesia leads ASEAN, Singapore as a member of ASEAN, has to follow. IMO, local politics and local concerns, exist in every country and Indonesia will not be immune to that.
More importantly, Indonesia military modernisation efforts is seen as credible by other countries, which means, a green-light for third parties like Australia, US and Singapore to provide as much help as the TNI wants (to build and grow the valued relationship). There is another ASEAN country that just talks, with a 2012 defence spending of US$2.9 billion (ranked at 6th in ASEAN) and 2012 GDP of US$250 billion (ranked at 5th in ASEAN),
but is not seen as credible. The level of help given by 3rd parties is much lesser; and Indonesia's defence budget is 2.3x theirs and a GDP of 3.5x theirs (even their treaty ally provides limited help - EDA F-16s for Indonesia but none for their ally). At an international level, many donor countries know that working with authorities in a certain ASEAN country is difficult and unrewarding task but Indonesia is so kind and
provided over 4 tons in aid and a million in funds recently. This country is difficult to work with and it is one of two ASEAN countries in a
list of 17 blacklisted by France because they do not help investigate foreign aid fraud. France has banned the use of their banks to help distribute development funds. This is a country that built a 621 megawatt nuclear power plant at a cost of over US$2.3 billion and never used it because of domestic politics.
There is a difference in credibility within ASEAN, when Indonesia is compared with other countries in the region - in terms of 2012 defence spending of US$6.8 billion (ranked as 2nd largest in ASEAN) and a 2012 GDP of US$878 billion (largest in ASEAN). Indonesia is the 2nd largest arms buyer in ASEAN. IMO, lack of credibility affects a country's standing between nations - which in turn affects its ability to get things done in the international setting and this includes invitations to speak at international events. Take for instance, the keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue, in 2013 by the PM of Vietnam, in 2012 by the President of Indonesia, in 2011 by the PM of Malaysia, in 2010 by the President of Korea, in 2009 by the PM of Australia, in 2008 by the PM of Singapore and so on (but notice which two founding ASEAN members do not get a turn).
