Indo Pacific strategy

[SolarWind]

In an opinion piece by Mark Helprin at the Wall Street Journal
The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China
Opinion | The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China
I will summarize my main takeaways from the article.
The author laments the US' loss of economic and high-tech manufacturing, research, and capitalization advantages since the eighties due to outsourcing instead of automation, which in my opinion enabled China's rapid economic expansion. The author laments our inability to rally allies in confronting China on trade instead of engaging everyone at the same time. The author alarms of the possibility of our future loss of control over the Pacific and China's expansion to East Pacific and take over of the Panama Canal, if we fail to implement an adequate strategy to counter China's possible expansion. To remedy, the author suggests to rally and support our Asia-Pacific allies, pressure China on some type of nuclear arms control regime, strengthen our Navy, Marines, and long-range air power, expand long-range sealift and airlift, and dig in on our islands in the Pacific. This approach seems to be similar to area denial.

I will quote some parts of the article because the WSJ requires paid subscription that many readers might not have, but admins, please feel free to remove if you feel this is not appropriate.

First, it is astounding that China, the world’s third-ranking nuclear power, with 228 known nuclear missiles and a completely opaque nuclear-warfare establishment, unlike the U.S. and Russia is subject to no agreements, no inspection, no verification and no limits, while in this regard the U.S. remains deaf, dumb and blind. The U.S. should pressure China to enter a nuclear arms-control regime or explain to the world why it will not.

Second, keeping in mind that America’s inadequate military sea and air lift make wartime supply of forces in Europe a well known problem, the distance from San Francisco to Manila is twice that between New York and London, China has 55 attack submarines, and the U.S. Navy has long neglected antisubmarine warfare. This renders the diminished string of American bases on China’s periphery crucial for initial response and as portals for resupply. But they are vulnerable, and little has been done to make them less so.

China has medium-range ballistic missiles, air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, air-refueled bombers and fighter bombers, sea-based missiles, and seaborne commandos. To protect our bases from all this we need long-range antiship missiles, adequately defended, on outpost islands; deep, reinforced aircraft shelters rather than surface revetments and flimsy hangars; multilayered missile and aircraft defenses in numbers sufficient to meet saturation attacks; deeply sheltered command and control, runway repair, munitions, and stores; and radically strengthened base defense against infantry, special forces, and sabotage. It would be expensive, but essential.

Above all, building up the Navy, Marines, and long-range air power to make the vastness of the Pacific correspondingly less an impediment is necessary in concert with base-hardening to remedy the diminution of those powers and balances that deter war and make for stable relations in the international system, in that they allow confident restraint and encourage productive negotiation. Failure will lead to the moment when our regional allies, finding less reason to adhere to us than to appease China, remove their increasingly important military components of the de facto Pacific alliance, thus catastrophically breaking it.

At present the U.S. is inexplicably blind to the fundamental power relations upon which China is intently focused. As long as we remain vulnerable while China increases its military powers and ours decline, Beijing need not do anything but pretend to compromise. This can change if we send the Chinese a message they cannot ignore. That is, if we take our eyes off the zero-sum game long enough to assure our strengths in depth. Frankly, if we do not, the Pacific Coast of the United States will eventually look out upon a Chinese lake.

I believe that development of an effective and cost-conscious strategy now will pay off in the long term. We need to seriously consider and address China's expansion while keeping in ming that, as predicted by Macroeconomic Theory, China's economy can continue to expand at a high rate until it approaches the level of developed Western Countries in terms of GDP per capita, which is a good measure of wealth. China is still far from it but is building its way there, at which point its GDP will become gigantic by current measures due to the size of its population. China will continue to strive to be a strong naval power due to the criticality of maritime trade to its population and economic growth. Their demand of agricultural and natural resources require large and stable maritime capabilities since their neighbors cannot fully meet Chinese demand, and diversification of suppliers provides trade advantages.

 

[Feanor]

I mean China was exploring alternate options for building a canal through Nicaragua. So I'm not sure they would necessarily be after the Panama Canal itself.

 

[SolarWind]

I mean China was exploring alternate options for building a canal through Nicaragua. So I'm not sure they would necessarily be after the Panama Canal itself.

I think the article looks at a long term worst case scenario. But I would agree that consequences of a Chinese Nicaragua canal are comparable to the article's scenario. A canal through the middle of the American large landmass, which otherwise stretches continuously from the Arctic nearly to the Antarctic, gives tremendous operational advantages to those who control it. I believe such level of expansion could embolden China and make them much more assertive. And there would be Chinese naval bases in the Americas for the first time.

 

[weaponwh]

look like Philippine are worried getting caught between two big players in the middle.

South China Sea: Philippines warns US treaty could drag it into war following B-52 flyover - CNN

The Philippines' top defense official has questioned a key treaty with the US over fears it could drag the country into war in the South China Sea, a day after an American B-52 bomber performed a flyover of the contested region.
Speaking Tuesday, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said the Philippines-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) was ambiguous and vague and risked causing "confusion and chaos during a crisis."
"The Philippines is not in a conflict with anyone and will not be at war with anyone in the future. But the United States, with the increased and frequent passage of its naval vessels in the West Philippine Sea, is more likely to be involved in a shooting war. In such a case and on the basis of the MDT, the Philippines will be automatically involved," Lorenzana said, according to CNN Philippines.
The West Philippine Sea is the local term for the South China Sea, where US naval vessels have been conducting freedom of navigation exercises, sparking furious denunciations from China, which claims much of the region as its territory and has built up and militarized islands and reefs throughout the sea.
On Monday, a US B-52 bomber flew near contested islands in the sea, according to US Pacific Air Forces, which oversees air operations in the region. This was the first flyover involving a nuclear-capable B-52 since November.

Read More
The MDT between the US and the Philippines was signed in 1951, in the early years of the Cold War. It commits both countries to come to the assistance of the other in the event of an "armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."
In December, Lorenzana ordered a review into whether the treaty was "still valid or still relevant today."
"It's a 67-year-old treaty. Is it still relevant to our national interest? That's what we should look at. Let us look at it dispassionately, without considering about past ties, about future ties -- dispassionately," he said, adding the end goal was "to maintain it, strengthen it, or scrap it."
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the treaty has long been a source of contention in the Philippines because of its vagueness in how it covers disputed territories, such as islands in the South China Sea that both Manila and Beijing claim as their own.
"Differences in interpretation arise from the fact that the United States does not explicitly state whether Philippine-claimed disputed territory falls under the provisions of the mutual defense treaty," CFR said in a 2016 report. "Some of these territorial claims were made in the 1970s, decades after the treaty was ratified."
Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte and other top officials, during which he sought to reassure Manila of Washington's commitment to the MDT.
"As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty," Pompeo said.
Speaking alongside him, Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin said the two governments "shared the view that the alliance must be able to ensure the unfailing mutual defense of our two countries."
On Monday however, Lorenzana pointed to what he said was previous US failure to uphold its part of the deal and defend the Philippines' territorial integrity.
Following the closure of the US naval base in Subic Bay, west of Manila, in 1992, Lorenzana said "the Chinese began their aggressive actions in Mischief Reef -- not an armed attack -- but it was aggression just the same. The US did not stop it."
Manila has been in an awkward dance between Beijing and Washington for years. Under the previous government of Benigno Aquino, it won a landmark case against China at an international tribunal, which ruled much of Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea were unlawful.
Under Duterte however, Manila has moved closer to Beijing, even as the President continued to voice occasional concerns about China's territorial ambitions. In November, the two countries agreed to cooperate on oil and gas exploration in the sea, which Duterte said Beijing was "already in possession" of.

"It's now in their hands. So why do we have to create frictions (and undertake) strong military activity that will prompt response from China?" the President said.
Similar concerns seemed to be on Lorenzana's mind Monday, when he said, "it is not the lack of reassurance that worries me. It is being involved in a war that we do not seek and do not want."

 

[ngatimozart]

look like Philippine are worried getting caught between two big players in the middle.

South China Sea: Philippines warns US treaty could drag it into war following B-52 flyover - CNN

Well the current President can't have it both ways by running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. Regardless of what his ego wants, if the big boys on the block go at it, the Philippines will be the meat in the sandwich. China already has shown that it doesn't respect international law and boundaries, so will have no hesitation in escalating on purely military grounds. The Sun Tsu Ping Fa stipulates that move because its sound military and political logic. The Philippines main island of Luzon is part of the First Island Chain.

 

[OPSSG]

look like Philippine are worried getting caught between two big players in the middle.

South China Sea: Philippines warns US treaty could drag it into war following B-52 flyover - CNN

This is so typical of the Pinoys and their national political narrative. Their defence should be their responsibility but in their case it is not. They are not even sovereign in their undisputed territory (on land as various rebel groups hold those areas).

For some strange reason they think that other nations should think like them (and are surprised that they are not well regarded in policy circles as they contribute nothing in their alliance relationship with the US).

 

[weaponwh]

This is so typical of the Pinoys and their national political narrative. Their defence should be their responsibility but in their case it is not. They are not even sovereign in their undisputed territory (on land as various rebel groups hold those areas).

For some strange reason they think that other nations should think like them (and are surprised that they are not well regarded in policy circles as they contribute nothing in their alliance relationship with the US).

Well US need ally in the area even if they don't do anything just prevent them from cozy up to china, especially after TPP ended. India is doing same they play both side to get maximum benefits

 

[Traveller]

I read in earlier posts some commentary on naval blockades. This interested me as my thinking is somewhat different. I thought I might post this and find what other members see in contemporary or future naval blockades.

On the topic of a naval blockade of Australia, do you need a traditional blockade to effect a change in Australian foreign policy?

The last 120 years has seen a change in the nature of the battle-space, from the battlefield to the air to electronic warfare. In the globalised economy it could be suggested that the battle-space can be monetised.

By way of example, PRC (China) had $US 3.09 trillion in foreign reserves in March 2019. China Foreign Exchange Reserves | 2019 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast

If China was to be perturbed by RAN/RAAF right of navigation activities in the South China Sea in support of US activities and agendas, hard military resources may not be required to effect Australian foreign policy changes.

China is a major trading partner to Australia which contributed to a recent $A 2.3 billion trade surplus. Australia's trade surplus comes up short


If China ‘dumped” $100 billion of forex and capital associated with the Australian economy it would not shake the Chinese economy. However the impact on a fragile Australian economy would likely be brutal. Sending a naval force south to Australia might invoke ANZUS, sending dollars ‘south’ if it achieves the desired effect, is safer.

 

[Catalina]

History has shown us that blockade can be an effective tool against an island nation and even though technologies change strategies still remain the same when dictated by geography.

This is an astute analysis that bears further consideration.

 

[MrConservative]

If China ‘dumped” $100 billion of forex and capital associated with the Australian economy it would not shake the Chinese economy.

That action would automatically trigger Basel III/IV international settlement and FSB protocols. They or more precisely their trading agents would quickly have no official trading market where to dump such currency.

The Chinese economy has far greater issues.

 

[Traveller]

That action would automatically trigger Basel III/IV international settlement and FSB protocols. They or more precisely their trading agents would quickly have no official trading market where to dump such currency.

The Chinese economy has far greater issues.

Is this what you are referring to?:
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mc...pean banks/basel-iv-whats-next-for-banks.ashx

Finance at this level is well out of my lane so I will bow to your knowledge.I do have one question on which I am not clear. It is my perhaps mistaken understanding that these are voluntary frameworks. So in language an ex-grunt can understand, would Basel 3 or 4 stop an attack on a currency like the by Soros on the Thai baht about the turn of the century?
Cheers
t

 

[MrConservative]

Is this what you are referring to?:
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business functions/risk/our insights/basel iv whats next for european banks/basel-iv-whats-next-for-banks.ashx

No because that is a McKinsey report focusing on debt liquidity concerning Europe as it relates to that aspect of the protocols.

Finance at this level is well out of my lane so I will bow to your knowledge.I do have one question on which I am not clear. It is my perhaps mistaken understanding that these are voluntary frameworks. So in language an ex-grunt can understand, would Basel 3 or 4 stop an attack on a currency like the by Soros on the Thai baht about the turn of the century?
Cheers
t

There is no set punitive arrangement - but for the ability of the BIS and their member Reserve Banks (The BIS is essentially the Global Reserve Bank for national Reserve banks) to throw the offender out into the cold of the international financial system and become institutem non gratia. Which in itself is a massive punishment.

Soros's activities during the 1990's are one of the reasons the core central banks who work with the Bank for International Settlement and the Financial Stability Board closely monitor global FX transactions tightened up their oversight role. In fact Reserve or Central banks as they are sometimes called can suspend participation in the BIS system of another Reserve bank. It is voluntary in the sense that they don't have to act - but they will act particularly if all of a sudden $100 Billion AUD is dumped on the global currency market. In any case just like in equity markets their are stop trade triggers. All of the big Reserve banks (Fed Reserve, ECB, BOJ et al) would likely suspend the transactional players (institutions or banks that are party to the transaction) within their jurisdictions or suspend their banks with dealing with them. The BIS market governance committee would refuse to finalise settlement.

China is in no position to commit financial war with the rest of the world. There are significant US based financial institutions in the private realm that control global equity classes that dwarf some G7 nations. In fact Vanguard and BlackRock together match China's GDP with around 12 Trillion of equities under management.

 

[Traveller]

Thankyou MrConservative, that was one interesting and informative post. Certainly an education for me. I appreciate the time you took to write it.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 3: Backgrounder

From my perspective, China wants a vote in Taiwan’s future and the ability to secure its trade routes against smaller powers. It’s island building efforts in the South China Sea and the PLAN’s attempt to develop an effective aircraft carrier arm reflects its efforts to mitigate this concern (to protect its trade routes). But as long as it’s economy is export driven, it wants trade, not war (unless Trump miscalculated over the redlines for China). I am hopeful the Sino-American trade war will end with a deal, in 2019. China will push back against regional states like the Philippines and Vietnam and engage in divide and conquer tactics with the rest of the Littoral States (eg. Malaysia and Brunei). There are six points to note about Sino-ASEAN relations:-

One, beyond taking part in ADMM Plus, China also participated in bilateral exercises, like the COOPERATION series of bilateral military exercises with Singapore (that is upsetting to Taiwan). Su Hao, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, said China and Singapore are interdependent. Singapore has helped China with its economic and administrative management expertise, while China's rapid growth offers investment opportunities for Singapore. Beyond that, Belt and Road offers more opportunities for cooperation.

Two, joint bilateral military exercises between China and individual ASEAN countries are not unique to Singapore. Indonesia (eg. Exercise Knife Sharp, anti-terror joint military exercise), Thailand (eg. Exercise Strike, a joint counter-terrorism exercise; and Exercise Blue Strike, an exercise between Thai and Chinese marine units), and Malaysia have conducted or are going to conduct bilateral exercises with China. Beijing's courtship of Jakarta, KL and Bangkok includes trade agreements, foreign direct investment, market access, technical assistance, and includes offers of military hardware and military cooperation.

Three, the Nine-dotted line was originally an "eleven-dotted-line" first indicated by the then Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947 for its claims to the South China Sea. After the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine as endorsed by Zhou Enlai. It should be noted that regulations approved by China's Hainan province require foreign fishing vessels in the South China Sea to ask for permission to enter its waters took effect on 1 January 2014. China claims to a U-shaped swathe of the South China Sea that over laps with the EEZ claims of Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki has said that the passing of these restrictions on other countries' fishing activities in disputed portions of the South China Sea is 'a provocative and potentially dangerous act.' On the other hand, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move is unremarkable. He said, "China is a maritime nation, so it is totally normal and part of the routine for Chinese provinces bordering the sea to formulate regional rules according to the national law to regulate conservation, management and utilization of maritime biological resources."

Four, at times, China’s moves are in response to perceived provocations by other countries, described by some as “reactive assertiveness.” The standoff between vessels from China and the Philippines, which was triggered in April 2102 by Manila’s dispatching a frigate to arrest Chinese fishermen engaged in poaching at Scarborough Shoal. This incident ended with China occupying the Shoal and it also revealed the Philippines’ misconceived expectations about the role of US and ASEAN. China continues to militarize the South China Sea features it occupies and to assert its questionable maritime claims versus other claimants. US rhetoric has sharply criticized China’s behavior and implied dire consequences if it persists. But China has persisted and it has become clear that America is not going to rescue the other claimants from perceived intimidation and coercion. The realization that the US will not be coming to the rescue is belatedly beginning to sink in throughout the region and misplaced hope is being replaced by bitter disappointment and even despair in the Philippines. However to seasoned observers in Singapore this development was not a surprise.

Five, the Indonesian Navy has distributed exercise maps that display Indonesian border delineations including Natuna, to ensure that all countries recognize Indonesian borders. This precaution is obviously taken in response to China's muscle flexing and claims in the South China Sea through the so-called nine dotted lines. China claims a U-shaped swathe of the South China Sea under the nine dotted lines, which is administered under the authority of China's Hainan province. This swathe overlaps areas also claimed by several South East Asian nations. In recent years, China’s claim has encroached Natuna waters, observers believe that China will eventually do so in a more robust manner (especially over fisheries rights).

Six, at the bilateral level, Singapore has attempted to balance a general disposition of deference towards China with firm resolve regarding its own autonomy and the right to assert it. At the regional level, Singapore’s efforts at engaging China have no doubt been complicated by regional circumspection about Chinese motives and power.

This article reports on the US Indo Pacific commander’s comments to Congress...

Indo-Pacific Command Worried About China’s Path

Yes there is worry but there are other trends we need to review. China is the world's most populous country but China is projected to be overtaken by India (current No. 2) in about 5 years. In 2016, China had a population larger than 1.4 billion (but by 2086, its ageing population will fall below 1.1 billion people). The projections – made by the UN's Population Division – suggest that by 2024, India will surpass China to become the world's most populous country. Rapidly declining fertility rates – from an average of 6 children down to 2.4 children per woman – in India means its population growth has fallen significantly over the last few decades. This means that while it will be the most populous country for the rest of the century, it's expected to reach 'peak population' in the late 2050s at around 1.7 billion before slowly falling in the second half of the century. For more details see: India will soon overtake China to become the most populous country in the world

Other demographic trends in Asia include increasing urbanisation and connectivity via smart phones with local apps (via mega cities, like Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta), and the growth of terrorism in the littorals and the increase in the proportion of people living in growing medium sized cities near the coast (eg. the Mumbai terror attack or Mindanao after the Marawi siege).

I believe that both China and India are less militarily prepared for these latest developments than they want. The less governed spaces and threats to trade (unconventional warfare against non-state actors) are Chinese and Indian concerns - just as it is a Japanese or American concern. Piracy in S.E. Asia is now locally managed (eg. the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol and the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" Combined Maritime Air Patrols, as well as through intelligence sharing) but I don’t think we understand enough about how coastal cities react to stress (eg. access to clean water, rise of sea levels, storm surges due to weather events, earthquakes and so on) - when it can be seen as a Feral City (or like a discussion on failed states). IMHO, there is a linkage between water shortage, lack of city planning and violence but I just don’t know enough to enlighten this discussion.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 3: Theory and context

In 2014, Seoul ordered 40 F-35As, built by Lockheed Martin, through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program. “The procurement agency has launched a feasibility study on the additional purchase of F-35As, and the request for proposal, or RFI, is to be issued early next year.” Funding for this effort will be about $3 billion, according to sources. Airborne systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are also on the purchase list as part of midterm force improvement plans from 2019 to 2023, according to South Korean procurement sources. The budget for that ISR acquisition is estimated at $1.7 billion, a DAPA source told Defense News. “The agency issued a request for information, and a couple of foreign potential bidders responded to the request,” the source said. Among the bidders are Boeing, Raytheon and Israel Aerospace Industries’ Elta Systems. Boeing offered a P-8 Poseidon-based aircraft fitted with Raytheon’s Advanced Airborne Sensor radar capable of wide-range ground surveillance operations.

The South Korean government is accelerating efforts to take back authority to control its armed forces during wartime by 2022. An American four-star general currently is responsible for the maneuvers of both U.S. and South Korean troops on the Korean Peninsula in the event of war, and South Korean forces are heavily dependent on American airborne equipment for deterrence in relation to N. Korea. From 2022 on onwards naval skirmishes between the North and the South, such as, the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong (29 June 2002) or the ROKS Cheonan sinking (26 March 2010), will be less restrained once the Americans are no longer in command.

In an opinion piece by Mark Helprin at the Wall Street Journal
The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China
Opinion | The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China
I will summarize my main takeaways from the article.
The author laments the US' loss of economic and high-tech manufacturing, research, and capitalization advantages since the eighties due to outsourcing instead of automation, which in my opinion enabled China's rapid economic expansion. The author laments our inability to rally allies in confronting China on trade instead of engaging everyone at the same time. The author alarms of the possibility of our future loss of control over the Pacific and China's expansion to East Pacific and take over of the Panama Canal, if we fail to implement an adequate strategy to counter China's possible expansion. To remedy, the author suggests to rally and support our Asia-Pacific allies, pressure China on some type of nuclear arms control regime, strengthen our Navy, Marines, and long-range air power, expand long-range sealift and airlift, and dig in on our islands in the Pacific. This approach seems to be similar to area denial.

....

I believe that development of an effective and cost-conscious strategy now will pay off in the long term. We need to seriously consider and address China's expansion while keeping in ming that, as predicted by Macroeconomic Theory, China's economy can continue to expand at a high rate until it approaches the level of developed Western Countries in terms of GDP per capita, which is a good measure of wealth. China is still far from it but is building its way there, at which point its GDP will become gigantic by current measures due to the size of its population. China will continue to strive to be a strong naval power due to the criticality of maritime trade to its population and economic growth. Their demand of agricultural and natural resources require large and stable maritime capabilities since their neighbors cannot fully meet Chinese demand, and diversification of suppliers provides trade advantages.

I am not a fan of Area Denial as described because the littoral countries in the South China Sea area will not support such action against China. ASEAN countries need to trade, as our economies are export driven. It’s a grave mistake for Congress to let the US navy’s attack submarine fleet to dwindle from fifty-three today to forty-one in 2029. That’s a 23 percent drop in the number of hulls at a time when China is bulking up its fleet of 78 nuclear and conventionally propelled submarine by 2020. Ask yourself why is it that Russia, Japan, S. Korea, India, Indonesia, and Singapore are serious in their efforts in rejuvenating their respective and very capable submarine forces. And why new submarine operators like Thailand (that has contracted to buy submarines from China), Viet Nam (that has six delivered from Russia) and Malaysia (that has two operational submarines delivered from France), have decided to invest in the silent service. More importantly, such a land based Area Denial strategy will not get Japanese support - the superb Japanese Navy or JMSDF EXISTS to protect trade. In any major conflict, Area Denial coverts Taiwan into a Vassal state of China - which seems to me like a bad strategy.

In other news, on 17 April 2019, for the first time in Indonesian history, the president, the vice president, and members of the People's Consultative Assembly are elected on the same day. While the Indonesian electorate is mainly concerned with domestic issues, the intelligentsia in Indonesia understand the importance of both Chinese and Japanese infrastructure investments and soft loans to their country. The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), of which Indonesia is a party, gives China a leg up in the economic sphere. ACFTA is a free trade agreement that reduced tariffs on 7,881 product categories, or 90 percent of imported goods, to zero, which is a factor in the recent elections in Indonesia. The Indonesians know they have to manage via trade-offs in their relations with China. Whereas other countries in ASEAN, India and US do not register on the Indonesian political calculus during the recent April 2019 elections. The US military may be powerful but the Americans are not major investors in Indonesia (relative to China or Japan). The Indians need investments and is not an trading power viz a vis China or Japan. Indonesia as ASEAN’s leader is the world's third-largest democracy with an electorate of 193 million (behind the US and India) and has the largest Muslim population in the world. In the April 2019 Indonesian election, the country will prove that Islam and multiparty democracy are compatible. In addition to changing demographics and today’s election in Indonesia, geopolitical analysis assumes two things:

First, that human beings have a preference to be loyal to the people and the places they were born into.

Second, that the character of a nation is determined to a great extent by geography, as is the relationship between nations. The term "geography" includes the physical characteristics of a location, but it goes beyond that to look at the effects of a place on individuals and communities.

These are the foundation of geopolitical forecasting. Opinion and reputation have little to do with national power. Whether the current American, Chinese, Indian or Indonesian leader is loathed or admired is of some minor importance but the fundamentals of Indian, Indonesian or ASEAN power (or rather the respective lack of ability to project power viz a viz China, US or Japan) is overarching. Nor do passing events like disputes over EEZ waters or the imposition of air defence identification zones have much to do with national power, no matter how significant they appear at that moment. The basic geometry of Indian weakness, Indonesian weakness or ASEAN weakness in military and economic terms viz a viz it’s more powerful neighbours, like US, China or Japan does not change.

As I said in my prior post China wants the ability to secure its trade routes against smaller powers and in some cases enforce the peace should conflict break out between the littoral states, if required. So in some sense it’s interests are aligned with that of the US and Japan. The island building is not only useful in enforcing its approach to the fisheries, it also out flanks Taiwan’s defensive posture. China’s goal is to win without a need to fight.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 3 of 3: Implications of recent developments

On 2 April 2019, Time magazine reports that Taiwan is unlikely to get 60 F-16V under the Trump administration as they seek a deal with China to end the Sino-American trade war. The longer this trade war drags on, the less trust US allies in Asia will have for Trump.

On 16 April 2019, South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) has reportedly been awarded a contract to build three Nagapasa Type 209/1400 diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) for the Indonesian Navy. This means the Indonesians will soon operate a fleet of submarines to eight by 2024 (including its pair of German-built Cakra-class boats). This fleet strength is line with the revised objectives found in the Indonesian Armed Forces' modernisation blueprint known as Minimum Essential Force (MEF). However, beyond 2024 Indonesian naval planners maintain the requirement for a total submarine fleet strength of 12 under its MEF to adequately defend its vast archipelago. This means Jakarta could eventually acquire up to four vessels under its third submarine acquisition programme. This change in the balance of power by 2024 is not without risk to Malaysia in KL’s calculus.

Any increase in instability in the Philippines will also affect Sabah’s security (eg. the 2013 Lahad Datu incident, where over 200 armed militants from the Philippines had to be killed by the Malaysian government). Plus Malaysia and Singapore just narrowly managed to avoid conflict escalation over port limits, air space and water pricing disputes - as a result of Malaysian actions in Dec 2018 (see: The best strategy to defending Singapore Island for details). With Dr M as PM, Malaysia is once again offering Singapore a test case of what happens when a populist is re-elected in a corrupt democracy. So thank you very much for the test case. What is important in this crisis is the strength of Singapore’s institutions as Malaysian institutions are rotten after the years of Barisan Nasional and UMNO in power, the foundations of which was laid in Dr M’s 1st stint as PM (from 1981 to 2003).

The countries in the region will not choose to go to war with big powers but amongst themselves, the temptation is there as the dynamics between the parties shift (due to weapons acquisitions or other local political dynamics). Growing from a force of two older Cakra class submarines, to a viable force of six modern Nagapasa class submarines (3 now and 3 more to be built) Indonesia will be capable of sea denial (as part of its MEF defence strategy). The question is whether Malaysia and Indonesia can continue to manage their disputed maritime borders in the Ambalat region (just to the northeast of Kalimantan) without further escalation. Intra-ASEAN conflict is not only possible but likely, if populist nationalist tendencies are not moderated - the Pinoys have scores to settle with the Malaysians over Sabah, which they claim. The Indonesians are still sore with the Malaysians over a range of other issues and are keen to demonstrate their resolve.

Due to the need for regular elections in Indonesia (without the corresponding maturity of political institutions and political parties), populism is a factor to consider in any border dispute.

In addition, since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has adopted two major approaches to relations with external powers.

First, ASEAN member states promoted the concept of regional autonomy to prevent any one power from exercising hegemony over Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s assertion of regional autonomy took two forms. It involved the expansion of membership from its initial core of five to ten of Southeast Asia’s eleven states. ASEAN’s assertion of regional autonomy also took the form of political declarations and treaties covering Southeast Asia as a whole such as the Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (1971), the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone Treaty (1995). In recent years ASEAN has advanced the concept of regional autonomy by ratifying the ASEAN Charter and setting the goal of creating an ASEAN Community by 2015. Further, there are three pillars to ASEAN and each pillar has a community council. The ASEAN Community Councils comprise Council of all the three pillars of ASEAN. Under their purview is the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and these include:

(i) the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council;

(ii) the ASEAN Economic Community Council; and

(iii) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council.

Second ASEAN's approach in relations with external powers has been to assert its centrality in the region’s security architecture. For example, when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 ASEAN insisted that it be in “the driver’s seat” as the sole chair. ASEAN has grown from a modest forum for regional cooperation to an institutionalized organization responsible for a broad range of practical cooperation, and the driver for broader regional economic, political, and security integration. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) is the meeting of the 10 Defence Ministers from ASEAN, plus 8 other powers. ADMM was inaugurated on 9 May 2006 in Kuala Lumpur and the 8 other powers are namely, the US, China, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. In May 2011, ASEAN approved the establishment of Expert Working Groups (EWGs) comprising of an ASEAN member with an ADMM Plus member as co-chairs.

The 2002 Bali bombing in Kuta attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah resulted in 202 people dead and 209 injured. Three years later, the bombing in Jimbaran and Kuta claimed the lives of 20 people and injured 100 others. The 253 people confirmed dead, the death toll for the Sri Lanka Easter terror attack with over 500 injured is also more than the 2008 Mumbai shooting and bombing attack which lasted four days, killed more than 170 people and wounded more than 300.

Beyond the Bali bombings, I turn my attention to Malaysia. In Malaysia’s case, Saudi Arabia has long been funding mosques and schools, while providing scholarships for Malaysians to study in the kingdom. Many of them find employment in Malaysia’s multitude of Islamic agencies, said Farouk Musa. One of the most worrisome doctrines they preach in multi-cultural Malaysia is ‘al-w ala’ wa-al-bara’ or “allegiance and disavowal”, Farouk said. “This doctrine basically means do not befriend the non-believers (al-kuffar), even if they are among the closest relatives. The Malaysian authorities continue to disrupt ISIS-linked plots and attacks. According to media reports, they have disrupted four terrorist plots and arrested more than 80 militants in 2018. While we continue to work with the Malaysian authorities to disrupt ISIS-linked plots and attacks, one day and without notice that cooperation may end due to domestic politics in Malaysia (see: Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2019).

Not only is there renewed concern about terrorism in the region (with the latest Easter terrorist attack in Sri Lanka), the changing the balance of power in the maritime Southeast Asia region will have an adverse consequence on the immediate security posture of these countries. Disputes in the South China Sea has already result in deaths, shootings at sea and destruction of property of innocent parties on land, if you read prior posts on what has happened to Taiwanese fishermen, and the riots in Viet Nam over China's placement of a rig in disputed waters. In addition, China has also become vulnerable to charges of manipulative “debt-trap diplomacy”, interference in domestic political affairs and links to corruption at high levels of foreign governments. Such manipulation occurs when a country intentionally extends loans guaranteed by the recipient country’s assets knowing that it may not be able to pay off the loans and thus hoping that the host will forfeit the assets.

 

[John Fedup]

You paint a rather grim picture of the region's possible (perhaps likely) future. I guess the situation might even get worse if certain great powers incorrectly decide to take opposite sides with quarrelling neighbours.

 

[OPSSG]

Korea will soon be building a second batch of 3 larger submarines. The first batch of KSS-III submarines are 83.5 meters long, 9.6 meters wide and with a draught of 7.6 meters, has a maximum submerged displacement of 3,700 tons - which shows the scale of Korean ambitions in building their submarine force.

You paint a rather grim picture of the region's possible (perhaps likely) future. I guess the situation might even get worse if certain great powers incorrectly decide to take opposite sides with quarrelling neighbours.

IMHO the picture painted by me is not grim. China continues to need trade (for continued economic growth and domestic stability), which is aligned to American, Japanese, S. Korean and Indian interests of keeping the Indo-Pacific region stable.

With Asia’s growth story, no one here really wants war. There may be brinksmanship (or at worse limited naval skirmishes between littoral navies or coast guards) but no actual desire for going on a full scale war footing (by any country mentioned in my 3 above posts). There may be posturing but no one is planning to attack merchant shipping. The various parties want to ‘protect’ or control trade (and not stop it, in this day and age). S&P has given both China and Japan a sovereign rating of A+ and having a peaceful external environment is key to managing borrowing costs for both these 2 governments, as they continue to invest in building infrastructure. I note that South Korea has a rating of AA, with even India having a rating of BBB- (an investment grade rating). Both Philippines and Indonesia have an investment rating of BBB. While we can say that there is some minor risk of war, that risk is very, very, very little - as all counties have much to lose if actual full scale hostility breaks out between the elephants in the room (aka US and China). There is so much hype on Sino-American rivalry (played up by supporters of the military industrial complex), when there is so much commonality in interests - when we look at the matter more carefully.

The past confidence put in the US support for a rules based order is misplaced in the era of Trump. No one in Asia regards the US as the protector of the global order, and nor does China, Japan or India. Rather, the US has been corrosive of the rules based order. The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the TTP, the Iran nuclear deal and its ambiguous stance towards Russia, has hurt its standing in Asia; the Trump administration seems intent on starting a trade wars be it with Europe or China.

IMO, America needs an enemy to continue spending so much and so inefficiently on building increasingly complex defence capability - that is why the China threat is so attractive to the global military industrial complex (eg. BAE, Thales, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and so on). Americans reading this post need to understand that dealing with the Chinese is very different from dealing with the Russians, who are much more willing to shoot. China is gun shy and inherently likes to ‘win’ without any shooting in their geo-political strategy. Even if they shoot, they tend to have limited goals and a clear exit strategy. Plus China has the withal and diplomatic savvy to create ‘win-win’ outcomes, if they so desire. The South China Sea is China’s backyard and they know the region better than the Americans - that is why they are so effective at divide and conquer.

 

[ngatimozart]

IMHO the picture painted by me is not grim. China continues to need trade (for continued economic growth and domestic stability), which is aligned to American, Japanese, S. Korean and Indian interests of keeping the Indo-Pacific region stable.

With Asia’s growth story, no one here really wants war. There may be brinksmanship (or at worse limited naval skirmishes between littoral navies or coast guards) but no actual desire for going on a full scale war footing (by any country mentioned in my 3 above posts). There may be posturing but no one is planning to attack merchant shipping. The various parties want to ‘protect’ or control trade (and not stop it, in this day and age). S&P has given both China and Japan a sovereign rating of A+ and having a peaceful external environment is key to managing borrowing costs for both these 2 governments, as they continue to invest in building infrastructure. I note that South Korea has a rating of AA, with even India having a rating of BBB- (an investment grade rating). Both Philippines and Indonesia have an investment rating of BBB. While we can say that there is some minor risk of war, that risk is very, very, very little - as all counties have much to lose if actual full scale hostility breaks out between the elephants in the room (aka US and China). There is so much hype on Sino-American rivalry (played up by supporters of the military industrial complex), when there is so much commonality in interests - when we look at the matter more carefully.

IMO America needs an enemy to continue spending so much and so inefficiently on building increasingly complex defence capability - that is why the China threat is so attractive to the global military industrial complex (eg. BAE, Thales, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and so on). Americans reading this post need to understand that dealing with the Chinese is very different from dealing with the Russians, who are much more willing to shoot. China is gun shy and inherently likes to ‘win’ without any shooting in their geo-political strategy. Even if they shoot, they tend to have limited goals and a clear exit strategy. Plus China has the withal and diplomatic savvy to create ‘win-win’ outcomes, if they so desire. The South China Sea in China’s backyard and they know the region better than the Americans - that is why they are so effective at divide and conquer.

Regarding both the PRC and the USA I think you are describing the Performative War Thesis which is summarised as:

" ... all states are concerned with their status. Hegemonic or hierarchic states are especially sensitive to status because their leadership relies upon their authority being accepted by minor powers and other observers; they are not merely interested in deterring threats to their territory but, more grandly, to their rule. When there is a mismatch between a powerful state’s self-perceived status and how others consider it, especially after a humiliation, that country may choose to start a war to demonstrate its hegemony to others in the system. Certain reputational and status benefits can only be earned by violence; a peaceful bargain, no matter how lopsided, cannot produce the same effect. As such, a state will itch for a fight, and there is nothing material or symbolic the victim can offer to sufficiently assuage the aggressor; there is no bargaining range to speak of."
Ahsan I. Butt (2019) Why did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003?, Security Studies, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1551567
​

Both nations have reason to assuage recent humiliations, in Chinas case the 100 Years of Humiliation and for the US losing the Vietnam War, both of which have seared the national psyche, but more so the inter-generational egos of the elites in the political, diplomatic, and military establishments of both countries.

I would also suggest that since Xi Jinping has become leader, that if / when push comes to shove the PRC will not back down and will push back hard. He has a lot to gain - more than he would lose, especially with his opponents in some disarray. The PRC and Russia are forging closer links and it's to both their strategic advantages because the US is not in a position to take both of them on at the same time. See: How Does the Next Great Power Conflict Play Out? Lessons from a Wargame

It also appears that the US may have won the Afghan War hands down back in 2001 and could've pulled out leaving the Afghans to rebuild themselves in a way that best suited their culture. However they didn't because somebody had a bright idea to proselytise western democracy into a society that had never had any exposure to such a concept, and forced foreign alien values upon a traditional tribal society, which was a fatal mistake because it and Iraq have worn the US military and Treasury down. See: Afghanistan, the forever war that was basically won in a few months

So where does that leave us? We have two great powers, actually three when you include Russia, in a status competition based around who's dick is the biggest and all three of them have the wherewithal and political will to back their claims up; two (US & Russia) with leaders who are egocentric, volatile and illogical, with the third who also has a large ego, appears to think of himself as Mao reincarnated, but is far smarter and more dangerous than Mao ever was.

 

[Catalina]

a large ego, appears to think of himself as Mao reincarnated, but is far smarter and more dangerous than Mao ever was.

Ngatimozart has hit the nail on the head, or to put that another way around, it is the head that hits the nail.

Analysts who talk only at a macro-level, miss the greatest lesson of history - it is leaders who start wars for totalitarian nations are not rational actors. Having ruthlessly purged so many, having determinedly collated such power in his hands, having so assetively expanded the borders of China like no other Chinese leader ever has, the fate of the entire Indo-Pacific region depends upon what Xi orders and what is on is mind.

Time for our navies and nations to prepare my friends as the CCP builds the equivalent of the French Navy every four years.

'Dictator for life': Xi Jinping's power grab condemned as step towards tyranny