How close has Australia come to war

[JoeMcFriday]

Mind you, presumably there will be a strong bias by this organisation (eg against the "West")?

Wiki article on the ICFI
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Committee_of_the_Fourth_International

No politics in this post, just a little history...
They are not so much against the 'West', [they are American I think], as against what they see as the ruling class of capitalists. They see politicians as lackeys, mercilessly ignoring human rights in pursuit of the almighty dollar for the few. they are Trotskyists, not Stalinists.
Get past their rhetoric and examine the historical facts of Australia's 'positions' on Timor and West New Guinea etc since 1946, then compare your findings to theirs and one might not be so surprised they hold those views.
The Menzies Government went a long way [with the Brits] to developing a Nuclear capability, military and civil, until summarily dropped by the U.K. who wanted American technology for the RN's SSNs. As part of that deal all Nuclear help to Australia was to stop, despite breaking agreements, all this being kept secret at the time. The Maralinga atomic wastelands were for nought in the end.
Probably to save the face, the Government made like it was its decision to not pursue a Nuclear option, now it's tougher to turn away from that public stance.
It seems we have to worry, even now, what other countries think about our defense spending, yet I don't recall any news reports about other Nations asking Canberra for permission to buy anything.
We should buy whatever is needed to give the ADF the means to ensure we never get caught short of readiness again and carry a better if not bigger stick than the the opponent.
The only positive outcome from coming 'close to war' is if the other side backs down and everyone comes home after achieving their goals.
The best way to achieve that is not through parity but superiority... in weapons, technology, transport and training. We sure can't count on numerical superiority, can we?
Lets hope the ADF doesn't get left with half a toolbox again and react less to what 'others' think because we will come close to war again and the ADF don't deserve to go to a confrontation handicapped. That's too much temptation for the other party to do something nasty.
Cheers,
Mac

 

[recce.k1]

No probs, won't get into that "class war" rhetoric for fear of treading into politics as you don't wish to either.

I'm no expert on Australian foreign policy of the 1950's/1960's etc, so am not qualified to talk about Australia's position on Timor and WNG, except to say, that I am happy to admit that I'm uneasy with the current situation in relation to West Papua. However I suppose, what is the alternative? It's easy for WSWS (and the John Pilger's) to be critical of the west's relationship with the former dictatorship in Indonesia, so what was the right thing to do? Go to war with Indonesia and occupy a vast territory of thousands of islands, with many millions and millions of people with a small non-conscript force of Aussies, kiwis and Brits? Not likely, and especially since post WW2 "we" signed up to the UN conventions to decolonise Asian/Pacific territories and former colonies etc.
Maybe the right thing to do was not go to war and try and have some influence with the then Indonesian dictatorship? But what if the alternative was a communist regime on Australia's back door? The mind boggles at the possibilities but maybe someone more qualified can give some better scenarios and advise how best this should have been countered and played out etc. Granted though, the dictatorship was not a good look for the west and "our" complicit support is something that won't be forgotten.

The Aussie nuclear programme comments are interesting. As it happens the latest RNZN Museum Journal "The White Ensign" covers Operation GRAPPLE. The journal also featured a fascinating back-grounder to Operation GRAPPLE, you may find the following article of interest in light of your comments as it touches upon the Australian "connection":

CODE NAME: Operation Grapple
Britain's Development of the Nuclear Bomb
By Russ Glacklin

When the USA dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945 to end World War 2 in the Pacific, they made the possession of nuclear power a major requisite for Great Power status in the post-war world. The British, no less than the Russians and French, scrambled to close the alarming nuclear gap that had been opened by the Americans and so began a nuclear arms race that was the very essence of the Cold War. There in lay the seeds of Britain's Operation GRAPPLE in the South Pacific.

ALLIES AT ODDS
Britain's scientists had long conceived of the concept of nuclear power and were committed to the development of nuclear weapons but it was not until two nuclear scientists at the University of Birmingham published a paper in 1940 theorising on the source of the fast chain reaction necessary for an atomic bomb, that the concept became a feasibility. The Maud Committee was immediately set up to explore the possibility of the feasibility becoming a reality. When the Americans read the first Maud Report they were impressed at how technically advanced the British were and pressed Roosevelt to set up the Manhattan Project and propose a joint collaboration with the British. Britain's chilly response was ironically at odds with what later transpired but they were concerned at the ability of the Americans to keep secrets. They were uneasy about America's neutral position in the war at that point and they were understandably reluctant to surrender their nuclear advantage which would be vital in the post-war world. Britain needed America's help to win the war. Churchill, accompanied by his daughter, travelled to America to request Franklin Roosevelt to come into the war.

PEARL HARBOUR BOMBING GALVANISES AMERICA
The American and British roles were dramatically reversed by the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941, committing America to the war and the atomic bomb. Roosevelt poured vast quantities of money, materials and manpower into the Manhattan Project against which a war-torn Britain could not compete. Churchill's formidable diplomatic skills were needed to persuade Roosevelt to give British scientists the opportunity to join the Manhattan team at Los Alamos in a desperate bid to build the bomb before the end of the War. Though the British scientists on the Project were 'compartmentalised' by the Americans and prevented from getting
an overall view of the work on the bomb their contribution to the Hiroshima bomb was vital and they returned home with a working manual on how to duplicate the American atomic bomb.

GUARDED ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION
By the end of 1945 the 'special relationship' between Churchill and Roosevelt had soured as Truman determined that America must retain its nuclear monopoly. They were suspicious of the socialist Government of Altee and could see no political advantage in continued collaboration with a poor relation. The McMahon Act of 1946 made it illegal for Americans to pass information to another country on pain of death. Britain was now in the bomb making business by itself.

GREAT POWER STATUS
The decision to proceed with the building of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent was made in January 1947. It was a highly secret project under the direction of William Penney and the costs were hidden. Reliance on the Americans for nuclear power was to ensure second-class status. 'Like native levies who were allowed small arms but not artillery' said Lord Cockcroft, the Head of the Atomic Research Establishment at Harwell.*1 The project was given greater impetus with the developing Cold War.

MONTE BELLO ISLANDS TEST SITE IN AUSTRALIA
The priority was to explode a nuclear device as soon as possible. Britain needed an isolated test site large enough to conduct twelve tests, with no human habitation within 100 miles downwind of a detonation and where prevailing winds would blow contamination out to sea but not into shipping lanes. In early 1952 Australia's pro-British Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, keen for Australia to start a nuclear energy programme of their own, readily agreed to allow Britain's fIrst atomic bomb test to be conducted on the uninhabited Monte Bello Islands off Australia's north-west coast. He assured Australians that 'the test..will be conducted in conditions which will ensure that there will be no danger whatever from radioactivity to the health of people or animals in the Commonwealth*2 whilst neglecting to mention that it was probably the first test in an ongoing programme and would leave the islands uninhabitable for years. Britain exploded its first A-bomb at Monte Bello at 9.15am on 3 October 1952 amidst great secrecy and urgency. It went faultlessly. Britain had joined an exclusive club but had singularly failed to impress its members for only a month after Monte Bello the USA exploded her first H-bomb followed by the Soviets in August 1953. It was, however, the beginning of Britain's programme of atmospheric nuclear tests that was to end with Operation GRAPPLE Z on the 23 September 1958.

NEW TEST SITES NEEDED
The original test-site on the Monte Bello Islands proved to be unsuitable. A further two new test sites were developed at Maralinga and Christmas Island. An aboriginal place name, Maralinga portentously translates as "field of thunder". The test site at Maralinga was completed in early 1956 at a cost of five million pounds. At the same time construction had already begun at Christmas Island.

DEVELOPING A BRITISH H-BOMB
Britain decided to manufacture its own H-bomb in June 1954 as the Americans and the Russians had already developed and tested their H-bombs. They got a "bigger bang for their buck" as the H-bomb was cheaper to manufacture than the A-bomb. The original Test Agreement with the Australians had specifically excluded hydrogen weapon testing on the Australian mainland so the hunt was on for another testing ground. The requirements for the new site were British ownership in the largest area of sea with the least number of adjacent land masses and the least number of people. The finger fell upon Christmas Island, the Pacific's largest atoll, a 1000 miles south of Hawaii and 1500 miles north of Fiji, and adjacent to Malden Island. The British H-bomb Tests on Christmas Island were code-named Operation GRAPPLE. The 4-pointed iron grapple symbolizing inter-service co-operation on the project -Army, Navy , Air Force and AWRE, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment. 1957-1958 saw direct New Zealand Navy involvement in nuclear testing when RNZN sailors were deployed at the request of the British to witness nuclear testing off the coasts of Christmas and MaIden Islands in the Pacific Ocean. These tests were the final block carried out by Britain in Australia and the Pacific. 551 men and two frigates (HMNZS ROTOITI and PUKAKI) comprised New Zealand's contribution. Their official duties were to witness the explosions and collect weather data, although some New Zealand sailors also monitored the test area for Russian and American spy-submarines. The first bomb was dropped from a Valiant bomber at 13000 feet on the 15 May 1957. Many who witnessed the blast were astonished and terrified by its power. William Oates, a storeman on the island recalled: 'Probably the thing that scared me the most was not the ball of flame in the sky, nor the searing heat but the blast and shockwave which followed later ...I saw grown men at their wits end trying to run away from the blast.'*3 Operation GRAPPLE ended in September 1958 and just in the nick of time as Britain joined the USA and the USSR in the next month in a moratorium on nuclear testing. Britain never tested in the open again but Christmas Island was back in business by 1962 as a test site for the Americans. The moratorium collapsed when the Soviets began testing again in 1961 and Britain lent their test site to the USA for a series of 25 tests called Operation DOMINIC which they used to refine their Polaris missiles. When Britain then purchased these Polaris missiles from the Americans they effectively ended their own independent nuclear deterrent by becoming reliant on the USA for supply thus denying the original objective of their nuclear programme since the end of World War 2.

*1,*2,*3: Deny, Blakeway, Sue Lloyd-Roberts, Fields of Thunder: Testing
Britain's Bomb, London. Unwin, 1985, p. BS.

REFERENCES:
Blakeway, Denys, L/oyd-Roberts, Sue, Fields of Thunder: Testing Britain's
Bomb, London: Unwin,1985.

Crawford, John, The Involvement of Royal New Zealand Navy in the British
Nuclear Testing Programmes of 1957 and 1958, Wellington: Headquarters
New Zealand Defence Force, 1989.

Ministry of Defence, Operation GRAPPLE 1956-1957, London: HMsO, 1958.

Wright, Gerry, We Were There: Operation GRAPPLE, New Plymouth: Zenith Publishing, n.d.

 

[JoeMcFriday]

No probs, won't get into that "class war" rhetoric for fear of treading into politics as you don't wish to either.

I'm no expert on Australian foreign policy of the 1950's/1960's etc, so am not qualified to talk about Australia's position on Timor and WNG, except to say, that I am happy to admit that I'm uneasy with the current situation in relation to West Papua. However I suppose, what is the alternative? It's easy for WSWS (and the John Pilger's) to be critical of the west's relationship with the former dictatorship in Indonesia, so what was the right thing to do? Go to war with Indonesia and occupy a vast territory of thousands of islands, with many millions and millions of people with a small non-conscript force of Aussies, kiwis and Brits? Not likely, and especially since post WW2 "we" signed up to the UN conventions to decolonise Asian/Pacific territories and former colonies etc.
Maybe the right thing to do was not go to war and try and have some influence with the then Indonesian dictatorship? But what if the alternative was a communist regime on Australia's back door? The mind boggles at the possibilities but maybe someone more qualified can give some better scenarios and advise how best this should have been countered and played out etc. Granted though, the dictatorship was not a good look for the west and "our" complicit support is something that won't be forgotten.

The Aussie nuclear programme comments are interesting. As it happens the latest RNZN Museum Journal "The White Ensign" covers Operation GRAPPLE. The journal also featured a fascinating back-grounder to Operation GRAPPLE, you may find the following article of interest in light of your comments as it touches upon the Australian "connection":

Hi recce.k1,
Really like the post, very good points and thanks for the link.
I like the facts as well and usually pay very little heed to rhetoric, except for recognising it as a filter through which the author is viewed and then allowances made.
Understandably the policy here is "NO Politics" but as politics and possible military threats are but two sides of one face, it somewhat cramps an answer to questions such as the one posed here. I try to avoid presenting any personal political stance myself in these posts.
This link is to Wiki, but it's convenient and it serves to highlight the controversial nature of Javanese expansionism [morphing into Indonesia] after WW2.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_New_Guinea
The Javanese manipulation of the USA vs USSR global struggle was used to great effect to secure their own ends, that of a regional empire extending over areas to which they had no moral or lineal claim.
It was the USA's pressure on the Dutch, Australians etc that denied any other choice than what has transpired, if it was concerned with ending colonialism, it failed. A European ruler was replaced with a Javanese one and just because they promised not turn into a Soviet client.
IIRC, Australia's suggestions for what should be done in the area were not followed as, mainly, they were seen as too self serving and, dare I say it, imperialistic.
So the question of what more could we have done is moot, we could/would do nothing against the will of the USA, so the short answer goes.
Anyway the rest of the main points are touched on [in no great depth] in that article.
Suffice to say, Indonesia remains mostly [in my opinion] an occupied empire and by that definition, divided and restive.
The fact remains, no matter how it was formed or is governed, it is there and we in the region must deal with it, as best we can, in its present form but prudently be prepared should that form change.
From the human rights and resource [profit] sharing points of view, many unsatisfactory situations exist which may lead to another regional faction calling on a new 'great and powerful friend' to 'help' them in seceding.
I doubt they'd call Australia for help, with good reason but we'd get drawn into any major instability in that region eventually and possibly militarily.
The problems you mention, widespread occupation etc, is not something we could do, even if the population is not hostile but there are many other scenarios the ADF would be very effective in.
When I support the continuance of the complete re-equipping of the ADF to a standard that allows us to act independently of another nations transport, supplies, air cover etc., I'm not fearful that anyone is going to invade us. There is so much deep-rooted potential instability nearby that we may have to deploy in force, on short notice, within our near region to prevent a major escalation on our doorstep.
Note that even in the Wiki article and the corresponding period in Borneo and Malaysia, the number of times the threat and use of arms was employed by our neighbour.
I am not convinced that this mindset is very far below the surface today, after all it succeeded in the past against the USA. This, however, is but one area of concern where we may come close to war again.
We will be, and are, in Coalition wars further afield but with a reduced capability to contribute, even East Timor was difficult to deploy to. The problems of manpower, equipment and transport deficiencies have been clearly highlighted and hopefully will be resolved.
If the present Government accepts that the ability to quickly project a balanced expeditionary force, to a place and time of our choosing, is not only a tactical but strategic necessity in defending Australia's interests, then they won't stop halfway. If a particular neighbor complains about feeling threatened, perhaps they should read the Wiki article. LOL
It's not the AWDs that make potential opponents nervous, it's the LHDs and transports, think logistics.
Cheers,
Mac

 

[thorpete1]

The hornets would of had at least a full load of gun ammunition. Not so much to protect its self as to help with balance issues. The 550 something rounds of 20mm ammo in the hornet ways a hell of a lot. If you don't have that weight then your flying slightly nose up all the way. This lowers fuel economy and in general is an annoyance. This is why on the F-35 the spent shells for the gun are kept in a closed loop, to keep the weight there and help with balance issues.

Australia could generate a nuclear capacity fairly quickly. We have a wealth of engineers and physicist. Our own supplies of nuclear material, a home grown uranium enrichment system developed at Lucas Heights by Silex and ANSTO that uses lasers and thus forgoes costly and obvious centrifuges. We also have the OPAL research reactor which creates a high flux of neutrons, allowing us to create plutonium (According to ANSTO's website OPAL is described as a "neutron factory" with double the neutron flux of HIFAR, our old research reactor ). A nuclear weapons program in Australia would be no cake walk but it would also be no Manhatten project and would be far easier for us then countries like Iran, North Korea, Old South Africa etc. as we already have the infrastructure and human resources to build nuclear weapons just not the designs.

A nuclear Australia doesn't depend on our resources but more on our political will and how we want to appear to the world.

Cheers

 

[barra]

The hornets would of had at least a full load of gun ammunition. Not so much to protect its self as to help with balance issues. The 550 something rounds of 20mm ammo in the hornet ways a hell of a lot. If you don't have that weight then your flying slightly nose up all the way. This lowers fuel economy and in general is an annoyance. This is why on the F-35 the spent shells for the gun are kept in a closed loop, to keep the weight there and help with balance issues.



Cheers

Hi Thorpete,

Interesting point of view but is not correct. The cannon is only loaded when being used and deployments to S.E Asia do not include gunnery. The only EO used during these deployments would be chaff and flare. Centre of gravity and fuel economy arguements , sounds like poppycock to me. The reason for the drum arrangement with the cannon, which the hornet cannon also uses, stems from the fact that ground troops in Vietnam calling in close air support often copped a shower of hot brass in the process as spent shells were expelled overboard during a gun run. The helical arrangement also means the spent shells can be downloaded at the end of the mission and taken back to the factory for re-cycling(as they are in Oz). Clean and green.

Cheers,
Barra

 

[thorpete1]

Good point Barra

A closed loop ensures you don't rain shells over your troops or into the path of you engines causing FOD.

Sorry for my little confusion there

Cheers

 

[t68]

Hi Thorpete,

Interesting point of view but is not correct. The cannon is only loaded when being used and deployments to S.E Asia do not include gunnery. The only EO used during these deployments would be chaff and flare. Centre of gravity and fuel economy arguements , sounds like poppycock to me. The reason for the drum arrangement with the cannon, which the hornet cannon also uses, stems from the fact that ground troops in Vietnam calling in close air support often copped a shower of hot brass in the process as spent shells were expelled overboard during a gun run. The helical arrangement also means the spent shells can be downloaded at the end of the mission and taken back to the factory for re-cycling(as they are in Oz). Clean and green.

Cheers,
Barra

I did not know that they stayed on board, i new of the problem in close with shell over the troops.

But hey peter garret should be happy with that as you say clean and green.
i hope it reduces the amount of ETS credits for defense :nutkick

 

[gf0012-aust]

The helical arrangement also means the spent shells can be downloaded at the end of the mission and taken back to the factory for re-cycling(as they are in Oz). Clean and green.

Cheers,
Barra

There's also the peripheral benefits to the loggies and the military lawyers.....

 

[stigmata]

Centre of gravity and fuel economy arguements , sounds like poppycock to me.

England decided to do away with the gun in Typhoon.
But as the balance was disturbed with the removal, they tried to make one in concrete.
Balance was still not rectified however, and it was found that the cheapest way to fix the problem was to install the gun after all, just not buying any rounds for it...

 

[barra]

England decided to do away with the gun in Typhoon.
But as the balance was disturbed with the removal, they tried to make one in concrete.
Balance was still not rectified however, and it was found that the cheapest way to fix the problem was to install the gun after all, just not buying any rounds for it...

I can understand CoG problems if you remove the whole gun system from the nose of the aircraft and then attempt to fly it, but whether it is loaded or not does not affect flying at all.

The RAAF experimented with "goofy" loads prior to the Op Falconer in 2003. A goofy load consisted of having droptanks on the centreline and station 3 or 7. The USMC used it extensively in Afghanistan(first time) to free up a weapon station for another GBU or JDAM. Of cause it does present some assymetric problems and the RAAF did not persist with it.

 

[Aussie Digger]

I can understand CoG problems if you remove the whole gun system from the nose of the aircraft and then attempt to fly it, but whether it is loaded or not does not affect flying at all.

The RAAF experimented with "goofy" loads prior to the Op Falconer in 2003. A goofy load consisted of having droptanks on the centreline and station 3 or 7. The USMC used it extensively in Afghanistan(first time) to free up a weapon station for another GBU or JDAM. Of cause it does present some assymetric problems and the RAAF did not persist with it.

I imagine the problem is manageable though, given the USMC have done it?

I guess if you are CERTAIN you're going to fire your weapons it's not such a problem. Unless it's classified, is a Hornet pilot able to manage WHICH tanks are in use at a particular time, ie how much fuel might be in one particular tank?

 

[Goknub]

Aust V Indo

Talking about Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, if anything that would most likely have had Australia's backing (of cause not in public).

The East Timor leadership were & many still are full-blooded Communists and the last thing Australia would want is a Soviet buildup on Darwins doorstep.

Altikiri (2006 former PM) and many Govt members are still commited Commie's to the detriment of development in ETimor and their recent deals for Chinese military equip isn't just business.

I can't find a pic but China's new embassy ov er there is apparently huge and Australia is going to have to keep on its toes if it wants to remain
No. 1 friend.

 

[barra]

I imagine the problem is manageable though, given the USMC have done it?

I guess if you are CERTAIN you're going to fire your weapons it's not such a problem. Unless it's classified, is a Hornet pilot able to manage WHICH tanks are in use at a particular time, ie how much fuel might be in one particular tank?

I suspect that the RAAF is a bit more cautious in how they use their aircraft, less likely to move away from "normal" operations. Having seen USMC aircraft up close it is apparent that their maintenance practises are less rigid (admittedly during wartime). They are more likely to let their pilots fly in aircraft with known problems then we are. I guess that comes down to risk management and a different service culture.

The Fuel Management System on the Hornet allows the pilot to transfer fuel from one tank to another but it is not as sophisticated as a civi airliner. They generally use the fuel in the externals first to limit stress on them during flight and particularly maneuvering. I only know of one occassion when externals were punched off a RAAF Hornet, well two actually but the other was by some gunnies doing tank jettison tests on the ground and it worked!!!

 

[Pro'forma]

Australia and Indonesia had lost all support between confrontation ?
Never thought the "european cold" war had spread to other side of the world.