Heavy armour for Afghanistan?

Firn

Active Member
So the Wiesel could be the true "QRF" for a large area if the lifting capability would be there. In the end this was mostly it's intended role, if I'm not mistaken. Roll in, fly, land, roll out - in Afghanistan with some element of surprise.

P.S: The Ceasar 155mm howitzers should be an excellent addition.
 

Palnatoke

Banned Member
WayL, Firn

I am not saying that it wouldn' t be better if the LEOIIA5 had a better mine protection package, but they don't. And in that case I think there are better ways to defeat the threath than making the best defended vehicles in the force even better protected and for that matter other areas that are more valnuable to the threath than A5s that still got a decent protection, eventhough it is not the best.

As I gather, the mine threath concerning the LEOs are not the standard roadside bombing scenario, the mine threath exists in combat situations in which the enemy have made an effort to produce a real mine field.

f.ex. In critical situations involving wounded, it appears that LEOs have taken point and f.ex. leads the armoured ambulance through - hoping that it's the LEO that detonates the mine and not the softer ambulance.
That is probably not part of the standard manual for tank warefare, and apparently goes a long way explaining why the tanks have a high frequvency of mine incidents. So the addition of dedicated armoured "mine ploughs" would probably do a lot to help that situation.

Of the nearly 30 KIA and many wounded, the far greater part is due to IEDs/Mines. One has been killed in a LEO, most cassulties resulting from soldiers simply stepping on mines or in softer vehicles. To me it doesn't seem that, while mines are the general chief danger, that MBTs plus mines are a big problem, compared to the other mine problems.

I quess that the biggest problem with the few danish tanks are the 18 large containers at camp bastion needed just for the spare parts... The good part is 120 mm of destruction and what appears to be "panzerschreck" amoung the talliban.
 
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Palnatoke

Banned Member
This is perhaps of limited interest for people who don't speak danish, though the images are somewhat self explaining;

The video, which is from the danish defense's own media service, shows an assult on a village in the opening phaze of operation "Panther's claws" (I think it's called - the latest big operation).

The story line:
First LEOIIs conduct artillery preparation of enemy positions. then armoured mine ploughs and mine sweepers clears paths for the infantery, The village is assulted and taken (Talliban had mostly left) and british forces passes through the "beach head" to continue the attack and operation.

Vent et øjeblik...

Then navigate to the video clip:: 06/07/2009: "Slaget om Spin Masjed"
 

Firn

Active Member
I just googled to get some information about HESH in Afghanistan and found some excellent material. To paraphrase Clausewitz, it helps too keep the flowers of theory close to experience, their porper soil.



Canadian Armor in Afghanistan

Originally Posted by Canadian Armor

Since May 2007, the tank squadron has fought almost constantly alongside Canadian and Afghan infantry in close combat with the Taliban. Supported by the artillery, combat engineers, attack aviation and fast air, mechanized combat teams from the 2 RCR BG have achieved decisive victories against insurgents in the Howz-e- Madad, Nalgham and Sangsar areas of Zhari District, where vineyards and imposing compounds render wheeled vehicle movement particularly difficult. Leopard tank crews have used extensively the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs, while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies. A testament to the tremendous contribution tanks are making to counter-insurgency operations and their high demand throughout the Canadian AO, A Squadron has routinely been split into troop-sized elements or less and attached to each of the infantry companies. This decentralized employment of armour and extremely high temperatures has strained the sustainment concept and serviceability of the tanks, while dispersing the breaching assets integral to the sub-unit. The impact of this squadron has been felt as far west as the Helmand border, and north towards Ghorak and Shah Wali Kot.


More on the utility of a big gun with the proper arguments sticking out of a highly mobile and armored AFV aka MBT right where it needs to be.

Originally Posted by Canadian Army

Rather, our enemy finds sanctuary in grape-drying huts and compounds with concrete-like walls measuring over a meter in thickness. Prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25 mm fire from the LAVs achieved limited results against these structures, often requiring the BG to resort to the use of aerial bombardment or risk the deployment of dismounted soldiers forward to affect a breach with anti-tank weapons or demolitions. One 105 mm HESH round from the Leopard C2 can punch a hole in excess of five by five meters through a grape-drying hut or compound wall, penetrating structures with reduced collateral damage to surrounding infrastructure and less risk to our dismounted soldiers.


The whole paper is IMHO excellent and especially of interest for old and young tankers alike. Another great take on the many issues of combined arms in Afghanistan is the following one. It also deserves a close look.



Lessons learned form the use of Tanks in ROTO 2



Originally Posted by Lessons Learned

When channelled in defiles and surrounded by walls or marijuana fields three metres high, the tanks lose their ability to fire at a distance and to move the turret. Just sweeping arcs of fire without destroying all the walls is the greatest challenge for the crews. We simply used the Stab Elevation Override to allow the gunner to observe, but generally speaking, the Stab stays off and the tank commander aims the gun between the walls and the dwellings. We have noted that sweeping the arcs, even if the gunner can see nothing, frightens the insurgents and discourages them from firing on us. With the Leopard 2, we used the tank commander’s periscope to observe when necessary. Since the barrel is approximately two metres longer than that of the Leopard C2, it was practically impossible to have the gunner constantly sweep the arcs. In some areas, the tanks are used more like bunkers for the dismounted troops than for their firepower. Nevertheless, in the event of contact, we did not hesitate to make room and expand our arcs of fire. In order to address the risks caused by lack of space, the crews had mounted their C8s on the turret (one pointing forward and one pointing backwards), with the tank commander’s 9-mm on the hatch and they had two hand grenades ready for throwing. In spite of everything, the best defence for the tanks in closed terrain remains the presence of infantry on the ground and a LAV III behind them.

Just some of many interesting points.

Originally Posted by Lesssons Learned

For the troop, all our engagements have been at distances of between 75 and 600 m. We have had some engagements at over 1000 m, but they occurred while the tanks were in firing position at the forward observation base (FOB) or when we were conducting observation in support of the infantry coys....

However, when we advance in complex terrain, the Taliban hide at between 75 and 300 m and most of the time they fired at us before we were able to observe them. We could see them because of the smoke or flash from their weapons. They observed our guns and waited until we aim them in another direction to fire. The advent of the Leopard 2 and its independent periscope greatly enhanced our detection capability and reduced the number of hits on the tank. We also received the canister shell at the end of our tour. Although we did not have a chance to try it in combat, we already know that it will discourage any attempt to hit us on the flanks at close range. Sometimes the insurgents launched a rocket from between two marijuana plants and disappeared. With a canister shell, we will be able to respond by firing in the direction from which the round came and kill or wound the hidden RPG crew. Following range trials, we have established that the lethal distance is approximately 400 m. The 120 mm HEAT rounds have produced excellent results in comparison to the 105 mm HESH round.


I only took out part of the things relevant to the topic and our discussion. The two papers indicate just how effective a well an Armored Mortar Fighting Vehicle (AMFV) with the right tools and equipment would be.



New rounds for the AMFV:


a) HEAT-MP

While enemy AFV are of no concern in Afghanistan and never should be the engaged without dire need directly by the MFV such a round would be overall a fine addition. It should endanger head-on any AFV short of an MBT and be a great and affordable allrounder. If the smaller, far lighter and slower warhead of the RPG-29 can cause concern, the 120mm mortar HEAT-MP should too...


b) HESH

A great wallbuster with little fragmentation flying sideways and back towards the AFV and friendlies. The slower spin of a 120mm mortar round fired out of a smoothbore barrel might influence (among other variables as speed) the "squashing" but it should at the very least be in the vicinity of the 105mm HESH, and "5x5m holes" sound right to. A perfect match with the AMFV, IMHO


c) Canister

Seems that the Canadians and Danes are eager on them and thing them perfectly suited for the environment. A Tank gun can launch them with far greater speed (> 800 m/s, my poor guess) and it seems to be that the lethal distance is (at least) around 400m. "Beehive rounds" accelerated by the106mm M40s of the Ontos reached roughly 500 m/s making them even with the thin armor very effective as support weapons.

Originally Posted by Diggerhistory

The 20" wide tracks of the 9-ton Ontos would allow it to go on the soft soils surrounding the rice paddies of Vietnam. They both served as bunker busters. Both vehicles lessened the infantry's causalities by being close to the fight; and could be quickly deployed to overcome an enemy's fixed positions.

The Ontos carried the beehive round that sent out a hundred darts per firing to clean out a jungle of its enemy. There was no other weapon that could clear a jungle for a depth of a ¼ mile (400m) like the 106mm recoilless rifle using the beehive round.
The small darts or pellets loose speed very fast. With a muzzle velocitiy of roughly 350 m/s the AMFV should thus be with the type of canister tested by the Canadian at least be lethal to 250m. This round should give the AFV a lethal area suppression weapon with a focused cone of lethality unable to endanger enemies or civilians behind "Afghan concrete"




Thoughts



Overall the more I learn the more I like the concept of the AMFV, especially in a combined arms team. Beside the invaluable ability to deliver quickly devastating plunging fire with so many round-fuzes (bomblets AB, HE PD or delayed one....) combinations and the ability to use all the neat guided precision rounds (Strix, FireBall..) it can be deadly precise and effective up close with the right rounds.

This "Assault mortar" with great SA (see my posts above) it can (and will) also be in a close firefight and will thus be able to play through the whole spectrum of firepower. At usual distances 75-600 every round in their arsenal can be very very accurate (high charge, "direct" fire) or very accurate (low charge, plunging fire). When not in a close firefight it can lend with staple rounds a helping hand of devastating power easily to seven klicks.

MBTs are still better to lead the rest on dangerous paths but such AMFV should be just like IFV close at hand.




P.S: A very good observation



This fits actually perfectly my interpretation of many an conflict. It is a great fallacy bring up the decreased willigness of insurgents or others in a great direct confrontations and conclude that "conventional force" and "firepower" is something somewhat somehow futile in such a war. It is a bit like asking a guy with a assault rifle to bring his knife to a gunfight and to ditch his rifle, because he has the advantage :rolleyes:
I posted some relevant links in an older topic - I think it does add somthing worthy to the discussion.

@ Palnatoke: You will find there that it seems to be almost an standard tactic to have the MBT leading the other AFV - one reason more to equip it with the M protection kit. Other than that I pretty much agree.
 

Palnatoke

Banned Member
Tanks are an asset that has it's uses. They can't replace the infantery in these kinds of wars and they won't win the war for us, but they can surport the infantery.

Eventhough this is about heavy armour, I need to state that:
The real war winning unit we need in Afgh. is neither tanks, helicopters nor infantery. What we need is units trained in the art of criminal investigation, Units that can identify the "poster boy", "The fund raiser", the guy that gives shelter, the guy that gives information to the enemy, in short units that can identify the hidden body of the insurgency, the hinter land of the enemy - and destroy it in depth.
We should realise that whenever we fight and destroy some talliban warriors, we are only attacking the leaves of the tree - and each year there will be plenty of young men willing to die for "the higher cause".
 

khatar

New Member
Hello

I'm curious, what did the US ever do to you? :)
Hello dear.If you want to know this.please send me an email.I will reply you in the best way.My email: [Mod edit: Text with email address deleted. You will not be allowed to use this forum to harvest information from our members.

Warning issued.]

Thank you
 
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