Great Commanders in History

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driftder

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Re: Great Commanders

gf0012-aust said:
I didn't think that Sir John was responsible for the creation of the tactics of the 95th. The 95th is regarded as the forerunner of modern infantry. I was under the clear view that it was Wellingtons initiative and mainly Beckwiths innovations. Moore developed tactics for the 43rd and 52nd, some of which were utilised by the 95th. But it was Beckwith who was the main tactician.

A good history reference on the 95th and its history is Mark Urbans "Rifles"
I tried to google up (Sydney) Beckwith but not much. What gives the idea that Beckwith is the better light infantry commander of his time? I found lots of references to the 95th and the Light Division. Incidentally for their time, its rather bold of them to raise a body of infanteers who's primary role is to skirmish.
 

gf0012-aust

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Re: Great Commanders

driftder said:
I tried to google up (Sydney) Beckwith but not much. What gives the idea that Beckwith is the better light infantry commander of his time? I found lots of references to the 95th and the Light Division. Incidentally for their time, its rather bold of them to raise a body of infanteers who's primary role is to skirmish.
A few reasons as to why.

Sir John Moore wasn't with the 95th all the time - plus his career in comparison with Beckwith esp with the 95th was shorter.

Beckwith was responsible for more on ground tactics in actual engagements than Sir John.

It might be worth your while trying to get a copy of the book at your "state" or "national" library. It is regarded as the definitive history of the 95th and according to some I know is now included as required reading for some staff courses.

The 95th is regarded as the precursor to modern light infantry - well ahead of their time.
 

ajay_ijn

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Re: Great Commanders

Anybody here likes the Desert Fox, with his lethal 88mm Flak,he could threaten an Force.

I am talking abput the great ww2 Commder Erwin Rommel.
 

Pendekar

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Re: Great Commanders

i'm not sure which of the german units was the best, Afrikakorps or SS division totenkopf, leibstandarte and das reich.
 
Re: Great Commanders

I'm not know too much about other german unit in WW2, but i think Rommel Afrikakorps has a remarkable achievement, their lossess is mainly because their logistic problem.
 

driftder

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Re: Great Commanders

gf0012-aust said:
A few reasons as to why.

Sir John Moore wasn't with the 95th all the time - plus his career in comparison with Beckwith esp with the 95th was shorter.

Beckwith was responsible for more on ground tactics in actual engagements than Sir John.

It might be worth your while trying to get a copy of the book at your "state" or "national" library. It is regarded as the definitive history of the 95th and according to some I know is now included as required reading for some staff courses.

The 95th is regarded as the precursor to modern light infantry - well ahead of their time.
Interesting...I believe I shall take up your advice on getting a copy of Mark Urban's though its not available to public here - though I hear there's a copy in Safti. Worse to worse, I might cross some silver with Amazon and get them to ship me one :D.

Back to topic, I came across a reference of Light Bobs and grenadiers which got integrated in light infantry work - apologies for the bad post, I will try to dig up the link and reference again and post it later. But if I am not wrong, Beckwith was a Colonel of one of the 95th battalions then. I doubt he would have much to do with planning campaigns as compared with Sir John Moore. Point I am trying to make is the difference in command level between the two. After all, its about Great Commanders :)
 

driftder

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Re: Great Commanders

ajay_ijn said:
Anybody here likes the Desert Fox, with his lethal 88mm Flak,he could threaten an Force.

I am talking abput the great ww2 Commder Erwin Rommel.
Hmm nothing against him, he got elan and flair. But he met his Waterloo ala El Alamien when he ran into Monty:D. A proposal? Let you take up cudgels for Rommel and I do the like for ole Monty - be interesting, provided it not get out of hand and degrade into a flaming debacle :rolleyes:
 

gf0012-aust

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Re: Great Commanders

driftder said:
Back to topic, I came across a reference of Light Bobs and grenadiers which got integrated in light infantry work - apologies for the bad post, I will try to dig up the link and reference again and post it later. But if I am not wrong, Beckwith was a Colonel of one of the 95th battalions then. I doubt he would have much to do with planning campaigns as compared with Sir John Moore. Point I am trying to make is the difference in command level between the two. After all, its about Great Commanders :)
I guess my view is that the 95th was very different from other units. It had relative freedom of movement with its commanders - a lot of the decisions to move it around were made by wellington - not by moore. at the contact level it was local commanders like Beckworth et al who made fire and movement decisions, and in fact at one point the unit made a critical engagement sans any instruction from their ranking officer - they were that "good" at reading the battleground.

I think Moore is a good commander, but I don't see that (eg) his stewardship of the 95th during the Peninsular Wars qualifies him as "great" :)
 

nz enthusiast

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Re: Great Commanders

I nominate Freyberg, hes probably been the closest thing NZ has had to a proper general, even though i think he was actually British. I think his name has actually been reserved for the name of a future combat vehicle (in case NZ ever makes one). You guys know what he did in Gallipoli?

Freyberg of Wellington and of Munstead, Bernard Cyril Freyberg, 1st Baron (1889-1963), commander-in-chief of the New Zealand forces in World War II and Governor-General of New Zealand (1946-1952). Born on March 21, 1889 in Richmond, Surrey, in England, Freyberg emigrated with his parents to New Zealand in 1891, where he studied at Wellington College. He served in the territorial army in New Zealand (1911-1912). Freyberg served in World War I, taking part in the retreat from Antwerp and in the Gallipoli campaign (1915), before being posted to the Western Front, where he fought with legendary bravery. Wounded nine times, he was awarded three Distinguished Service Orders and won the Victoria Cross at Beaumont Hamel in December 1917. Then, at the age of 27, Freyberg was promoted to brigadier general (the youngest of his rank in the British Army) and commanded the 29th Division (1917-1918). Between the wars he held senior staff appointments in the War Office.

At the outbreak of World War II, Freyberg was selected by Michael Savage to command the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. He sought and was granted a charter that gave him the right to disregard such orders from the Imperial General Staff as seemed to endanger the lives of his soldiers unnecessarily. Now a major general, Freyberg fought with the Second Division in the Mediterranean: in 1941 he was sent to Greece but was forced to evacuate to Crete where he took control of the Allied forces. Freyberg fought in almost all of the Western Desert operations up to the German capitulation in Tunisia. He also led the assault on Monte Cassino in Italy (February 1944) and has been blamed by some for the bombing of the monastery there. In 1946 Freyberg was made Governor-General of New Zealand and on his return to England was appointed Deputy Constable and Lieutenant-Governor of Windsor Castle (1953). He was knighted in 1942, and raised to the peerage in 1951. He died at Windsor on July 4, 1963.

Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003. © 1993-2002 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
 

Daelin

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Re: Great Commanders

I have to put a vote in for Napoleon Bonaparte. Not saying I applaud his morality or support his goals, but it does stand out, when a man builds an army, outwits a rabid bureaucracy in the process, loses it all and flat-out rebuilds another army all over again.

Can't say as I know of anyone else who managed the feat.
 

veronius

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Scipio Africanus, anyone?

I don't know if this name has been mentioned here before, but didn't Liddell Hart, or Fuller perhaps, write a book titled "Scipio Africanus: A Greater Than Napoleon"? This is a man who defeated Hannibal, after all, despite being outnumbered.

Just a thought.
 

driftder

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Re: Scipio Africanus, anyone?

veronius said:
I don't know if this name has been mentioned here before, but didn't Liddell Hart, or Fuller perhaps, write a book titled "Scipio Africanus: A Greater Than Napoleon"? This is a man who defeated Hannibal, after all, despite being outnumbered.

Just a thought.
Scipio? Fighting outnumbered? I would like to read up on that - in which engagements was he faced by a numerically superior force? Hannibal though was facing more than one Roman army when he was frolicking up and down the boot of Italy and held his forces together regardless.
 

veronius

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Re: Great Commanders

He was outnumbered at Zama apparently. In infantry anyway. He did have the edge in cavalry and while that edge still didn't bring him to parity overall, it was what proved decisive according to the accounts I've read.

No slight on Hannibal's greatness intended, by the way. Still, facing down more than one army isn't quite the feat it first appears to be when you allow for the fact that the defending, multiple-army side has to cover as much territory as possible and have forces in position ready to counter (or at least shadow and harass, if you're contending with a general of Hannibal's stature) any possible move the invader might make.
 

General_Conway

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Re: Scipio Africanus, anyone?

veronius said:
I don't know if this name has been mentioned here before, but didn't Liddell Hart, or Fuller perhaps, write a book titled "Scipio Africanus: A Greater Than Napoleon"? This is a man who defeated Hannibal, after all, despite being outnumbered.

Just a thought.
Now, I do not know who wrote your book, but I have read two books by BH Liddell Hart: HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR and STRATEGY. I find him a very knowledgeable strategist and a well balanced writter- by that for example he did not take either side during WWII, he just laid out what happened.
 

driftder

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Re: Great Commanders

veronius said:
He was outnumbered at Zama apparently. In infantry anyway. He did have the edge in cavalry and while that edge still didn't bring him to parity overall, it was what proved decisive according to the accounts I've read.

No slight on Hannibal's greatness intended, by the way. Still, facing down more than one army isn't quite the feat it first appears to be when you allow for the fact that the defending, multiple-army side has to cover as much territory as possible and have forces in position ready to counter (or at least shadow and harass, if you're contending with a general of Hannibal's stature) any possible move the invader might make.
No slight indeed eh? You must have forgotten how Hannibal get his supplies - by living off the country since his nearest supply base is in Spain. The distance and travel between Spain and Italy during Hannibal's time is measured differently from ours today - no Airbus then. No forgetting too that Hannibal's army has soldiers from different races - Gauls, Spaniards, Nubians etc and he has to hold them together. Not only that but he has to learn how to use them effectively, as proven by his success in many battles in the Italian boot. Resupply and reinforcements also don't come easy - the Romans cut off the passes and supply lines of Hannibal and used a containment strategy after finding their heads handed to them by Hannibal, best example being Cannae.

Now lets look at old Scipio. He don't have a problem with supplies as he is getting them from Sicily and Rome via the Med. which can be considered a Roman lake at that time, since no contenders. He also did not have to live off the land, wondering where his next meals coming from. His army is more easily controlled - mostly Romans with some auxillary levies.

Back at Zama - well lets get some feedback from the others but Zama is not as one-sided as you would make it out to be for old Scipio. :p:
 

veronius

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Re: Great Commanders

So now all of a sudden we're talking logistics and supplies instead of Zama... hmmm, okay then! I certainly don't recall ever saying Hannibal had a walk in the park feeding his troops and keeping them together in Italy, but if you say I did, I guess I must have. I can be so silly sometimes! (By the way, I love that "via the Med" - sounds so darn easy! Y'know, I bet I could supply about 30,000 men that way myself!)

Anyway, back to Zama, which I think is what we were talking about in the first place. I think I might be repeating myself, but... Scipio was outnumbered. Hannibal may have been bottled up in Carthage, facing an uncertain supply situation, missing a good number of the veterans he'd had in Italy etc. etc. but I still wouldn't want to face him with inferior numbers, not nohow. Not even with an Airbus on my side.

In response to another post (General Conway), I've checked and it was Liddell Hart who wrote the book - Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon. Can't claim to have read it myself, but the title says it all. And this quote from LH himself:

"Scipio's battles are richer in stratagems and ruses--many still feasible today--than those of any other commander in history."

Not that that means we have to agree, of course...
 

stephen weist

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Re: Great Commanders

winning battles is nice but being a great commander also means knowing when not to fight. Admiral BYNG, Royal Navy should be included here. He was sent on a task, assembled his fleet and upon arrival sent recon out to scout his adversary. When he learned he was hopelessly out numbered and wcould not win without a larger force he wisely withdrew. He was subsequently found guilty of whatever trumped up charge the admiralty could think of at court marshal, and shot. nice thanks for saving thousands of lives dont you think.
 

veronius

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Re: Great Commanders

stephen weist said:
winning battles is nice but being a great commander also means knowing when not to fight. Admiral BYNG, Royal Navy should be included here. He was sent on a task, assembled his fleet and upon arrival sent recon out to scout his adversary. When he learned he was hopelessly out numbered and wcould not win without a larger force he wisely withdrew. He was subsequently found guilty of whatever trumped up charge the admiralty could think of at court marshal, and shot. nice thanks for saving thousands of lives dont you think.
Very good point. I'll go read up on Byng!

By the way I think Ulysses Grant probably rates in here somehwre, in terms of knowing when and when not. In the reading I've done on his military career, the point that seems to come up above all is that generals capable of prompt, decisive action when it is required are very rare indeed.
 

driftder

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Re: Great Commanders

veronius said:
So now all of a sudden we're talking logistics and supplies instead of Zama... hmmm, okay then! I certainly don't recall ever saying Hannibal had a walk in the park feeding his troops and keeping them together in Italy, but if you say I did, I guess I must have. I can be so silly sometimes! (By the way, I love that "via the Med" - sounds so darn easy! Y'know, I bet I could supply about 30,000 men that way myself!)

Anyway, back to Zama, which I think is what we were talking about in the first place. I think I might be repeating myself, but... Scipio was outnumbered. Hannibal may have been bottled up in Carthage, facing an uncertain supply situation, missing a good number of the veterans he'd had in Italy etc. etc. but I still wouldn't want to face him with inferior numbers, not nohow. Not even with an Airbus on my side.

In response to another post (General Conway), I've checked and it was Liddell Hart who wrote the book - Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon. Can't claim to have read it myself, but the title says it all. And this quote from LH himself:

"Scipio's battles are richer in stratagems and ruses--many still feasible today--than those of any other commander in history."

Not that that means we have to agree, of course...
Well logistics is part of war. Check out any war that don't rely on logistics. As for what you said or implied to say, all I did was point out the different situations both Scipio and Hannibal were facing. As for the "via the Med." part, well which is easier - fighting a convoy through hostile territory be it land or water, or travelling on ground which is controlled and swept safe? During the 1st Punic War, the Romans wrest control of the Med. away from Carthage. If its still Carthage who controls the Med., why the heck should Hannibal go via the Alps? Definitely not for the scenery.

As for Zama, Scipio wasn't that outnumbered - both sides had roughly equal numbers of infantry, with Scipio having a edge in cavalry due to his alliance with the Nubians under Masinissa. And when they met at Zama, Scipio have the better trained troops as compared to Hannibal's 15000 veterans (reference to http://www.roman-empire.net/army/zama.html).

Then again, based on another reference, Hannibal had the upper hand - reference to http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/zama.htm. As you said, still that doesn't mean we have to agree.
 
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veronius

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Re: Great Commanders

driftder said:
Well logistics is part of war. Check out any war that don't rely on logistics. As for what you said or implied to say, all I did was point out the different situations both Scipio and Hannibal were facing. As for the "via the Med." part, well which is easier - fighting a convoy through hostile territory be it land or water, or travelling on ground which is controlled and swept safe? During the 1st Punic War, the Romans wrest control of the Med. away from Carthage. If its still Carthage who controls the Med., why the heck should Hannibal go via the Alps? Definitely not for the scenery.

As for Zama, Scipio wasn't that outnumbered - both sides had roughly equal numbers of infantry, with Scipio having a edge in cavalry due to his alliance with the Nubians under Masinissa. And when they met at Zama, Scipio have the better trained troops as compared to Hannibal's 15000 veterans (reference to http://www.roman-empire.net/army/zama.html).

Then again, based on another reference, Hannibal had the upper hand - reference to http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/zama.htm. As you said, still that doesn't mean we have to agree.
Whoa - so I said logistics has nothing to do with success in war? Man, I can't believe the stupid stuff I say sometimes! Once I finish this post I'm getting a checkup.

If Roman domination of the seas was so total, how did Hannibal get what was left of his army back to Africa before the battle of Zama? (No references to Airbus will be accepted.) Rome may have had 'command of the sea' but no ancient navy was capable of anything like a total blockade of an entire nation's coastline over open waters. Hannibal spent much of his time in Italy trying to capture a port so he could be resupplied by sea, which suggests that it was indeed possible.

But whether or not Hannibal got supplies through by sea, don't forget the many regions and cities that defected to him on his way to Italy and during his time there. In some respects Hannibal was in what might be considered friendly territory for much of his Italian campaign. The Gauls in northern Italy alone supplied several thousand soldiers and who knows what in the way of supplies when he passed through. Large parts of southern Italy went over to Hannibal and I'm sure the people there did more than just wave flags for him.

The barca source you sent (I've seen it before) seems a bit inconsistent. In listing the opposing forces for Zama they give Scipio 43,000 men and then say 30,000 men - in the same paragraph! So I don't know that it's much help to either of us.

Finally, it is true that Hannibal had a high proportion of fairly raw, inexperienced troops, but his classic encirclement strategy depended for its success on the presence of large bodies of relatively weak troops in the centre, who would at best be able to just hold their own against the Romans, if not giving way slightly, while the flanks closed in.
 
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