Vive L’Empereur!
Bill Sweetman
Defense Technology International
November 2009
Editorial – Insight
What does the president of the world’s fifth-biggest economy, who stands 5 ft. 6 in. on a good day and is married to a stunning ex-model who does a mean job on some of Georges Brassens’ foulest lyrics, do for fun? The answer is: become the world’s greatest weapons salesman.
The idea that politics intrudes in arms sales has about as much news value as an assertion that Jenna Jameson’s virtue may not be intact. Mais sacre bleu, Sarko, there’s got to be a limit somewhere.
The mess that surrounds Brazil’s choice of a new fighter aircraft is not a case for international codes of conduct in defense business. They would never be enforced even if everyone agreed to such a thing. But they are an argument for national self-restraint.
There’s no dispute as to the facts. In September, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced that Brazil was going to buy 36 Dassault Rafale fighters. The air force responded by confirming that their evaluation (including the Gripen NG and Super Hornet) was still under way, thank you. Embraer stated that it regarded the Gripen NG industrial package as more attractive, and then rapidly retracted the statement.
In military terms, it was understantable that the decision was close. Franco-Brazilian ties are close, and in aviation date to Aerospatiale’s transatlantic flights in the 1930s. The Rafale is also a proven aircraft with a fully funded upgrade program. Twin engines and long range are an advantage for a country with maritime interests and a vast hinterland.
The Gripen NG promises lower cost and a remarkable level of performance and technology in a package barely more than half the size of Rafale. It’s also starting life in an era of commercially derived electronics and software, where Rafale may face some obsolescence issues. But it’s a new program and people are understandably nervous that they will end up being the only operator of the NG, alongside with Sweden’s small air force.
Industrially, Embraer’s preference for the Gripen is interesting. A company that’s energetic and smart enough to bound from nowhere in commercial airplanes to 30, 50 and then 90 seats in just two decades, and to break into business aviation as well, clearly has a better-than-average record of predicting the future. The company has a successful partnership with Saab on airborne warning and control systems.
I suspect Embraer has two reasons to favor Gripen. The first is that it wants to demonstrate it has the chops for a full-scale development program, not just an upgrade step for Rafale. The second is reflected in Lula’s statement that France would let Brazil build any other Rafales ordered in South America – but how many of those will there be? Embraer, it’s likely, believes that the Gripen has more upside.
More contradictions emerged as the story unfolded, with France apparently agreeing, to buy 10-15 KC-390 airlifters from Embraer and even becoming involved in the program. I will bet you Louis XIII to illegal rustic marc that the announcement was news to the French Air Force, which is committed to the A400M and has been searching under the mattress for the money to replace its decrepit tankers. I love the guys of Dassault as much as anyone, but let’s say that their last jet transport venture began with MER and ended in DE; their experience is in fighters and high-end corporate jets, and I am not sure what they could do on the KC-390, except make it more expensive.
Sadly, the time for logic may be past. Lula and Sarkozy have bypassed their professionals and created a strategic alliance, including a jointly developed nuclear submarine (a bold venture but one that may remain a unique toy, while most nations move into bigger conventional subs) and a helicopter industry. Now the problem is this: Sarkozy set out to prove that he could get Rafale sold where his predecessors failed. He has, according to Lula, accomplished that, and to back down would be an epic loss of face for the Elysee Palace.
At a conference on nuclear deterrence in Omaha, Neb., last summer, the boss of France’s strategic air force noted that France considers its nuclear weapons as a response to “an attack on France’s vital interests”, but that it deliberately does not specify what those are. Whether “Making M. le President look like an idiot” in on the list in the bunker somewhere, I don’t know, but I don’t think that President Lula wants to find out.
The deal has been done before the terms are settled, and that doesn’t often work well for either side.