Hardly. I prefer to spend my time more productively than "banging it against a brick wall" in a futile attempt to change the status quo.
I stand by my earlier words and nor am I am naive enough to think there are not any problems within the Australian Defence Organisation.
Thought as much. From my readings, a true 'Aussie Digger' would not accept the 'status quo' when it meant dumbing down one's air force and refusing to fight for getting the best for one's fighting men and women. Shame on you for misrepresenting such a proud national icon as the 'Aussie Digger'.
Here is what some senior folks in the US think about Dr Kopp's summation of the situation -
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Wishing all of you Happy New Year, and to leave you with this sage point from Australian Carlo Kopp, one of our most trenchant airpower analysts:
“Professional mastery in the core business of air power is not measured by ‘stick and throttle’ flying skills. It is measured by the ability of an air force to deliver its product - air power in support of national interests - and its ability to maintain and develop the operational, technological and strategic planning machinery required to deliver that product. It matters not if Australia has the most skilled combat pilots in this region, if its lacks suitable aircraft, weapons, systems and software support base, planning capability, doctrine, and management and strategic expertise to apply and maintain these capabilities.”
His year-end summary can be found at:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2006-03.html and is well worth reading.
We should consider what Carlo views as a crisis in Australian airpower affairs, and to contemplate the USAF’s current situation. In an era where both the ability to control airpower targeting through the JFACC was lost to the JFC (Army) staff since 2001, in which the USAF lost control over its major acquisition programs to OSD and one man in Congress, and its major developmental acquisition program recapitalizes the F-16, we should be asking some fundamental questions. What is the state of the USAF’s “operational, technological, and strategic planning machinery”? Have we reverted to pre-Kasserine Pass airpower employment, and if so, should we wait for a Monty to snap us out of it? What has become of centralized control (BY THE SENIOR AIRMAN), centralized execution? What is the Air Force’s strategic future, and what are its core competencies (e.g., cyberspace)? When the Air Force is stuck (which happens with stunning regularity in the press and published articles) does it bleed? Does the Air Force have anything meaningful to say about US military power in the 21^st century other than “we support others”? Perhaps at the core of this, is the Air Force a service, or is it a collection of people wearing the same uniform?
Perhaps 2007 should be the* Year of Air Force Re-Militarization*, a year where Airmen decide they really are warriors with something to say, that they’ve had enough, and decide to recapture the spirit of our Founding Airmen who understood that real Airpower involves three essential principles:
*1. The essence of aerospace power is the control of air and space, which has its own strategic effect and remains the essential precondition for all US military operations. *
*2. The exploitation of air and space, i.e., aerospace options that become available when one establishes control, continue to be of increasing importance to US national security at every level of war, relative to, and in concert with other military means. *
*3. These two propositions present a threat to legacy,
surface-centric worldviews, and as such, require energetic advocacy to expedite their full incorporation into a more enlightened, progressive, and effective means of conducting American warfare and diplomacy.*
Airpower, with all deference to Dr Kopp, isn’t just a product; it’s an alternative, a disruptive idea, a revolutionary American perspective that has continuous, increasing importance to US national security. It retains that increasing importance EVEN WHEN IT’S REJECTED. But, in order to be either accepted or rejected, it must be injected. There are only two real measures of merit—whether American Airmen
have a unique, meaningful, relevant perspective, and whether they make it a part of the debate. We need a lot of work on the former, and need to at least register a pulse on the latter.
Airpower must inevitably be presented as a counterpoint, that is, as a meaningful alternative that springs from its nature. A counterpoint has relevance only in contrast to another perspective, which implies conflict. Airpower cannot be presented in an environment of consensus or comity because the theologians of the dominant paradigm won’t allow it. This is the essence of the Billy Mitchell Syndrome—if you present an Airpower alternative forcefully enough to make an impact, you are branded as divisive; but if you are timid or circumspect, you will be ignored. They leave us no middle ground, although the more timid among us have been searching for it in vain since 1903.
Thus, to re-militarize, we must find courage. That is my wish for all of us in 2007.