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Very interesting, would "deep strike" also apply to the Navy JSF as well?
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It would have to as the F-35A is a virtual clone of the F-117 delivery capability for the USAF with added AMRAAM capability and all weather munition delivery traded against less LO while having nearly the same radius as the F-35C. The latter's higher gross weight navalization and immense drag penalty (inherent to the added 200 square feet of slow-speed wing) eating up all pretense of greater fuel loads or superior altitude performance, IMO.
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The navy JSF all it has to do is drop bombs. A UCAV could do the same.
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Truth be told, that's the biggest problem with the F-35C. The USN 'official' desire is for only 170 of the type which puts it in the same category as the A-6 in terms of 10 aircraft per airwing as a heavy all weather interdictor.
But _what do you do with that kind of airwing percentage_? You fly out 700 odd nautical miles and you end up looking at 7-10hr round trips, even assuming you don't have to do intermediate tanking. Hitting even 20 targets at maximum (Kabul from the IO) radii is not going to do much to a distributed conventional warfighter architecture and next to nothing at all to an irregular force.
Even as all your (external HARM and AMRAAM and big/powered-standoff PGM) support missions are going to be struggling to get there at all and NONE of you are going to be staying long on-station (average in AfG was 20 minutes over the targets in the north of the country, 40 minutes once Krghyz tanking became available).
Of course you could reserve the airframe for use as a pseudo F-22 at much closer distances while basically acknowledging that standoff ordnance had replaced penetrating airpower for the rest of the 'not-LO-so-much-as-low!' airwing.
Yet the huge wings and 'only two' AMRAAM count means that the F-35 is _never_ going to be a pure fighter, it simply doesn't bring enough to the table.
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For the airforce the JSF will be a glorified bomb truck, again a UCAV could do all of this. Close air support which often requires a human in the loop could still be done by the A-10 as the JSF was not going to replace this aircraft.
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IMO, the UCAV is the replacement for the A-10 as well. More precision shots from above the trashfire (typical A-10 loads are 1 Maverick, 2 GBU-12 and a LITENING these days). More loiter by /hours/ at typical <250nm Hog-CAS distances (the A-10 has NO combat tank capability). Compatibility with high altitude tanking in the .85 Mach range. And of course the /incredible/ advantage inherent to just 'sitting there' doing the ISR mission of looking 10-20nm up the road to watch the IED emplacer or the guerilla ambush. Often days before a given travel route is used. All because, with the UCAV, you are looking at perhaps as little as $1,200/flthr.
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If the JSF was cancelled the Airforce would be happy as it would get more F-22's and of course UCAVs. 500 F-22's and 1000 UCAV's would be better than a 200 F-22's and 1500 JSF's.
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The F-22's biggest advantage is transit time and a 'configurable' weapons bay. If you treat radius in terms of straightline segments, you can do the 'supersonic from the deck' as a best climbout profile to 30K, and then a burn-up, ramp-up from their to hit Mach 1.45 and 45K or so some 400nm down range and 1.6 by the time you come back out of SSC at 600-800nm. At which point, you can step down to a tanker, suck another 10-15,000lbs of gas and REALLY hit it, for Mach 1.5-1.8 intrusion run, the last 300nm to target. Before coming back out to hit the tanker again and then highstep on home (3,000lbs lighter in A2G munitions) at Mach 1.5 average. All in a total cycle interval of perhaps 3.5-4hrs. Compared to the JSFs which will only /just/ be getting to the target area if not fence, at Mach .9.
Such just magnifies your daily sortie rate numbers all out of proportion to the size of your force (1.5 for a JSF, 3-5 for an F-22, given sufficient pilots and maintenance and targeting to support it).
_Assuming_ you have enough jets to do more than a token 'Air Dominance' mission ala Stealthy Albino.
Which is where the blue suit brigade and I seriously part company. Because COE Strike is what the F-22 should be configured to do as more of a stealthy F-111 than an F-15. For as long as LO advantagement lasts. Blk.20 is going to get closer to this with GBU-39 and genuine SAR modes for the radar rather than just 'data entry off the IPod text message' which is effectively what Raptor pilots are flunky-with-keypad reduced to doing these days with GBU-32.
Of course if we /whore/ LO to the world at large, a great deal of that edge could slip away, overnight. And we would be back to needing to play 'Ye Compleat Warrior', dragging a dozen different kinds of support missions, 90% of them subsonic, alllllll the way there and back.
Having said this, the Admiral in charge of the JSF program has flatly stated that 1,600 is the cutoff for production economics of the home force. Yet the USAF is fighting Congress to get down to an 1,100-1,200 airframe fleet (because they don't want to be stuck with 'Texas Politics' on another F-16 yearly wallet bleed with current F-35 PAUC sucking dry their acquisition accounts for another 10-15+ years).
OTOH, 'the smart ones', the airpower services for whom naval-LO was originally deemed to be essential to their being a part of 21st century airpower, are already down from 680 to 240 (USMC) and 450 to 170 (USN)
Which means that the business case for the JSF is already neck deep and sinking quick in red ink as foreign buyers have the /gall/ to 'demand' that U.S. purchases remain high enough to leverage their own micro-lot buys. And Congress listens because Congress wants pork for their home districts and a sop to the massive trade deficit.
With the capabilities of small IAMs (and particularly the coming GBU-40 with a seeker and AMSTE) to leverage single airframes with high DMPI counts, there is no excuse for supporting the Fighter Pilot Lobby 'just on tradition'. But tradition in America is making money through corruption of government and industry in support of the military. And that's a hard habit to break.
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If the JSF was canceled the navy still has the superhornet and if the UCAV delivers as promised it will have a better strike platform than the JSF with less manpower. An X-35C is so small height wise that on a navy carrier you could stack them two high allowing 100 UCAV's and 40 Superhornets on a single carrier. This gives more firepower with less carriers and a HUGE saving that spills over to less escorts, less personel, less food etc
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You tell'em!
The key here is going to still be enablers of course. Since a 100 UCAVs operating at 400nm are going to have perhaps as much as 6-10hrs of loiter with a similar, 'easy going' launch-recovery cycle. But the same number operating at 700nm is going to NEED tanking to be fully useful. And probably a high altitude data relay aircraft like a ROBE-in-miniature to keep connectivity going on what would otherwise be a 3-4hr end-radius mission duration. Followed by 3-4hrs coming and going _useles_ transit interval.
For true independence of operations, such can only suggest a CSA platform, whether robotic or manned and the tangential possibilities of replacing the E-2/C-2 and EA-18 as well (fleet size economics again).
IMO, to get the full 100 UCAV sized airwing, would also require a significant redesign of existing hangar spaces and/or a new class of SWATH type ships to ensure that more working vs. deckpark space was availabe on the roof (no more angle deck nonsense) with less or even no reconfigure time between shooting and catching. You would also need to modify hot weapons bay hangar rules between missions (suggesting a compartmentalized bay), bring online an ability to rapidly move unpowered aircraft without a tug (electric wheel motors running on APU?). And of course implement the full spectrum JPALS as a total-LINK replacement ACLS capability to give not only high fidelity approach but general ATC stacking and logistics precue to what was wrong with any given jet. So that you could rapidly repair or replace it the flight list.
i.e. THERE IS WORK TO BE DONE HERE.
To get a truly dominant UCAV mission force stood up and reliably (mechanically) able to start devising new doctrinal approaches to how we do FTSF missioning. But it can be done. And there is no real 'alternative' so long as threats continue to improve ultra short cycle airpower in the form of rockets (it's only a matter of time before inertial if not inertial-GPS systems and then, eventually, terminal seekers are miniaturized down to the level at which even a Fajr/Katyusha system becomes the equivalent of an improved MLRS). Because it will be rockets which drive the development of DEWS. But it will be DEWS that /utterly changes/ the nature of airpower.
The JSF would have been fine if it had been an airframe brought online in the period 2000-2004 as a SINGLE 'CALF', assuming the initial 1998 F-22 IOC had also been met and the F-16/18 were replaced without intermediate standins (F-16C.50+ and F-18E/F). But by pushing this (F-35) airframes service inception date out to beyond 2010, we have _guaranteed_ that the jet will not only overlap the first generation DEWS, it will spend as much as 3/4s of a 20 year life cycle _utterly useless_ whereever these weapons are encountered. Weapons which will look at manned airframes as simplistic threats compared to missile defense.
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Remember that to "spec up" a UCAV will in most cases be software only. So you could add 1000 extra fucntions in software with no extra weight penalty etc.
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There will be limits to what you can do within a given architecture however. The F-22 had an initial backplane datarate requirement almost double what was eventually installed. Nominally to save costs. But truthfully because there simply were no processor:bus architectures sufficient to provide the level of capability desired. COTS now drives the SOA in the computing world far more than all but the most specialist (radar/EW etc.) of military chip architectures and thus predicting that all elements of a given design will be updateable without 'more memory! more processor power!' limitations of SEM-E type systems is largely unwise. Just like computer gamers, there will be a competing war between what you want (say) a given aperture to do. And what you expect the backing avionics to support that expanded mission set with.
Frontends can be a bleep to redesign for a given LO aperture and indeed overall airframe integration plan. Especially as we switch to ever more complex AESA type architecture and start to USE THEM as both comms pipe and sensor lookin with conflicting bandwidth and datarate problems.
Overall Processor and System Management architecture is easier to deal with on a plug'n'play basis. So long as you don't have any data rate neckdown through the bus.
But either way, software-only is a bit of a myth even as it /implies/ the need for a much greater 'no baby onboard = all on you R2' software update support infrastructure to monitor changing world picture (essentially flying around sampling other peoples bandwith allocations and usage), write new code, flight test and integrate it on a machine without a human backup to given empirical quality-not-quantity performance verification.
THE IMPORTANT THING TO REALIZE is that for a baseline mission of simply COP-watching a backwater threat, the likelihood that the threat will even know you're there, let alone have a reasonable ability to fight back electronically is limited. Because most of the high-rate CDL architecture is now shifting to X and Ka bands which are highly directional. And because there is frankly not a lot you can do in the back of beyond with Radio Shack level electronics against a well designed first-world avionics system. Just _be there_ and the mission will happen. If you don't play, you don't win. And right now modern airpower is too oriented around point target and back flight modes rather than vulturing over wide areas continuously.
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I think a F-22 size bomb bay would be ideal for a UCAV. It allows for 6 AMRAAM missiles or 12 small diameter bombs or a combination of each. The X-35C cannot carry AMRAAM''s as its not long enough, it'd require a complete redesign of the aircraft.
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I think it's going to be a more complicated question myself. If you have a blended wing body design of what is essentially a low wing monoplane aerostructure, there will likely be a chordwise longeron/rib integrated wingroot. Which, while it may well be fairly deep has the added potential stress factors of outboard landing gear locations (the wider the stance, the less heavy landing or crosswinds will make the jet drag a wingtip or bunny hop from strut to strut) and possibly a wingfold. If the overall box of the airframe volumetric is still fairly shallow/blended, you may not have the option of a wideXshallow weapons bay design. OTOH, if there is virtually nothing in the nose, you may well want to consider the 'Lancaster Configuration' of tandem bays. While you will pay an additional doorsegment/actuator weight penalty and may or may not have an interbay frame (stiffener) that effects absolute length of the munitions available for internal carriage (no SLAM-ER or HARM for instance), you also get away from having such monstrously /over size/ doors as plague the F-22 design.
Indeed, it may well be time to reinvestigate the nature of how we carry munitions again. The B-52 uses individual 'clip load' stations within the airframe itself. Especially now that we are moving towards integrated pneumatic 'smart' ejector systems vs. the old cartridge ejectors (automatic weapons system awareness of proper launch angle and impetus from each station), it may well be easier, safer and faster to replace SMALL munitions individually with exoskeleton enabled crews or robots. Presently, cleared-loads weaponeering rules require that munitions have a given separation from adjacent weapons or in fact not be mixed at all to ensure safe separation. And when a single failed rack-widget is denying you full use of a rack, you can't replace a unit in-situ on the jet, the ENTIRE unit has to be removed/pinned-safe.
Indeed, even weight becomes an issue, for when you look at the Boeing SMER, you have 4, nominally 285lb, GBU-39 (1,140lbs) weapons out of a total loaded system weight of some 1,640lbs. That's 500lbs worth of unnecessary structural strongbacking, IMO.
If, instead, you switch to a series of parallel, longitudinal, /tracks/
/````````\
|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..| Bay 1
|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..| Bay 2
|..|..|..|..|
\_____/
With a thousand or two thousand pound weight station (lined up with a major structural frame at the middle of the midboard stations (2X GBU-31) and two or three other stations on which one or more racks can slide forward or back to various 60-70 inch, 500lb, displacements; while having at least the option to also include a secondary structural footer so that you can extended 120-144" or rail-forward restricted weapons into the airstream then you can start to truly mix loads with say two GBU-39 in tandem on each of the inboard three stations (X6) total. An AMRAAM/Meteor or like (DEAD) 'powered IAM' clone on the left outboard. And a mix of 3 MicroUAV or JCM on the opposed outboard side. The nifty thing being that, even though it was a common bay, with the exception of the AMRAAM or heavyweight JDAMS, all munitions could be released by opening _single hinged_ doors without having the barn-door reflector and likely aerodynamic penalties of say the F-22 system. And without intruding upon wingroot/landing gear bay areas.
The alternative, especially if you want a central keel for stiffness in a carrier capable system, is almost always going to be two separate bays which will restrict the total lateral spread and individual diameters of weapons and require you to go to vertical stacking if you want multiple carriage to the full volumetric capability of the bay or weight carriage of the airframe (within a stealthy enclosure). Munition stacking being another no-no in all our airpower services.
B1 B2
/```\ /```\
.|..|. || .|..|.
.|..|. || .|..|.
.|..|. || .|..|.
.|..|. || .|..|.
.|..|. || .|..|.
\__/ \__/
Of course, there are other modifiers. For instance, IMO, the days of using 2,000lb munitions to kill buildings with should be /long over/. If the structure is truly heavy, go with a hypervelocity (FRSW or ARRMD) aeroballistic kinetic kill weapon. Or a BROACH enabled heavy-warhead AGM-158 variant. If it's Osama Bin Laden hiding in some civillian's basement, pop _the internal volume_ with a spread of GBU-39 or 38 type (250-500lb) weapons, evenly spread and fuzed to take out both the upper and lower floors.
DO NOT SEND MULTITON SEGMENTS OF BRICK AND CONCRETE FOR BLOCKS WORTH OF FRAG AROUND THE IMPACT SITE!
If the key to 4GW is information dominance and knowing WHERE AND WHEN to hit, as much as having tons of explosive overkill when you do (again, the present day IDFAF 'problem' with striking civillian apartment buildings in Beirut and Tyre is a clear casepoint), then it is CRITICAL that you both be able to strike immediately upon detection of a TCT (Time Critical Target set) as a function of omnipresent eyeball force. And that you have immediately available _just the right weapon_ to do the job of precision engagement when that opportunity pops. And lastly that, as a function of both pre and post release BIA 'collaterals damage assessment', you be able to fly a drone down to _take precise pictures_ of the man you were after.
It's one thing to hunt terrorists based on the say of someone and then to have a huge furor when a bunch of civillians die while he was out getting his morning coffee and paper. It's another to show Robin Hood walking a bunch of kids to school because /he knows/ that you won't hit him in a mass of 'innocents'. The threshold of culpability being inherent to parents who let their children or themselves be used as a cheering section shield wall to protect _Very Bad Men In A Total War_.
Proving this, just once or twice, on TV, would go a long ways towards revealing the Arabs 'indignant outrage' as the moral hypocrisy it is. Again, only a cheap airframe taking pictures through a bentpipe relay of _high resolution_ threat verification can prove it however. And F-16s are just not a part of that, even as F-35s (fewer and more expensive yet) /never will be/.
KPl.