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Part 4 of 5: An attempt to debunk CCP myth making
7. Taiwan’s MND dropped a bombshell in Sep 2021 when it presented an incredibly downbeat assessment of the growing Chinese threat toward the island state. In its annual report to the parliament, the defense ministry stated that China’s PLA could “paralyze” Taiwan’s defenses.
9. The JASDF and JMSDF don’t create a strategy with a plan. Rather, they execute the Japanese military procurement plan to invest in the correct tools to win the naval battles to come, as their strategy for deterrence — the Japanese have sufficient forces and the ability to use it within their A2AD bubble of their island chains they control.
10. Increased computational power on fighters, attack helicopters, destroyers, frigates and submarines have resulted in the widespread use of decision support engines in target selection. The Japanese have a data strategy that is slowly transforming their intelligence cells at all levels into data-centric organizations. The JSDF KNOWS that future battlefield survival will hinge on data utilization, due to use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by the Chinese. Within this context, Japanese air power has three important characteristics:
7. Taiwan’s MND dropped a bombshell in Sep 2021 when it presented an incredibly downbeat assessment of the growing Chinese threat toward the island state. In its annual report to the parliament, the defense ministry stated that China’s PLA could “paralyze” Taiwan’s defenses.
(a) A discussion of a localized war against China over Taiwan is not one that should treat lightly. Anyone that is intellectually honest can admit the USAF, US Navy, and US Marines by themselves are not on the trajectory for victory there, without substantial JMSDF input. And not just for combat power. The Americans need Japanese naval power, intellect, EW and ISR capabilities to visualise the battles to come and the escalation options, given Taiwanese weaknesses.
(b) The USAF’s director of electromagnetic spectrum superiority, Brig. Gen. Tad Clark acknowledged that electromagnetic warfare (EW) has evolved, and while the US stalled in this domain, adversaries have improved their capabilities. This presents the US military with new challenges. “Gone are the days when we know what the threat is, we have a library [of countermeasures], and we have a few buttons to press to protect us,” Clark said. In apparent recognition of this fact, the US DoD made an effort to accelerate capabilities in this domain, first by releasing the Superiority Strategy in Oct 2020 and then in Jul 2021, when SecDef Lloyd Austin signed the strategy implementation plan.
(c) Despite the Sep 2021 Taiwanese MND bombshell, and US DoD stalling on EW, I think overall, in 2021, Taiwan has made remarkable progress on building a large conventional deterrent. As such, there is some cause for optimism. In fact, the Taiwanese MND report acknowledged that the PLA still lacked the capacity—particularly when it came to transport and logistics—to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Nevertheless, China is working to boost those capabilities.
8. Above is some of the AWACS in service with the JASDF; with these new Japanese E-2Ds often used to provide situational awareness for their fighters, when they conduct an intercept of a formation of PLAAF aircraft that overfly Japan’s ADIZ. Japan has through Foreign Military Sale, placed orders for 13 E-2Ds. The JASDF’s acquisition of the F-35As and F-35Bs paved the way for cooperation and training with the USAF and U.S. Marines on LO air superiority CONOPS that utilises the better situational awareness for a tactical advantage.9. The JASDF and JMSDF don’t create a strategy with a plan. Rather, they execute the Japanese military procurement plan to invest in the correct tools to win the naval battles to come, as their strategy for deterrence — the Japanese have sufficient forces and the ability to use it within their A2AD bubble of their island chains they control.
(a) Japanese platform procurement is professional and requirements based. The selection of the F-35A, F-35B and E-2D combination are seen as an influence purchase for the ROKAF and the RSAF. This is about Japan acquiring a range of advanced air power capabilities evolved from American LO air power CONOPS for an unfair fight, through systems of systems engineering for their C4 systems that plug into their database. While their actual littoral warfare heuristics is OPSEC, there are clear signs the JSDF is well along this path.
(b) The leadership of the JMSDF are strident critics of CCP, but they are never be so stupid, racist or strategically blind to consciously underestimate the PLA/N/AF, as a combined arms force that uses AI. I don't understand why some admirals in the US Navy continue to make that mistake. Don’t just look at the fighters, rather, to understand current JSDF capability, it must be located as a competing C4 system for the Blue force to be used against the Red force. The Chinese are already using of AI to process information gathered by domain awareness sensors.
(c) To match the Chinese OODA loop, the Japanese have developed the capability to convert terabytes of data (generated from a broad array of sources ranging from battlefield sensors to captured enemy material to publicly available information) into intelligence. The Japanese have installed predictive algorithms to identify and predict ECAs and guide OCAs along an optimal path. Analytics translators could then take the model outputs and work with Japanese commanders to modify initial military training curricula and identify at-risk forces and enable early intervention to prevent loss through enemy action. The OODA loop that the JASDF is building to win in a fight, is incredible (see post #254 for a glossary of abbreviations).
10. Increased computational power on fighters, attack helicopters, destroyers, frigates and submarines have resulted in the widespread use of decision support engines in target selection. The Japanese have a data strategy that is slowly transforming their intelligence cells at all levels into data-centric organizations. The JSDF KNOWS that future battlefield survival will hinge on data utilization, due to use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by the Chinese. Within this context, Japanese air power has three important characteristics:
(a) it includes less tangible ingredients, such as LO fighter employment doctrine along with allies, CONOPS that uses 13 E-2Ds, training, their tactics to create surprise, and their adaptability to Chinese counter-moves;
(b) it is inseparable from Japanese intelligence on China — JASDF F-35A/Bs have a signal gathering capability, an unique datalink and the ability to operate as a formation for situational awareness, which should make the kinetic response to PLA(N) more feasible. JASDF air power involves more than merely attacking targets. The KHI P-1 MPAs, Japanese UAVs and submarines on patrol will no doubt assist in gathering ISR to help the JSDF decide on what PLA(N) target to hit and where to find it using predictive algorithms; and
(c) it is inherently a joint force and embraces naval and army aviation, plus the KHI C-2’s ability to move anti-ship missiles of the joint force to remote islands to various chokepoints to bottle up the PLA(N). Planning for joint forces is a team effort that requires a system-of-systems engineering road map to guide data interface points.
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