Defence of Taiwan

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 1

The rhetoric coming out of the PRC reminds me of the rhetoric that enamated from Nazi Germany in the mid 1930s with the talk of avenging the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles and talk of lebensraum.

1. Viewing the CCP as a monolith is misleading, and impedes the understanding of domestic Chinese politics, and the dynamics of factional politics within it. If you choose to see China through this sort of lens, you will lose insight on how to actually deter the PLA by working to build understanding without prejudice — unfounded prejudice is what will cause American and Japanese efforts to resist the PLA’s growth to fail.

2. China’s system internally selected Xi Jinping, as General Secretary, to reform and he has a charter for reform, if it is not squandered. Thus far the reforms seems to be real and deep reaching within this dysfunctional system’s parameters; but he has concentrated power to a degree never before seen — it is not useful to think of Xi Jinping as having ended the CCP’s internal democracy that Deng Xiaoping had established.

3. The rise of a new power-seeking faction under the patronage of President Xi is one of the biggest developments in elite Chinese politics over the past three decades. What is his purpose? Is it only for control? I suspect that is not the only way to look at these changes. Countries in Asia have to navigate a difficult middle path from 2030 to 2049 because of China’s awareness of its looming weaknesses; and not because of its strength. China is a threat because it has a system but China’s weakness is also because of the limitations of the same system.

4. The Chinese bureaucracy involves two vertical hierarchies, the state and the party. These two vertical hierarchies are then replicated across the five levels of government: central, provincial, county, city, and township. A certain level of local knowledge is needed to help the PLA become self-aware of the harm it is doing to itself. Unfounded prejudice that I often see in other forums will create an unnecessary enemy, when there is scope to both cooperate and to push back.

5. Chinese politicians can be divided into 7 distinct groups based on their nature of connection with President Xi: princelings, Shaanxi, Tsinghua University, Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. Each of these 7 groups represent a particular stage in Xi’s political career. Therefore, all the members of the Xi Gang essentially formed a relationship with the leader as Xi rose up the ranks.

 

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 2

6. Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline. It is this judgement that is more consequential, encouraging Beijing to challenge Washington not only in Asia but globally. In the book: “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order,” Chinese leaders have constantly assessed and reassessed American power. Since the end of the Cold War, each leader has publicly anchored Chinese grand strategy to concepts like “multipolarity” and “the international balance of forces” that are essentially polite euphemisms for the relative balance between Chinese and American power. When China’s perception of American strength shifts, its strategy generally changes.

7. The Chinese version of grand strategy delineated in the analysis by Rush Doshi has been patient, persistent, and relentless, combining all the elements of statecraft—diplomacy, information, military, and economic—the so-called DIME model of strategy. Beginning with the early opening of China to the west in 1979, the author breaks down the sequence of Chinese grand strategy into three basic phases: blunting, building, and expansion, and then shows how each element of the DIME model was conducted during that phase as well as the continuity of strategy across changes in top CCP leadership, with each succeeding General Secretary building on the efforts of his predecessor.

8. Additionally, some close allies of Xi such as Wang Qishan have also formed their own patron-client networks, and these are also included in the Xi Gang. In July 2021, Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan called on:

(a) party members to make more efforts at learning the Xi thought by heart, improve the political judgement, understanding and execution, and closely follow the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core in terms of thinking and actions; and​

(b) China and the U.S. to handle differences through dialogue and expand common interests. The US' biggest challenge is not China, but itself, Wang said during a high-level meeting to commemorate the 50th anniversary of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China.​

9. In the past decade, Chinese efforts to displace the US on the world economic stage has only accelerated, with the Belt and Road Initiative and the growing effort to displace the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, creating both economic and diplomatic inroads throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America.

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(a) The challenges faced by the world’s economy from the COVID crisis of 2020 has only increased Chinese economic efforts to take advantage of the situation to strive for dominance in the crucial high-tech industrial race of the 21st century: quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and robotics.​

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(b) In spite of its massive military power compared to its immediate neighbours, China faces structural problems. The demise of the US has been forecasted before, most prominently in the late 1970s in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. However, the will and determination to solidly face the Chinese threat has not yet solidified, which is still emerging from a deep COVID slumber. Solid research and sharp analysis is sorely needed to truly understand the challenges faced with China’s rise.​

10. I have confidence that Japan will articulate its security concerns via performance at military modernisation— the JSDF will in the next 10 years demonstrate how deterrence is to be achieved while remaining cordial with an adversary. However, if we adopt the bi-polar Taiwanese approach — KMT (too much appeasement) vs DPP (too much confrontation without substance) — we will fail. The most concerning factor for Taiwan has been the development of:

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(a) a more modern and lethal military force, particularly the PLA(N), which has moved from a force designed to keep both the JMSDF and the US Navy out of the Western Pacific and the approaches to China to a burgeoning global maritime force capable of projecting forward presence and sea power to defend a growing Chinese economic and diplomatic presence;​

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(b) large amphibious ships, at-sea replenishment ships, multi-warfare capable surface ships, and the beginning of an aircraft carrier fleets for the PLA(N); and​

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(c) Chinese determination to dominate not only the East and South China Seas, but to populate these contentious zones and waters with civilian ships to contest ownership.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

China’s system internally selected Xi Jinping to reform and he has a charter for reform, if it is not squandered. Thus far the reforms seems to be real and deep reaching within this dysfunctional system’s parameters; but he has concentrated power to a degree never before seen — it is not useful to think of Xi Jinping as having ended the CCP’s internal democracy that Deng Xiaoping had established.

That sounds overly optimistic. Xi was selected in part because the different Party factions couldn't agree on who to choose, and Xi seemed like a sensible compromise. I don't think there was any belief he was the best person to choose to pursue "reform". Similarly I doubt the factions thought he was going to abolish term limits or that they wanted that. But by the time he did it he had too much power to be stopped.

The rise of a new power-seeking faction under the patronage of President Xi is one of the biggest developments in elite Chinese politics over theast three decades. What is his purpose? Is it only for control? I suspect that is not the only way to look at these changes.

It's not the only way to look at it, but so far it's the obvious way to interpret his actions. His "anti-corruption" drives conveniently tackle his enemies, and he's set up various "snitch lines" to report people not for general criminal activity but for political "crimes" like wrongthink. Meanwhile writing about the wealth of Xi's family or even speculating what his daughter looks like is a serious crime. You can't tackle corruption without transparency.

He's also continuing to dodge the really difficult stuff, like raising the retirement age quickly to deal with the demographic crisis, raising taxes to pay for better wages (because crap public sector pay is one cause of corruption) and rebalancing security spending for better education, healthcare, etc.

(b) China and the U.S. to handle differences through dialogue and expand common interests. The US' biggest challenge is not China, but itself, Wang said during a high-level meeting to commemorate the 50th anniversary of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China.

Didn't Biden try to do that through the direct talks some months ago, only for the Chinese delegation to start ranting during the opening remarks and then make petty comments about having instant noodles for lunch? I think the CCP should read Matthew 7:5

"first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye"

 

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 3

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1402278233144541186

11. China’s PLA and industry needs another 5 to 15 years to develop their beach storming AI controlled robot swarms — they certainly don’t have ROE concerns of the Americans — their PHD holders are proud of what they can achieve in their system. The PLA may not intend to get there by 2026 but it’s coming to a beach on the 1st island chain.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1424511798258987008

12. This is why dominance of the electro-mangnetic spectrum is key to any fight within the 1st and 2nd island chains. In 2019, it was reported that Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) seeks to develop an electronic warfare version of the P-1 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, to replace the EP-3 and OP-3 series in JMSDF service. Which is why we need to study the Japanese, Australian and American modernisation efforts (or lack thereof) in this area. Japan’s Signal Intelligence Capability could certainly be improved if they were willing to adopt the US Navy’s system called Ship Signals Exploitation System, which collects foreign radio communication and radar signals.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1407971527782408195

Why China insists on poking Japan with a stick is beyond me. Japan has theoretically got enough plutonium for around 5000 to 6000 warheads.

13. Because the CCP decided that they can at this moment of American weakness, just after Trump stepped down (before Biden can shore-up the alliances in the Indo-Pacific) — the message from them is being heard loud and clear by the peace lobby in Japan.

14. Don’t misunderstand the CCP’s propaganda message. It’s not intended for you but directed at the anti-nuclear lobby in Japan, or the local Japanese who oppose the US military presence in Okinawa, and the Taiwanese surrender factions who are aided by Chinese funds. The CCP understands that Taiwanese willingness and plans to defend themselves is as hollow as the Afghan National Army (if the CCP decide to push forward in the event of an armed conflict in the late 2030s).

15. After the latest corruption scandal erupted, President Tsai Ing-wen admitted that the DPP once again faces a legitimacy crisis — its former president Chen Shui-bian was arrested for corruption in 2008 — and that it is uncertain her party will retain control of Taiwan in 2024. Tsai further warned that those who aim for personal enrichment should not join the DPP. Su Jia-chyuan, Tsai’s confidant and widely believed to be a top candidate for chief officer of the executive branch if the DPP were to stay in power in 2024, resigned from his post as Secretary General so that prosecutors can conduct unhindered investigations.

16. The blow to the NPP is even more devastating. Hsu Yung-ming has voluntarily resigned from the presidency of the party, but apparently that was insufficient to convince party members not to rescind their memberships. NPP’s only two legislators in Taipei’s municipal parliament quit the party, while the second-highest party member said he would not seek to become the NPP president. In short, the third-largest political party in Taiwan is on the verge of collapsing. The domestic politics of Taiwan is insane — I don’t see the possibility of real bipartisan support for getting serious about defence in Taiwan.

17. Due to the endless domestic political in fighting, presently, many of Taiwan’s conscripts see military service as a waste of time. Until and unless the Taiwanese conscript trust the fighting ability of their sister unit to hold their flank, you will see the progressive collapse of defenders if they face a determined opponent.

18. Americans who support Taiwanese military modernisation efforts need to be honest and realistic about the party they are selling weapons to. The first question they need to ask, is:

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Q1: Can the Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) really use the weapons systems approved for sale?​

19. The prior Trump administration pushed out 6 FMS packages for Taiwan between Oct. and Dec. of 2020, including a US$2.37 billion deal for Harpoon coastal defense systems. Overall, the Trump administration cleared 20 FMS cases for Taiwan, with an estimated cumulative price tag of almost US$18.3 billion.

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(a) When the Taiwanese watch Singaporean soldiers on the SAF’s unilateral training in Taiwan, they get demoralised (because they know the difference). In contrast to the 4 months in Taiwan, Singaporean conscripts serve for 22 months. I know their training standards, where instead of being given blanks to fire during an exercise, they blow whistles. Taiwan’s MND needs to be reformed before they can utilise the package of weapons being sold by Biden. The U.S. State Department cleared Taiwan to purchase an estimated US$750 million in howitzers and associated equipment — the first major Foreign Military Sales case to Taiwan approved by the Biden administration. Without real reform, these same weapons can be used against US allies after their surrender.​

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(b) When Singaporean troops train, it is a combined arms level for a battalion, a brigade or a division (as demonstrated at Exercise Wallaby and at Exercise Forging Sabre) with the supporting C4ISR systems. Each Singaporean division is supported by an artillery brigade and that artillery brigade is defended by GBAD systems in concentric layers. The Taiwanese conscripts are minimally trained and they are not serious in spending money on training for combined arms warfare.​

20. The conventional American logic is let’s arm the Taiwanese to the teeth but have they looked at the rot in the MND in Taiwan?

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

14. Don’t misunderstand the CCP’s propaganda message. It’s not intended for you but directed at the anti-nuclear lobby in Japan, or the local Japanese who oppose the US military presence in Okinawa

Neither of those factions control Japanese politics, and Beijing has turned Japanese public sentiment against them [China]. If anything the anti-nuclear/peace lobby was more powerful 20 years ago when China played down the threat it posed. China has made it politically possible for Japan to purchase stand off weapons like JASSM. If the purchase didn't go ahead it would probably be because of cost rather than public concerns about principle.

The fact that it appears LRASM has been ditched to ensure JASSM goes ahead is rather telling about the current political climate.

After the latest corruption scandal erupted, President Tsai Ing-wen admitted that the DPP once again faces a legitimacy crisis

FYI the link is broken.

and that it is uncertain her party will retain control of Taiwan in 2024. Tsai further warned that those who aim for personal enrichment should not join the DPP. Su Jia-chyuan, Tsai’s confidant and widely believed to be a top candidate for chief officer of the executive branch if the DPP were to stay in power in 2024, resigned from his post as Secretary General so that prosecutors can conduct unhindered investigations.

We're still 2.5 years out from the next general election, so sure nothing is certain. But if the DPP choose someone popular, and they've gotten a lot better about selecting people via primaries than doing deals between factions, I'd still expect them to win largely on the basis that the KMT positioned itself on the wrong side of the vaccine strategy. The KMT banked on Taiwan struggling to get vaccines without China but were blindsided by donations from Japan and the US. The daily infection/hospitalisation rate is also super-low again, whilst other countries are talking about tens of thousands of infections a day being the "new normal". If the government can keep things under control as the vaccinations keep being given out, I think the DPP will get credit for that.

Due to the endless domestic political in fighting, presently, many of Taiwan’s conscripts see military service as a waste of time.

I know you talk about the conscripts a lot. What about the professional (volunteer) personnel that are now the front line forces?

 

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 4

What about the professional (volunteer) personnel that are now the front line forces?

21. You are just cherry picking on any aspect of my point that does not fit your world view. I keep telling you, Taiwan’s MoD procurement plans is deeply dysfunctional at any level. Given the current state of U.S.-China relations, increasing bipartisan support for Taiwan in Washington. As I explained before, DPP raises tensions with China for political gain; and to gain support for their intermittent weapons build programs for armoured vehicles, jets, ships and submarines.

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(a) In 2021, the Tsai Ing-wen administration released its second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Their 2021 QDR contains some fluff but at its core does nothing to fix their broken, but mainly professional army. They don’t have modern IFVs and don’t intend to acquire them, because it’s cheaper to only buy 8x8s. Every Tsai Ing-wen supporter and constructivist had a plan until they get punched in the face by CCP’s realpolitik.​

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(b) Taiwan’s 2021 QDR emphasizes Taiwan’s procurement and development of long-range strike capabilities without regard to increasing the immediate lethality of their existing brigades. The MND explicitly admits that “conventional warfare of attrition or arms race is not viable options for [Taiwan].” Taiwan is also acquiring 400 Harpoon Block II missiles (as part of it’s coastal defense system) and to extend Taiwan’s defenses deeper into Chinese territory. This all sounds good until you realise that Taiwan makes its own longer ranged anti-ship missiles at a lower cost point. They could just increase the local anti-ship missile production rate to sustain Taiwanese industry instead of wasting money on American missiles.​

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(c) There are also no believable plans to increase the level of training for their armed forces, at the brigade level. Have they constructed urban warfare ranges, to enable a Taiwanese brigade to train together? Taiwan’s MND also talks about building submarines, naval vessels and buying 40 M-109A6 Paladin 155mm self propelled howitzers (SPH) and 100 M1 MBTs— but there is nothing concrete on plucking low hanging fruit to hire a few more troops to make up for the recruiting shortfall. Taiwan basically bought 2 battalions of MBTs and 2 battalions of SPHs, plus a few spares. This is a good first step but is grossly inadequate, as they lack modern IFVs.​

22. If produced in sufficient numbers, the new variant of the 8x8 Clouded Leopard armored vehicle with a 105mm gun will enable them to retire their dates CM-12 (a modified M48A3 light tank). It is also great to see an increased emphasis on cyber, improving their C2 and improving the lethality of their 8x8 battalions by developing the 81/120 mm Mobile Mortar System (MMS) on the 8x8 M2 Mortar Carrier. MMS is a self-contained, electro-mechanical turntable mount that can be armed with an 81 mm or 120 mm smoothbore mortar. However, Taiwan is still buying less than the basics to improve the fighting ability and cohesion of Taiwanese army divisions — instead they rely on the magic word ‘asymmetric’, as a cure all. If the US DoD were to review Taiwanese war plans, they would note the lack of Taiwanese MND desire to really change for the better.

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(a) This is typical of the Taiwanese desire to fake it, rather than fix it under the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Based on my observation of their implied CONOPS and announced procurement plans, they have an island defence plan that does not seem to work, yet.​

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(b) The proposed FY 2021 Taiwanese military budget is US$12.4 billion, an increase of about 4.4%, which compares poorly with a PRC military budget estimated by SIPRI at US$261 billion for 2019. US Marine Maj. Gen. Dave Furness, deputy assistant commandant for plans, policy and operations, speaking late Monday afternoon at Sea Air Space on Indo-Pacific security issues said:​

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China is in the midst of “a large-scale exercise, a theater level exercise of huge scope and scale. It’s something that really US forces haven’t done, you know, since Reforger.”​

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(c) Nothing works when the leadership under Tsai Ing-wen is so incompetent in defence planning. In future, I hope the Taiwanese will take time to really refine their war plans, to make them credible and workable against the PLA’s amphibious forces.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

You are just cherry picking on any aspect of my point that does not fit your world view. I keep telling you, Taiwan’s MoD procurement plans is deeply dysfunctional at any level.

I wasn't cherry picking, I just asked you for your views on the volunteer services given that Taiwan is no longer a conscript-focused military but that your comments on morale, etc focus on the conscripts. If you'd said "morale amongst the volunteers is also low because [insert reason]" I would have accepted that.

Not every question is an attack on you, sometimes it's a valid request for an opinion.

 

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 5

Not every question is an attack on you, sometimes it's a valid request for an opinion.

23. Your point is well understood and at no point do I assume that this is a personal attack. However, I do note your very selective use of points to counter-argue that at this stage of our extended conversation, I find a little tiresome. Unlike the Americans, the PLA is willing to take attrition and keep pushing.

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(a) With only a US$5.2 billion personnel budget, the Taiwanese infantry battalions can’t take attrition because they are chronically understaffed. Except for SF, every normal Taiwanese infantry battalion is under-strength; and they want to use minimally trained conscripts to make up numbers — because the conditions of service is so poor that they can’t hit recruitment numbers for professionals (except in the most elite of units). Augmenting a professional force with poorly trained Taiwanese conscripts in a mobile defensive battle requires skill that the Taiwanese do not possess and hence is doomed to failure.​

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(b) Finland spends much less of defence than Taiwan and yet they are able to deter the Russians. Unlike Finland’s use of conscripts to augment its brigades, Taiwanese war planning and use of force lacks an in-depth understanding of what it means to fight outnumbered. Finland’s army consists of a highly mobile brigades backed up by local defence units. The training of conscripts is based on joukkotuotanto-principle (lit. English troop production). In this system, 80% of the conscripts are trained to fulfill a specific role in a specific wartime military unit. Each brigade-level unit is responsible for producing specified reserve units from the conscripts it has been allocated. The army defends Finland’s territory and its active defence military strategy employs the use of the heavily forested terrain and numerous lakes to wear down an aggressor, like the Russians, instead of attempting to hold the greedy Russian bear at the frontier.​

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(c) What the Taiwanese really need to buy to augment their army’s lethality at a divisional level is Lockheed Martin’s precision strike missile (PrSM), as the range of HIMARS is too short for coastal defence. In 2020, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) – the country’s principal defence science research and development agency – showcased the production-ready version of the Chien Hsiang anti-radiation loitering munition. If Taiwan deploys both PrSM (once it is developed) along side the Chien Hsiang anti-radiation loitering munition, it will force China to deploy their S400 systems or HQ-9 further in-land and away from the Taiwan Straits. In this respect, the Jun 2021 MND decision to acquire HIMARS for an estimated US$436.1 million, for Taiwan by 2027 is a good initial step.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1428683774301065228

(d) IMHO, a medium weight Taiwan 8x8 infantry brigade is a hollow force that can’t hope to fight and win against any Singaporean armoured brigade that is spearheaded by a Leopard 2SG battalion at its core and having Bionix II (or Hunter) IFV equipped armoured infantry and satcom equipped Apaches to fire Spike missiles, in support. Likewise, a USAF funded study by Rand found that:​

• Heavy ground forces are the most likely to enhance deterrence, and crisis deployments may prevent escalation but do not improve partners' leverage.
• This study highlights the importance of considering the type and location of U.S. forces when deciding how to design U.S. overseas deployments to enhance their deterrent value. The general patterns in this study suggest that, in the average case, heavier ground forces and those deployed near, but not directly bordering, potential adversaries may be most likely to reduce the risk of conflict. However, the dynamics of individual situations may differ, and policymakers will need to carefully analyze each situation before deciding on the appropriate approach.

(e) The Taiwanese Army has to fight out numbered by the PLA but they don’t even aspire to have the right combination of armoured forces to make the fight longer and enhance deterrence; as they are still operating M113s — which makes me wonder, if this modernisation is just for show. In contrast, the SAF attempts to build armoured forces with layers of superiority against our anticipated adversary.​

24. In prior posts, I explained that Taiwan spends a pitiful 2.3% of GDP on its military. This tiny amount (with the smallest defence budget in NE Asia) is further divided into personnel (US$5.2 billion, 46%), operations (US$3.1 billion, 27%), and defense technology and acquisition programs (US$3.1 billion, 27%). There are three points to note:

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One, the Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) in FY 2020 spends less than tiny Singapore’s defence ministry on new weapons procurement and R&D — they can and will spend much more to buy weapons in the years ahead but recruitment and retention is hard. Taiwan’s MND has a growth plan, and there are efforts to improve how they use civilians and regulars, but that all needs time. The Taiwanese Navy will need years to build to where it needs to be. And remember, it's not just about recruiting 250 to 500 more sailors and marines today. Taiwanese frigates and LPDs need officers, senior sailors and marines to operate — Taiwan's air force has benefited from big-ticket items like new and upgraded F-16s, the navy is President Tsai's next focus.​

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Two, the MND are buying weapons the Americans are willing to sell them but not in sufficient numbers nor in the correct sequence for incremental force development. Trump’s weapon sales seems to benefit the American military industrial base, but more weapons sales is by itself not enough to improve Taiwanese military capability. Improving military capability needs to occur in progressive and digestible increments.​

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Three, in direct contrast to Taiwan’s R&D efforts, Singaporeans are much more innovative in our platform sub-systems integration efforts, and use of AI and encryption for network centric warfare to increase lethality of the SAF’s divisions and brigades.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Your point is well understood and at no point do I assume that this is a personal attack.

That's good to know.

However, I do note your very selective use of points to counter-argue that at this stage of our extended conversation, I find a little tiresome.

With respect to Taiwan the query about volunteers versus conscripts was not a counterpoint but a question, as it wasn't clear to me if you thought conscripts were a weak link or a sign of problems throughout the military. I'm grateful for your provision of more detail, and I will try to make note of that.

As for the political situation I'm not sure I said anything controversial, whether about the possibility for the DPP to regain favour due to falling infection numbers or the lack of influence Japanese pacifists have on their government's policy (nuclear weapons development being a different matter and currently off the table).

In prior posts (#184 and #186), I explained that Taiwan spends a pitiful 2.3% of GDP on its military. This tiny amount (with the smallest defence budget in NE Asia) is further divided into personnel (US$5.2 billion, 46 percent), operations (US$3.1 billion, 27%), and defense technology and acquisition programs (US$3.1 billion, 27%).

I think pretty much everyone here is in agreement that Taiwan needs to spend more on defence.

 

[John Fedup]

Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, August 17, 2021 | The White House

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room 1:33 P.M. EDT MS. PSAKI: Hi, everyone. So, joining me today is our National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, who

www.whitehouse.gov

"We believe that our commitments to our allies and partners are sacrosanct and always have been. We believe our commitment to Taiwan and to Israel remains as strong as it’s ever been."

Not sure it's usual for the US to mention Israel and Taiwan in the same sentence and in the context of "allies and partners". I know that official policy re Taiwan is strategic ambiguity, but in reality has that been thrown out the window? Just wondering.

The US position on Taiwan is like between a rock and a hard place. Failure to counter an invasion of Taiwan would signal to allies and enemies that Pax America is over. Many Allies would begin appeasement policies wrt Russia and China. Countering a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, possibly the end of everything.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

The US position on Taiwan is like between a rock and a hard place. Failure to counter an invasion of Taiwan would signal to allies and enemies that Pax America is over. Many Allies would begin appeasement policies wrt Russia and China. Countering a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, possibly the end of everything.

It's a hard choice, but that's what you get when you're the #1 global power. (Should have backed us over Suez, might have meant we could do more heavy lifting now. )

I think that the US has to intervene over Taiwan unless Taipei surrenders immediately or it's clear it will do so before US/allied forces can make a meaningful impact. Simply standing back and wagging fingers will mean not just the end of US credibility in Asia but probably also NATO. Everyone knows how Taiwan is strategically important so the "hurr-durr, but there's no defence treaty between us" argument won't wash with anyone. Obama used that get-out-of-jail-free card over Ukraine, so I don't think the US can't do that again anytime soon.

In future decades there could be an isolationist President who says "fuck it, we're pulling out of Asia and Europe", but they'd have to be pretty stupid given the world is so interconnected and the US is moving to be a net food importer rather than an exporter.

In other news President Tsai has jumped on the news from Afghanistan to make a point about Taiwanese defence.

“Recent changes in the situation in Afghanistan have led to much discussion in Taiwan,” Tsai wrote on Facebook. “I want to tell everyone that Taiwan’s only option is to make ourselves stronger, more united and more resolute in our determination to protect ourselves.”

She said that Taiwan should practice self-reliance. “It’s not an option for us to do nothing ... and just to rely on other people’s protection,” she wrote. She added that Taipei cannot rely on “momentary goodwill or charity from those who will not renounce the use of force against Taiwan,” an apparent reference to Beijing.

Pure political rhetoric or poking public sentiment towards accepting higher defence spending? Probably no changes to the 2022 budget now, so it would be 2023 at the earliest. Not worth holding your breath over.

 

[Blackshoe]

The US position on Taiwan is like between a rock and a hard place. Failure to counter an invasion of Taiwan would signal to allies and enemies that Pax America is over. Many Allies would begin appeasement policies wrt Russia and China. Countering a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, possibly the end of everything.

Yeah, in the same briefing, Sullivan noted that AFG is different from say, South Korea or Taiwan because it's not intervening in a civil war (excepting that the ROK IS in a civil war, just a frozen one, and if we're having to help Taiwan, then the PRC would also frame it as a civil war). Good job of making a clear policy, buddy!

 

[OPSSG]

On a less serious note…

Yeah, in the same briefing, Sullivan noted that AFG is different from say, South Korea or Taiwan because it's not intervening in a civil war (excepting that the ROK IS in a civil war, just a frozen one, and if we're having to help Taiwan, then the PRC would also frame it as a civil war). Good job of making a clear policy, buddy!

Have you seen the Onion? I was laughing so hard.

Critics Warn Withdrawal From Afghanistan Paints Entirely Accurate Picture Of U.S. Government

WASHINGTON—Characterizing the disaster left behind after a 20-year military intervention as completely indicative of what America stands for, critics warned Tuesday that the withdrawal from Afghanistan paints an entirely accurate picture of the U.S. government. “The collapse of a nation...

www.theonion.com

 

[Blackshoe]

Have you seen the Onion? I was laughing so hard.

Critics Warn Withdrawal From Afghanistan Paints Entirely Accurate Picture Of U.S. Government

WASHINGTON—Characterizing the disaster left behind after a 20-year military intervention as completely indicative of what America stands for, critics warned Tuesday that the withdrawal from Afghanistan paints an entirely accurate picture of the U.S. government. “The collapse of a nation...

www.theonion.com

At some point if you are the Taiwanese, exactly how useful the US might be to you becomes a valid question.

 

[OPSSG]

Many Chinese believe that Trump accelerated American decline —Part 6

At some point if you are the Taiwanese, exactly how useful the US might be to you becomes a valid question.

25. I see your point but… More than just talking about arms, Taiwan needs a trade partner and an alternative export destination to China. The threat emanating from the Mainland is however not only purely military, since Beijing has adopted a multi-faceted approach of carrots-and-sticks towards Taiwan, in which military force represents just one aspect.

​

(a) Besides military measures, China has a comprehensive strategy that includes ‘three warfares’, which emphasizes psychological, legal, and public opinion (media) measures. In the aftermath of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, it became clear that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by the PLA’s forces, until then the central assumption of Taiwan’s military strategy, was only one of the possible scenarios; that the PLA was waging other means of Taiwan’s intimidation, such as blockade or aerial attack.​

​

(b) Following the 1996 crisis and particularly with the rise of the DPP to power, Taiwan’s defense experienced an important shift in defense posture. The original Lee Teng-hui’s strategy of “resolute defense, effective deterrence” gave way to “effective deterrence, strong defense”, that was never implemented under Chen Shui-bian. With PLA acquiring advanced refuelling capability and aircraft carriers, Taiwan is under the threat of encirclement; and blockade is another potential scenario of PLA’s intimidation of Taiwan — not only does the Taiwanse Navy need the submarines, they also need JMSDF help.​

​

(c) Taiwan can be defended, if the Taiwanese are willing to adopt more of Finland’s approach. They have to be willing to fight out numbered, if they are serious in worse case scenario building to test their planned responses. If that is indeed the case (and it may not be, due to factors I explained earlier), the US is the most important arms supplier to Taiwan. The Taiwanese are smart, if they want to apply themselves to a particular problem.​

26. So America remains very useful for trade, weapons and advanced CONOPS, for them to adapt to local conditions. Under President Tsai, the Taiwanese has developed an incomplete plan that has significant execution risk, to bring new capabilities to IOC. If this plan can be improved over the years, it can enhance deterrence.

​

(a) An annual Japanese defense white paper in mid-July 2021 calls Taiwan important to domestic and international security for the first time, and it adds that “it is necessary that [Japan] pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before.”​

​

(b) China of course retorted that Japan was interfering in Chinese internal affairs. Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said the government would have to defend Taiwan with the United States in the event of an invasion, the Kyodo News Agency reported. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) willingness to take such a stance, even if it is just on an informal basis, buys time for Taiwan to transition from not being serious, to being serious on defence. This is because it will take 10 to 15 years of consistent effort to re-build military capability that was lost under prior KMT rule.​

​

(c) Japan's LDP is planning on holding talks with representatives from its Taiwanese counterpart, the DPP, in the first-ever ruling party version of its “two-plus-two” security dialogue normally held between governments, reported The Japan Times. Japan has initiated the bilateral talks, which will include LDP Foreign Affairs Division Director Sato Masahisa and National Defense Division Director Otsuka Taku.​

 

[ngatimozart]

Yeah, in the same briefing, Sullivan noted that AFG is different from say, South Korea or Taiwan because it's not intervening in a civil war (excepting that the ROK IS in a civil war, just a frozen one, and if we're having to help Taiwan, then the PRC would also frame it as a civil war). Good job of making a clear policy, buddy!

Actually IMHO the Chinese Civil War hasn't ended because whilst the ChiComs have conquered the mainland, they never succeeded in destroying their Koumintung enemies. AFAIK the KMT and its' nationalist allies have never surrendered.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

Yeah, in the same briefing, Sullivan noted that AFG is different from say, South Korea or Taiwan because it's not intervening in a civil war (excepting that the ROK IS in a civil war, just a frozen one, and if we're having to help Taiwan, then the PRC would also frame it as a civil war). Good job of making a clear policy, buddy!

Well sure if you want to get your legal textbook out. But I doubt the vast majority of people believe there's a civil war re China-Taiwan or NK-SK. In both cases pretty much everyone is going to see two countries next to each other, one being the dictatorial aggressor the other being a peace-loving democracy.

The point he was trying to make - and I think people watching would have understood it - is that there's a difference between protecting one country from another and trying to save a country from internal fighting.

 

[swerve]

Actually IMHO the Chinese Civil War hasn't ended because whilst the ChiComs have conquered the mainland, they never succeeded in destroying their Koumintung enemies. AFAIK the KMT and its' nationalist allies have never surrendered.

Not formally, but in Taiwan the KMT is now the pro-PRC party, the one which has argued for a 'one country two systems' deal - though that seems to have gone a bit quiet recently, what with Chinese behaviour in Hong Kong, where the PRC has now decided that opposition of any kind is now seditious, thus making elections rather pointless.

The PRC has been quite openly backing the KMT against the DPP (the current governing party in Taiwan) for quite a while.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 6: The Taiwan factor in regional calculations

1. Taiwan has requested a change the name of its mission in the United States from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to the Taiwan Representative Office.

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(a) I view this as a Taiwanese attempt to provoke Beijing, with little to gain for the Americans. Renaming the office will not start a war with China, but the United States should NOT go ahead with the move.​

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(b) The United States should keep in mind whether a policy sends mixed messages to Taiwan regarding the U.S. position on Taiwan independence and emboldens those on Taiwan who advocate for independence. It also should consider whether a proposed policy is intellectually consistent with the U.S. One-China policy.​

2. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a budget proposal of NT$471.7 billion (US$17.05 billion) to the Legislative Yuan for the procurement of defense systems in FY2022. Under President Tsai, the Taiwanese has developed an incomplete plan that has significant execution risk, to bring new capabilities to IOC. If this plan can be improved over the next 8 to 10 years, it can enhance deterrence.

3. Above is a silly Taiwanese TV discussion on NS, where they compare their short duration conscript service to Singapore and Israel. I know that I am harsh but given their defence policies, correctly understood, the average Taiwanese solider and citizen do not intend to defend Taiwan. Rather, they expect the Americans to do it. Taipei is Kabul on steroids. Lots of rage from the online media in Taiwan but actually impotent, when it comes to raising, training and sustaining a force.

(a) IMHO, a medium weight Taiwan 8x8 infantry brigade is a hollow force that can’t hope to fight and win against any Singaporean armoured brigade that is spearheaded by a Leopard 2SG battalion at its core and having Bionix II (or Hunter) IFV equipped armoured infantry and satcom equipped Apaches to fire Spike missiles, in support. Likewise, a USAF funded study by Rand found that:​

• Heavy ground forces are the most likely to enhance deterrence, and crisis deployments may prevent escalation but do not improve partners' leverage.
• This study highlights the importance of considering the type and location of U.S. forces when deciding how to design U.S. overseas deployments to enhance their deterrent value. The general patterns in this study suggest that, in the average case, heavier ground forces and those deployed near, but not directly bordering, potential adversaries may be most likely to reduce the risk of conflict. However, the dynamics of individual situations may differ, and policymakers will need to carefully analyze each situation before deciding on the appropriate approach.

(b) The Taiwanese Army has to fight out numbered by the PLA but they don’t even aspire to have the right combination of armoured forces to make the fight longer and enhance deterrence; as they are still operating M113s — which makes me wonder, if this modernisation is just for show. In contrast, the SAF attempts to build armoured forces with layers of superiority against our anticipated adversary.​

​

(c) Finland spends much less of defence than Taiwan and yet they are able to deter the Russians. Unlike Finland’s use of conscripts to augment its brigades, Taiwanese war planning and use of force lacks an in-depth understanding of what it means to fight outnumbered. Finland’s army consists of a highly mobile brigades backed up by local defence units. The training of conscripts is based on joukkotuotanto-principle (lit. English troop production). In this system, 80% of the conscripts are trained to fulfill a specific role in a specific wartime military unit. Each brigade-level unit is responsible for producing specified reserve units from the conscripts it has been allocated. The army defends Finland’s territory and its active defence military strategy employs the use of the heavily forested terrain and numerous lakes to wear down an aggressor, like the Russians, instead of attempting to hold the greedy Russian bear at the frontier.​

​

4. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a budget proposal of NT$471.7 billion (US$17.05 billion) to the Legislative Yuan for the procurement of defense systems in FY2022. Under President Tsai, the Taiwanese has developed an incomplete plan that has significant execution risk, to bring new capabilities to IOC. If this plan can be improved over the next 8 to 10 years, it can enhance deterrence.

(a) The budget proposal allocates NT$21.70 billion to Taiwan’s Air Force for fiscal years 2022-2025, for the procurement of four MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs. In 2020, then defense minister Yen Teh-fa (嚴德發) told Legislators that MQ-9B UAVs will be deployed for surveillance and reconnaissance. The ROC Navy will be allocated NT$43.15 billion to upgrade the combat management system, radar system, air defense missile system of its 6 Kang Ding-class frigates from 2021 until 2030. NT$27 billion is allocated for purchasing 10 MH-60R helicopters. Taiwan also to acquire 40 M-109A6 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers for US$750 million.​

​

(b) A GSDF official in charge of the Sept 2021 National level military drills said the exercises are based on the 2019 National Defense Program Guidelines, which call for strengthening defense capabilities to help safeguard the Nansei Islands, including Japan-administered, Beijing-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. These drills involve 100,000 personnel, 20,000 vehicles and 120 aircraft will include 12,000 personnel and 3,900 vehicles from two GSDF divisions based on the northernmost main island of Hokkaido and in the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan as well as a brigade in western Japan's Shikoku region conducting an expeditionary mission to the Kyushu region in southwestern Japan.​

​

(c) The annual Japanese defense white paper in mid-July 2021 calls Taiwan important to domestic and international security for the first time, and it adds that “it is necessary that [Japan] pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before.” China of course retorted that Japan was interfering in Chinese internal affairs. Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said the government would have to defend Taiwan with the United States in the event of an invasion, the Kyodo News Agency reported. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) willingness to take such a stance, even if it is just on an informal basis, buys time for Taiwan to transition from not being serious, to being serious on defence. This is because it will take 10 to 15 years of consistent effort to re-build military capability that was lost under prior KMT rule.​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1435912094394634243

(d) Japan's LDP has held talks with representatives from its Taiwanese counterpart, the DPP, in the first-ever ruling party version of its “two-plus-two” security dialogue normally held between governments, reported The Japan Times. Japan has initiated the bilateral talks, which will include LDP Foreign Affairs Division Director Sato Masahisa and National Defense Division Director Otsuka Taku.​

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 6: The Taiwan factor in regional calculations

5. The Institute for National Defense and Security Research scholar Huang En-hao (黃恩浩) on 6 Aug 2021 released a report that said the scope of the U.S. and Japan’s defense strategy has gradually shifted southward, which will ensure Taiwan Strait security and support Taiwan’s defense in the event of a conflict. The paper, titled “Observations of the expanded U.S.-Japanese ‘Orient Shield 2021 military exercise’” noted that this year’s Orient Shield included 1,700 American soldiers and 3,000 Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces and added space, electronic, and electromagnetic warfare drills to the schedule.

6. All Taiwan has to do to avoid a PLA invasion is to avoid any declaration of independence — but their government’s policy IS to create hostility without actual military capability — we have to wait for IOC of all 8 of their submarines in the 2030s to 2040s before they can deter China and engage in sea denial. In contrast, Singapore Navy’s 4 Type 218SGs will have achieved IOC and be on the prowl in the 2026 to 2028 time frame; with at least 4 of 12 F-35Bs also delivered to Ebbing Air National Guard Base in Fort Smith, Arkansas, for pilot training to begin by in a RSAF composite squadron (that will fly both F-35Bs and F-16s).

Taiwan's planning with regards to defending itself is centered on the ability to develop some level of deference or in the event of actual hostilities with China, to be able to defend itself to a degree until the Americans enter the equation.

7. They had a real NS (once upon a time, where it’s was over 2 years), which gave their army well trained huge numbers. Now they have a summer camp that pretends to be NS. Training for Taiwanese conscripts is reduced to a 16-week term, that includes a combat fitness training and a 12.5-mile (20km) route march — as part of the curriculum of the 5 week basic training program to enhance conscripts’ physical condition, and strengthen their combat skills.

​

(a) Taiwanese conscripts are so poorly trained that I respect Hamas more than them. They have seen Singapore conscripts train in Taiwan and they know they can’t match the level of realism in training, due to the huge difference in physical training standards — be it in basic physical conditioning, mental preparation for operations, tactics, or ROE driven shooting. Don’t just take my word for it, watch this U.S. Marine for his reaction to the gear used by the our conscripts and NSmen, upon mobilisation, to do their routine tasks, as part of the profession at arms.​

​

(b) These Taiwanese conscripts can only manage basic fire and movement, when in contact with the enemy — they don’t have the required tactics for various scenarios, including urban warfare or jungle training. Below is a short video clip of Singapore’s MMRC used to improve Singapore’s conscript proficiency in shooting at a variety of targets (in day and night). They are also taught to fire live rounds at a video screen according to ROEs (i.e. shoot to kill, shoot to incapacitate), where they are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants. For a conscript, scenario shooting based on ROEs is pretty stressful. It takes time to build up confidence to operate in urban areas and protect civilians who are mixed in with hostiles.​

8. If the Taiwanese army keep buying weapons and platforms at the present rate, in about 8 to 10 years, they might have some of the kit needed and the people trained to operate them, to engage in a coherent defence. But buying more weapons sales is by itself not enough to improve Taiwanese military capability. Improving military capability needs to occur in progressive and digestible increments.

Is this correct?

9. No amount of extra defence spending (even the US$8.69 billion over the next five years), will make a difference if troops are not trained or willing to fight. In theory and after reading staff papers, the Taiwanese leadership strangely believe the Taiwanese solider will fight when:

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1438840084510412804

(a) their conscripts are poorly trained (to a very low standard) and their full time professional arm is not equipped to complete their stated mission or assigned tasks — the Taiwanese will have better luck resisting the PLA, if they can find 1,000 volunteers to wear suicide vests or drive SVBIEDs (rather than fighting conventionally);​

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(b) their navy is dismissed as a joke by the PLA(N) and western naval analysts mostly agree with that view;​

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(c) it is doubtful the air force can achieve air parity and can’t strike at range, to fight a naval blockade. Given the above, I believe that they are as hollow as the Afghan Army that surrendered in 11 days. More worrisome, is the ability of China to endlessly test Taiwanese response timings. On 17 Sep 2021, Taiwan's air force scrambled to warn away 10 Chinese aircraft that entered its air defence zone, Taiwan's defence ministry said; and​

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(d) their US$5.2 billion personnel budget, ensures that the Taiwanese infantry battalions can’t take attrition because they are chronically understaffed. Except for SF, every normal Taiwanese infantry battalion is under-strength; and they want to use minimally trained conscripts to make up numbers — because the conditions of service is so poor that they can’t hit recruitment numbers for professionals (except in the most elite of units). Augmenting a professional force with poorly trained Taiwanese conscripts in a mobile defensive battle requires skill that the Taiwanese do not possess and hence is doomed to failure.​