Chinese Naval buildup

[OPSSG]

Despite the dissolution of the South East Asian treaty organization, the Manila pact remains in force.

You state this as a fact. Show me a source for the above statement.

I agree that SEATO has been desolved. The remaining and relevant organisation in Southeast Asia is ASEAN, though ASEAN is NOT a military pack.

Thailand continues to be a key security ally in Asia, along with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea.

There are two American treaty allies in the ASEAN member states, Thailand and Philippines. And I would argue that none of the ASEAN (Singapore, included) are middle powers. Though I have seen a Singapore academic try to argue that Singapore is a middle power (to which I disagree).

Whereas Australia is a classic middle power. Japan and South Korea are significant regional powers with immence navies. These three countries are technologically advanced with significant power projection capabilities that far exceeds the naval capabilities of most, if not all ASEAN states, in numerous dimensions.

Interesting to note is that Thailand has over 1 million personnel in their military, and something else . . . Thailand has an operational aircraft carrier. I admit though, the carrier currently has no operation air wing other than helicopters and spends most of its time at dock now.

And how is this relevant to the PLAN?

 

[PCShogun]

You state this as a fact. Show me a source for the above statement.

Iagree that SEATO has been desolved. The remaining and relevant organisation in Southeast Asia is ASEAN, though ASEAN is NOT a military pack.



There are two American treaty allies in the ASEAN member states, Thailand and Philippines. And I would argue that none of the ASEAN (Singapore, included) are middle powers. Though I have seen a Singapore academic try to argue that Singapore is a middle power (to which I disagree).



Whereas Australia is classic a middle power. Japan and South Korea are significant regional powers with immence navies. These three countries are technologically advanced with significant power projection capabilities that exceeds the naval capabilities of most, if not all ASEAN states.



And how is this relevant to the PLAN?

You are correct, this is going off the edge from the original question.I will answer your questions and leave it at that.

I should have included sources. My response was based on previous comments concerning Thailand - U.S. agreements in the event of hostilities between the PLAN and the Royal Thai Navy, not that this is an imminent concern.

You are correct that ASEAN is an economic, not military, agreement. I do not disagree here, although economic agreements can also be used to justify intervention and mutual defense in times of war.

Royal Thai Embassy, Washington D.C.

The Avalon Project : Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); September 8, 1954

http://www.jstor.org/pss/40395167

http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/US-THAIBilateral.pdf

Specifically, I refer to the statements of the Thai Embassy in Washington, D.C. which states that:
Thailand is one of the five countries in the Asia - Pacific region, and one of only two countries in Southeast Asia, with whom the United States has a bilateral security agreement.
A military assistance agreement was signed with the United States in 1950 following the end of the Korean War.
In 1954, the Manila Pact was signed, pursuant to which the United States recognizes that a threat to the security of Thailand constitutes a threat to the United States. This Pact was subsequently reinforced by the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communique of 1962.

While the SEATO was dissolved in the 70's, a condition of that resolution was that the Manilla Pact would remain in force between Thailand and the United States.

 

[OPSSG]

A military assistance agreement was signed with the United States in 1950 following the end of the Korean War.

In 1954, the Manila Pact was signed, pursuant to which the United States recognizes that a threat to the security of Thailand constitutes a threat to the United States. This Pact was subsequently reinforced by the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communique of 1962.

While the SEATO was dissolved in the 70's, a condition of that resolution was that the Manilla Pact would remain in force between Thailand and the United States.

Thanks for the reply and the sources.

BTW, there is potential for PLAN suspicions for Exercise Cobra Gold. Read up on it and you should take note that Thailand is friendly to China and also buys weapons from China. I also have some more sources on ASEAN that may be of interest to you:

On 3 Nov 2011, the U.S.-ASEAN Strategy Commission produced a report called 'Developing an Enduring Strategy for Southeast Asia' (See Video: U.S.-ASEAN Strategy Commission Report Rollout). On 11 Nov 2011, the Asia Society added its considerable weight behind this call for a shift in priorities, with a report “U.S.-East Asia Relations, A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement.” These recommendations include:

(1) Recognize and prepare for a change in the U.S.-Asia relationship.
(2) U.S. engagement with Asia can and should continue to be deepened.
(3) Asian regionalism should be supplemented by efforts to engage more deeply with the U.S. and to avoid Asian triumphalism.
(4) U.S.-China ties are most important for the region, but others in Asia also have a stake.
(5) ASEAN can serve as a foundation.
(6) Recognize that integration on different economic and security issues will continue at different speeds in the region.
(7) A new U.S. diplomacy with ASEAN is needed.
(8) ASEAN must be more dynamic to offer regional leadership.

The two reports (especially the report released on 11 Nov 2011) and the 2011 ASEAN Annual Report produced by the ASEAN Secretariat would be good starting points to read so as to gain some background info. BTW, China is ASEAN's biggest trading partner, with two-way trade expected to surpass US$350 billion in 2011. regardless of what ASEAN does militarily, our economic interests in China will be devastated by any serious conflict between Beijing and Washington. This logic applies to all the Northeast Asian states, Australia and NZ whose economic capacity is fundamentally contingent on uninterrupted maritime and telecommunications flows – the first casualty of war in the Pacific and the South China Sea.

Can we please come back to the topic at hand? Here's a little 2010 IISS info nugget on China and the developments in the region:

...Since 2008, preparing for ‘diversified missions’ has become an operational and training priority. This term is used by the PLA to refer to expanded nontraditional security responsibilities such as helping to safeguard the country’s increasingly global economic and energy interests, adopting more proactive antiterrorist and anti-separatist strategies, and participating in long-range multilateral anti-piracy escort duties. It also includes non-military missions such as domestic and international disaster and humanitarian relief, and dealing with infectious diseases.

Since 2004, China’s President and Central Military Commission Chairman Hu Jintao has championed the idea that the PLA should undertake an everexpanding portfolio of new missions under the official moniker of the ‘historic missions of the PLA in the new period of the new century’. However, this policy initiative did not gain operational traction until a series of natural disasters struck China in 2008, including a massive earthquake in Sichuan. The PLA was caught unprepared and lacked the expertise and capabilities to respond effectively to these challenges.
...
The PLAN has also taken on an important new task though its participation in multinational antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia. This is the first time that the PLAN has conducted such operations in its 60-year history. A three-ship task force has been deployed on rotation in the Indian Ocean since the end of 2008 and Chinese navy chiefs say they are prepared to carry out this duty for an extended period. Although the Somali escort mission was an unexpected opportunity, this type of long-distance and long-endurance deployment fits squarely into the PLAN’s new strategic focus to protect Chinese interests beyond its traditional territorial boundaries, with new priorities to include ‘maritime rights and development interests’. This alludes to the PLAN’s role in supporting China’s efforts to gain secure global access to energy, commodity and export markets. The challenge for PLAN chiefs is to meet these new mission requirements while also developing the training and infrastructure necessary for missions of sustained duration and, at the same time, continuing to strengthen naval capabilities to secure territorial waters and build up an effective anti-access capacity towards the US. Strategic rivalry between the US and Chinese navies has been quietly intensifying in the past few years and was highlighted by a confrontation between a US naval survey ship, the USNS Impeccable, and Chinese government and fishing vessels off Hainan Island in March 2009. China accused the US ship of intruding into its exclusive economic waters, while the US countered that it was operating in international waters. Sino–Indian border tensions also rose in summer 2009 over Indian troop deployments in Arunachal Pradesh, Indian claims of Chinese violations along the Line of Actual Control, and alarmist media reporting over these tensions in India.

The reduction in political and military tensions between mainland China and Taiwan is a key factor in allowing this shift to new non-traditional security threats and missions. The 2008 election of Kuomintang leader Ma Ying-jeou has led to a relative softening in the PLA’s rhetoric regarding the threat situation in the Taiwan Strait. China’s 2008 defence White Paper judged that ‘the attempts of the separatist forces for “Taiwan independence” to seek “de jure Taiwan independence” have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn’...

The Convention Military Balance 2010, page 378 - 379​

Cheers