Can Malaysia Hold It's own - Political and Military views welcome

[Mr Ignorant]

To gf0012-aust

A continuation of the previous thread, however with a view to discussing the politics and military implications of Malaysian and Singaporean defence policies, together with any historic or political contributions offered.

Additional views welcome on this thread

Mod edit:

If you're still reading this, political views are NOT welcome on this website and like this thread will be closed or deleted. Read the rules and apply them and perhaps the discussions you're interested in having will be allowed to continue.

Regards

AD

 

[Chino]

On the previous thread, all the time we are talking about an attack on SIngapore by the Malaysians.

IMO, the likelihood of that happening is very low.

Just look at the makeup of MAF.

Their actual fighting qualities aside, MAF simply do not have the quantitative factor to initiate a large scale war against any of her immediate neighbours.

MAF is currently one of the smaller armed force in ASEAN. Even at their current rate of arms buildup, MAF will not achieve the overwhelming edge needed to attack Singapore - or Indonesia for that matter.

...

For all their sabre-rattling, senior Malaysian leaders know well that without even having to mobilise a single one of our supposedly "third rate" reservists, Singapore can bomb Malaysia back to the stone age with just the standing airforce. We have the numbers, they don't, it is as simple as that.

...

IMO Singapore can more than hold our own - if attacked - by our immediate neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia, even if the two combined. We may even inflict heavy damage on their forces and infrastructure to discourage future adventures. (This is the doctrine of Israel.)

...

However, if Singapore attempt to make happen our threat of "Forward Defense" into Malaysia or Indonesia, then all bets are off.

We may drive all the way to KL, or our forces may get trapped in Malaysia and get shredded.

So can Malaysia hold out against a SAF numerically-superior attack? It is not an all-out impossibility. Nothing in war is certain. SAF will probably make a predictable set of high-speed road mobile thrusts with leap-frogging coastal hooks and airborne/heliborne landings. Very similar to what the Japs did albeit in the opposite direction.

Malaysia is a peninsula, so the invasion route options are predictably limited.

Depending on what the war goals are, SAF will either try to move onto KL or form a defence perimeter behind some natural barriers like river etc somewhere in Malaysia.

 

[Mr Ignorant]

Thanks

What about from the North, Thailand for example??? I tend to think highly of the Thai forces, and what with the politics in Southern Thailand, any chance in the future of further aggression from the Thais??

Addendum

Apologies Chino, I expanded the above to include Thailand, because I believe on the relevant points raised, that the peninsula is also an interest to the Thais, albeit a minor one.

 

[Chino]

Thailand has no more interest to grab additional Malaysian land. Their forefathers have already taken Patani from the Malaysians.

And the Malay Muslims of Patani (now Southern Thailand) had been in constant armed revolt to this day.

I'm sure Malaysia - or certain Malaysian groups - had in the past or continues to support their fellow Malay Muslim brothers' insurgency in Southern Thailand. How can they not when many of Malaysians are blood relations to the Patani Malays? And Patani was clearly a Malay sultanate. And the Thais had shown themselves to be savage dictators and ruthless racists.

So things may come to a head, and Thailand may take punitive cross border raids to end arms supply or raid insurgent refuge in Malaysia etc.

Though Thai forces are superior to MAF in many ways, I feel the action will be limited and localised, as these things traditionally had been.

The Thais will not involve the airforce and navy. It will be land battle with tanks and arty at most.

(Unlike war with Singapore, Thailand's survival or territory will not be threatened and I see no possibility of the Thai wishing to escalate a punitive strike to invasion scale.)

This means the smaller MAF can more than cope if they deploy quickly and correctly.

Unlike in Borneo where the border with Indon is tortuously long, Malaysia's land border with Thailand is a little more manageable with her current forces.

And once the Malaysians secured assurances of non-interference from Indon and Singapore, they can concentrate their forces at the Thai border. A bit far-fetched but Indon may even join in the fray in the interest of Muslim brotherhood.

While MAF do not have as much tanks, if they have a big supply of RPG they can more than neutralise Thai armour, which is of a certain vintage.

...

Malaysia's bigger security concern has been, and will remain - Indonesia.

Indonesia is huge and share a long land border with Malaysia. This means they can attack across a wide front without worrying about amphibious ops etc.

And since their armed struggle against the Dutch colonials succeeded, TNI has remained one of the most powerful and aggressive military of SEA.

 

[Chino]

Thanks

What about from the North, Thailand for example??? I tend to think highly of the Thai forces,

Many non-Malaysians - myself included - tend to have a low opinion of the MAF.

Just to play devil's advocate: is this dim view warranted? Can this stand up to questioning?

- At which point did the MAF show itself to be inept, weak, stupid etc?

- How did this low image arise?

- In their overseas peacekeeping missions, did they not do well?

- In their fight against the tenacious CT (commie terrorists) did they fare badly?

In my country many seem to think war with MAF will be a walkover for SAF. I wonder if this is so?

We have the superiority in numbers and many other things. But once boots are on the ground, things don't always play out like you expect. The Arabs outnumbered and outgunned the IDF in 1973 by a wide margin but still got thrashed after initial success.

I know there are some real fighters among the men I served with in SAF but generally, most are just normal guys who feel their time will be better spent out of uniform. I'm not saying we're crap, but we aren't the IDF in Six Day War either.

Of course a belief that your enemy is weak is a good thing for morale, but excess ego lead to stupid mistakes.

 

[Mr Ignorant]

The trouble is the perception of the MAF in terms of Materiel, modernity in other words. I believe in reply to your interesting question put forward, the view of the MAF as a modern, proffessional army is not going to change. This could be down to several factors;

1. Lack of Modern Artillery - especially 155mm and 105 mm. Further purchases of 155mm pieces should be welcome, but the entire inventory should be replaced.

2. Lack of Modern Anti Tank capabilities - Russian rockets is not enough. A small local defence industry should bolster manufacture of arms, but this at best is at an intermediate stage.

3. Understated quality of modern armour - 48 PT 91 Twardy tanks is not going to convince most defence experts.

4. Lack of AWACS and Air Superiority fighters - 40plus fighters may not appear to be enough.

5. Lack of a convincing fleet air arm of the RMN

6. Upgradation of the RMN is a welcome addition, with 2 Scorpene Subs, 20 plus Corvettes and 2 more frigates on order.

So, I would suggest the problem view is the perception of weaponry used, or rather in this case, not purchased or employed.

Otherwise, the MAF is a very proffessional armed force in terms of quality. The basic training, the jungle warfare schools, the staff services colleges,the air and naval colleges, the commando training, the intelligence gathering, the order of battle, the structure, everything is in place to show that this is an all out volunteer, proffessional army in every respect.

Another thing about the MAF is the experience. The first, second and third generation of Officers, NCOs and Soldiers are now a hardcore of very experienced veterans. This is the result of combat acquired in the war, in the insurgency, in the confrontation and in peacekeeping. The experience acquired is second to none.

Borneo is not a geographic problem for the MAF, the question is the division and logistic supply of assets. In Borneo, an air arm is lacking, but considering this is a major area, the proposed construction of further bases in Semporna and maybe Labuan is welcome.

Also is the paramilitary arm of the Malaysian State. 20 plus Battalions of the General Operations Force are active and these can be raised in number, to bolster any local strikes, especially in Borneo. Added to the current makeup of Combat Battalions in the MAF, and this number is already in excess of 50 Combat ready Battalions of Military and Paramilitary forces.

So the proffessionalism of the MAF is not a question. Both the Army and Police GOF attend the same colleges and courses. School leaving volunteers are never lacking in number, and places like the RMC, will continue to produce a cadre of Officers required for the country.

Would it not be fair to say that arms, weaponry and equipment is the main problem here?

Still I believe, a the basic infantry soldier of the MAF can kill with a rifle, no matter how old the weapon is. And with a history of long protracted conflicts, and much of the country still covered by dense forests, victories or defeats are decided and executed by the very best strategies.

 

[Chino]

Actually...

The MAF have modern 155 arty pieces - South African made.

They also have Astros II MLRS.

Their standard infantry rifles are license-made Steyr AUG (no more than 10 years old) and are now being replaced by imported US-made M4.

In terms of airforce fighters they are getting Sukhoi SU-30 in addition to their MiG-29 and F-18.

...

MAF may have less pieces of each type of weapon but that can change over time with additional purchases. Already, on their shopping list is a great deal of sophisticated stuff. They are dead serious about modernising their armed forces. And they have shown themselves to be not shy of introduce new weapon systems into the region to upset the balance.

They are even considering the Brahmos - some supersonic anti-ship missile developed by Russia and India, I think.

...

Overall, I feel that the perception of fighting the MAF as picnic by many of my countrymen has less to do with equipment.

 

[Mr Ignorant]

Yes, sometimes ethusiasm gets the better of many of us, including me. Singapore's overall capability and strategy is definitely geared for deterrence, and it is revealing to note that the immediate threat is perceived across the causeways. I don't doubt that the SAF fears its other neighbours as well.

But anyway, Malaysia's geography although somewhat peculiar, will always mean that 2/3 rds of its Military capability is deployed in Malaya. I don;t think the borders in Borneo is an issue, as logistics there would take an entirely different meaning.

However, Malaysia and Indonesia both deploy a unusual strategy of using reserves (Wataniah, Rela, Laskar Jihad, etc) for their overall purposes. Indonesia more so than Malaysia. After the insurgency, the MAF did not have any further need to maintain all Battalions at full strength, so gradually this tier has been reduced to some 550-600 men per battalion, more involved with recycling and retraining Wataniah (Territorial Army - Singapore's equivalent of NS) than anything else.

Also is another relevant point. The use of conscripts as opposed to Volunteers. That's probably a manpower issue, as I know from other friends experience of NS in Europe, that the Military was always the last place they wanted to be. Not too say the quality of training is any different, but a compulsory military service of 1 year or 2 for most Singaporean youth, must be a pain.

 

[Chino]

People are the same the world over.

Only in some places like Israel, Finland and maybe Switzerland is compulsory military service seen as an honour. And not being accepted is a shame.

In Singapore I would say the numbers AGAINST military service is probably higher than those whom are FOR military service. Although even these people just grin and bear as the fact that we have to do NS begins to dawn on you quite early on.

 

[gary1910]

I am quoting AGRA form the other thread:

Having witnessed the quality of the SAF’s focus on training and motivation compared to some of their “more professional” neighbours I have little doubt that in the bulk of the line units the SAF will actually outperform the MAF or TNI in individual solider quality.

And that is at least the third time I heard compliment abt SAF from other parties in a forum. once from another OZ soldier who has trained with many regional armies and the other from Taiwanese who have seen our soldiers in training in ROC.

One reason is becos SAF soldier is pretty well equip as compare to many armies in SEA, 2ndly SAF is pretty professional in term of training for conventional warfare.

Whereas many armies in the region for example like MY, Indon amd PH etc are only geared toward small scale COIN ops, the reasons are/were:

1) there are/were insurgency activities in their country,

2) lack of budget to equip the armies for combined arms operations as well the training require for large scale combined arms Bde/Div level exe.

Whereas SAF is from the very start geared toward large scale conventional warfare, we formed our first combined arms div since the 80s, IIRC 1 light infantry Bde, 1 airmobile Guard Bde and 1 light armoured Bde plus all the support units like arty , signal. engineers , recon etc and since then we have annually at least have 1 large scale combined arms exe in ROC, this is something we dun see in other armies in SEA.

Later the Guards Bdes were pulled out to form our first RDF Div specialise in air assualt and amphi ops, and the other 3 Combined Div were restructured into 2 light infantry Bde and 1 light armoured Bde.

Even up to now for example MAF has just formed their very first combined arms Div with new tanks just been delivered, training for large scale Bde/Div level exe is I believe yet to start, which means doctrine for large scale combined arms ops yet to be established.

Thailand on the other hand, is very much better with their regular Cobra Gold exe with US and SAF, their combined arms doctrine should be well established.

Whereas SAF has done that since 2 decades ago, and now we are going toward NCW SAF, so far based on reports:

1) a few large scale NCW evaluation exe have beed conducted in Australia and US which involved not the army but the airforce as well which are all connected in the same network.The navy will be next to be connected, therefore our 3G SAF is more like a combined services outfit then a combined arms outfit that was established abt 2 decades ago.

2) Evaluation has been completed and now is the implemetation stage, 3 Div will be our very first digitised Div as reported, all commanders from platoon level upward will be connected to the network with infantry with their portable rugged PDA and armoured units with their BMS in their vehicle.

This I believe that I will not see it in other armies in SEA for at least another 1~2 decades from now becos they are mainly have a pretty small defence budget and lack of established arms industry to support such upgrades on their own.

So, I believe that SAF will maintain it's technological edge over all armies in the regional for the forseeable future.

Here the latest on our 3G army:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/cyberpioneer/news/2007/October/10oct07_news.html

 

[gary1910]

Yes, sometimes ethusiasm gets the better of many of us, including me. Singapore's overall capability and strategy is definitely geared for deterrence, and it is revealing to note that the immediate threat is perceived across the causeways. I don't doubt that the SAF fears its other neighbours as well.

But anyway, Malaysia's geography although somewhat peculiar, will always mean that 2/3 rds of its Military capability is deployed in Malaya. I don;t think the borders in Borneo is an issue, as logistics there would take an entirely different meaning.

However, Malaysia and Indonesia both deploy a unusual strategy of using reserves (Wataniah, Rela, Laskar Jihad, etc) for their overall purposes. Indonesia more so than Malaysia. After the insurgency, the MAF did not have any further need to maintain all Battalions at full strength, so gradually this tier has been reduced to some 550-600 men per battalion, more involved with recycling and retraining Wataniah (Territorial Army - Singapore's equivalent of NS) than anything else.

Also is another relevant point. The use of conscripts as opposed to Volunteers. That's probably a manpower issue, as I know from other friends experience of NS in Europe, that the Military was always the last place they wanted to be. Not too say the quality of training is any different, but a compulsory military service of 1 year or 2 for most Singaporean youth, must be a pain.

MAF is reducing their strength is becos it is going towards a more professional army geared toward more combined arms outfit rather than a COIN outfit.

And that cost money due to the needs to buys more equipment like tanks, AFV, arty etc plus the expensive large scale exe needed for such outfit.

That is why we see that MAF is getting tanks, new AFVs and arty etc in this decade with the resulting reduction of strength, that is no coincidence.

China did that a few ago due to what they see in GW1, becos modern army need to gear toward combined arms and now the latest NCW doctrine, to have better defences against another army that operate with such modern doctrines.

But with their large army mainly based on light infantry was draining their available resources to go toward that direction, so they streamline their army with better equipment to establish these modern doctrine.

TNI is also similar to MAF, becos they are simply lack of budget to have their whole army equipped with arty , AFVs support etc, not becos they want to have an army mainly consist of Territorial Army which more like militia than a modern army.

That is also changing now, as we see TNI is getting more lightly armored 4x4 wheeled armoured cars, I suppose they will be equipping some these Territorial Army units.

So in reality, it is not some unusual strategy as you stated as a means for defence but rather lack of budget to fully equips the whole army into a modern outfit.

As for NS men in SAF, you obviously dunno much abt SAF,in all the frontline Div in SAF which is abt 4~5 Div, 2/3 are consist of NS men, the other 1/3 are NS fulltime and regulars.

And since our Div are the best equip Div in the whole SEA,therefore our NS men are not some Territorial Army as you described becos they are extremely well equip as compare to best Div of other armies in SEA.

Perhaps our PDF which is abt 2~3 Div strength is separate from the frontline Div as I described above, is mainly infantry based NS men with wheeled AFV plus arty support for the defence of SG, is more of a Territorial Army, but the infantry units in PDF are still as well as equip as the other infantry units in the frontline Div.

One thing , this may change soon, there is a plan to mechanised all light infantry units in all the frontline Div, so PDF will be the only force with light infantry units.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Ground forces training is an issue.

How much experience does the MAF have in coordinating large formations ie divisional size and above?

Can the logistics structure maintain a high tempo for a large number of troops?

What about the sophistication of networked combined arms training?

We know that MAF has some peacekeeping experience including action in Somalia.

Does the MAF ground forces (besides special forces) train with other country's formations esp those who do have combat (and not just peacekeeping) experience?

One thing I do note is that Malaysia has very interesting road developments. A lot of roads such as the highways are maintained over bridges (not necessarily over water) to give a smooth ride. Denial of roads (to be used) is probably a major facet of Malaysian defensive strategy.

On the question of whether Malaysia can hold its own, the answer would be "of course". Afterall, who wants to attack Malaysia? The biggest threat to Malaysia is probably internal. Radical groups like PAS (political) or JI (terrorist) are more likely to pose a threat than any external factor since both have regressive strategies.

 

[Transient]

Yes, sometimes ethusiasm gets the better of many of us, including me. Singapore's overall capability and strategy is definitely geared for deterrence, and it is revealing to note that the immediate threat is perceived across the causeways. I don't doubt that the SAF fears its other neighbours as well.

But anyway, Malaysia's geography although somewhat peculiar, will always mean that 2/3 rds of its Military capability is deployed in Malaya. I don;t think the borders in Borneo is an issue, as logistics there would take an entirely different meaning.

However, Malaysia and Indonesia both deploy a unusual strategy of using reserves (Wataniah, Rela, Laskar Jihad, etc) for their overall purposes. Indonesia more so than Malaysia. After the insurgency, the MAF did not have any further need to maintain all Battalions at full strength, so gradually this tier has been reduced to some 550-600 men per battalion, more involved with recycling and retraining Wataniah (Territorial Army - Singapore's equivalent of NS) than anything else.

Also is another relevant point. The use of conscripts as opposed to Volunteers. That's probably a manpower issue, as I know from other friends experience of NS in Europe, that the Military was always the last place they wanted to be. Not too say the quality of training is any different, but a compulsory military service of 1 year or 2 for most Singaporean youth, must be a pain.

How many volunteer career soldiers join the service out of love for the country or a strong desire for soldiering? The matter of fact is there isn't that much of a difference as far as motivation is concerned. Relying on conscripts bring about some advantages as well, most important being that the reservists are not just soldiers, they come with very diverse skill sets as a result of them working in the civilian world. Especially in Singapore with a well-educated population, it will not be uncommon in the near future to find corporals or even privates with degrees. Do not underestimate a battalion comprising soldiers who come with diverse skillsets and job skills such as structural engineering, electrical engineering, medicine, psychology etc. This is a very flexible formation, problem solving wise. (as US National Guard units found out)

Another important thing to remember is that in the new age of war, technology in the form of equipment is a strong force multiplier, provided the soldiers can operate them. A well-educated soldier force with an affinity for technology is more likely to be able to handle their equipment properly than an army comprised of the less educated. China, for example, is facing this problem.

 

[swerve]

...
Another important thing to remember is that in the new age of war, technology in the form of equipment is a strong force multiplier, provided the soldiers can operate them. A well-educated soldier force with an affinity for technology is more likely to be able to handle their equipment properly than an army comprised of the less educated. ....

That's been a factor since WW2, at least.

 

[Mr Ignorant]

Thanks all

Gosh, I am going to have to itemise and respond to all the points raised, beginning with Chino and Gary1910. Hopefully, we'll be able to shed some light into a subject, where some basic understanding might be gained at the expense of those "mine is bigger and better than yours" debates.

To Chino,

I tend to agree. The youth have historically, never been keen on the armed services, who can blame them? A lot of growing up needs to be done during those turbulent years to adulthood. Ever the case of those raging teenage hormones hehehe

Gary 1910

You did raise some interesting points to consider, and I must admit, I spent time this afternoon in the office reading on asymmetric warfare, and the so called "revolutionary military affairs" concept. The RMA, as I understand it has been around for sometime, whether use selectively at certain theatres of war, or widely to display some prowess using "force multipliers". All very fine, and I must say, anyone keen of Military theories should include in their future reading list, the RMA concept other than Clausewitz's impressive writing on war.

Whereas SAF has done that since 2 decades ago, and now we are going toward NCW SAF, so far based on reports:

1) a few large scale NCW evaluation exe have beed conducted in Australia and US which involved not the army but the airforce as well which are all connected in the same network.The navy will be next to be connected, therefore our 3G SAF is more like a combined services outfit then a combined arms outfit that was established abt 2 decades ago.

2) Evaluation has been completed and now is the implemetation stage, 3 Div will be our very first digitised Div as reported, all commanders from platoon level upward will be connected to the network with infantry with their portable rugged PDA and armoured units with their BMS in their vehicle.

All this is fine and well. To illustrate, the concept of RMA, this in Military tactics, has been around for quite sometime, and perhaps during Napoleonic periods. Wars of heavy Industry and logistics can be fought and sustained, using what we could only describe as selective RMA, for instance, the introduction of the Gatling gun, the lever action rifle, manouvre, guerilla or total war tactics in the American Civil War. The mass employment of advanced weaponry did help somewhat, but is technology a real "force multiplier"???

Blitzkrieg remains a novel RMA concept, but as a concept, those terms it used was couched in promises of advanced weaponry and tactics to be combined in harmony with skilled organisations (Modern divisions consisting of a single battle group of artillery, infantry, air superiority, support and logistics).

Terrain, I believe is one cruel master for "force multipliers". For example, a single platoon of soldiers with very advanced equipment, having to run patrols over hilly and difficult terrain, need to have the know how in survival skills. So a Lieutenant armed with a communications set, pdas, and so on, would have less time preoccupying about his gear, and be more concerned with dividing up his sections to forage for food and water. So, in effect, that platoon is no longer a viable military unit, the patrol is meaningless and every effort is expended trying to master the geography and dwindling rations, rather than track, locate and engage a elusive enemy. What more to say, a platoon of townboys fighting in dense jungle, secondary forests or even plantations???

A force multiplier in technology does not always deliver the right results. Environment, Survival conditions, understanding the lay of the land remains the basic military skills for any army. RMA as a fluid concept can be selectively shifted and used in this area, but faced with tenacious conditions, it can also be inhibited.

The MAF is changing but it is doing so at a snail's space. Consider this, today's flavour of the month is tomorrow's outdated tool. The basic tactics of Military warfare remains a staple diet for those attending the MAF defence and staff colleges. Processes need to be identified, analysed, and implemented in the best possible manner, and this includes technology and economics.

Would it be a conflict of heavy industry in a scenario like MAF and Malaysia? I very much doubt it, and no victory will be swift.

Anyway, moving on to Weasel;

 

[Mr Ignorant]

How much experience does the MAF have in coordinating large formations ie divisional size and above?

Can the logistics structure maintain a high tempo for a large number of troops?

What about the sophistication of networked combined arms training?

Does the MAF ground forces (besides special forces) train with other country's formations esp those who do have combat (and not just peacekeeping) experience?


More particular questions for someone as ignorant as myself, who can't possibly comment on the MAF's brigade or divisional formations. I am afraid that you've managed to point out more reading material for students of military warfare.

Can the logistics cope with mass military deployment in the case of the MAF?

The answer remains in the economics. The MAF have strategically placed an onus on defending its country's economy infrastructure, albeit from sabotage or guerilla operations in the past. Can this be tested on a much higher threshold, an all out military strike, for instance???

I believe the scenarios are agonising for a country that has pressed hard for development, hence the small progress on modernising the entire inventory of the MAF.

Does the MAF regularly train with other forces? In reply, yes. Historically, various branches of the MAF have trained regularly with other Military partners. The RMAF (TUDM) is a case in point. It was raised from the ground up with substantial assistance by the RAF and the RAAF.

Would it consider further military exercises with other force partners? Always.

 

[Mr Ignorant]

How many volunteer career soldiers join the service out of love for the country or a strong desire for soldiering? The matter of fact is there isn't that much of a difference as far as motivation is concerned....................... Do not underestimate a battalion comprising soldiers who come with diverse skillsets and job skills such as structural engineering, electrical engineering, medicine, psychology etc. This is a very flexible formation, problem solving wise. (as US National Guard units found out)

Well this is a matter of perspective and differing points of view. The SAF has traditionally drawn from a highly educated and skilled class of citizenry. In that, there is no doubt. But how useful is a battalion of lawyers, accountants, managers, and tradesmen in a harsh unforgiving environment, where dehydration is always a constant worry for example??

You could have a battalion of highly educated citizens sitting on top of dense forested hill, but can you get them to survive on a diet of rice and salted fish for three weeks ??? Take into account that rations and supplies, at times mean just that.

 

[Chino]

A conscript army would fight very well when the nation's security or survival depends on it.

But the same conscripts may be less reliable if asked to lay down their lives for some dubious ideals they do not share.

US conscripts in Vietnam War is one example, Argentine conscripts in Falklands War is another. In both cases, most of the conscripts didn't want to be there.

The US conscripts still fought very hard cos the enemy took few prisoners.

In the Falklands case, the Argentine conscripts knew the Brits would take POWs and readily surrendered.

Would SAF conscripts or reservists happily go if the mission is to fight insurgency in Sudan or to liberate Christmas Island etc? I doubt seriously.

 

[Chino]

Well this is a matter of perspective and differing points of view. The SAF has traditionally drawn from a highly educated and skilled class of citizenry. In that, there is no doubt. But how useful is a battalion of lawyers, accountants, managers, and tradesmen in a harsh unforgiving environment, where dehydration is always a constant worry for example??

You could have a battalion of highly educated citizens sitting on top of dense forested hill, but can you get them to survive on a diet of rice and salted fish for three weeks ??? Take into account that rations and supplies, at times mean just that.

The Israelis have lawyers, doctors, school teachers etc in the front lines. And as I recall, they won every war.

In WW2, same situation.

Rice and salted fish on a forrested hills is not as bad as you make it out to be. We've all been through it and it's all in a day's work.

 

[gf0012-aust]

There is an excellent book you should consider buying or sourcing through your library (if poss)

Misguided Weapons, Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield by Azriel Lorber.

well worth reading if you're a student of technology and its effect on wars/battles/events. it's a solid lesson on the price of arrogance and misunderstanding on the battlefield.