1. Singapore invades Vietnam. Forget it. In spite of a superior air force you don't stand a chance. The US, France and China all failed in Vietnam; so would Singapore.
And why would we be interested in invading or attacking a fellow ASEAN country (with ASEAN as a 10 member organisation)? What is the incentive or motivation? Do you understand ASEAN's
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation?
I hope you realise that Singapore is investing in and giving aid (in our usual limited fashion) to Vietnam. Further, we don't share a border with Vietnam and we are not a EEZ claimant in the disputed areas in the South China Sea region.
BTW, in the last few years, the SAF has grown smaller. In fact, we have reduced the size of our air force (and even transferred 7 F-16A/Bs to Thailand), stood down some army units (infantry and artillery) reduced the duration of conscription and length of reserve cycles - because there is no peer threat.
In future, there is little chance that a small country, like Singapore, would act alone especially in a cooperative defense scenario. There are various operational scenarios where SAF could participate in. In one of those scenarios SAF participation in a coalition event, could be as a junior partner (be it in war, operations other than war, non-combatant evacuation, or even in response to a specific humanitarian crisis). In limited circumstances, SAF could lead a coalition event as force commander.
2. Vietnam invades Singapore. In spite of a superior air force you don't stand a chance. 90 million Vietnamese will overwhelm tiny Singapore in no time. First taking Malaysia and then launching attacks across the straits. A few F-15 and F-16 simply will not make that much of a difference.
If you watch enough Star Trek and believe in teleportation.
Other that teleportation, you also need to understand 2 main limitations on Vietnam:
(1) the concept of 'local superiority' and the ability of the SAF to establish such local superiority; and
(2) the ability of the the potential aggressor to project his forces.
Beyond the above limitations, you will need to discuss the route of advance. There are two choices (either by land or by sea). To meet the conventional threat presented by Singapore's forces, the aggressor will need to meet and exceed both the RSAF and the Singapore Navy operating in the 3 dimensions of: (i) air warfare, (ii) surface warfare, and (iii) underwater warfare dimensions of naval warfare before they can move their forces.
One, by sea, no chance in hell of them moving their forces over the distance, as the Vietnamese lack the means to project their power. Vietnam needs oil and unless a major power delivers oil to them via a land route (like China, as was the case during the Vietnam war). IMHO, good luck to Vietnam declaring war on Singapore or Thailand and hoping to ship oil through the maritime choke points at the Straits of Malacca and Sunda (where most of Vietnam's oil shipments are sent through).
(1) Beyond sea control at maritime choke points, the Singapore Navy can also put their oil drilling platforms in the South China Sea at risk. Like China, Vietnam's economy is growing and they are just as addicted to oil. However, I would caution that a country does not usually go to war for things you can buy in the market. Countries will however go to war over another country acting against their national interest. Keep in mind that countries are not people.
(2) By way of background, Singapore's Ministry of Defence signed an agreement with Kockums for the supply of 2 Archer-Class (formerly Västergötland class) submarines to the Singapore Navy on 4 November 2005. These 2 submarines have been rebuilt, life-extended and modernised and the Singapore Navy currently operates 6 submarines (4 of which are the even older Challenger-Class submarines). And this is a capability that Vietnam currently lacks.
(3) While the Singapore Navy (utilising all the assets of the SAF), as a standalone force, has an issue with Sea Control once we are out of range of our air bases, the Vietnamese navy is even more limited in naval capability. Keep in mind that while the 4 Endurance Class, the 6 upgraded Victory Class and the 6 Formidable Class vessels (see
link) are capable vessels in their respective classes, they are also of limited tonnage (which can be an indicator of sea keeping endurance). Therefore, the Singapore Navy is a green water navy but is blue water capable within a coalition environment. Further, I also do not consider the Endurance-Class giving any division within the SAF true 'expeditionary capabilities', as our army and navy (plus their supporting arms in RSAF's Participation Command) are not designed to fight wars far away (but we are capable of forward defence in the near abroad). By design, there's still a logistics umbilical cord tied to Singapore or Thailand for us to sustain our forces at war. However, I do acknowledge that at the joint operational-level planning and warfighting level for amphibious operations, the SAF continues to face many inherent resource limitation issues. With the 4 Endurance-Class vessels, the SAF has gained an improved but limited capability to:
(i) conduct small scale amphibious operations in the near abroad, in the face of some opposition (but not too much determined opposition);
(ii) conduct air assault at extended reach from Singapore air bases, as these ships can serve as lily pads to refuel RSAF's helicopters (RSAF helicopters have done deck landing qualifications on both USN and RSN ships);
(iii) sustain deployments in Operations Other than War (OOTW) thousands of miles away (OOTW includes both counter pirate missions and oil platform protection or destruction in low intensity conflict scenario);
(iv) conduct Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions (as in the case after the Dec 2004 Tsunami); and
(v) collect SAF equipment from overseas bases and bring them back to Singapore during a period of tension.
Two, via the land route.
Thailand, whose air force and army are not small (and Singapore maintains military bases in Thailand) and Malaysia (a fellow member of the FPDA) are in the way of the invading Vietnamese army. You did not even read a map on the basics of the region before commenting (you seem to have forgotten about Thailand, which is a US ally).
(1) While the SAF is small compared to the Vietnamese army, the network centric SAF has the most advanced armour (upgraded Leopard 2s and armour engineers), anti-armour (Spike ATGM teams and Apaches) and artillery capabilities (HIMARS, Primus, Pegasus and FH-2000; supported by artillery hunting radar) in South East Asia. If an artillery barrage starts, they would quickly discover the joys of Singapore counter-battery fire. Kindly read up on
Ex Cobra Gold and
Ex Cope Tiger (which is in its 17th edition, involving over a hundred aircraft, 2,300 personnel from the Royal Thai Air force (RTAF), the USAF and the RSAF), to get an idea of the military to military relationships. For example, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is one of the most frequent users of Changi Naval Base, where its ships call for replenishment as they deploy between the Andaman and the Gulf of Thailand. Most recently, the
RTN launched an Endurance class vessel, which was built by ST Marine. The SAF and the Thai Armed Forces have also worked together in humanitarian relief operations.
(2) In December 1978, with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, during the cold war, Singapore and Thailand had to come up with a joint defence plan for the threat at that time. The combined armoured forces of Thailand and Singapore were and are still designed to fight a substantial force in echelon at Corps or higher level operations. The level of Singaporean commitment to Thai defence is not small and in the past, our forces conducted joint patrols at Thailand's northern border (including mantaining an ammo stockpile in Thailand). To give one historical example that can now be stated. Singapore's E-2Cs were not bought primarily to engage in the defence of Singapore within Singapore borders. They were bought to assist in the defence of Thailand against the then Vietnamese/Soviet threat. 2011 marks the 30th year of RSAF heliopter operations at Koke Kathiem, Thailand (KKT). Most recently in March 2011, a RSAF Apache detachment flew up to KKT to train with the RTAF. In fact, Singapore's infantry, engineer and armor units train in Thailand and the most common foreign airborne wing worn on SAF uniforms is the Thai airborne wing (reflecting our close ties and level of inter-operability).
(3) And if you could read a map, you would also know that there is
a natural terrain chokepoint in the South of Thailand and that frontage is defendable against a northern threat (and defendable by a division plus sized force, if you understand the effects of terrain). In fact, as WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. There is also a
Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings by LTC (NS) Singh. You don't seem to understand its military implications of terrain and just one of the SAF's three forward deployable combined arms divisions will be a handful, when deployed in the correct location. And Singapore, with Thailand's permission can land and support a division in Thai territory to conduct a joint defence.
(4) BTW, attacking an aggressor's rear areas is a key feature of any Singapore's forward defence and you will find that from time to time, the Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister (who
retired as a Rear-Admiral) and former Defence Minister will refer to the deep battle in his speeches. This is so because the main fight for Singapore forces must be with the second echelon, otherwise it will become a battle of attrition. Singapore's current Prime Minister is a former artillery officer (who was trained in the US at
both Fort Sill and Fort Leavenworth) and retired from the SAF as a Brigadier-General.
In the case of Singapore, RSAF's ability to establish air superiority enables the SAF to conduct amphibious operations and to conduct heli-borne operations to aid in maneuver and resupply - which greatly aid offensive operations. Air power also provide combined arms support for our armoured forces. Further, the RSAF is capable of a full spectrum of air operations including: CAP, SEAD, CAS, BAI, ISR missions, Rebro for comms, insertion of recce elements and pathfinders, air assault, aero-medical evacuation, battle damage assessment, aero-resupply, SIGINT and EW. Further, Singapore has developed a procurement system that is widely admired for selecting solutions that are suited to operational needs. To give you an idea of how SAF sources for weapons - here's a limited list of countries that the SAF have bought weapons from, over the last few years:
(1) Swedish built submarines (Challenger and Archer class submarines) and mine sweepers (Bedok Class);
(2) French designed Frigates (Formidable Class), French built Super Pumas & Cougars, the Life Extension Programme of RSN's Swedish built Bedok class mine countermeasure vessels performed by Thales and so on;
(3) German made tanks (IBD evolved Leopard 2s for urban warfare, with the L44 gun), the M3 float bridges and the Lürssen designed Corvettes (Victory Class);
(4) American aircraft like F-15SGs, F-16C/Ds, Apaches, Chinooks, KC-135Rs and Seahawks naval helicopters;
(5) Russian designed SAM missiles (Igla); and
(6) Israeli supplied G550 CAEWs and the Barak missile system on the Victory Class vessels,
making the SAF's supply network truly global. All discussions that are focused only at a platform level (be it about a particular fighter plane, tank or artillery) is totally meaningless and without context if we don't look at the systems supporting that particular platform. To me a platform is just a tool and I've listed some of the tools in the SAF's arsenal. In fact,
Trefor Moss, writing for Janes had on 18 Jan 2010 said:-
"The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) of 2010, by far the most advanced military force in Southeast Asia, are the outcome of a long-held policy of allotting defence up to 6 per cent of GDP. While defence spending has dipped below this level in recent years – it was 4.3 per cent in 2009, an allocation of SGD11.4 billion (USD8.2 billion) – this remains very high by regional standards. As the Indonesian defence minister recently lamented, Singapore (population less than five million) spends more on defence in real terms than Indonesia (population 230 million)... The SAF not only enjoy a clear capability advantage over other Southeast Asian militaries, but it is also now close to becoming the 'Third-Generation' armed force, which recent procurement and reforms have been designed to produce."
Therefore, IMHO, there is no way Vietnam can project her forces to move that far south against the most advanced military force in Southeast Asia.
