Bad time for stealth planes..

[LordoftheLord]

i want you to know that i go to ------ in southern african botswana. this school is big and has large field where we can play. our school offers many sports to play. we have quite large number of students who like to play cricket. i enjoy playing cricket with my friends. we have to wear school uniform every time. grey shirt and white shirt with black tie.
thats it for now and i will talk to you later.

 

[Grand Danois]

Ukraine sells Kolchuga to Iran
will US try to block this deal or can ukraine stand up aganist us opose?
just one of these things get in chines hands.. woo boy wo boy it will be the end for stealth and bye bye F-22 or even B-2???
Iran air space will be tight and unpenetrate able!

It sure didn't help the Iraqis much. IIRC The Kolchuga's for Iraq was diverted from a shipment going to the PRC.

Edit: I note that Wiki says no material confirmation on this was found in Iraq. But Wiki does say:

"Like any ESM system, it is of doubtful use against stealth aircraft, which are designed to operate without emitting any RF signals."


'Kuchmagate' and Iraq

On 20 September, US President George W Bush unveiled the new US national security strategy. It calls for a first strike against rogue states that possess weapons of mass destruction and strive to "acquire dangerous technologies". Three days later, Washington accused Ukraine of violating UN sanctions against Iraq by selling it four sophisticated Kolchuga radar system units.

At the centre of the Iraqi arms scandal stand the hundreds of hours of tapes made illicitly in the office of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma by security guard Mykola Melnychenko. The portion of the tapes dealing with Iraq was only released in March on the eve of the Ukrainian elections. The existence of the tape of the Iraqi radar sale was reported earlier in the year but at that stage the US still did not publicly back up the accusations. In March, shortly before the Iraq allegations surfaced, Valeriy Malyev, head of the arms export company Ukrspetseksport, died in a mysterious car accident.

The US has been careful to indicate that the re-examination of its policy towards Ukraine is primarily directed against Kuchma, not the country as a whole, which has received $2 billion in aid since 1994 and is the fourth largest recipient of US aid.

The tape, which has been authenticated by the FBI, is of a conversation between Kuchma, Malyev, and then Security Service chief Leonid Derkach (who is accused of other illegal arms sales) which took place in July 2000. In April 1999, US intelligence sources discovered that Ukraine had signed a secret agreement for military co-operation with Iraq in November 1998. In January 1999, a Ukrainian delegation led by a deputy minister visited Iraq. During the first stage of the agreement equipment identified for customs as 'agricultural' was sent to Iraq.

On the Melnychenko tape of the July 2000 meeting, Kuchma is heard giving the go ahead to sell four Kolchuga units to Iraq for $100 million. Melnychenko claims to know the name of a "high-ranking Russian official" who was also alleged to be present. If this turns out to be true, the US-Russian alliance against international terrorism could come under serious strain.

The scenario of events after the meeting follows a clear pattern that seems to confirm the Kolchuga units were indeed dispatched to Iraq. Only four days after the conversation, the government released the Kolchuga system from any export restrictions. On 9 October 2000, an agreement on trade and scientific and technical co-operation was signed with Iraq. This was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament on 15 November 2001.

After recent US pressure, Ukraine's Security Service chief Volodymyr Radchenko conceded that the conversation had occurred but denied that the sale had actually gone ahead.

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jsws/jsws060927_1_n.shtml

 

[Grand Danois]

I am going to expand this a little.

But no modern military aircraft, tank, or ship can exist without its own radar. Without a radiating aerial it is simply “blind”. That is why every aircraft, ship, and ground-based radar complex has active radiolocation devices. These devices are always on, emitting radio signals. Each specific type of hardware emits signals within different parameters. Consequently, a machine on which an emitting radar is mounted can be identified.

A stealth platform (bomber, fighter, warship) does not have to rely on onboard sensors. IIRC the F-117 has no radar at all (besides an altimeter?).

Though Kolchuga is a very capable ESM, the usual restraints on capability on such a type of system applies.

1. The "target" has to emit on its own.
   
   
2. In order to triangulate, several receiver stations need to pick up the
   emissions.
   
   
3. In order to correlate the emissions for triangulation, the threat library of the ESM has to identify the signal as belonging to the same emitter (radar).

This is very difficult with the LPI radars that is or will be the norm in most platforms.

More from Wiki:

Low probability of intercept
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A low probabililty of intercept radar (LPIR) is designed to be difficult to detect by passive radar detection equipment (such as a radar warning receiver - RWR) while it is searching for or tracking a target. This characteristic is desirable because it allows finding and tracking an opponent without alerting them to the radar's presence.

Ways of reducing the profile of a radar include using wider frequency bandwidth (wideband), frequency hopping, using a frequency-modulated continuous-wave signal, and using only the minimum power required for the task. Using pulse compression also reduces the probability of detection, since the peak transmitted power is lower while the range and resolution is the same.

Constructing a radar so as to emit minimal side and back lobes may also reduce the probability of interception when it is not pointing at the radar warning receiver. However, when the radar is sweeping a large volume of space for targets, it is likely that the main lobe will repeatedly be pointing at the RWR. Modern phased array radars not only control their side lobes, they also use very thin, fast moving beams of energy in complicated search patterns. This technique may be enough to confuse the RWR so it does not recognize the radar as a threat, even if the signal itself is detected. All military EM emitters, including fighter aircraft, naval ships, and missile systems are designed for reduced electromagnetic profiles for improved stealth.

In addition to stealth considerations, reducing side and back lobes is desirable because it makes the radar harder to characterise, meaning not only is it more difficult once the radar is detected to tell which type it is (which may give hints about the carrying platform), but it is also much harder to jam.

Systems which feature LPI include modern AESA radars such as that on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the electronically steered phased array on the S-300PMU-2.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_probability_of_intercept

 

[rjmaz1]

woo boy wo boy it will be the end for stealth and bye bye F-22 or even B-2???

Bye bye JSF, a slow medium altitude aircraft will be a sitting duck to SAM's. The JSF without stealth is no better than a teen series fighter.

F-22 however is that good that even if it did not have any stealth no current missile system could defeat it. The F-22 just has to change its mission profile to high and fast, unfortunately no other stealth has this luxury. Russia found it difficult enough to shoot down a U-2 spy plane at 80,000feet let alone an aircraft traveling 4 times faster and that can sustain 9g turns.

The B-2 can always attack at low altitude. They have done alot of training with this mission profile even though they never use it. Atleast the yanks are prepared.

The requirement for inflight refueling will be many times greater if both of these aircraft had to use those mission profiles in a large scale conflict.

You'd hate to see stealth being compromised as the JSF will be the biggest mistake ever. By the time stealth is defeated the JSF will already to operational.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Bye bye JSF, a slow medium altitude aircraft will be a sitting duck to SAM's. The JSF without stealth is no better than a teen series fighter.

apart from the glaring inaccuracies in the original article - why are you so sure that it will be a sitting duck. Assets aren't committed in isolation.

F-22 however is that good that even if it did not have any stealth no current missile system could defeat it.

I'm curious as to where you're getting your info for this. None of the data about capability has been released into the public domain - not one scintilla of empirical info has been released.

The F-22 just has to change its mission profile to high and fast, unfortunately no other stealth has this luxury. Russia found it difficult enough to shoot down a U-2 spy plane at 80,000feet let alone an aircraft traveling 4 times faster and that can sustain 9g turns.

rubbish.

the U2 was withdrawn from running ferret missions into hot territory straight after Powell was freckled.

even though the SR-71 was deemed capable, the risk factors were regarded as too high to continue to send them into hot overflight ferret flights. that was the USAF view - irrespective of the fact that they weren't compromised - the clear view was that the russians would and could eventually slot one. They were regarded as the masters of high altitude SAMs. Any hi-al SAMs with onboard AESA would have been a nightmare. Politically nobody wanted to run the risk and destroy the planes track record.

The B-2 can always attack at low altitude. They have done alot of training with this mission profile even though they never use it. Atleast the yanks are prepared.

and the similarity to how the yanks go to war with australia lies where? we're closer in overall doctrine - and compared to USMC capability as far as operational similarities are concerned.

If we ever decide to go for strategic intercontinental (let alone transcontinental) bombing then you might have a point.

You'd hate to see stealth being compromised as the JSF will be the biggest mistake ever. By the time stealth is defeated the JSF will already to operational.

when stealth is neutralised at a holistic level by countries on our threat matrix - then the F-22 will be just as useless. stealth is a point in time advantage - and is but one arrow in the quiver of available responses that can be bought to the table.

stealth will not determine whether we militarily survive a war. its a tad oversimplification to invoke gloom and doom just because an author has made some generalisations that are geared to panda to a particular audience. when said author gets the basics wrong - then the rest of their treatise becomes somewhat of an analysis collander.

this notion that the F-22 is the placebo for all our air forces ills is ludicrous. the notion that the JSF will be a lemon by association is just as disingenuine.

 

[Grand Danois]

when stealth is neutralised at a holistic level by countries on our threat matrix - then the F-22 will be just as useless. stealth is a point in time advantage - and is but one arrow in the quiver of available responses that can be bought to the table.

When the advantage of stealth as it is being used today is neutralised, then the F-35 looks like a much more favourable aircraft for the strike mission to me. It has enough survivability and loiter for the role as a standoff NCW node for a group of UCAV's.

Despite the F-22, the USAF intend to deal with the double-digit SAM's with standoff missiles like JASSM anyway.

its a tad oversimplification to invoke gloom and doom just because an author has made some generalisations that are geared to panda to a particular audience. when said author gets the basics wrong - then the rest of their treatise becomes somewhat of an analysis collander.

But I do think such systems as the Kolchuga makes it a no-brainer if the Eurofighter and Rafale should have LPI (AESA) in their upgrade paths (T3 and F3). It is the issue of survivability and tactical flexibility that is at the fore, rather than the extra number of functions, reliability and maintenance such radars may provide.

Edit: Why won't my emoticons work ?!

 

[Wooki]

will US try to block this deal or can ukraine stand up aganist us opose?
just one of these things get in chines hands.. woo boy wo boy it will be the end for stealth and bye bye F-22 or even B-2???
Iran air space will be tight and unpenetrate able!

I think it is premature to make statements like this LL. I didn't see anything in the shopping list of capabilities that would significantly compromise even the F117's low tech LO characteristics.

cheers

w

 

[LordoftheLord]

I think it is premature to make statements like this LL. I didn't see anything in the shopping list of capabilities that would significantly compromise even the F117's low tech LO characteristics.

cheers

w

:lam if you would do a little bit more research then i think you will get the answer!!

 

[Wooki]

:lam if you would do a little bit more research then i think you will get the answer!!

Oh, I see, this is going to be "I know more than you, so there thread".

The radar system you described has less than a 2% chance of detecting an F117, even in an ideal configuration. If Iran were to actually have a chance of detecting one aircraft they would need to buy a further 68 platforms according to my pad and pencil.

But, hey, you know more than me LoL

If that number is correct then 68 platforms means an extra 68 presicion weapons for the USN and USAF to use in taking out said platforms. So you'll get to see a blip before you get to see your maker. But I am sure the US pilots will enjoy the practice.

The systems performance would degrade so fast, it doesn't make sense to even purchase one. Its like the captain of the Titanic handing the first mate a bucket and ordering him to start bailing.

Better for Iran to save their money by increasing expenditure on IEDs

cheers

W

 

[dioditto]

Rubbish.

the U2 was withdrawn from running ferret missions into hot territory straight after Powell was freckled.

even though the SR-71 was deemed capable, the risk factors were regarded as too high to continue to send them into hot overflight ferret flights. that was the USAF view - irrespective of the fact that they weren't compromised - the clear view was that the russians would and could eventually slot one. They were regarded as the masters of high altitude SAMs. Any hi-al SAMs with onboard AESA would have been a nightmare. Politically nobody wanted to run the risk and destroy the planes track record.

The pilots' lives, and the risk of SR-71 ever been shot down is not really the issue.. U2 has been shot down numerous times and it never amount to much political fallout.

I think withdrawing the SR-71 from service was not just the risk factor alone. The real factor I consider is the fact that SR-71/U2 and variuos spy plane have accelerated, made the russian/USSR SAM and long range detection technology formidable to the point that, it's detrimental to "prod" them along any further. Since no other fighter or bomber have the capability to fly as fast as SR-71 currently, (although one is planned recently), to prod the russian along that direction and develop a far more sophiscated defense capability than american's simply makes no sense, thus the withdrawl.

Note: And currently, Russian SAM technology is A GENERATION AHEAD of american.

 

[dioditto]

Better for Iran to save their money by increasing expenditure on IEDs

I don't think they are increasing expenditure on the IED...

(They are increasing expenditure on something else far more devastating........)

 

[Todjaeger]

The Kolchuga is intended to detect the take-off and formation of aircraft groups at ranges beyond those of existing radar, as well as determine the course and speed of targets while designating them for air-defence systems. It can identify aerial targets through their emissions and identify the mode of aircraft weapon control systems.

When the newly independent Ukraine that had only just survived a severe economic crisis, developed an advanced passive radiolocation complex, it was a severe blow to the Americans, who were so sure of their domination in the air thanks to their stealth planes. On the one hand, the advantages of the attacker’s “invisibility” were reduced to zero. On the other, passive radiolocation, i.e., the absence of the radar’s own radiation, radically reduced the disadvantage of insufficient secrecy. Besides, an attacking object detected by a passive radar is never aware of its detection and so has no reasons to activate its own defenses. It means that the most important advantage is now in the hands of the air defense, especially considering the impression produced on experts by the latest Kolchuga modification.

The Ukrainian scientific, engineering, and design solutions in the field of passive radiolocation, embodied in the Kolchuga complex, are what is eating U.S. designers and government functionaries, who are responsible for stealth technologies in modern armaments. Such technologies are meant to fulfill every general’s dream: to make his aircraft, ships, tanks, and other hardware invisible to enemies. The geometrical shape may be changed (like in the F-117 or B-2) to disperse a reflected signal from active radars, or there may be various wave-absorbing coatings to transform active signals into heat energy. But no modern military aircraft, tank, or ship can exist without its own radar. Without a radiating aerial it is simply “blind”. That is why every aircraft, ship, and ground-based radar complex has active radiolocation devices. These devices are always on, emitting radio signals. Each specific type of hardware emits signals within different parameters. Consequently, a machine on which an emitting radar is mounted can be identified.

An the following, taken from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/kolchuga.htm

The relatively cheap Ukrainian Kolchuga radar station, which is able to detect and identify practically all known active radio devices mounted on ground, airborne, or marine objects, actually cancels out all those billions of dollars spent on stealth-based armaments.

As has been mentioned repeatedly in the articles and on the site, the system is not properly Radar. Rather, it is a radio triangulation device, which is something used to determine the location of a radio source.

In order for such a device to passively locate an object (stealth or no stealth) the object needs to be a radio source. This means emitting radiation via radio, radar, etc. With aircraft, and stealth aircraft in particular, operating under EMCON there are little or no radio emissions from the aircraft. This is done because radio triangulation is not a new technique. Heck, it's similar to how an RDF works where there is a radio source that is homed in on. As long as the stealth aircraft doesn't emit radiation, a passive system is pretty much out of luck. As for the aircraft flying "blind" that is what a GPS receiver an/or inertial guidance is for.

The sort of system that could potentially detect stealth aircraft is something like the Australian JORN.

 

[LordoftheLord]

Oh, I see, this is going to be "I know more than you, so there thread".

The radar system you described has less than a 2% chance of detecting an F117, even in an ideal configuration. If Iran were to actually have a chance of detecting one aircraft they would need to buy a further 68 platforms according to my pad and pencil.

But, hey, you know more than me LoL

If that number is correct then 68 platforms means an extra 68 presicion weapons for the USN and USAF to use in taking out said platforms. So you'll get to see a blip before you get to see your maker. But I am sure the US pilots will enjoy the practice.

The systems performance would degrade so fast, it doesn't make sense to even purchase one. Its like the captain of the Titanic handing the first mate a bucket and ordering him to start bailing.

Better for Iran to save their money by increasing expenditure on IEDs

cheers

W

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor
"It will pick up any of the stealth aircraft, they just will be closer than the others. The triangulation of Kolchuga helps to get different angles of the RCS of the stealth aircarft. This makes a bigger target on the radar screen. While the F-22 may be RCS of .05m head on, Kolchuga will get 2m RCS by hitting the F-22 from different angles therby making her cross section bigger."

Global Security, a US specialized Website, even admits the capability:
The relatively cheap Ukrainian Kolchuga radar station, which is able to detect and identify practically all known active radio devices mounted on ground, airborne, or marine objects, actually cancels out all those billions of dollars spent on stealth-based armaments.

Iran is not like iraq or afghanistan, i think if americans decide to invade i "dought it" it will be a new vietnam for them but this time less casualty on the opposite side!

 

[Grand Danois]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor
"It will pick up any of the stealth aircraft, they just will be closer than the others. The triangulation of Kolchuga helps to get different angles of the RCS of the stealth aircarft. This makes a bigger target on the radar screen. While the F-22 may be RCS of .05m head on, Kolchuga will get 2m RCS by hitting the F-22 from different angles therby making her cross section bigger."

Global Security, a US specialized Website, even admits the capability:
The relatively cheap Ukrainian Kolchuga radar station, which is able to detect and identify practically all known active radio devices mounted on ground, airborne, or marine objects, actually cancels out all those billions of dollars spent on stealth-based armaments.

Iran is not like iraq or afghanistan, i think if americans decide to invade i "dought it" it will be a new vietnam for them but this time less casualty on the opposite side!

This is utter rubbish. What is it about passive vs active that is so hard to understand? The RCS of any plane is utterly unimportant as the Kolchuga is PASSIVE. RCS matters for ACTIVE systems. How will Kolchuga detect an aircraft that doesn't emit?

If the target doesn't emit, the Kolchuga will register NOTHING.

Even when emitting the characteristics of an LPI emitter reduces the usefulness of passive detection DRASTICALLY.

BTW, that quote isn't even anywhere on the Wiki link.

 

[swerve]

...The sort of system that could potentially detect stealth aircraft is something like the Australian JORN.

Which does, very well, from what I've heard. But it doesn't give a precise enough location for aiming a missile, & has a minimum range of a few hundred km. Excellent early-warning system, but has to be used as a complement to shorter-range, more precise location systems.

 

[Todjaeger]

Which does, very well, from what I've heard. But it doesn't give a precise enough location for aiming a missile, & has a minimum range of a few hundred km. Excellent early-warning system, but has to be used as a complement to shorter-range, more precise location systems.

Quite correct, though I hadn't heard about a minimum range, since it apparently has been tested on tracking vehicles moving through northern Australia. I'm sure Australia is eager to export such an early warning system. Really.

Direct quote from the Wiki page on the Kolchuga ESM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor

Like any ESM system, it is of doubtful use against stealth aircraft, which are designed to operate without emitting any RF signals.

Active vs. Passive, since this apparently needs to be explained.

An Active sensor consists of at least two components, an emitter and a receiver. During operation, the emitter send out a signal (in the case of radar it's usually a radio signal in the microwave frequency range.) The receiver then will detect the returning signal after it hits and bounces back (the radar return) from the aircraft/ship/etc. With radar, this is where RCS comes into play, since the smaller the effective RCS, the less there is for a signal to hit and return back to the receiver for detection. These basic operating principles are the same for other systems like active sonar as well, what changes is the what is being emitted and the medium in which operations are done.

A Passive sensor consists only of a receiver. What it does is wait for the emission of whatever it is keyed to detect, be it IR, RF, noise, etc. and then reports when an emission is made within it's area of detection.

With stealth aircraft, operating under EMCON (Emissions Control) do not transmit RF signals that can be detected by a passive RF detector. After all, having a very low RCS does an aircraft no good if the aircraft broadcasts it's position by transmitting RF signals. Not sure it can be said plainer than that.

 

[LordoftheLord]

can some one clearify my misunderstanding about the KOCHULGA radar.. i am not making that info!!http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/103246

 

[dioditto]

Quite correct, though I hadn't heard about a minimum range, since it apparently has been tested on tracking vehicles moving through northern Australia. I'm sure Australia is eager to export such an early warning system. Really.

Direct quote from the Wiki page on the Kolchuga ESM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor


Active vs. Passive, since this apparently needs to be explained.

An Active sensor consists of at least two components, an emitter and a receiver. During operation, the emitter send out a signal (in the case of radar it's usually a radio signal in the microwave frequency range.) The receiver then will detect the returning signal after it hits and bounces back (the radar return) from the aircraft/ship/etc. With radar, this is where RCS comes into play, since the smaller the effective RCS, the less there is for a signal to hit and return back to the receiver for detection. These basic operating principles are the same for other systems like active sonar as well, what changes is the what is being emitted and the medium in which operations are done.

A Passive sensor consists only of a receiver. What it does is wait for the emission of whatever it is keyed to detect, be it IR, RF, noise, etc. and then reports when an emission is made within it's area of detection.

With stealth aircraft, operating under EMCON (Emissions Control) do not transmit RF signals that can be detected by a passive RF detector. After all, having a very low RCS does an aircraft no good if the aircraft broadcasts it's position by transmitting RF signals. Not sure it can be said plainer than that.

I think from what I gather, Stealth aircraft still use radar, but in wideband, meaning it shoots out a radio signal low enough it's almost mask by background noise. Shooting out cascades of radio signal in multitude of frequencies, and you can get the full picture of what's in front without being detected by enemy. But, that does not mean it is totally undetectable. It is just incredibly difficult to seperate noise from a generated real signal pretend to be noise.

 

[Todjaeger]

I think from what I gather, Stealth aircraft still use radar, but in wideband, meaning it shoots out a radio signal low enough it's almost mask by background noise. Shooting out cascades of radio signal in multitude of frequencies, and you can get the full picture of what's in front without being detected by enemy. But, that does not mean it is totally undetectable. It is just incredibly difficult to seperate noise from a generated real signal pretend to be noise.

I'm not so sure about that. The comm system used by USN subs and I presume RAN subs as well, operate under a similar principle. The transmission is barely above the background radiation, thus requiring special equipment to communicate with. Such equipment is found at a joint Australian-US comm centre, and onboard special aircraft used by the US to communicate with submerged subs. I believe the US Joint-Rivet aircraft is one such time. Given the properties of such transmissions, data/communication is relatively slow, but virtually undetectable without special equipment already deployed in the correct area.

Not sure that a stealth aircraft could use such means to determine positioning. As mentioned before, with GPS and inertial navigation systems available, not sure such a system is needed during stealth operations.

 

[Grand Danois]

@Wooki

I am curious about your previous post regarding the number of receivers needed.

The Kolchuga is described as an ESM ie using passive sensors. Do you think the Kolchuga could be used as a passive radar ie using illumination form a 3rd party?