Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
The problem is finding the funding, it would probably be a $10b+ project. The Army is also going to be extremely busy for the next 10 years introducing a raft of new capabilities as well as replacing a large % of the equipment we have now, including 2 major Aviation Fleets in the ARH replacement and introduction of the Lt SF Helicopter.
Indeed funding could be an issue. OTOH it might not be, as the projected costs to operate and sustain the MRH in the numbers required could equal or exceed what the replacement and then operating costs might be for new Black Hawks. One thing which had struck me when I was doing some research on the early model Black Hawks in US Army service and the ANAO reporting from 2014 on the MRH90's in Australian. IIRC both reports indicated that their subject helicopters were falling sort of the respective project availability targets. From memory, the MRH90 was targeted for 60% availability but only managing 55%, while the Black Hawk was just failing to meet the US Army availability requirement of IIRC 80%.

If those availability rate requirements for the Black Hawk have held true to newer variants, then some of the trouble Army has had in meeting service outputs could be eased because fewer helicopters might need to be on standby.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Completely outside the square. With all the issues and unexpected costs associated with MRH, I can't help but wonder what an FMS acquisition of MV-22 would have cost in comparison.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Completely outside the square. With all the issues and unexpected costs associated with MRH, I can't help but wonder what an FMS acquisition of MV-22 would have cost in comparison.
The base flyaway costs from around about 2013 were:

MV-22 Osprey US$72 m / AU$95 m.*

NH90 €27 m / US$ 37 m / AU$42 m.*

So basically you could buy two NH90 for one Osprey. Whilst the MRH-90 is a variant of the NH90, it is not sufficiently different to cause a significant cost difference such as the NFH variant does at €36.4 m.

However it's like comparing apples to oranges because the Osprey is not a helicopter, but a tilt rotor offering a different capability set. It also has a major drawback in that it has a tendancy to announce its arrival long before it arrives so its not exactly sneaky.

* Rounded to nearest million.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The base flyaway costs from around about 2013 were:

MV-22 Osprey US$72 m / AU$95 m.*

NH90 €27 m / US$ 37 m / AU$42 m.*

So basically you could buy two NH90 for one Osprey. Whilst the MRH-90 is a variant of the NH90, it is not sufficiently different to cause a significant cost difference such as the NFH variant does at €36.4 m.

However it's like comparing apples to oranges because the Osprey is not a helicopter, but a tilt rotor offering a different capability set. It also has a major drawback in that it has a tendancy to announce its arrival long before it arrives so its not exactly sneaky.

* Rounded to nearest million.
I was thinking in terms of cost of ownership, the MRH being a maintenance hog and all.

An exaggeration but I was wondering how much more it would have cost to operate ospreys, which work, verses Taipans that don't.

The Osprey can be sneaky, yes you can hear them but can't always tell where the sound is coming from. They also tend to come in at high speed, medium altitude, then drop straight onto the LZ before opfor knows where they were going.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Not sure it would be a $10b+ billion dollar project unless you are counting also O&S which shouldn't be as that is money that would be spent on helicopters regardless if what type we operate.

Based on recent FMS sales some within the last 12 months to buy a UH60M including spares and associated support/training your looking at $50m USD per a bird so to replace every taipan we would be looking at around $3 billion AUD.

That's your upfront capital costs, if we want to see if it makes financial sense does any one have the flight hour cost for the nh90 and UH60M along with annual flight hour requirements for Australia?
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Here’s my two cent comment on military medium lift helicopters. The CH-148 Cyclone saga has been a complete PITA acquisition made solely for political reasons. Will likely be years before before the actual verdict on its performance are finally known. The NH90 verdict has been rendered by others on this thread. Of the three naval medium lift helicopters developed over the last 30 years, only the Merlin has been reasonably successful, a selection which was made by a Canadian government 30 years ago but cancelled by a new incoming government resulting in a cluster f$&@ lasting decades.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The Merlin became successful; but, like many other similar programs it suffered early on. I remember being told by FONAC, 20 or so years ago, that of the dozen or so aircraft the RN then had no two had the same configuration; that they had both avionics and airframe issues, and that the logistic position was woeful. It seems to be a fact of military helo program life that the beginnings are “challenging”.
 
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Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Completely outside the square. With all the issues and unexpected costs associated with MRH, I can't help but wonder what an FMS acquisition of MV-22 would have cost in comparison.
I only have my memory to go on but I’m sure Bell-Boeing actually offered the MV-22 to Australia in the late 80s as the Huey replacement eventually won by the S-70A Blackhawk. Don’t think anyone took it very seriously at the time.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The Merlin became successful; but, like many other similar programs it suffered early on. I remember being told by FONAC, 20 or so years ago, that of the dozen or so aircraft the RN then had no two had the same configuration; that they had both avionics and airframe issues, and that the logistic position was woeful. It seems to be a fact of military helo program life that the beginnings are “challenging”.
The RCAF also has 14 CH-149s (EH101) which have been ok but you are spot on wrt logistics issues. The RCAF really lucked in when the EH101 derived Presidential helicopter program was cancelled. Canada got 7 complete frames and a bunch of assorted spares for $164 million, a rare procurement success story!
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
One needs to remember that the Tiger ARH was ordered back around December, 2001 or nearly two decades ago. First delivery was in December, 2004 and they were supposed to reach FOC in December 2011. While FOC might have been reached (finally!) in April 2016, this was nearly five years later than planned, and nearly a dozen years after first delivery. Basically by the time FOC was reached, the Tiger was nearly ready for a MLU to upgrade/replace avionics and comm systems. In point of fact, discussion among Tiger users started in early 2016 for a series of proposed upgrades which became known as the Tiger Mk 3, with comms and avionics among the elements to be upgraded.

Basically by the time Australia reached FOC with the Tiger, it had already been recognized by other Tiger users (France, Germany & Spain) that upgrades were required to keep the helicopter in service in a useful capacity.

This is then where one needs to look at what the actual cost would likely be/have been, to get the Tiger ARH fleet to be where it needed to be so that it provided the desired capabilities to Army and the ADF. Given that the fleet itself was already determined to be too small, as well as in need of upgrades, it does seem that opting for an earlier fleet replacement makes more sense than it might otherwise at first seem.
A look back in time to this ADM article for AIR 87


A most unusual journey


Regards S
 

swerve

Super Moderator
It’s almost like going to a prestige car dealer and picking your ‘basic’ car configuration, but then looking at the ‘option’ book and having endless variations on the same theme, looks good in the beginning when you receive your new customised car, but not so good when you need spares and support in future years.

I do wonder if the problem is more to do with paperwork technicalities rather than actual faults with the airframes themselves?

Cheers,
There are certainly cases where that's happened. IIRC it was the cause of the UK special forces Chinooks fiasco. Some avionics customised to MoD (not the users) requirements, & which turned out to be impossible to certify. The MoD's internal safety people said they couldn't prove they were safe to fly.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
There are certainly cases where that's happened. IIRC it was the cause of the UK special forces Chinooks fiasco. Some avionics customised to MoD (not the users) requirements, & which turned out to impossible to certify. The MoD's internal safety people said they couldn't prove they were safe to fly.
Yes I do remember reading about that, it certainly was a f**k up!

Not to be outdone, we of course have the SH-2G(A) fiasco to look back on.

Cheers,
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Completely outside the square. With all the issues and unexpected costs associated with MRH, I can't help but wonder what an FMS acquisition of MV-22 would have cost in comparison.
That’s a high end option — as you mentioned earlier, there are cheaper options that include the H225Ms.

Singapore’s five bladed H225Ms have the TopOwl helmet-mounted display (much like Australia’s Eurocopter Tiger) — this helps modernise the capability of this helicopter to conduct more difficult missions with greater ease.
 
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ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There was a bit of scuttlebutt from Andrew McLaughlin at ADBR, that ADF was keen on a larger Seahawk / Blackhawk / Pavehawk purchase…

Seahawk of unknown designation and numbers for RAN and Blackhawk / Pavehawk to replace the SF Light Helicopter project…

Considering Army is using Chinook to (pardon the pun) carry the load for MRH-90 in addition to it’s own role (hence the extra airframes) if a relatively common standard between the proposed RAN aircraft, the alleged SF requirement, there might be some scope to do something similar to what Sweden did?

This way they‘d gain a small, useable TTH capability with a few extra Seahawk / Blackhawk / Pave Hawk airframes and might be aboe to reduce the number of MRH-90 ‘in-service’ to balance up the sustainment side of things and actually gain some useable capability from Army’s TTH fleet?
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Sea sprite, Tiger, MRH. Not a good procurement record. Seasprite 100% our fault. Can we put the others down to French engineers? Have you hear about heaven and hell?

in heaven the French are the cooks, the Italians the lovers, the English the police, the Germans the engineers and the Swiss run the place.

In hell the Swiss are the cooks, the English the lovers, the Germans the police, the French are the engineers and the Italians run the place.

The French do have a car ...the Renault that has a car jack as it’s emblem.Renault
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Sea sprite, Tiger, MRH. Not a good procurement record. Seasprite 100% our fault. Can we put the others down to French engineers? Have you hear about heaven and hell?

in heaven the French are the cooks, the Italians the lovers, the English the police, the Germans the engineers and the Swiss run the place.

In hell the Swiss are the cooks, the English the lovers, the Germans the police, the French are the engineers and the Italians run the place.

The French do have a car ...the Renault that has a car jack as it’s emblem.Renault
At least one of the "French" engineers on NH90 was an Australian and if he did on that program what he did on the program I knew him from, it explains an awful lot.

Procurement from the mid 90s was a total mess. I can not think of a single project kicked off after 95 that actually delivered what it was meant to, when it was meant to, if it managed to deliver anything at all.

In hindsight the reasons why are obvious. Cost cutting efficiency drives and commercialisation, in the post Cold War era, compounded by layer upon layer of policy and compliance, even though there were fewer experienced and competent people in defence to undertake it.

Core ADF engineering capability, uniform and civilian, was gutted, engineering capability was outsourced and experimental procurement processes enacted. Government owned entities sold off, after being handed major projects to make them more attractive for sale.

At the same time government was often over ruling defence on what was to be bought, when, and from where. Post Timor and 9/11, when defence became a vote winner, PM&C often over ruled defence.

Then there was Kinnard, the procurement model that guaranteed defence got neither what it wanted or what it needed. It selected the prefered evolved / clean sheet design option that met or exceeded all the requirements, then competed it against the prefered zero / minimum change exiting option that failed to meet most of the requirement and had minimal growth factored in. This excluded every perfectly good enough solution that was lower risk and met most of the requirements.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
There was a bit of scuttlebutt from Andrew McLaughlin at ADBR, that ADF was keen on a larger Seahawk / Blackhawk / Pavehawk purchase…

Seahawk of unknown designation and numbers for RAN and Blackhawk / Pavehawk to replace the SF Light Helicopter project…

Considering Army is using Chinook to (pardon the pun) carry the load for MRH-90 in addition to it’s own role (hence the extra airframes) if a relatively common standard between the proposed RAN aircraft, the alleged SF requirement, there might be some scope to do something similar to what Sweden did?

This way they‘d gain a small, useable TTH capability with a few extra Seahawk / Blackhawk / Pave Hawk airframes and might be aboe to reduce the number of MRH-90 ‘in-service’ to balance up the sustainment side of things and actually gain some useable capability from Army’s TTH fleet?
Yes I remember that too.

Andrew posted an article on ADBR that was only up for half a day or a day max, then it disappeared (from memory it was last year some time).

The article suggested that apart from the RAN replacing MRH-90 with MH-60 (which we know about), the article also suggested that instead of the Special Forces operating a mixed fleet of LUH and modified MRH-90, they would end up with a new Blackhawk fleet instead.

And that would mean that Army would have all 47 MRH-90 available for the MUH role.

Be interesting to see what eventually happens.

Cheers,
 

Toptob

Active Member
At least one of the "French" engineers on NH90 was an Australian and if he did on that program what he did on the program I knew him from, it explains an awful lot.

Procurement from the mid 90s was a total mess. I can not think of a single project kicked off after 95 that actually delivered what it was meant to, when it was meant to, if it managed to deliver anything at all.

In hindsight the reasons why are obvious. Cost cutting efficiency drives and commercialisation, in the post Cold War era, compounded by layer upon layer of policy and compliance, even though there were fewer experienced and competent people in defence to undertake it.

Core ADF engineering capability, uniform and civilian, was gutted, engineering capability was outsourced and experimental procurement processes enacted. Government owned entities sold off, after being handed major projects to make them more attractive for sale.

At the same time government was often over ruling defence on what was to be bought, when, and from where. Post Timor and 9/11, when defence became a vote winner, PM&C often over ruled defence.

Then there was Kinnard, the procurement model that guaranteed defence got neither what it wanted or what it needed. It selected the prefered evolved / clean sheet design option that met or exceeded all the requirements, then competed it against the prefered zero / minimum change exiting option that failed to meet most of the requirement and had minimal growth factored in. This excluded every perfectly good enough solution that was lower risk and met most of the requirements.
@Volkodav you make an amazing point there. I don't know how it is in Australia, but here in the Netherlands they keep removing military personel from the upper echelons in the defense department. One comment on that article calls it, they remove people who know about how to run a military because they're difficult and exchange them for someone who won't talk back.

And even if I'm not the biggest fan of buying French, their defense industry works a lot better for their country than most. And I think a big part of that is that they're still somewhat like state companies. Unlike in a lot of other countries where the government let their defense industry be picked apart by the vultures of "liberalism" and "peace dividend".
 
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