Australian Army Discussions and Updates

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Hmm, rather think there were will probably be a BoI in his (or her) immediate future - there would have not been a need to recover from an emergency situation if it had not be created in the first place.
Yep probably. More video. I did think about putting it on Facebook, but they have spat the dummy, thrown all the toys out of the cot, and chucked their nappy against the wall over Australian government legislation.

 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Yep probably. More video. I did think about putting it on Facebook, but they have spat the dummy, thrown all the toys out of the cot, and chucked their nappy against the wall over Australian government legislation.

This incident may reinforce the need for a small helicopter for the special forces

Project Land 2097 Phase 4 will be welcomed sooner rather than later.

Regards S
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
This incident may reinforce the need for a small helicopter for the special forces

Project Land 2097 Phase 4 will be welcomed sooner rather than later.

Regards S
Not necessarily. The object of the exercise is to get as many as possible SF onboard the target ship in the quickest possible time. In this particular case it looks like the helo was to low. So that is more likely pilot error than a platform problem.
 
- I don’t think it is fair to say that 13 Bde will be expanded compared to the other reserve brigades, just that it will be expanded. It is the only conventional force in the western third of the country, so I think there is a desire to have a bit more capability over there. One small correction is that the slide indicates that 9 Bde will remain part of FORCOMD, not 1 Div. Also interesting to note that 2 Div will no longer be part of FORCOMD, but directly commanded by AHQ.
Hello Raven (and All)

Apologies for bringing this old post back up, but am only just looking at this document again i.e. the Force Structure Plan and any changes for AHQ & ARes RAAC.

I noticed that ARes Cav Scout/LH units appear to not be not included (i.e. PWLH, RNSWL etc), except in the case of 13 Bgd, which indicates Cavalry ISR (Hawkei & G-Wagon SRV platforms) - I assuming this is A Sqdn/10 LH?
- Do you think there are plans to remove ARes RAAC Sqdns with the exception of the WA region's based 13th Bgd? I would find it surprising for a number of reasons and at many different levels. I came across a recent article posted from the notebook of Cpl EM Hale - RAAC Light Cavalry; A marriage of regular and reserve.

May I also ask your (or other great posters that are informed) opinion on some thought bubbles that have been circulating over the past few months.
- I noticed a recent article in DTR magazine issue Dec 2020 AMV and MAV considerations by AHQ, where (pg.6) it indicates AHQ is considering cutting the PAV* & MSV numbers in favour of AMV and MAV combinations. Sounds very interesting and would give Australian army both tracked Armoured SPG and Armoured (maybe wheeled) 120mm Mortars (NEMO looks viable). Do you (or anyone) think this is the direction the Army is heading for the new FSP? IMHO, this gives Australian Army HQ great flexibility (14-70+km range) and commonality with Boxer

* Just bringing up the PAV and the low numbers that were proposed a few years back, I see the BAE/IVECO SuperAV is now in production with USMC. BAE contract with USMC You think there might be some future appetite for these platforms to be used by the regular 2x PLF's? Obviously no real commonality with Boxer. Interesting that 13 Bgd will have a planned PLF unit (most likely ARes) as part of the new FSP.

From capability change standpoint and much is still fluid, but I find that 8th Bgd will be the most interesting. From my brief understanding and looking again at the FSP.
- The LRPF (XX) Rgt will likely be HIMARS or something similar (hopefully an Armoured cab HX77), but with the USMC looking at LBASM options (as are Australia), the actual launch platform itself appears to be the common variant of the M142 truck or the future Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck. So irrespective of the missile selected, it appears the USMC, are looking to use a common launchers across there limited numbers. My question, relates to whether Australian Army will look to follow a similar path, where the LRPF Rgt will cover the LBMS capability or do you think the R&R's are different? Recent article on the options - LBASM options USMC
- 16th Rgt appears to be NSAMS/CEA selection with Hawkei & HX77/40 platforms from what I have seen on ABDR & DTR articles over the last 24 months. This covers Med/SHORAD, but do you think there is a capability gap at any level on VSHORAD, in light of newer threats?

Just a general question and your view on SPIKE-LR selected for the CRV/IFV's turret. Would there be any reason that the Australian Army would also consider the use of mounted Javelin (FGM-148) on a RWS (i.e. EOS, Kongsberg or CROWS II), specifically for PMV/PMV-L? We already have Javelin across the army and I assume in use with ARes Inf also. An RWS of an M2 + single FGM-148, would certainly viable option to use

Sorry for the long post and questions, I am very curious on the future development, of what is promising time for Australian Army. In my view, it appears Army will catch up in the great strides taken by both RAAF and RAN.
 
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Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Hi Nick
- Do you think there are plans to remove ARes RAAC Sqdns with the exception of the WA region's based 13th Bgd? I would find it surprising for a number of reasons and at many different levels. I came across a recent article posted from the notebook of Cpl EM Hale - RAAC Light Cavalry; A marriage of regular and reserve.
The short answer is I don't know, but I very much doubt it. That orbat slide in the presentation only showed the roles for the units in the reserve brigades, not necessarily their actual organisation. I would expect each reserve brigade to more or less maintain the units they have, but reorganised to achieve the contingency response roles. Any meaningful change of 2 Div is extraordinarily difficult, so I imagine any difficult decisions like disbanding units will be put off to some indeterminate time in the future.
Do you (or anyone) think this is the direction the Army is heading for the new FSP? IMHO, this gives Australian Army HQ great flexibility (14-70+km range) and commonality with Boxer
I certainly think the army will end up with a mounted mortar capability of some description. Whether it is AMOS/NEMO or something else, and whether it is Boxer or IFV mounted I don't know. My preference would be something like NEMO mounted on the IFV chassis to support the armoured battlegroups. I don't think mortars are actually that useful for the cavalry, so I don't see the point of Boxer mounted versions.
* Just bringing up the PAV and the low numbers that were proposed a few years back, I see the BAE/IVECO SuperAV is now in production with USMC. BAE contract with USMC You think there might be some future appetite for these platforms to be used by the regular 2x PLF's? Obviously no real commonality with Boxer. Interesting that 13 Bgd will have a planned PLF unit (most likely ARes) as part of the new FSP.
I don't think the PAV will be a priority for a long time. The problem with trying to shoe-horn the PAV into the Land 400 program is that there is no existing suitable variant of the IFV contenders out there, so the program risk, for only a very small buy, would be massive. Perhaps once Land 400 is sorted it will come around again, but even then I don't think so.
My question, relates to whether Australian Army will look to follow a similar path, where the LRPF Rgt will cover the LBMS capability or do you think the R&R's are different? Recent article on the options - LBASM options USMC
I think it is too early to answer this with any accuracy. I certainly think that in a perfect world the LBASM will share a common launch platform with the LRPF solution (*cough* HIMARS *cough*), and the missile itself will be common with the air force/navy. Whether such a solution is feasible is the question.
- 16th Rgt appears to be NSAMS/CEA selection with Hawkei & HX77/40 platforms from what I have seen on ABDR & DTR articles over the last 24 months. This covers Med/SHORAD, but do you think there is a capability gap at any level on VSHORAD, in light of newer threats?
I would say that, specifically, a counter UAS capability is a the biggest gap. The problem is that no-one really knows what the best solution is to the UAS problem. Is kinetic or non-kinetic solutions the answer? Is it something that you need dedicated platforms for, or should all manoeuvre platforms be capable of it? I don't know the answer to this, nor I think does anyone else.
Just a general question and your view on SPIKE-LR selected for the CRV/IFV's turret. Would there be any reason that the Australian Army would also consider the use of mounted Javelin (FGM-148) on a RWS (i.e. EOS, Kongsberg or CROWS II), specifically for PMV/PMV-L? We already have Javelin across the army and I assume in use with ARes Inf also. An RWS of an M2 + single FGM-148, would certainly viable option to use
Javelin is being replaced by the Spike, so any solution would use the Spike, not the Javelin. In my opinion, there is certainly a place for the capability you describe. A good example would be the light cavalry you raised earlier. A light cavalry troop that had six Hawkei, with two equipped with an RWS with mounted Spike (so each patrol would have a mounted ATGM capability) would be an excellent capability. One thing to note, though, is that an RWS with a mounted ATGM should only be though of as self-protection against armour, not a dedicated anti-armour capability.
 
Thank you Raven :) Both for the time to respond and the considered responses

The short answer is I don't know, but I very much doubt it. That orbat slide in the presentation only showed the roles for the units in the reserve brigades, not necessarily their actual organisation. I would expect each reserve brigade to more or less maintain the units they have, but reorganised to achieve the contingency response roles. Any meaningful change of 2 Div is extraordinarily difficult, so I imagine any difficult decisions like disbanding units will be put off to some indeterminate time in the future.
That is re-assuring. Never really considered the aspect of institutional 'change resistance' that would be within 2Div.
I certainly think the army will end up with a mounted mortar capability of some description. Whether it is AMOS/NEMO or something else, and whether it is Boxer or IFV mounted I don't know. My preference would be something like NEMO mounted on the IFV chassis to support the armoured battlegroups. I don't think mortars are actually that useful for the cavalry, so I don't see the point of Boxer mounted versions.
Thank you. I have no professional view, but it would be interesting if that eventuates. We might have both mixed ACR's and possibly mixed Artillery Rgts!
I don't think the PAV will be a priority for a long time. The problem with trying to shoe-horn the PAV into the Land 400 program is that there is no existing suitable variant of the IFV contenders out there, so the program risk, for only a very small buy, would be massive. Perhaps once Land 400 is sorted it will come around again, but even then I don't think so.
Agreed. As you mentioned, there appears to be no real IFV contenders that cover this capability, unless its bespoke equipment.
I think it is too early to answer this with any accuracy. I certainly think that in a perfect world the LBASM will share a common launch platform with the LRPF solution (*cough* HIMARS *cough*), and the missile itself will be common with the air force/navy. Whether such a solution is feasible is the question.
I guess the picture will become clearer over the next 18months on options. I cant help but feel that the USMC is the area to be watching. Their need to change and pivot, is accelerating interesting and practical options.
I would say that, specifically, a counter UAS capability is a the biggest gap. The problem is that no-one really knows what the best solution is to the UAS problem. Is kinetic or non-kinetic solutions the answer? Is it something that you need dedicated platforms for, or should all manoeuvre platforms be capable of it? I don't know the answer to this, nor I think does anyone else.
Thanks and I hadn't considered regarding dedicated vs. non-dedicated question, plus non-kinetic options.
Javelin is being replaced by the Spike, so any solution would use the Spike, not the Javelin. In my opinion, there is certainly a place for the capability you describe. A good example would be the light cavalry you raised earlier. A light cavalry troop that had six Hawkei, with two equipped with an RWS with mounted Spike (so each patrol would have a mounted ATGM capability) would be an excellent capability. One thing to note, though, is that an RWS with a mounted ATGM should only be though of as self-protection against armour, not a dedicated anti-armour capability.
Apologies, I wasn't aware, we are moving away from Javelin. Then that makes my question rather redundant. 100% agree on your last point and I wasnt advocating Anti-Armour, I just thought that any self protection for a PMV platform, that found itself in the wrong situation, would be rather viable with a single FGM-148 mounted.

It would appear that the Hawkei will be a very utilised platform when all is said and done.

Thank again for taking time to respond! :)
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Reinforcing fires to @Raven22 ...

I noticed that ARes Cav Scout/LH units appear to not be not included (i.e. PWLH, RNSWL etc), except in the case of 13 Bgd, which indicates Cavalry ISR (Hawkei & G-Wagon SRV platforms) - I assuming this is A Sqdn/10 LH?
- Do you think there are plans to remove ARes RAAC Sqdns with the exception of the WA region's based 13th Bgd? I would find it surprising for a number of reasons and at many different levels. I came across a recent article posted from the notebook of Cpl EM Hale - RAAC Light Cavalry; A marriage of regular and reserve.
Personally I think the fetish of light cavalry outside RFSU and SOCOMD (even then, possibly), needs to die. Which will come from an actual study of 2 Div, what they do and what their expected roles are. I don't think it's unfair to say that 2 Div is the forgotten red-headed step-child and neither they nor the ARA know what to do with them. This is compounded by some....entrenched views that frankly make any form of restructure nigh on impossible. There needs to be some sackings across the Div first while we can determine their role(s) and then build a force structure that matches it.

- I noticed a recent article in DTR magazine issue Dec 2020 AMV and MAV considerations by AHQ, where (pg.6) it indicates AHQ is considering cutting the PAV* & MSV numbers in favour of AMV and MAV combinations.
More bluntness - the PAV is a silly idea at the moment. When you crunch the maths with what is available; noting that we would have to use these in an IFV role on the land it doesn't make sense from an assault or fight-through point of view. It was driven by a small handful of people and honestly, if the PAV is deleted I think that's a benefit to Army. Frankly, the best way of getting a machine that can fight and live from ship to shore is on a boat - but the PAV funding into that. It'll be more useful.

Sounds very interesting and would give Australian army both tracked Armoured SPG and Armoured (maybe wheeled) 120mm Mortars (NEMO looks viable). Do you (or anyone) think this is the direction the Army is heading for the new FSP? IMHO, this gives Australian Army HQ great flexibility (14-70+km range) and commonality with Boxer
It has long been known - predating LAND 17 - that the optimal fires configuration for the Australian Army is 155mm SPG, 120mm SPM and 81mm mortar. That's been shown in a number of studies and wargames. Whether the 120mm is on tracked or wheels is generally seen to not be an issue; but I'd suggest that some maths against likely threats and Australian assault formations indicates that the 120mm is likely to be at risk of direct fire at range, suggesting that the platform may have to be armoured beyond a Boxer.

- The LRPF (XX) Rgt will likely be HIMARS or something similar (hopefully an Armoured cab HX77), but with the USMC looking at LBASM options (as are Australia), the actual launch platform itself appears to be the common variant of the M142 truck or the future Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) truck. So irrespective of the missile selected, it appears the USMC, are looking to use a common launchers across there limited numbers. My question, relates to whether Australian Army will look to follow a similar path, where the LRPF Rgt will cover the LBMS capability or do you think the R&R's are different? Recent article on the options - LBASM options USMC
Conversely to the self-propelled mortar, the LRF truck doesn't have to be armoured. Protected likely (against rocket blast), but a base model HX-77 'should' / 'could' be ok. But in a single word, yes. We hope that the LRF platform can launch all the required long range rockets/missiles - so an SSM, ASM and maybe even SAM. That gives the joint force the most flexibility, provides adds complexity to the threat's analysis and provides redundancy.

- 16th Rgt appears to be NSAMS/CEA selection with Hawkei & HX77/40 platforms from what I have seen on ABDR & DTR articles over the last 24 months. This covers Med/SHORAD, but do you think there is a capability gap at any level on VSHORAD, in light of newer threats?
Ah, the perennial question as to VSHORAD. There are lots of answers and questions here. What is VSHORAD in today's world, who is responsible for it, what are the counters available and how does it tie together. There is a gap, but how that is filled is a thorny problem. The best answer is probably directed energy weapons on all platforms - which suffers from, well, not really existing at the moment. So what can the IFV/CRV guns do, what can the APS do, what about other electronic warfare elements, can you have a 'fighter' UAV - all needs to be considered and wargammed. I'm not sure you'll see a LAND XXX for VSHORAD, what you'll see are tweaks to existing programs or, honestly, just classified answers.
 
Some interesting thoughts Takao and was hoping you would chip in. :)

Both yourself and Raven's response's I find refreshing and thought provoking in the context of the (ever) changing structure of Australian Army. Cheers again

Personally I think the fetish of light cavalry outside RFSU and SOCOMD (even then, possibly), needs to die. Which will come from an actual study of 2 Div, what they do and what their expected roles are. I don't think it's unfair to say that 2 Div is the forgotten red-headed step-child and neither they nor the ARA know what to do with them. This is compounded by some....entrenched views that frankly make any form of restructure nigh on impossible. There needs to be some sackings across the Div first while we can determine their role(s) and then build a force structure that matches it.
Interesting points and part of me agrees, but as I said initially, I would personally find it surprising.
May I ask do you base your view on cost vs capability, in regards to light cavalry outside RFSU & SOCOMD? Fully understand your last point and one of the reasons I posted the question, as I was trying to understand what the current ARes RAAC units provide to the ARA, when required. I was thinking along similar lines with ARes Artillery.
Not at all undermining their role at all, just trying to mentally understand the the future fit. I think we have 5-6 Sabre Sqdns in ARes RAAC? and in the case of 11Bde, none, since 11/14 QMI became regular.
More bluntness - the PAV is a silly idea at the moment. When you crunch the maths with what is available; noting that we would have to use these in an IFV role on the land it doesn't make sense from an assault or fight-through point of view. It was driven by a small handful of people and honestly, if the PAV is deleted I think that's a benefit to Army. Frankly, the best way of getting a machine that can fight and live from ship to shore is on a boat - but the PAV funding into that. It'll be more useful.
:)
The part I highlighted has resonated with me the most, as not advocating, just reflecting based on AHQ suggested changes for dropping PAV capability.
It has long been known - predating LAND 17 - that the optimal fires configuration for the Australian Army is 155mm SPG, 120mm SPM and 81mm mortar. That's been shown in a number of studies and wargames. Whether the 120mm is on tracked or wheels is generally seen to not be an issue; but I'd suggest that some maths against likely threats and Australian assault formations indicates that the 120mm is likely to be at risk of direct fire at range, suggesting that the platform may have to be armoured beyond a Boxer.
Thanks for sharing, interesting that 81mm is included in the optimal mix. Armoured beyond Boxer, do you mean Lynx/Redback 'type' or a heavy option?
Quick question, Do we use 81mm in the ARA Inf, at the Btn level? I thought that we do, I know the x6 battery's in ARes Art have them.
Conversely to the self-propelled mortar, the LRF truck doesn't have to be armoured. Protected likely (against rocket blast), but a base model HX-77 'should' / 'could' be ok. But in a single word, yes. We hope that the LRF platform can launch all the required long range rockets/missiles - so an SSM, ASM and maybe even SAM. That gives the joint force the most flexibility, provides adds complexity to the threat's analysis and provides redundancy.
Agreed the LRF platform ideally should be agnostic to the capability used. I guess considering the positional range of the platform, armour isn't a requirement.
Ah, the perennial question as to VSHORAD. There are lots of answers and questions here. What is VSHORAD in today's world, who is responsible for it, what are the counters available and how does it tie together. There is a gap, but how that is filled is a thorny problem. The best answer is probably directed energy weapons on all platforms - which suffers from, well, not really existing at the moment. So what can the IFV/CRV guns do, what can the APS do, what about other electronic warfare elements, can you have a 'fighter' UAV - all needs to be considered and wargammed. I'm not sure you'll see a LAND XXX for VSHORAD, what you'll see are tweaks to existing programs or, honestly, just classified answers.
Cheers Takao and great insights.
'Directed energy on all platforms', I thought would be an expensive option, considering current maturity and the already decreasing real estate on an IFV/CRV/MBT (i.e APS + add-on armour kit). Power & weight being first to mind. Would then not dedicated platforms be the short term solution (next 5yrs), in the same way we will utilise our capability on threats perceived in the AO, with 16th LAAD Rgt?
As when LAND400 ph3 is selected and we are into FOC, the actual number of true tier one platforms will be 800+ for 1Div?
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Interesting points and part of me agrees, but as I said initially, I would personally find it surprising.
May I ask do you base your view on cost vs capability, in regards to light cavalry outside RFSU & SOCOMD? Fully understand your last point and one of the reasons I posted the question, as I was trying to understand what the current ARes RAAC units provide to the ARA, when required. I was thinking along similar lines with ARes Artillery.
Not at all undermining their role at all, just trying to mentally understand the the future fit. I think we have 5-6 Sabre Sqdns in ARes RAAC? and in the case of 11Bde, none, since 11/14 QMI became regular.
This is aimed at Takao, but I’ll chip in because I have some skin in the game. The problem with the current light cavalry is that it essentially provides zero capability. As Takao is saying, no one sat down and did the analysis of what capability they were supposed to provide, and then developed a coherent structure to provide that capability. The light cav model came evolved to where it is simply because it required the absolute bare minimum in terms of resources, so the army could pretend to give the reserve units a role and purpose and not have to make difficult and unpopular decision about whether units should continue to exist. As they stand, the light cav units have nowhere near the equipment and training they need to provide a useful capability. Realistically, the only somewhat useful capability the ARes RAAC units provide is the PMV lift capability, and even then the capability is tiny.

In my opinion though, we could create light cavalry units that do have a purpose and do provide a capability. Both the British Army and US Army provide models of what could work (although personally I don’t like the British Army model as it developed much like our own - simply because they couldn’t afford enough real AFVs). However, the question would remain whether the ARes could sustain such a capability. Here I am very dubious. From my experience, with current conditions of service, the ARes simply cannot conduct the collection training necessary to maintain a capability above the platoon level. It turns out you can’t train a squadron/regiment when only a small portion of the soldiers turn up to each training event. This is why I think things like the integrated 9th brigade are doomed to fail. Without fundamental reform to ARes conditions of service, which would make training something close to compulsory, the ARes will simply not be able to generate a combat capability at a collective level.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
This is aimed at Takao, but I’ll chip in because I have some skin in the game. The problem with the current light cavalry is that it essentially provides zero capability. As Takao is saying, no one sat down and did the analysis of what capability they were supposed to provide, and then developed a coherent structure to provide that capability. The light cav model came evolved to where it is simply because it required the absolute bare minimum in terms of resources, so the army could pretend to give the reserve units a role and purpose and not have to make difficult and unpopular decision about whether units should continue to exist. As they stand, the light cav units have nowhere near the equipment and training they need to provide a useful capability. Realistically, the only somewhat useful capability the ARes RAAC units provide is the PMV lift capability, and even then the capability is tiny.

In my opinion though, we could create light cavalry units that do have a purpose and do provide a capability. Both the British Army and US Army provide models of what could work (although personally I don’t like the British Army model as it developed much like our own - simply because they couldn’t afford enough real AFVs). However, the question would remain whether the ARes could sustain such a capability. Here I am very dubious. From my experience, with current conditions of service, the ARes simply cannot conduct the collection training necessary to maintain a capability above the platoon level. It turns out you can’t train a squadron/regiment when only a small portion of the soldiers turn up to each training event. This is why I think things like the integrated 9th brigade are doomed to fail. Without fundamental reform to ARes conditions of service, which would make training something close to compulsory, the ARes will simply not be able to generate a combat capability at a collective level.
Long gone are the days that an ARES sabre Sqn, with the same basic equipment as the ARA equivalent, significant ARA cadre staff, and substantial numbers of ex ARA members, could supplement and support ARA units and formations.

The writing has been on the wall ever since the decision was made to upgrade the M-113 instead of replacing it. With no replacement, there was nothing modern enough, with sufficient residual life/capability, to cascade down to the reserve units.

With SPGs on the way the dropshorts could return to being maybe useful with cascaded M-777? ASLAVs with be too shagged to be worthwhile for CAV. I also get the impression, that since the loss of heavy manufacturing and the rundown/dumbdown of apprenticeships and technical training in the 90s and 2000s, that the reserved struggle to recruit and retain sufficient technical soldiers, sailors and auircraftsmen.
 

FoxtrotRomeo999

Active Member
The ARA is built around the idea of supporting one expeditionary combat brigade overseas. Australia has not been able to do so for quite some time (we needed US, Kiwi and CMF attachments in Vietnam). With the new kit and bodies coming over the next few years we may well be able to sustain a modern high intensity brigade strength warfighting capability. This is, however, not the same as defending Australia - we couldn't afford the large permanent standing Army necessary to do so. The Army Reserve gave us a cheap, quick, surge capability. I am not sure why this role is now disparaged.
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
This is, however, not the same as defending Australia - we couldn't afford the large permanent standing Army necessary to do so.
Whenever I see a comment like this, I have to ask: Defending against what?

@Anthony_B_78 You are a newbie on here and we have a rule about not making one line posts. Please don't make a habit of it.
Ngatimozart.
 
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ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Long gone are the days that an ARES sabre Sqn, with the same basic equipment as the ARA equivalent, significant ARA cadre staff, and substantial numbers of ex ARA members, could supplement and support ARA units and formations.

The writing has been on the wall ever since the decision was made to upgrade the M-113 instead of replacing it. With no replacement, there was nothing modern enough, with sufficient residual life/capability, to cascade down to the reserve units.

With SPGs on the way the dropshorts could return to being maybe useful with cascaded M-777? ASLAVs with be too shagged to be worthwhile for CAV. I also get the impression, that since the loss of heavy manufacturing and the rundown/dumbdown of apprenticeships and technical training in the 90s and 2000s, that the reserved struggle to recruit and retain sufficient technical soldiers, sailors and auircraftsmen.
As Raven mentioned the problem isn’t (entirely) kit, it’s what the ARes could do with it. There is a push and it may well succeed, to develop a light cavalry capability across Army (even in ARA) based on the Hawkei fitted with appropriate sensors and weapons mounted via RWS and enabled with appropriate TTP’s. The thinking is we need a Cavalry capability in places where a near 40t Boxer may be inappropriate, but an un-armoured G Wagon isn’t either...

Such an idea may well prove to be a viable capability and would appear to be well suited to ARes formations to give them a useful role within the means allocated, but that still doesn’t solve the issue of having sufficient ARes staff actually turn up to train so that collective sub-unit or unit level capability can actually be achieved.

Actually having some kit, is one but not the only one issue facing ARes.
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
Whenever I see a comment like this, I have to ask: Defending against what?

@Anthony_B_78 You are a newbie on here and we have a rule about not making one line posts. Please don't make a habit of it.
Ngatimozart.
Regarding this moderator note, my apologies, but I thought it was sufficient to convey the point that I wanted to make. I'm happy to expand on it though. I'm interested in defence, it's not my profession, and yet I feel rather confident in saying that the claim that the Australian Army (or ADF as a whole) is not of a sufficient size to defend the country - which, frankly, I see a lot - misses the rather salient point that context is critical. That is, what are they defending us against? There's arguably only one nation that could project force - at sea, in the air, and on land - and sustain it in such a manner as to pose a threat to Australia beyond our own defence capabilities, and that's one of our closest allies in the US. That's not to say this won't change over time; it likely will. But, for now, and the foreseeable future, it means that our defence force will most likely be employed in expeditionary operations and this - as others are saying - is making it difficult to identity where the Army Reserves fit in. Their ability to facilitate the expansion of the Army is, I would observe, a little overstated in its importance. I would think if there was a need for a dramatically larger Army then it would achieved through national service and it would be the permanent force that would be key to facilitating this growth. This doesn't mean there isn't a role for the Reserves; there is. But clearly they are struggling to identify one and to make it an attractive option for part-time soldiers and officers.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Some interesting thoughts Takao and was hoping you would chip in. :)
Oh no - a reputation....

May I ask do you base your view on cost vs capability, in regards to light cavalry outside RFSU & SOCOMD? Fully understand your last point and one of the reasons I posted the question, as I was trying to understand what the current ARes RAAC units provide to the ARA, when required. I was thinking along similar lines with ARes Artillery.
Not at all undermining their role at all, just trying to mentally understand the the future fit. I think we have 5-6 Sabre Sqdns in ARes RAAC? and in the case of 11Bde, none, since 11/14 QMI became regular.
I'll preface this by saying I've never worn a yellow lanyard and @Raven22 has raised many of the issues I see. Light 'cav' for the RFSU I think is a clear match, if only to boost up their mobility assets. SOCOMD needs something like light cav (what it's called, I don't care), but that's outside discussions here.

But as for why I disagree with the role in the ARA or ARes is simple - I can't see the point of it. It's not survivable,* it has bad ISR capabilities and it adds nothing. In ARA terms I think it's a hold out from olds and bolds; CRV is too big and recce must be sneaky. As my yellow lanyard peers hammer in my head though, recce is a mindset, not a platform. So Boxer is bigger than ASLAV - ok. It's also orders of magnitude more survivable and capable, meaning you now have options you didn't in an ASLAV. Or, perhaps you consider using the smallest AFV - the M1 (with upgraded sights of course). We need to look at milking the best from this new capability (that we haven't even begun to really play with) before claiming the sky is falling and we need a new capability.

In ARes terms it's a bandaid to make senior ARes ranks happy that the RAAC units still have a role. Which has a flow on thought, and one that the senior ARes people refuse to seriously consider, about what is the role of the ARes. There are some efforts to define their role, look at some of the stuff coming out from AHQ with revised structures, but there is a senior element that seems determined to not want to consider new roles. At the moment they are neither fish nor fowl - they can't support an actual ARA deployment (see @Raven22 and @ADMk2 comments about training ability) but they are still part of the ADF so they can't do domestic civil support as well as a non-Defence Act agency can.

For all that doom and gloom though, the ARes RAA offers options. Sorry @Volkodav, the only place I want to see the M777 cascaded is over the side of an LHD - preferably 20nm west of HMAS Brisbane II. But, what is something that could be considered is making the Long Range Fires platform ARes. The training needs are lower than tube arty, the maintenance easier and you get some good morale - "not only do we have more advanced tech than the ARA but they need us. In fact, sometimes the JTF will need us before the ARA."

* what was amusing was seeing the British Army light cav pundits on Twitter through late last year bragging about how Jackal was superior to Boxer because it could be deployed better - including to Estonia. Cue a photo in Nov / Dec that showed a Jackal a the end of a short drive and how it was fully iced up, the driver's goggles included, and the crew were near hypothermic. This led to a drastic shift in the social media reporting, as the formal army accounts started publishing imagery without Jackals, but rather with Chally 2's and Warriors. You know - survivable (in peacetime!) vehicles!

Thanks for sharing, interesting that 81mm is included in the optimal mix. Armoured beyond Boxer, do you mean Lynx/Redback 'type' or a heavy option?
Quick question, Do we use 81mm in the ARA Inf, at the Btn level? I thought that we do, I know the x6 battery's in ARes Art have them.
Well, while I disagree with formed units of standing light infantry in peacetime, there will always be a need to have infantry operate dismounted at points. The 81 mm offers that capability. It also allows for deployment options below the need for AFVs that will still give some fire support options (including at a base, illum). And yes, 81's should still be in the Bn.

Yep - IFV levels. I mean, I'd be happy to see all our AFVs armoured to M1 standards... :cool:

Agreed the LRF platform ideally should be agnostic to the capability used. I guess considering the positional range of the platform, armour isn't a requirement.
And see options for ARes above...

'Directed energy on all platforms', I thought would be an expensive option, considering current maturity and the already decreasing real estate on an IFV/CRV/MBT (i.e APS + add-on armour kit). Power & weight being first to mind. Would then not dedicated platforms be the short term solution (next 5yrs), in the same way we will utilise our capability on threats perceived in the AO, with 16th LAAD Rgt?
Oh, it's expensive and impractical now, 100%. But I'm convinced that's what the self protection assets will look like. With dedicated platforms within the BG operating similar + EW packages. The decreasing real estate is a concern, but I do know that people are looking closely at what platforms need for power now and guesses in 15 - 20 years. The RAN has learnt and relearnt that as platforms age they need more power - we have started grasping that. Which will hopefully future proof our kit for electronic systems.

The ARA is built around the idea of supporting one expeditionary combat brigade overseas. Australia has not been able to do so for quite some time (we needed US, Kiwi and CMF attachments in Vietnam). With the new kit and bodies coming over the next few years we may well be able to sustain a modern high intensity brigade strength warfighting capability. This is, however, not the same as defending Australia - we couldn't afford the large permanent standing Army necessary to do so. The Army Reserve gave us a cheap, quick, surge capability. I am not sure why this role is now disparaged.
Australia is more than capable of doing that. When we start taking casualties our reinforcements run out very quick, but we can sustain a Brigade(+). We do chose to not deploy assets at the moment and rely on allies (hospitals or attack helicopters leap to mind), but we can do it from FORCOMD alone.

DoA is easy, and you don't need more than a Bde for that anyhow.

And no one is disparaging the ARes. Individually they are arguably more committed than ARA - they give up spare time to do the training. But there are systemic issues with how the ARes is designed, built and their CONOPS. I've seen senior ARes personnel disparage any plans / thoughts that shift the ARes from its 1990s construct - and that is worth disparaging. The Rum Brigade has much to answer for.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Oh no - a reputation....



I'll preface this by saying I've never worn a yellow lanyard and @Raven22 has raised many of the issues I see. Light 'cav' for the RFSU I think is a clear match, if only to boost up their mobility assets. SOCOMD needs something like light cav (what it's called, I don't care), but that's outside discussions here.

But as for why I disagree with the role in the ARA or ARes is simple - I can't see the point of it. It's not survivable,* it has bad ISR capabilities and it adds nothing. In ARA terms I think it's a hold out from olds and bolds; CRV is too big and recce must be sneaky. As my yellow lanyard peers hammer in my head though, recce is a mindset, not a platform. So Boxer is bigger than ASLAV - ok. It's also orders of magnitude more survivable and capable, meaning you now have options you didn't in an ASLAV. Or, perhaps you consider using the smallest AFV - the M1 (with upgraded sights of course). We need to look at milking the best from this new capability (that we haven't even begun to really play with) before claiming the sky is falling and we need a new capability.

In ARes terms it's a bandaid to make senior ARes ranks happy that the RAAC units still have a role. Which has a flow on thought, and one that the senior ARes people refuse to seriously consider, about what is the role of the ARes. There are some efforts to define their role, look at some of the stuff coming out from AHQ with revised structures, but there is a senior element that seems determined to not want to consider new roles. At the moment they are neither fish nor fowl - they can't support an actual ARA deployment (see @Raven22 and @ADMk2 comments about training ability) but they are still part of the ADF so they can't do domestic civil support as well as a non-Defence Act agency can.

For all that doom and gloom though, the ARes RAA offers options. Sorry @Volkodav, the only place I want to see the M777 cascaded is over the side of an LHD - preferably 20nm west of HMAS Brisbane II. But, what is something that could be considered is making the Long Range Fires platform ARes. The training needs are lower than tube arty, the maintenance easier and you get some good morale - "not only do we have more advanced tech than the ARA but they need us. In fact, sometimes the JTF will need us before the ARA."

* what was amusing was seeing the British Army light cav pundits on Twitter through late last year bragging about how Jackal was superior to Boxer because it could be deployed better - including to Estonia. Cue a photo in Nov / Dec that showed a Jackal a the end of a short drive and how it was fully iced up, the driver's goggles included, and the crew were near hypothermic. This led to a drastic shift in the social media reporting, as the formal army accounts started publishing imagery without Jackals, but rather with Chally 2's and Warriors. You know - survivable (in peacetime!) vehicles!



Well, while I disagree with formed units of standing light infantry in peacetime, there will always be a need to have infantry operate dismounted at points. The 81 mm offers that capability. It also allows for deployment options below the need for AFVs that will still give some fire support options (including at a base, illum). And yes, 81's should still be in the Bn.

Yep - IFV levels. I mean, I'd be happy to see all our AFVs armoured to M1 standards... :cool:



And see options for ARes above...



Oh, it's expensive and impractical now, 100%. But I'm convinced that's what the self protection assets will look like. With dedicated platforms within the BG operating similar + EW packages. The decreasing real estate is a concern, but I do know that people are looking closely at what platforms need for power now and guesses in 15 - 20 years. The RAN has learnt and relearnt that as platforms age they need more power - we have started grasping that. Which will hopefully future proof our kit for electronic systems.



Australia is more than capable of doing that. When we start taking casualties our reinforcements run out very quick, but we can sustain a Brigade(+). We do chose to not deploy assets at the moment and rely on allies (hospitals or attack helicopters leap to mind), but we can do it from FORCOMD alone.

DoA is easy, and you don't need more than a Bde for that anyhow.

And no one is disparaging the ARes. Individually they are arguably more committed than ARA - they give up spare time to do the training. But there are systemic issues with how the ARes is designed, built and their CONOPS. I've seen senior ARes personnel disparage any plans / thoughts that shift the ARes from its 1990s construct - and that is worth disparaging. The Rum Brigade has much to answer for.
I agree.

On the M-777, I was only suggesting cascading as it is better than an 81mm mortar (that rightfully belongs with the infantry). The ideal would be a GOAT but then money becomes an issue.

The primary obstacle that prevents the ARES from doing what it ideally should do is funding and support. What should it be doing, it should be a feeder to the ARA with the same structures, training and equipment. Obviously the same standards you see in a unit about to be deployed are not possible because of limitation in training days, but there is nothing stopping ARES units achieving suitable minimum standards over a longer training cycle.

Increase the number of cadre staff and facilitate movement between different SERCAT levels. Increase retention in reserves and ARA, increase the amount and quality of training and mentoring, facilitate the feed of trained personnel to the ARA.

As for new roles for ARES CAV the first that comes to mind is UAVs and short to medium range (possibly guided) fires, let the dropshorts have the long range stuff. Looking more holistically at reserve capability in general across the services, any capability that is modular/containerised, that training is predominantly via simulation, would be ideal for reserves. Basically any value adding capability that can plug into a deployed capability.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
...
* what was amusing was seeing the British Army light cav pundits on Twitter through late last year bragging about how Jackal was superior to Boxer because it could be deployed better - including to Estonia. Cue a photo in Nov / Dec that showed a Jackal a the end of a short drive and how it was fully iced up, the driver's goggles included, and the crew were near hypothermic. This led to a drastic shift in the social media reporting, as the formal army accounts started publishing imagery without Jackals, but rather with Chally 2's and Warriors. You know - survivable (in peacetime!) vehicles!....
Jackal's probably OK in the right circumstances, but there isn't a lot of LRDG-style raiding going on & chasing guerrillas around deserts, while something the British army & its allies (yes, France - I'm looking at you) do a significant amount of, is still a fairly narrow niche. Give the Légion étrangère some to play with in Mali & it should work.

I'm sure the SAS likes it.
 
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