What is the current feedback on the Hawkei ? Not a lot out there about it and has been pretty quiet since the Steyr Motors drama, which I am assuming has been sorted ? I do recall Thales stepping in at some stage and putting some money up ?
What sort of vehicle to you think an updated Ph2 would like ?
Cheers
I haven’t had anything to do with Hawkei since the trials in Townsville a couple of years ago. I imagine the problems have been solved, as they weren’t huge to begin with and the program wouldn’t be allowed to fail.
As to the solution for Phase 2, as I think I’ve said a few times I think the best solution would be a vehicle around the 20 - 25 tonne mark. The Boxer is the result of passive protection having an unreasonably high priority - which stems from learning the wrong lessons from Iraq/Afghanistan. However, by mandating the vehicle have such a high level of protection, while also mandating they must be MOTS vehicles (which means they must be adapted IFVs), the solution was always going to be huge and heavy.
Huge is a problem though, as while it means they are great in a fight, it also means they are pretty terrible at getting to the fight. Their strategic and operational mobility is much poorer, and the logistic tail to sustain them much greater. But, as anyone who has read any book at all would tell you, mobility is by far the biggest asset for the cavalry. The whole point of the cavalry is to avoid enemy strengths and threaten weaknesses. If the cavalry is doing it’s job properly, it shouldn’t be decisively engaged at all. By prioritising protection over mobility to such an extent, the entire purpose of cavalry is ignored.
A good analogy is the Wermacht on the Eastern Front in WWII. The Germans conducted Barbarossa with Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs being their best tanks. While these were out classed by the T-34 in a fight, they were extremely reliable, could travel huge distances on their own tracks, and required a relatively small logistics tail. The result is well known - the Panzer divisions penetrated deep behind Soviet lines, shattered the cohesion of the Soviets, and enveloped and destroyed entire armies in massive cauldron battles. The fact the Panzer IIIs and IVs couldn’t outfight a T-34 didn’t matter.
However, the Nazi technocrats learned the wrong lessons and wanted tanks that outclassed the T-34. The result of course was the Tiger and Panther. These were great tanks in a fight, but they were very unreliable, couldn’t travel large distances on their own tracks, and needed a relatively huge logistic tail to keep in the fight. As a result, the Panzer divisions could no longer conduct their previously successful tactics of penetration and envelopment. They were now locked in to a battle of attrition with the Soviets, pitting tank against tank in conventional fights. There was no way the Nazis could outproduce the Soviets, and they lost.
The lesson here is clear, looking at a vehicle purely on its technical merits in a fight, and ignoring the context in which it is employed, risks missing the point entirely. It’s the same with Boxer. It doesn’t matter that it will outclass the opposition on a battlefield if it is too big and heavy to get there in the first place. The renewed focus on our region exacerbates this issue. The type of conflict in the region won’t involve huge fights of armour against armour. In the land domain it will largely be a conflict of preemption - one side or the other seizing key terrain to shape the fight in the maritime and air domains. Clearly, strategic and operational mobility here is key. The risk is the Boxer is just too big to get to the fight, and sustain it in the fight. The fact that it is a technically better vehicle than a 20 - 25 tonne vehicle becomes irrelevant at that point - an inferior vehicle is better than no vehicle at all.
This is the utility of the Hawkei. It is inferior to the Boxer in pretty much every technical category that can be measured, but it has the advantage of having a 10 tonne combat weight and not a >35 tonne combat weight. It therefore provides options to the Army and Government that the Boxer can not. Of course, that doesn’t mean we should scrap Boxer and buy nothing but Hawkei. The cavalry still need a vehicle that has the combat power to focus the attention of the enemy, and the Hawkei doesn’t do that. However, a cavalry capability that is nothing but Boxer might struggle for relevance over the coming decades.