Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ngatimozart]

It's not an issue of what can fit in the back of the IFV, but simply the number of soldiers that exist. With Plan KEOGH, the section size has gone back to nine, regardless of how the section is employed. If the section is entirely dismounted, then clearly this means there are nine dismounts. If the section is PMV mounted, then there is one driver and an eight-man dismount element. For a future IFV section, there is the three-man crew and a six-man dismount element.

If the entire section remains RAInf, then clearly it is easier to swap between roles. For example, imagine if the Army wanted to send a mechanised battalion on some stabilisation mission somewhere in the pacific where IFVs weren't required. The entire battalion could be dismounted, and maintain its full capability with nine man sections. Now imagine a section with three RAAC crewman and six RAInf dismounts in that same scenario. As the entire section is not infantry you can't have the same dismounted capability. Essentially, having specialist IFV crew reduces flexbility.



Nope, that's just my fat fingers. Apparently I am not smart enough to distinguish between a CRV and IFV.

Would it be possible to have a sub species of grunt, oops I mean infantry soldier, trained by the RAAC in the full operation of the IFVs and CRTs as well as being infantry? That may solve your problems with problem I can see that it would cross union lines and the RAAC union getting a bit septic about the grunt union stomping their boots on their territory. I am sure that you could find some in the infantry who would be trainable in such arts. Look for the ones who can tell the difference between the colours of the crayons they have for breakfast. In all seriousness though, it could work and there should be some candidates who would meet the criteria required.

 

[Cadredave]

Would it be possible to have a sub species of grunt, oops I mean infantry soldier, trained by the RAAC in the full operation of the IFVs and CRTs as well as being infantry? That may solve your problems with problem I can see that it would cross union lines and the RAAC union getting a bit septic about the grunt union stomping their boots on their territory. I am sure that you could find some in the infantry who would be trainable in such arts. Look for the ones who can tell the difference between the colours of the crayons they have for breakfast. In all seriousness though, it could work and there should be some candidates who would meet the criteria required.

Been there done that when 1RNZIR reroled into CAV it failed for all the reasons that Raven has identified. It's why QAMR has now got the responsibility back for raise train and sustain armoured crew with dismounts being provided by the two Infantry Battalions when required.

 

[Raven22]

Would it be possible to have a sub species of grunt, oops I mean infantry soldier, trained by the RAAC in the full operation of the IFVs and CRTs as well as being infantry? That may solve your problems with problem I can see that it would cross union lines and the RAAC union getting a bit septic about the grunt union stomping their boots on their territory. I am sure that you could find some in the infantry who would be trainable in such arts. Look for the ones who can tell the difference between the colours of the crayons they have for breakfast. In all seriousness though, it could work and there should be some candidates who would meet the criteria required.

That’s basically what I was talking about by creating a mechanised/armoured/jäger career stream within the infantry corps (which is what a lot of other countries have).

As I said though, it solves some problems but not others. You still end up with the problem that these soldiers would effectively need to conduct all the current individual training of an RAAC soldier on top of the training of an RAInf soldier. That is a huge ask and would be extraordinarily difficult to manage.

What is usually under estimated is the amount of individual training a CRV/IFV will need. They will introduce a whole host of new capabilities (ATGMs, APS, programmable munitions, data fusion etc) that each will add to the individual training burden over current systems. The new vehicles will be more complicated than the M1, and order of magnitude more complicated than an ASLAV, and a googolplex more complicated than an M113. The RAAC is struggling to develop a training system that will meet this challenge for dedicated crews who already have significant AFV experience. To expect infantrymen to be able to do this on top of their dismounted skills truly is, as an old boss of mine would say, a heroic expectation.

 

[Stampede]

Yes AIR 9000 Phase 2 was about quick procurement of 12 extra troop carrier helo's to supplement the existing understrength (~36) UH-60A fleet, but also to allow replacement of the ageing Sea Kings. The next phase (I cannot recall the #) was to extend that purchase to replace all Blackhawks with the same type as Phase 2. I looked up Janes All the World Aircraft 2010 and confirmed that in FY03 UH-60Ls were in full rate production for the US Army whereas a few UH-60Ms prototypes were were only just being ordered from remanufactured UH-60As. To meet ADF rapid delivery request with proven systems the only realistic Sikorsky option was the proven UH-60L which continued in full rate production until FY06 when ADF had hoped for initial delivery. Of course the MRH-90 delivery date promises were not met

Reducing airframes and timing.

In a perfect world the MRH 90 would of being on time and have satisfied all of Army's needs as advertised and even better, its naval counter part would have been selected for NAVY and met similar expectations

I understand the Taipan is now a good platform and it's naval counter part is finally getting some credits with overseas forces.
Maybe our needs when selecting the above were by chance not in sync with all the offerings available...........just timing???????

As is, Army now have a good platform in the Taipan and Navy a good platform in the Romeo.

Buying big defence projects is problematic.
Do you go safe and conservative or take a risk with developing technology.

Not sure of the answer even with hindsight.

Regards S

 

[Stampede]

That’s basically what I was talking about by creating a mechanised/armoured/jäger career stream within the infantry corps (which is what a lot of other countries have).

As I said though, it solves some problems but not others. You still end up with the problem that these soldiers would effectively need to conduct all the current individual training of an RAAC soldier on top of the training of an RAInf soldier. That is a huge ask and would be extraordinarily difficult to manage.

What is usually under estimated is the amount of individual training a CRV/IFV will need. They will introduce a whole host of new capabilities (ATGMs, APS, programmable munitions, data fusion etc) that each will add to the individual training burden over current systems. The new vehicles will be more complicated than the M1, and order of magnitude more complicated than an ASLAV, and a googolplex more complicated than an M113. The RAAC is struggling to develop a training system that will meet this challenge for dedicated crews who already have significant AFV experience. To expect infantrymen to be able to do this on top of their dismounted skills truly is, as an old boss of mine would say, a heroic expectation.

Do we just go back to having light infantry battalions only, that hitch a ride in things with 4 wheels / 8 wheels / tracks or flying things with rotors.
With only six battalions ( forget 2RAR ) is this the best fit for an Army of our size.

Specialisation is good, but flexibility may be better.
RA Inf specialise in the dismounted stuff and RAAC / Aviation specialise in their respective machines and how to employ them.

I get issues of tribalism, but over a few decades of observation we seem to always be on a reoccurring loop with this subject.

Thoughts

Regards S

 

[buffy9]

Do we just go back to having light infantry battalions only, that hitch a ride in things with 4 wheels / 8 wheels / tracks or flying things with rotors.
With only six battalions ( forget 2RAR ) is this the best fit for an Army of our size.

Specialisation is good, but flexibility may be better.
RA Inf specialise in the dismounted stuff and RAAC / Aviation specialise in their respective machines and how to employ them.

I get issues of tribalism, but over a few decades of observation we seem to always be on a reoccurring loop with this subject.

Thoughts

Regards S

I think there is room to specialise by having the actual lift/fighting vehicles (PMV/IFV) be a part of the battalion construct as opposed to being attached as needed. Individual SOPs would benefit from crews working with the infantry on a regular basis, as opposed to rarely being exposed and not developing those core inter-corp skills.

Even now, if we deploy forces that need airmobile skills, we can do that to a decent standard. Same with light infantry skills. Whilst less time is dedicated to improving these skills; more time is dedicated to working with vehicles they may operate from more typically.

It's not an issue of what can fit in the back of the IFV, but simply the number of soldiers that exist. With Plan KEOGH, the section size has gone back to nine, regardless of how the section is employed. If the section is entirely dismounted, then clearly this means there are nine dismounts. If the section is PMV mounted, then there is one driver and an eight-man dismount element. For a future IFV section, there is the three-man crew and a six-man dismount element.

That seems to be a versatile layout in light ops too. If fully dismounted then you could at first glance have two bricks with a dedicated secco monitoring both for more tactical awareness. I digress though.

The point I was trying to make is whether it is still viable to use a nine man section for both crew and dismounts (3+6) when the number of dismounts available to the vehicle is higher (3+8/9). You could in theory throw in the entire nine man section on the Lynx whilst also having a three man RAAC crew with more specialisation. I understand manning issues but it gives more flexibility to the section if it were to deploy without vehicles whilst exploiting the capacity of these larger vehicles.

In regards to your point of incorporating the vehicle at the lowest level, it would not work in the example I just gave as it significantly increase the size of the platoon. Having an IFV TRP within the COY however, as opposed to a SQD at the BN level, may work.

I note all of this with a mid-term outlook. FOC probably won't be reached until the mid-2020's, but it is worth speculating.

 

[Massive]

the training and sustainment burden of whatever is chosen, I hope the Lynx wins

I am agnostic to which platform wins but I would hope that the training & sustainment burden would be right at the top of the list if capability of the platforms is broadly similar.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Massive]

As the entire section is not infantry you can't have the same dismounted capability. Essentially, having specialist IFV crew reduces flexbility.

The flexibility point is well made but I question whether more than three regular light infantry battalions are required.

Assuming the regular army remains at its current size I am comfortable with 3 mechanised and 3 light infantry battalions.

To be honest, if the army was to expand beyond 6 infantry battalions, I would preference adding mechanised battalions over light.

Regards,

Massive

 

[aussienscale]

So just curious as to people's thoughts/opinions and some reasoning behind/Modern armour philosophy ?

Lynx KF-41 around 44t

AS21 Redback around 26t

So to me protection levels between the 2 seem very different, as a layman on armour, so does weight still equal, to a degree, protection ? If that is the case so to speak why would we be looking at an IFV that potentially has less than the CRV we are already building ? With the Boxer at 24t and 38t at combat weight ?

Education appreciated

Cheers

 

[Stampede]

Hi Aussienscale

I think the AS21 is a different animal to the in service and older K21 IFV

Hanwha Defense

I'm not sure if the original armour for the K21 is the same as on the Redback offer.
But the significant growth in weight between the Korean IFV's must hopefully be buying some protection.



Regards S

 

[oldsig127]

So just curious as to people's thoughts/opinions and some reasoning behind/Modern armour philosophy ?

Lynx KF-41 around 44t

AS21 Redback around 26t

So to me protection levels between the 2 seem very different, as a layman on armour, so does weight still equal, to a degree, protection ? If that is the case so to speak why would we be looking at an IFV that potentially has less than the CRV we are already building ? With the Boxer at 24t and 38t at combat weight ?

Education appreciated

Cheers

A cursory glance at photos of the two show little in common between the AS21 and Redback but the fact they are both sold as IFVs. The Redback is supposedly a new design, clearly has a very different hull form and turret, and seven roadwheels each side versus six. Finally, Redback has a published combat weight of 42 tonnes.

oldsig

 

[Massive]

Redback has a published combat weight of 42 tonnes.
oldsig

If you are going to operate the vehicle as a true IFV, the 40t is what you want.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Volkodav]

I wonder if it would be possible for each IFV to have 2 crew and 9 dismounts?

Not sure on the layout and workload of the turrets concerned but I assume the gunner and commander both have access to all systems and can operate the turret on their own? Could it potentially be possible for the gunner to be the vehicle commander (say an experienced Boxer commander) to be RAAC with the dismount commander (and section 2IC) being RAINF but either taking the other seat in the turret? Not ideal but the battalion retains the capability of deploying at full strength, dismounted and the vehicle is still mostly effective without the dismounts. Turret operations could be introduced to corporal subject courses, with the knowledge they will have an experienced RAAC NCO sitting next to them in the turret.

Perhaps the introduction of SPGs will free up enough manpower to cover the increased numbers required to introduce the IFVs?

Just an observation, I have noticed RAAF integrate very well with air RAEME, infact there is less "them and us" between RAAF and RAEME airtrades than there is between air RAEME and ground RAEME. It seems the common work environment and working on the same gear with the same systems leads to better comradery and greater effectiveness than being in the same corps. People living and working together, operating the same equipment, and training to fight together should do ok.

Another thought is, again manpower permitting, infantry and even RAE could provide assault troops to the ACRs to back fill the numbers seconded to crew IFVs and future armoured engineering capabilities. Again, like the seconded RAAC personnel, these would be senior and experienced soldiers in their ECN, able to pull their weight in a new and unfamiliar environment. Detachment commanders would ideally also be from the lending corps and senior in their rank. I would imagine assault troop platoon commander being RAINF or RAE, while each Btn could even have a Rec Platoon crewed and commanded entirely by RAAC (former US National Security Advisor and ACR legend, HR McMaster, started his career as an armoured infantry battalion cav platoon commander).

If this is done properly individual soldiers will not be overloaded with training and excessive proficiencies, but will become very effective at working in combined arms, while excelling in their own professions. In the long term, virtually every senior NCO and officer in each RAAC, RAINF and RAE battalion and regiment, will have served on secondment to one or both other corps during their career. The potential of this could be transformational.

 

[Takao]

I think this plan works as an interim introduction to service, but misses the cultural change we need RAInf to undergo. These beasties need a very different mindset to the traditional, light infantry mindset that permeates so much of our Army. Unfortunately, I've seen it already - my favourite being present for a phone call where a senior RAInf officer, in planning a Corps conference, demanded LAND 400 people attend, but "not talk about that mech crap". I've also seen senior RAInf bang on the desk to make the main gun dismountable and able to be fired off a tripod - "just like the M113s".

In many ways, this is Kiowa to Tiger again. AS4 to IFV needs a cultural change that demands technical aptitude, leans heavily on the RAAC method of training and seeks to inculcate a significantly different approach to fighting. The reality is that light skills can be learnt quickly, mech can't; so the Corps needs to focus on the latter. Unfortunately, RAInf is the only Corps that, overall, doesn't get this. Some do, some are bloody brilliant at pushing it. But they usually don't have the rank or are on the outside.

If the way that the Corps handled AS4 introduction is a guide, the best thing the Australian Army can do for the IFV capability is put it into Battalions, but not let any red lanyard near the doctrine, training or career management. Not fair to all, but at least then the Joint Force will have an IFV capability it can rely on.

 

[ngatimozart]

I think this plan works as an interim introduction to service, but misses the cultural change we need RAInf to undergo. These beasties need a very different mindset to the traditional, light infantry mindset that permeates so much of our Army. Unfortunately, I've seen it already - my favourite being present for a phone call where a senior RAInf officer, in planning a Corps conference, demanded LAND 400 people attend, but "not talk about that mech crap". I've also seen senior RAInf bang on the desk to make the main gun dismountable and able to be fired off a tripod - "just like the M113s".

In many ways, this is Kiowa to Tiger again. AS4 to IFV needs a cultural change that demands technical aptitude, leans heavily on the RAAC method of training and seeks to inculcate a significantly different approach to fighting. The reality is that light skills can be learnt quickly, mech can't; so the Corps needs to focus on the latter. Unfortunately, RAInf is the only Corps that, overall, doesn't get this. Some do, some are bloody brilliant at pushing it. But they usually don't have the rank or are on the outside.

If the way that the Corps handled AS4 introduction is a guide, the best thing the Australian Army can do for the IFV capability is put it into Battalions, but not let any red lanyard near the doctrine, training or career management. Not fair to all, but at least then the Joint Force will have an IFV capability it can rely on.

How do the US Army, USMC, Canucks, & Poms do this? If it works well for them, maybe send these red lanyards off for some hands on hard core re-education. Tell them that if they fail to pass muster, they will be remustered to civilian on their return to Australia. That should encourage a positive change in attitude.

 

[Volkodav]

I think this plan works as an interim introduction to service, but misses the cultural change we need RAInf to undergo. These beasties need a very different mindset to the traditional, light infantry mindset that permeates so much of our Army. Unfortunately, I've seen it already - my favourite being present for a phone call where a senior RAInf officer, in planning a Corps conference, demanded LAND 400 people attend, but "not talk about that mech crap". I've also seen senior RAInf bang on the desk to make the main gun dismountable and able to be fired off a tripod - "just like the M113s".

In many ways, this is Kiowa to Tiger again. AS4 to IFV needs a cultural change that demands technical aptitude, leans heavily on the RAAC method of training and seeks to inculcate a significantly different approach to fighting. The reality is that light skills can be learnt quickly, mech can't; so the Corps needs to focus on the latter. Unfortunately, RAInf is the only Corps that, overall, doesn't get this. Some do, some are bloody brilliant at pushing it. But they usually don't have the rank or are on the outside.

If the way that the Corps handled AS4 introduction is a guide, the best thing the Australian Army can do for the IFV capability is put it into Battalions, but not let any red lanyard near the doctrine, training or career management. Not fair to all, but at least then the Joint Force will have an IFV capability it can rely on.

Yes I've seen a few of those "not talk about that (fill the blank) crap". The army is if anything, very tribal with its command structure based on length of time living and breathing the status quo. Always thought it was the ultimate cheek to force experienced lateral transfers from OS services, that are already doing what we are trying to learn how to do, to drop from SSGT or WO to CPL, or from Major to Captain. In industry if we got people like that we'd make the team lead or manager to get the most out of their experience.

In my experience there is very little recognition or respect for anyone outside of the particular silo they have progressed through, that is until they start hitting ranks with greater forced exposure to all corps training and requirements, i.e. E7/8 and O5. In my reserve days back in the 90s I had no idea of the issue as we all had day jobs so there was a lot more to each of us over and above our military training, while the cadre staff were usually experienced E8s and above. The exception in the full time army seems to be the members who joined at a later age and had a real life before the army, especially those with technical and professional qualifications and experience earned outside army, then again they tend to cop it from the pure grown army types as well. I have never encountered a culture so determined to force people to forget, or at least never mention relevant experience gained else where, it almost like a race handicap, instead of outside skills and experience being seen as beneficial, if they are not specifically itemised in you PD they are never to be mentioned.

Agree on the Kiowa to Tiger analogy, IFV is going to have issues because army is not going to listen to those in the know. I can pretty much guarantee for instance, none of the ex Brit SNCOs with IFV operation / maintenance experience are going to be put into key roles, it will be the Teflon coated "rising" stars who are good at looking good. The best of them will learn by trial and error, eventually muddling through, posting out by the time they get it down pat, the worst will fail and take others down with them (or maybe leave others to take the blame).

A bloke I and others wanted to throttle a year ago has got his stuff together six months out from posting to his next new experience. Another who has left a trail of broken careers behind them is also posting out, ironically I initially thought they were ok, the issues only starting when they were given their own command and their inability to look out for their subordinates became apparent. It really was a case of hands off management, delegating supervision and tasking authority every which way then throwing people under the bus when problems occurred. Technically they never did anything wrong, but that's because they actually did very little. A standout example of this was a digger, who discovered a serious technical issue, being charged for not following the stated procedure (if he had he wouldn't have made the chance discovery he did, which averted a potentially very serious incident). A real leader would have acknowledged procedure hadn't been followed, but a serious issue had been identified, and worried more about fixing the process problem than punishing initiative.

 

[Massive]

misses the cultural change we need RAInf to undergo

I think this is the crux of the issue.

My suggestion of making the dismounts RAAC may be a little radical, but it is this cultural issue that it is targeted at.

The world is moving to heavier formations with greater and greater technology embedded. The idea that an organisation founded on light infantry training should be leading this change makes no sense to me. The mech battalions are going to be dedicated under Plan Keogh - so, in effect, the army will only have 3 light infantry battalions. Does it make any sense to have the army's thinking dominated by light infantry experience when it is no longer the dominant capability in the army?

Regards,

Massive

 

[Bob53]

I touched on the subject of a wheeled SPG few months ago now. An article on the Japanese SPG and an Archer update appear in this months DTR. Defence Technology Review : DTR OCT 2019, Page 1

Putting the sustainment aside for the moment ....I am still wondering about the wisdom of having a tracked vehicle for Australian purposes. While no armoured force logistics tail will be small, it just seems illogical to try and move any number of SPG plus their ammo and supporting cast over 2000kms-3000kms to where they are most probably going to be needed.

 

[ngatimozart]

I touched on the subject of a wheeled SPG few months ago now. An article on the Japanese SPG and an Archer update appear in this months DTR. Defence Technology Review : DTR OCT 2019, Page 1

Putting the sustainment aside for the moment ....I am still wondering about the wisdom of having a tracked vehicle for Australian purposes. While no armoured force logistics tail will be small, it just seems demented to try and move any number of SPG plus their ammo and supporting cast over 2000kms-3000kms to where they are most probably going to be needed.

@Bob53 Why is it demented? Are you implying that the senior leadership of the Artillery and Armoured Corps are mentally deficient and ill suited for their jobs. I strongly suggest that you read back through the thread taking note of what has been said on this subject and specifically by the defence professionals, who have blue tags.

If we follow the line of your argument then the same logic applies to the M1 Abrams tanks. Do we also axe those because they don't meet your criteria? The Archer SPG that you suggest doesn't offer the same level of protect for its crew that something like a SPH2000 does, nor is it able to manoeuvre in the same environment that the Abrams can. Any SPG in Australian service has to be part of an armoured force, so any potential candidate for that capability must be able to fully operate in that environment.

 

[ASSAIL]

I touched on the subject of a wheeled SPG few months ago now. An article on the Japanese SPG and an Archer update appear in this months DTR. Defence Technology Review : DTR OCT 2019, Page 1

Putting the sustainment aside for the moment ....I am still wondering about the wisdom of having a tracked vehicle for Australian purposes. While no armoured force logistics tail will be small, it just seems demented to try and move any number of SPG plus their ammo and supporting cast over 2000kms-3000kms to where they are most probably going to be needed.

I’m not sure that you appreciate the role of the RAN’s two LHDs
These ships are exactly what Army needs to move heavy equipment to where they’re needed whether that be on our northern frontier or overseas.