You don’t add anything to the discussion if you pick individual amphibious operations from the past.I believe Takao raised relevant concerns on aspirations of future amphibious planning this may come back to what the Canberra class were originally purchased for ,were they as disaster relief,and to address previous shortcomings in shipping, and developing a purpose for its incorporation in the fleet is the aim of present acquisitions .
Its easy to look back in historical context and find there are no requirements for future operations in that context , but it seems history is full of situations arising that had no pretext and left people unprepared.
If its believed Australia should not be involved in the acquiring of skills needed for its forces to assail a defended beachhead because it could be too costly perhaps other developed skills that Australia has shown in its military history should be remembered and what that cost actually was..
My father was in the Royal Marines and was involved in the training of U.S troops for d day he told me of them in practice coming ashore and stopping for a brew instead of as the British troops heading inland, times were harder then of course and d day showed the cost of unobtained skills
You could use for example the British landings at Suvla Bay at Gallipoli, where the lack of any action by the landed force, who pitched their tents and had their tea, probably changed the result of the campaign but it adds nothing.
Your criticism of the US troops is trite considering the huge and costly amphibious war effort by them in the Pacific which were the benchmark for all future amphibious operations.
Back to the present, Australia’s CONOPS for amphibious ops is quite clear, we will only participate in peer force contested landings as part of a coalition, that’s the crux of this discussion.