Australian Army Discussions and Updates

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I believe Takao raised relevant concerns on aspirations of future amphibious planning this may come back to what the Canberra class were originally purchased for ,were they as disaster relief,and to address previous shortcomings in shipping, and developing a purpose for its incorporation in the fleet is the aim of present acquisitions .
Its easy to look back in historical context and find there are no requirements for future operations in that context , but it seems history is full of situations arising that had no pretext and left people unprepared.
If its believed Australia should not be involved in the acquiring of skills needed for its forces to assail a defended beachhead because it could be too costly perhaps other developed skills that Australia has shown in its military history should be remembered and what that cost actually was..
My father was in the Royal Marines and was involved in the training of U.S troops for d day he told me of them in practice coming ashore and stopping for a brew instead of as the British troops heading inland, times were harder then of course and d day showed the cost of unobtained skills
You don’t add anything to the discussion if you pick individual amphibious operations from the past.
You could use for example the British landings at Suvla Bay at Gallipoli, where the lack of any action by the landed force, who pitched their tents and had their tea, probably changed the result of the campaign but it adds nothing.
Your criticism of the US troops is trite considering the huge and costly amphibious war effort by them in the Pacific which were the benchmark for all future amphibious operations.

Back to the present, Australia’s CONOPS for amphibious ops is quite clear, we will only participate in peer force contested landings as part of a coalition, that’s the crux of this discussion.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
My criticism as you refer to it was citing my father who was involved in the training of U.S troops at the time in their training in comparison to British for the Normandy landings , he did not claim knowledge of the U.S marines in their training for the Pacific theatre
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Back to the present, Australia’s CONOPS for amphibious ops is quite clear, we will only participate in peer force contested landings as part of a coalition, that’s the crux of this discussion.
Further to this, no one is planning to conduct contested amphibious landings against a peer adversary. Even the US Marines will quietly admit it is not really something they plan on anymore. Weapon lethality and the relative lack of amphibious assets (and will) makes contested landings unfeasible. Which is fine, because the whole point of the amphibious concept, certainly for Australia, is to go where the enemy is not. The amphibious capability provides so many more options for manoeuvre, and increases the problems for any potential enemy by such a degree, that if we are looking at conducting a contested landing we are doing it very wrong.

Indeed, from my viewpoint, the biggest attraction of the amphibious capability for Australia is the options it presents for strategic pre-emption. We can get somewhere before the adversary gets there, and make the whole opposed landing problem his instead of ours. Sun Tzu would approve. The amphibious capability, the emerging GBAD, long-range fires and ground-launched ASM capabilities (along with the extant capabilities the Navy and Air Force bring to the table), makes an enemy penetrating/controlling the archipelago to our north by military means that much more difficult.

If we think of the amphibious capability as simply a means of theatre entry in a replay of D-Day we are missing the boat big time (pun intended).

As an aside, the fact that the Army’s dedicated commitment to the amphibious capability is based in Townsville is proving really handy right now. The small boat platoon from 2 RAR and LARCs from 10 FSB are very busy. I’m just glad I bought a house on the side of a hill.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
One point to remember in amphib discussions, is that whilst all the emphasis is on the maritime surface side of the concept, do not forget that the overall strategy also includes landings by airborne elements deep within the enemy's hinterland, utilising fixed and rotary wing assets. The USAF / US Army / USMC are adherents of this and the ADF has the capability to undertake this type of strategy as well.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
We don't need a maritime / amphibious Brigade. It's questionable if we even need 2 RAR as it is, but who am I to question removing a unit....

The vast majority of landings conducted, ever, have been done with regular Army units. Read Kainmbla's war diary from 1944/45; the majority of units she takes are Army units - some of who Kanimbla is the first time they have seen a boat, landing craft or ship. They do rehearsals along the way. Aphibious is just another dlievery method.

Also, people really need to understand Beersheba / Keogh. They are raise-train-sustain organisations, not warfighting organisations. The Brigade we need will be assembled from 1 / 3 / 6 / 7 / 16 / 17 and others with the C2 element drawn from 1 / 3 / 7. This means that any of our units needs to be able to conduct amphibious operations (emphasised by our region). So a marine Bde would actually undermine our overall flexibility and capability (especially as, generally speaking, marine units are not as capable as land focused units).

Strike one against an amphibious AFV.

With this in mind, it flows that the forces do not need to be amphibious - rather the "bits" that move forces from the ships to the land need to be capable. They need to be able to carry lots and quickly. But they are fundamentally simple, and hence cheap to upgrade as technology increases. It is easier to upgrade a ship-to-shore connector (despite the ADFs best attempts to do otherwise) than an entire AFV or land mobility capability. Fundamentally, a ship-to-shore connector is more flexible than an amphibious vehicle, as it can move more "stuff" in a given period of time. The amphib can swim ashore (yay!), the landing craft can move a better vehicle, then do all it's stores and support in wave 2, 3 and 4.

Strike two against an amphibious AFV.

Now, tactically we need to move from the ship to the land as fast as possible. It either gets more stuff ashore, or allows us to strike from over the horizon and hence keep the ships safer. Amphib vehicles will never move fast. K-21 speed = 3.8 kt; LCM-8 = 9 kts. More than twice as fast. And LCM-8's are slow. LCM-1E go 50% faster again. And if we want to go crazy, a LCAC is 40+ kt. They are all exemplars - but anything that is a displacement hull (which an AFV is the best example of) is slower than other options like planning or hovercraft.

Strike three against an amphibious AFV.

"But Boxer is too big" I hear the cry. "It can't deploy as well". Noting that protection drives size, pending a change in armour technology or better integration of unmanned elements, all AFVs are going to be about the same size for a given protection level. But an amphib needs even more space for flotation. So pick one, an amphib has to be less protected (despite facing the same threats) or bigger (with consequences for tactical movement and deployment in confined areas like a LHD or C-17).

Strike four against an amphibious AFV.

Finally, the cost. We plan on running five 'armoured' fleets: Hawkei, Bushmaster, Boxer, IFV and M-1. They are in addition to three B-vehicle fleets. These things are expensive, and we want to add a sixth? "But it'll be smaller and cost less" I hear. You need a minimum fleet size, look at M-1. So your 40 may not be enough. So your sustainment costs will either be higher, or you cut the other fleets.

Strike five against an amphibious AFV.

tldr: Purchasing an amphib AFV goes against historical knowledge, reduces tactical, operational and strategic flexibility, undermines the basis of the Australian Army's structure, is too big, costs too much and will struggle on the battlefield, taking more losses.

Overall, it's a great example of kit fetish over needs analysis.
Hi Takao and others

Does ARMY have any units other than the special forces on rotation to give government a quick military response option.
Now I get military response could be anything from light troops for HADR to a Heavy Mech force and everything in between, but the question still stands.
If I recall somewhere 3RAR when it was a parachute unit had on rotation a company sized group on a higher state of readiness for deployment.
Now weather it was at a days , week , or months notice I could not say.
But it does highlight a graded capacity for deployment and growth.

What are our options for Tomorrow - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

What are our options in a week - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

What are our options in a month - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

It maybe a broad question but with six ( Seven ) Battalions it would be nice to know that at least one could be deployed relatively quickly.

Interested

Thanks S

PS - Understand Battalion will probably be a combined arms sized force.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Hi Takao and others

Does ARMY have any units other than the special forces on rotation to give government a quick military response option.
Now I get military response could be anything from light troops for HADR to a Heavy Mech force and everything in between, but the question still stands.
If I recall somewhere 3RAR when it was a parachute unit had on rotation a company sized group on a higher state of readiness for deployment.
Now weather it was at a days , week , or months notice I could not say.
But it does highlight a graded capacity for deployment and growth.

What are our options for Tomorrow - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

What are our options in a week - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

What are our options in a month - section / platoon / company / Battalion sized force

It maybe a broad question but with six ( Seven ) Battalions it would be nice to know that at least one could be deployed relatively quickly.

Interested

Thanks S

PS - Understand Battalion will probably be a combined arms sized force.
Yep. DJFHQ / 1 Div has a C2 element on a shorter notice to move, individual elements from 6, 16 and 17 do as well. There is also a Ready Battle Group based on an infantry Bn that rotates through 1 / 3 / 7. That obviously has elements on an even shorter notice to move. As the name suggests, that has mech and other enablers. That can also provide the immediate HQ for a small JTF (allowing DJ's to step up in time).

The RBG trains pretty hard - certainly I knew the RBG I would have followed was superb - if the CO said they could do it we just planned on that occurring perfectly and didn't worry anymore.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Further to this, no one is planning to conduct contested amphibious landings against a peer adversary. Even the US Marines will quietly admit it is not really something they plan on anymore. Weapon lethality and the relative lack of amphibious assets (and will) makes contested landings unfeasible. Which is fine, because the whole point of the amphibious concept, certainly for Australia, is to go where the enemy is not. The amphibious capability provides so many more options for manoeuvre, and increases the problems for any potential enemy by such a degree, that if we are looking at conducting a contested landing we are doing it very wrong.
To a point. And I agree this is the generic Western view.

Having said that, I have come across the same statements and the same reasons as to why there would never be contested amphibious landings again - in 1928 and in 1947. To claim no one is planning may be correct, but we should still have people considering how to do it if we have to. Often, war doesn't allow us to pick and choose what we do.
 

foxdemon

Member
Further to this, no one is planning to conduct contested amphibious landings against a peer adversary. Even the US Marines will quietly admit it is not really something they plan on anymore. Weapon lethality and the relative lack of amphibious assets (and will) makes contested landings unfeasible. Which is fine, because the whole point of the amphibious concept, certainly for Australia, is to go where the enemy is not. The amphibious capability provides so many more options for manoeuvre, and increases the problems for any potential enemy by such a degree, that if we are looking at conducting a contested landing we are doing it very wrong.

Indeed, from my viewpoint, the biggest attraction of the amphibious capability for Australia is the options it presents for strategic pre-emption. We can get somewhere before the adversary gets there, and make the whole opposed landing problem his instead of ours. Sun Tzu would approve. The amphibious capability, the emerging GBAD, long-range fires and ground-launched ASM capabilities (along with the extant capabilities the Navy and Air Force bring to the table), makes an enemy penetrating/controlling the archipelago to our north by military means that much more difficult.

If we think of the amphibious capability as simply a means of theatre entry in a replay of D-Day we are missing the boat big time (pun intended).

As an aside, the fact that the Army’s dedicated commitment to the amphibious capability is based in Townsville is proving really handy right now. The small boat platoon from 2 RAR and LARCs from 10 FSB are very busy. I’m just glad I bought a house on the side of a hill.

Is that really true? China seems to be thinking about a contested landing on Taiwan. So someone is thinking about. Whether they would succeed or not is debatable. Certainly, they would have to isolate the island first and then wear down the defences to give the landing a chance.

I think it is worth bearing in mind that the landings at Normandy and Leyte, though contested, were aimed at where the defences were weakest. No one in their right mind would try an amphibious assault against a strong position, unless they had no other choice and had a huge force available. The Falkland landing was a good example of how best to do it, if at all possible. Land where they are not and consolidate quickly.

The problem with the ADF conducting such assaults is the lack of numbers. Generally a 6 to 1 advantage is needed. So with a single brigade, even an opposing battalion would be too strong without significant force multipliers. With naval gun and air support, plus getting tanks on the beach in the first wave, a brigade could take a battalion. But the scale is small by the standards of peer state wars. That being said, as part of a coalition, every little bit counts. I doubt a USMC commander would say no to an extra brigade.

To my mind the reason for the LHDs is regional operations, as inspired by E Timor. A brigade can achieve a lot in local stabilisation or COIN campaigns. And of course the LHDs are a useful asset for HADR missions.
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Think back to the Falkland island campaign.
The POM's landed a long way from the Argentine defences, and walked a long way to assault them.
Forget Normandy.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Yep. DJFHQ / 1 Div has a C2 element on a shorter notice to move, individual elements from 6, 16 and 17 do as well. There is also a Ready Battle Group based on an infantry Bn that rotates through 1 / 3 / 7. That obviously has elements on an even shorter notice to move. As the name suggests, that has mech and other enablers. That can also provide the immediate HQ for a small JTF (allowing DJ's to step up in time).

The RBG trains pretty hard - certainly I knew the RBG I would have followed was superb - if the CO said they could do it we just planned on that occurring perfectly and didn't worry anymore.
Thanks Takao for the reply

Regards S
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
So the Blackhawks are finally being retired. Will there be extra MRH90 helicopters or is it just shuffling the current fleet? The article also mentions a small SOF helicopter requirement. No mention of the MR60S. I thought that helicopter would be a good choice.

Australia begins SOF helo transition from Black Hawk to MRH90 | Jane's 360
Shuffling the fleet. It'll stay at 47 airframes across five Squadrons. 171 would operate Taipan, 173 would operate the light helicopter (which would obviously be a new fleet).

Australia releases RFI for at least 16 special operations helicopters
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
So the Blackhawks are finally being retired. Will there be extra MRH90 helicopters or is it just shuffling the current fleet? The article also mentions a small SOF helicopter requirement. No mention of the MR60S. I thought that helicopter would be a good choice.

Australia begins SOF helo transition from Black Hawk to MRH90 | Jane's 360
Interesting that Janes are talking about a Helo in the UH-1Y/A109 Class when most Commentators are talking about Helos in the AH-6/A-135 Class. Have to fit 4 into the back of. a C-17. UH-1Y seems doubtful to me.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Interesting that Janes are talking about a Helo in the UH-1Y/A109 Class when most Commentators are talking about Helos in the AH-6/A-135 Class. Have to fit 4 into the back of. a C-17. UH-1Y seems doubtful to me.
Yep looks like they can only fit two, and they have to take the blades off.

 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Shuffling the fleet. It'll stay at 47 airframes across five Squadrons. 171 would operate Taipan, 173 would operate the light helicopter (which would obviously be a new fleet).

Australia releases RFI for at least 16 special operations helicopters
Yes this will be an interesting one to watch.
I have no answers and was originally sceptical about getting an additional helicopter type as I thought the ADF wanted to consolidate and reduce the number of aircraft types in inventory.
Anyway a small helicopter does make sense for many roles as does a modest increase in Taipan numbers.
So what will Army aviation look like in 2025.
Time will tell


Regards S
 

FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
Interesting that Janes are talking about a Helo in the UH-1Y/A109 Class when most Commentators are talking about Helos in the AH-6/A-135 Class. Have to fit 4 into the back of. a C-17. UH-1Y seems doubtful to me.
I'm not sure what you mean by "...UH-1Y/A109 Class..." the UH-1Y is practically three times heavier empty (and at max weight) than the AW109.
The AW109 is really in the same class as the NorthStar 407 MRH (Bell 407) mentioned in the same Janes article, and that of the EC135 you mentioned (which is significantly larger than the AH6 you seem to have "classed" it with)

If Jane's sources are correct, that Bell plans on offering the UH-1Y, it would seem more like Bell is wasting their time and money offering an A/C is seemingly well outside the program's parameters
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
I'm not sure what you mean by "...UH-1Y/A109 Class..." the UH-1Y is practically three times heavier empty (and at max weight) than the AW109.
The AW109 is really in the same class as the NorthStar 407 MRH (Bell 407) mentioned in the same Janes article, and that of the EC135 you mentioned (which is significantly larger than the AH6 you seem to have "classed" it with)

If Jane's sources are correct, that Bell plans on offering the UH-1Y, it would seem more like Bell is wasting their time and money offering an A/C is seemingly well outside the program's parameters
Your points are valid but what I was trying to get at is Janes are way out with the Helos they are talking about. Australia’s req is for a light Helo that can be fitted 4 to a C-17 and there is no way the UH-1Y is going to do that.
The EC-135 is the closest Helo Airbus can put up against the AH-6 and that is why I put them together. The most likely scenario is going to be a AH-6 v EC-135 competition. I think a FMS purchase of AH-6 will look very attractive to Australia.
 
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