That is a rubbish article. If a new subbie presented that to me as article written for professional development, he would get resubmit written across the top in big red letters.
I’ll just quote one sentence from it:
And apparently they may be poor value for likely tasks in the region. Firstly, he hasn’t attempted to articulate what those likely tasks are. He implies that all we are going to be doing is stability ops, but if that is the case we can get rid of half the capabilities in the ADF. A skim read of the white paper would indicate we aspire to far more than the ability to stabilise a pacific nation.
His logic here is at cross purposes. IFVs can’t be both too vulnerable on a modern battlefield, as well as Ill suited to likely tasks because it has too much combat power. It is one or the other.
As t68 has pointed out, he hasn’t actually attempted to offer an alternative, other than a couple of meaningless throw away lines. For example:
Of course, the central logic of this article is applicable to everything else in defence. How much are we spending on JSF? How vulnerable are flying things to emerging technology, and how useful will they be in stability operations in the region? What about submarines? They are hardly going to be useful next time we have to stabilise a pacific nation.
I’ll just quote one sentence from it:
That sentence attempts to sum up two thirds of the article, and it is entirely meaningless. Apparently IFVs may not be survivable in the future because they are vulnerable to ATGMs and tanks. Well, no shit. Everything has been vulnerable to ATGMs and tanks since the 60s. What has changed? By that logic, every single capability that is intended to go into the direct fire zone is obsolete. A dismounted infantryman is far more vulnerable to ATGMs and tanks than IFVs, so I take it we shouldnt invest in them either?So IFVs may not be survivable in a future conventional war, and they may be poor value for the likely tasks the ADF will have to perform in the future in the near region.
And apparently they may be poor value for likely tasks in the region. Firstly, he hasn’t attempted to articulate what those likely tasks are. He implies that all we are going to be doing is stability ops, but if that is the case we can get rid of half the capabilities in the ADF. A skim read of the white paper would indicate we aspire to far more than the ability to stabilise a pacific nation.
His logic here is at cross purposes. IFVs can’t be both too vulnerable on a modern battlefield, as well as Ill suited to likely tasks because it has too much combat power. It is one or the other.
As t68 has pointed out, he hasn’t actually attempted to offer an alternative, other than a couple of meaningless throw away lines. For example:
What are these systems? If he knows of any magic low cost systems that don’t expose soldiers to risk, he should sell them to every nation in the world and make a fourtune. You might as well say the answer is hover tanks. He has a point with the follow up line, that lighter, easier to deploy vehicles might be better, but fails to articulate that, if heavily armoured vehicles are obsolete because they are too vulnerable on a modern battlefield, how could lightly armoured vehicles possibly be a better option?For example, it could allow the army to experiment with low-cost, disposable systems that don’t expose soldiers to risk and can be replaced cheaply. Or lighter, more deployable vehicles better suited for our near region.
Of course, the central logic of this article is applicable to everything else in defence. How much are we spending on JSF? How vulnerable are flying things to emerging technology, and how useful will they be in stability operations in the region? What about submarines? They are hardly going to be useful next time we have to stabilise a pacific nation.