- Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Replacement, 2021–2030, $5bn–$6bn
- Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Assurance Program, 2017–2026, $500m–$750m
I am not sure whether the Assurance Program is progressing but there seems to be a little time ahead of any decision.
As far as replacement options, I wouldn't assume the AH-64 and AH-1 are the only options for consideration for the capability, though they certainly would be strong contenders.
There are other options which could potentially be in the mix, particularly if an Australian build is considered highly desirable (I could easily see a domestic build option for a $5bn-6bn program being politically favourable). For example Leonardo (formerly Agusta-Westland) have provided the locally built TAI/AW-129 for Turkey and have the AW-249 currently in development replace the Italian Mangustas from around 2025.
CAP is required to treat obsolescence issues, if nothing else. That will get Tiger to the PWD. I would also steer away from assuming only a helicopter will fulfil the armed reconnaissance capability, and while an AH-64 is probably the lead contender (especially as Mangusta lost to Tiger and it is unlikely we would take a developmental program again), there should be consideration of a non-inhabited platform as well.
I do agree with you Tod and I think your approach makes a lot of sense. As I have stated previously I personally believe Australian industry involvement is best value in the support and maintenance.
This is the theory - and I believed it in 2007/08. But what has flowed on from Eurocopters involvement in Qld? A handful of EC 120 built there? The regional hub that was to occur has not really progressed - so what long-term benefits has there been?
With the new special forces light deployable helicopter capability from the mid-2020s, I am curious if a FMS of something like the MH-60M (Special Operations version of UH-60M) could be considered.
The last thing the SORW capability needs is a H-60 model. There are other parts that are (a) more needed and (b) contribute to the ADF overall in a better fashion.
As to the future I'm starting to wonder if the battle space is to hot for any type of armed helicopter.
As IFV's are getting larger calibre weapons with smart munitions together with 5 generation SAM's the air space is looking pretty precarious for high end conflict. Maybe the UAV day is already here with troops only flown in only when the area is sanitised or alternatively when conducting low intensity operations.
It is a very pertinent question, that some aspects of AHQ are trying to look at now. FVL has potential to mitigate some of the increased AD capabilities; but the reality is that 2035 - 2040 will be very unhealthy for low level aviation.
If you get the chance ask the operators and those who have worked with the tigers in recent times. Ask about manoeuvrability, flight performance, reliability, ease of maintenance (when the parts are available), survivability (including crash survival), the capability of the systems, the ordinance they can put on target and their performance in the recon role.
What is becoming more and more apparent is the "issues" are pretty much like those of the Collins class. They were an advanced platform delivering capabilities the ADF had not had before that required a lot more time and effort to get them into service than anticipated while the contract and sustainment side of the equation was sadly deficient.
Why were there so many troubled projects in the 90s and 2000s? Was it every single contractor, no matter where they came from or how successful they had been on other projects or was it the gutting of defences engineering capability and its replacement by contractors and a bipartisan belief in Canberra that things could be done on the cheap (despite the lessons of the past)?
The Tiger is not perfect but it is much better than the rumour mill would have you believe.
Yes, Yes and Yes. To all three points. Tiger is a lot better than this forum believes and, other than the smoke and fumes issue in 2012/13, I cannot think off-hand of any pilot or maintainer who wouldn't happily take it to war.
The point about 1990s / 2000s is a very good point that should be part of a separate review that seeks to answer it. But almost every project in that period, across all services, had massive issues. It might actually be worth a proper review...
But we know of the very real problems the Tiger has with it’s sensor systems and inability to exploit the capabilities of it’s main weapon systems. Without off-board targetting a Tiger can’t engage a target at much beyond 2k’s (ie: line of sight) with Hellfire because it’s targetting system is so limited. Compared to a UH-1H Bushranger I’m sure it’s a big step no doubt, but we are comparing it to top of the line modern attack helicopters, not 1960’s era modified utility helicopters... Have you ever heard of such an issue with Apache or UH-1Z? It’s how Tiger compares with the capabilities of these aircraft that is at issue. I’m sure we would have, if they were superior given AH-1Z aircraft have done plenty of live fire training in the NT on the same ranges the Tigers use...
That is the true situation of the aircraft today. I’m sure the operators do like it, in fact we’ve heard the CO of 1 Avn bleating publicly about how good it is and running the company line. How mrvelous it is to fly and how agile it is. Well that is wonderful, except it is supposed to be on le of our Army’s major weapon systems as Raven has pointed out, not a dynamic airshow performer...
That company line will run until the ‘company’ decides to replace the capability and then we’ll truly see how ‘wonderful’ it is...
I have seen AGM-114 shots greater than 2000 m. From a single aircraft doing onboard targeting. And every actual issue bar one that has been raised with Tiger I have seen similar / identical raised with Zulu. In fact, I know of engineering work that the ADF supplied to the USMC to help clear up at least two Zulu technical issues.
Could it be that the company line is correct? After all, we are the operators.