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12. Air Power Generation
(1) After discussing the four roles of air power and the limits of air power, a brief introduction to capability management may provide insight on how a military organisation that employs air power works. Capability management is organized around a concept of operations (CONOPS), because the CONOPS describe how a specified course of action is to be executed. CONOPS can also be defined as the planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over an enemy.The ability to execute the specified course of action depends on the relationship between three key factors, as follows:
For an air force to perform its four roles, we must also look at all three interdependent key factors and the four sub-elements of combat readiness/availability [which includes (a-i) equipment; (a-ii) people; (a-iii) units; and (a-iv) infrastructure]. This means that each factor or sub-element on its own, do not tell the whole story about an air force's capability. Each factor of total combat fleet size or readiness cannot tell us about sortie generation capability. If anyone is really interested in the topic of F-16 operating and support costs, kindly take a look at this June 2006 NPS MBA thesis/report (which relates to Poland's F-16 purchase): "Analysis and Forecasting of Operating and Support costs for F-16 C/D". This thesis/report is a useful starting point for a reader to acquaint himself on the basic support issues discussed in this post.
(4) It is also important not to get certain key terms, like strategy, tactics, battle and CONOPS confused. A reference to strategy, for example, could mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends.
(1) After discussing the four roles of air power and the limits of air power, a brief introduction to capability management may provide insight on how a military organisation that employs air power works. Capability management is organized around a concept of operations (CONOPS), because the CONOPS describe how a specified course of action is to be executed. CONOPS can also be defined as the planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over an enemy.The ability to execute the specified course of action depends on the relationship between three key factors, as follows:
(a) combat readiness/availability;
(b) sustainable capability; and
(c) force structure.
(b) sustainable capability; and
(c) force structure.
For an air force to perform its four roles, we must also look at all three interdependent key factors and the four sub-elements of combat readiness/availability [which includes (a-i) equipment; (a-ii) people; (a-iii) units; and (a-iv) infrastructure]. This means that each factor or sub-element on its own, do not tell the whole story about an air force's capability. Each factor of total combat fleet size or readiness cannot tell us about sortie generation capability. If anyone is really interested in the topic of F-16 operating and support costs, kindly take a look at this June 2006 NPS MBA thesis/report (which relates to Poland's F-16 purchase): "Analysis and Forecasting of Operating and Support costs for F-16 C/D". This thesis/report is a useful starting point for a reader to acquaint himself on the basic support issues discussed in this post.
(2) Air power generation is the ability to raise, train and sustain aircraft generation to ensure continuous launch and recovery of aircraft (or sortie generate). For illustrative purposes, an air force's ability to conduct air power generation can be measured by using two interdependent key factors of force structure and combat readiness/availability [which includes the four sub-elements (a-i) to (a-iv) listed above].Concept Check on the Importance of Currency For Combat:-
9 April 2013 — Air Force officials will begin to stand down active-duty combat units starting April 9 to ensure the remaining units supporting worldwide operations can maintain sufficient readiness through the remainder of the fiscal year... Gen. Mike Hostage, the ACC commander said:
"We're entering uncharted territory in terms of how we've had to take this year's cuts and make adjustments to mitigate the most serious impacts," Hostage said. "Remaining as mission-ready as possible for combatant commanders is our priority, and we're prioritizing spending to ensure this imperative is met."Units that are stood down will shift their emphasis to ground training. They will use flight simulators to the extent possible within existing contracts, and conduct academic training to maintain basic skills and knowledge of their aircraft. As funding allows, aircrews will also complete formal ground training courses, conduct non-flying exercises and improve local flying-related programs and guidance...
Although each weapon system is unique, on average aircrews lose currency to fly combat missions within 90 to 120 days of not flying. It generally takes 60 to 90 days to conduct the training needed to return aircrews to mission-ready status, and the time and cost associated with that retraining increases the longer that crews stay on the ground. Hostage said:
"This will have a significant and multi-year impact on our operational readiness... But right now, there is no other acceptable way to implement these cuts."*The above is an extract of a USAF article: "Air Combat Command stands down units due to budget cuts"
(3) Taking a more holistic view on air power generation by looking at the three key factors and four sub-elements of combat readiness, would tell us more about an air force's capability to: (1 of 4) contest for control of the air; (2 of 4) attack an enemy; (3 of 4) conduct air mobility missions; or (4 of 4) complete its ISTAR mission (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) in support of the air, land or sea campaign. Capability management means raising, training and sustaining in-service capabilities through the coordination of fundamental inputs to capability and it is:Sortie Generation Concept Check:-
In this illustration, the total sorties generated (before attrition) can be calculated with reference to the formula below:
Total sorties = fleet size x combat readiness/availability* x No. of sorties flown per day**.
For example, the Vietnam Air Force (VAF) may have more fighters (estimated to be about 200 fighters for the VAF) than the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) (estimated to be about 120 fighters for the RSAF). However, a force structure comparison of fighters (i.e. using just one of the three interdependent key factors) is not accurate or meaningful if it is simply done by comparing fleet sizes on each side. It needs to factor in combat readiness/availability. Below is a sample calculation made with reference to the formula shown below:
VAF Sorties per day = 200 x 0.5* x 3**Despite its small size, with 5 fighter squadrons (3x F-16C/D squadrons, 1x F-15SG squadron and 1x F-5S squadron - all 5 squadrons are BVR capable), the RSAF as a tertiary air force can generate more sorties (with much more capable aircraft) than larger air forces in South East Asia. In many war scenarios numbers do matter, but it is: (aa) the number of sorties generated by capable and modern platforms; (bb) how these sorties are gainfully employed; and (cc) how well an air force performs at a systems level, that matter in a battle for the control of the air.
............................................... = 300
VAF Sorties in 30 days = 300 x 30
............................................... = 9,000
RSAF Sorties per day = 120 x 0.8* x 4**
............................................... = 384
RSAF Sorties in 30 days = 384 x 30
............................................... = 11,520
The above example contains indicative calculations that are not representative of actual capabilities of both air forces. Conceptually, the above example shows that it is possible for a small air force with a smaller fleet of combat aircraft to out-sortie-generate a medium sized air force by 2,520 sorties over a 30-day campaign period.
(i) not just about the asset/platform alone;
(ii) much more than buying the 'best' or the 'right' equipment to support the asset/platform;
(iii) about training people and units to a certain level of combat readiness in order to execute a plan in accordance with a CONOPS;
(iv) about having the right organisational structure and base infrastructure to support the CONOPS;
(v) about sustainable capability and this includes retaining the technical ability gained by the organisation with the asset/platform acquired; and
(vi) about having the budget to sustain the assets/platforms and base infrastructure after acquisition on the basis of projected through-life costs of the assets/platforms acquired.
(ii) much more than buying the 'best' or the 'right' equipment to support the asset/platform;
(iii) about training people and units to a certain level of combat readiness in order to execute a plan in accordance with a CONOPS;
(iv) about having the right organisational structure and base infrastructure to support the CONOPS;
(v) about sustainable capability and this includes retaining the technical ability gained by the organisation with the asset/platform acquired; and
(vi) about having the budget to sustain the assets/platforms and base infrastructure after acquisition on the basis of projected through-life costs of the assets/platforms acquired.
(4) It is also important not to get certain key terms, like strategy, tactics, battle and CONOPS confused. A reference to strategy, for example, could mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends.
Some Key Terms Defined for Readers
(1) Strategy - The overall concept of using military power to achieve political and/or military ends
(2) Tactics* - The art of winning battles and engagements (and this idea is always tied to a specific area of operations, usually at a lower level of command and against a specific enemy)
(3) Battle - A violent collision of forces at a specific time and place
(4) CONOPS - The planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over the enemy
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Note: *The following definition of tactics may also be used:
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