ADF General discussion thread

[Rock the kasbah]

WHEN THEY COME OVER HERE | ADBR

Mention power projection in Australian defence circles, and the conversation will default to talking about ADF readiness and reach. Fundamentally, it is about when ‘we’ go over ‘there’.But what happens…

adbr.com.au

I will add this older piece for any new members like me who may have missed it
It rhymes with the above mentioned

 

[aussienscale]

This is interesting ! Wonder what the CCP think of this ? either way a very good move on our part and some very good engagement in the region that has been lacking for some time !

Australia-PNG sign $580m port upgrade deal

Cheers

 

[ngatimozart]

This is interesting ! Wonder what the CCP think of this ? either way a very good move on our part and some very good engagement in the region that has been lacking for some time !

Australia-PNG sign $580m port upgrade deal

Cheers

That's great. The next country that will need combined AU-NZ financial help is Tonga. It's into the CCP / PRC for US$108 million which is due in 2024. In 2920 the Tongan requested debt relief from the PRC which was given but the debt still has to be repaid in full in 2024. To do so in time is equivalent to 24% of Tongan GDP. It would be in the defence and security interests of both Australia and NZ if we were to advance the Kingdom of Tonga the funds to repay their debt to the CCP / PRC. We could keep it a South Pacific "family" thing. Something to think about.

Chinese debt a concern in Tonga's post-eruption rebuild | Stuff.co.nz

 

[aussienscale]

That's great. The next country that will need combined AU-NZ financial help is Tonga. It's into the CCP / PRC for US$108 million which is due in 2024. In 2920 the Tongan requested debt relief from the PRC which was given but the debt still has to be repaid in full in 2024. To do so in time is equivalent to 24% of Tongan GDP. It would be in the defence and security interests of both Australia and NZ if we were to advance the Kingdom of Tonga the funds to repay their debt to the CCP / PRC. We could keep it a South Pacific "family" thing. Something to think about.

Chinese debt a concern in Tonga's post-eruption rebuild | Stuff.co.nz

The speed of reply to Tonga was critical ! Was very impressed at how quick ships sailed from NZ, good to see the RAAF has now landed and both the RAAF and RNZAF effort to photograph the islands to start to asses the damage and what HADR assets are required.

Looks like Adelaide is not far from sailing, have you heard anything about any further NZ assets ? Canterbury ?

The BRI debt trap was certainly set, with the PNG announcement that staves off, hopefully and guessing, talk of the CCP interest in Daru, how likely is it that Australia, and maybe NZ pay off the debt and add some investment in Tonga post disaster do you think ?

Lack of engagement over the last decade or so has been appalling, and I think, dare to say, from an Australian POV a little arrogant, is the South Pacific !

Cheers

 

[oldsig127]

The speed of reply to Tonga was critical ! Was very impressed at how quick ships sailed from NZ, good to see the RAAF has now landed and both the RAAF and RNZAF effort to photograph the islands to start to asses the damage and what HADR assets are required.

Looks like Adelaide is not far from sailing, have you heard anything about any further NZ assets ? Canterbury ?

At about 8am this morning marinetraffic tracker showed HMAS Adelaide about 40nm off the Queensland coast. She sailed around 1aam as I understand it.

oldsig

 

[ngatimozart]

The speed of reply to Tonga was critical ! Was very impressed at how quick ships sailed from NZ, good to see the RAAF has now landed and both the RAAF and RNZAF effort to photograph the islands to start to asses the damage and what HADR assets are required.

Looks like Adelaide is not far from sailing, have you heard anything about any further NZ assets ? Canterbury ?

Wellington arrived Thursday night and immediately started surveying and checking the wharves etc. Aotearoa arrived yesterday (Friday) morning. Canterbury is sailing today and should be there on Tuesday. It has 2 NH90 helos, army engineers and plant operators etc., on it as well as supplies and what not. The engineers etc will be able to help with any recovery, building, taskings that the Tongan Govt may request of them. The NZG plans two Herc flights a day with at least one Herc flight heading up today.

The BRI debt trap was certainly set, with the PNG announcement that staves off, hopefully and guessing, talk of the CCP interest in Daru, how likely is it that Australia, and maybe NZ pay off the debt and add some investment in Tonga post disaster do you think ?

I think that both Australia and NZ have to devote considerable resources to Pacific Island aid in order to keep the CCP / PRC out and to help secure the region. However it has to be done in a way that doesn't intimidate or remind the Islanders of colonial times and colonisation. We must be respective and sensitive to their ways and cultures and especially listen to their concerns. Because a certain NZ foreign Minister and some MFAT officials didn't listen closely enough to Micronesian concerns and didn't follow the established PIF Chair selection protocols we now have a Micronesian walkout. They were dissatisfied before but that snub was the straw that broke the camel's back. Now the CCP / PRC are taking advantage of that situation.

Lack of engagement over the last decade or so has been appalling, and I think, dare to say, from an Australian POV a little arrogant, is the South Pacific !

Cheers

Yes engagement from both countries has to improve and it has to be far more than just words. It has to be deeds and substantive actions with long term commitments. Maybe some privileged immigration policies will have to be set aside in both countries. That's going to go down well with certain sections of society.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

The BRI debt trap was certainly set, with the PNG announcement that staves off, hopefully and guessing, talk of the CCP interest in Daru, how likely is it that Australia, and maybe NZ pay off the debt and add some investment in Tonga post disaster do you think ?

Personally I would issue new loans to cover the Chinese ones, but with nominal interest rates and a long repayment period. Otherwise what you're doing is encouraging small states to take out loans they can't repay in expectation FVEY/EU pays the debts off. It also doesn't rule out debt forgiveness later or grants to pay off some of the loans.

 

[Rock the kasbah]

MAJOR PROJECTS | ADBR

A summary of the 2020-21 ANAO Major Projects Report. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) annual major projects report (MPR) provides a useful and detailed snapshot of progress of the…

adbr.com.au

In these reports there is a fair amount of time between IOC and FOC
Does IOC mean the equipment is being handed to the troops as it arrives and FOC mean that everything has been delivered?

 

[John Newman]

MAJOR PROJECTS | ADBR

A summary of the 2020-21 ANAO Major Projects Report. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) annual major projects report (MPR) provides a useful and detailed snapshot of progress of the…

adbr.com.au

In these reports there is a fair amount of time between IOC and FOC
Does IOC mean the equipment is being handed to the troops as it arrives and FOC mean that everything has been delivered?

No it doesn’t.

For example, the RAAF received its first F-35A in early 2015, but IOC was not declared until late 2020 when two Squadrons has re-equipped (one training and one operational Sqn).

FOC for the F-35A fleet is planned for 2023 when the last of 72 aircraft is delivered.

 

[John Newman]

Here’s an explanation of IOC and FOC from the RAAF point of view:

Capability | Royal Australian Air Force

In a military context, Capability is the power to achieve a desired operational effect.

www.airforce.gov.au

Capability

In a military context, Capability is the power to achieve a desired operational effect.

Capability is much more than just the aircraft, or training personnel to operate equipment. Capability describes the optimum combination of the organisation and its required:

• personnel;
• collective training;
• major systems;
• supplies;
• facilities and training areas;
• logistics;
• support; and
• command and management.

Together, they need to be able to deliver a sustained effect, at the right time, in the right way, for an extended period.

When a new capability is introduced, it must first go through a series of phases to ensure extensive testing and operational evaluation before it can be declared a capability.

These phases are known as Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Final Operational Capability (FOC).

The Chief of Air Force is responsible for reporting and declaring IOC and FOC for Air Force capabilities.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

IOC can be declared when one or more subsets of the capability can be deployed on operations. IOC considers the personnel, training, major systems, supplies, facilities and training areas, logistics, support, command and management required to deliver the subset of capability required.

Final Operational Capability (FOC)

Final Operational Capability is declared when the entire capability can be deployed on operations. FOC considers the personnel, training, major systems, supplies, facilities and training areas, logistics, support, command and management required to deliver the full capability required.

 

[Observer27]

MAJOR PROJECTS | ADBR

A summary of the 2020-21 ANAO Major Projects Report. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) annual major projects report (MPR) provides a useful and detailed snapshot of progress of the…

adbr.com.au

Thanks for highlighting this article, it's a great read. Things that stood out to me:

The NASAMS project (LAND 19 Phase 7B) looks like it is well managed, on top of the various risks, and on track for IOC next year. I hope everything goes smoothly for this much needed jump in capability involving significant Australian industry technology.

In contradiction to the alarmist media reporting of the time, there seemed to be no fundamental problems with the Attack class submarine project (SEA 1000) at the time of the audit. Despite apparent celebrations by some defense commentators, I fear the Attack cancellation and AUKUS nuclear submarine "deal" is all marketing and no substance and that at best we will have a major capability gap due to additional delay and reduced fleet size. At worst we will end up determining that nuclear submarines will be not actually be fit for Australian operations after all (for one of many potential reasons such as cost, manning, industry capability, integration, etc.) and have to start a conventional submarine program from scratch again after pissing-off many of the major players. A look at the historic media criticism around both the early ANZAC class ("floating targets" according to Bronwyn Bishop) and Collins class now reveals that both have matured into extremely reliable and capable platforms. The Attack class almost certainly would have too (as should the Hunter class) if not for what appears to have been a politically motivated axing.

Like the Attack class, the Hunter class project (SEA 5000 Phase 1) looks to have no fundamental problems, just the typical bumps along the way that all complex projects experience and need manage. Despite some recent media reports, this does not seem to have changed. I suspect that at worst we may see some cost increases due to more significant design modifications than planned. In the big picture, identifying and addressing these sorts of issues in the design phase is minor compared with encountering them later.

The F-35 project (AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B) looks to be progressing from IOC to FOC but with concerns about aircraft "availability rates" and "acceptable deficiencies". I truly hope these will get ironed out (all our eggs were placed in the F-35 basket long ago) but I personally still worry that for all its proven technical capabilities the F-35 may be a sustainment dud in terms of cost and reliability.

The CRV project (LAND 400 Phase 2) and Collins upgrades (SEA 1439) have minor delays mostly due to COVID. No big deal.

The JORN upgrade (AIR 2025 Phase 6) is running "several years" late and lessons learned suggest "an aggressive schedule developed under competitive pressure proved far too optimistic." This confirms to me that when doing world-leading technology development, advancing the state-of-the-art, using market-based competitive processes can be counter-productive. This is where long-term collaborative technology partnerships should be emphasized rather than bean-counting.

The BMS project (Project LAND 200 Tranche 2) is unfortunately confirmed to be a total mess.

 

[Boagrius]

I think you may be comparing apples and pears there - there is a vast difference in terms of cost, complexity, and overall scope between a fairly modest investment like NASAMs (for example) and some of the other projects listed.

The simple reality is that our strategic outlook is substantially different today to what it was 20, 30 (or, arguably, even 5) years ago, and our capability requirements have changed with it. You probably need to factor this in to your assessment of our current procurement trajectory.

 

[Observer27]

I think you may be comparing apples and pears there - there is a vast difference in terms of cost, complexity, and overall scope between a fairly modest investment like NASAMs (for example) and some of the other projects listed.

The simple reality is that our strategic outlook is substantially different today to what it was 20, 30 (or, arguably, even 5) years ago, and our capability requirements have changed with it. You probably need to factor this in to your assessment of our current procurement trajectory.

I wasn't really doing any direct comparison between projects. Simply commenting on those projects as reported on by ANAO. I see NASAMS IOC as an early step along the crawl, walk, run trajectory in terms of GBAD and eventually IAMD.

I wasn't attempting to make an overall assessment of our current procurement trajectory, but if I were to make one as an armchair amateur it would be that Australia's mostly non-political, capability-based procurement policies have served it reasonably well over the recent few decades of relative peace (only overseas deployments of political choice) and constrained budgets. Where I have concerns, it has usually been because politicians have jumped in to short-cut professional capability-based Defence planning (e.g. the Howard government with M1 Abrams and JSF purchases) for political reasons or industry lobbying (kickbacks?), or because politicians have delayed or cancelled long planned Defence projects for political or budget cutting reasons (the Gillard government with the LAND 17 Phase 2 SPH project, or multiple governments including Morrison's with the SEA 1000 program) without regard for the overall capability gaps they create.

I am in strong agreement that our strategic outlook is substantially different to even a decade ago: our prior assumption of a ten-year strategic warning time for a major conventional attack against Australia was formally dropped in the 2020 Defence Strategic update. With modern acquisition of major systems necessarily taking many years to achieve full operational capability, any conflict is going to be fought entirely with the only the defence force and systems we have at the start and there will be no meaningful upgrade or replacement within operationally significant time frames. For this reason, now is not the time to risk major capability gaps for political marketing stunts that leave Defence scrounging to pick up the pieces.

Don't get me wrong, the general idea of AUKUS as closer alliance on defense technologies is fabulous. But boy do I wished Morrison had announced the US were sharing the B-21 bomber with us to achieve IOC by the mid-late 2020's instead ditching the Attack class for nuclear subs that are decades away if they do actually eventuate.

 

[Boagrius]

Don't get me wrong, the general idea of AUKUS as closer alliance on defense technologies is fabulous. But boy do I wished Morrison had announced the US were sharing the B-21 bomber with us to achieve IOC by the mid-late 2020's instead ditching the Attack class for nuclear subs that are decades away if they do actually eventuate.

Why do you prefer the B21 to an SSN capability? Would it be able to perform the tasks that we need it to, and in lieu of a nuclear submarine no less? Is a B21 purchase actually more practical or viable than an SSN purchase, given that the latter has at least been given the green light by our allies? Would an SSK like the Attack Class even be suitable for our needs going forward? How do you know that the SSN capability is decades away? I'd like to see you flesh out the answers to these questions a bit more.

Ultimately what I am getting at is that many of these capabilities have been matched to the capability we need, not just to guarantee a smooth and hassle free procurement process. I'd suggest that the F35 is a good example of this - while we didn't actually put all our eggs in the F35 basket, as we have ~36 odd Super Hornet derivatives to call upon (including Growlers) on top of it, there is nothing I can see in the ANAO report that would support your concern about it being a "cost & availability dud". AFAIK the USAF F35A's availability rates have been in line with the rest of their TACAIR fleet for some time now, and I'd expect our own to be at least as high given that we don't have to look after any of the more maintenance intensive early-lot birds. I'd suggest that it's actually fortunate that we did not opt instead for one of the other contenders in the AIR6000 project, as their lack of signature reduction, sensor capability/integration and data sharing capability would have made them far less future proof in the context of a PLAAF/PLANAF threat than the Lightning is today...

 

[Todjaeger]

Don't get me wrong, the general idea of AUKUS as closer alliance on defense technologies is fabulous. But boy do I wished Morrison had announced the US were sharing the B-21 bomber with us to achieve IOC by the mid-late 2020's instead ditching the Attack class for nuclear subs that are decades away if they do actually eventuate.

<insert facepalm here>

I will be honest here and state that I think some of the Oz defence "thinktank" contributors, specifically those who seem to think B-21 Raiders in RAAF service by the end of the 2020's or earlier, are IMO either under or over medicated.

Without even getting into all the issues of where a platform like the B-21 Raider would fit into the overall RAAF and ADF force structure, how it would be afforded, or even if the US was willing to sell such a platform to Australia, there are other issues with the idea.

For example, AFAIK there are currently only two such aircraft, and these are both in testing. The expectation (from early last year, no less) is that first flight is expected in the middle of this year, 2022. It was also expected to start entering USAF service c. 2026-2027, with current plans calling for ~100 aircraft minimum, and reaching IOC c.~2030 with the USAF. Given that the USAF might ultimately have a fleet of ~200 B-21 Raiders as they enter service and replace existing strategic aircraft, I could easily see it being a number of years before there might be any available production slots for a hypothetical RAAF order. One thing which is certain though, is that the RAAF could not reach IOC before the USAF.

Those who suggest otherwise are either already aware of this fact and putting forward an impossibility, or are existing in some other reality.

 

[Observer27]

Why do you prefer the B21 to an SSN capability? Would it be able to perform the tasks that we need it to, and in lieu of a nuclear submarine no less? Is a B21 purchase actually more practical or viable than an SSN purchase, given that the latter has at least been given the green light by our allies? Would an SSK like the Attack Class even be suitable for our needs going forward? How do you know that the SSN capability is decades away? I'd like to see you flesh out the answers to these questions a bit more.

Ultimately what I am getting at is that many of these capabilities have been matched to the capability we need, not just to guarantee a smooth and hassle free procurement process. I'd suggest that the F35 is a good example of this - while we didn't actually put all our eggs in the F35 basket, as we have ~36 odd Super Hornet derivatives to call upon (including Growlers) on top of it, there is nothing I can see in the ANAO report that would support your concern about it being a "cost & availability dud". AFAIK the USAF F35A's availability rates have been in line with the rest of their TACAIR fleet for some time now, and I'd expect our own to be at least as high given that we don't have to look after any of the more maintenance intensive early-lot birds. I'd suggest that it's actually fortunate that we did not opt instead for one of the other contenders in the AIR6000 project, as their lack of signature reduction, sensor capability/integration and data sharing capability would have made them far less future proof in the context of a PLAAF/PLANAF threat than the Lightning is today...

Very happy to flesh out answers:

Why do you prefer the B21 to an SSN capability? Would it be able to perform the tasks that we need it to, and in lieu of a nuclear submarine no less? I think you've misinterpreted what I'm saying here, I'm certainly not suggesting a B-21 and a SSN would perform the same tasks or fulfill the same capability role - that would be ridiculous! I was using this as a simple example of a technology transfer under AUKUS that I think would be more useful to us than nuclear submarines.

Is a B21 purchase actually more practical or viable than an SSN purchase, given that the latter has at least been given the green light by our allies? I also understand that as it currently stands SSN's are on offer and B-21's are not, this is the objective situation at the moment, no contest. But would I prefer our government had pushed for B-21's instead of SSNs as the signature technology transfer of AUKUS: yes. Maybe it would never have got traction to be green lit. Maybe the government did push for it behind closed doors. I don't expect to find out.

Would an SSK like the Attack Class even be suitable for our needs going forward? Defence certainly seemed to believe so until very recently and my impression is very much that the switch to SSNs has been far more driven by politics and ideology rather than a genuine cold hard assessment of our capability requirements. I could be wrong about this, it's very hard to know what goes on behind closed doors. But given that SSKs can often be quieter and more stealthy than SSN's (yes, I'm aware of indiscretion ratios and that this is a very complex topic), I think it is highly likely that SSK's would have been suitable for our needs. In my admittedly inexpert opinion, it is highly likely that for cost reasons alone we will end up with fewer SSN hulls than the 12 Attacks we had planned, let's say 8 optimistically. With the potential for the PLA taking actions like "freedom of navigation" cruises of carrier strike groups down the east coast of Australia in the 2030's, would you rather have 8 SSNs or 12 SSKs?

How do you know that the SSN capability is decades away? Decades was perhaps a stretch, but I am confident there will be a significant multi-year delay in us fielding any SSN capability compared with the underway Attack program. To quote from a Department of Defence report published in 2016:

Australia lacks the appropriate infrastructure, regulation guidelines and procedures to successfully build and operate nuclear submarines, and the time required to amass such support systems and skilled people would extend beyond the timeframe for replacement of the Collins class fleet.

I find it unlikely that this has changed in 5 years, even if you consider (the very limited) build elsewhere options.

Ultimately what I am getting at is that many of these capabilities have been matched to the capability we need, not just to guarantee a smooth and hassle free procurement process. I think you'll find we are in absolute total agreement here. I think my first post above fully supports using this model. And I just don't believe that the SSN shift is a genuine example of this.

I also don't happen to think the F-35's were a good example of this: we entered the F-35 program as a "captain's call" decision by PM John Howard immediately after meeting LM execs, not as the result of a considered capability assessment. Would we have ended up selecting the F-35 under the AIR6000 project anyway? Probably, but we may have been able to go into the program with a better definition of the capabilities we needed instead of defining our capability requirements based on the JSF program sales pitch. And once again a political short-cut decision resulted in a capability gap that Defence needed to scrounge around to fill (yes, those the Super Hornets you mentioned). Regarding cost and availability, I did say this was my personal concern, not that it was indicated in the ANAO report, and there has certainly been a lot of discussion about this elsewhere.

 

[Observer27]

<insert facepalm here>

I will be honest here and state that I think some of the Oz defence "thinktank" contributors, specifically those who seem to think B-21 Raiders in RAAF service by the end of the 2020's or earlier, are IMO either under or over medicated.

Without even getting into all the issues of where a platform like the B-21 Raider would fit into the overall RAAF and ADF force structure, how it would be afforded, or even if the US was willing to sell such a platform to Australia, there are other issues with the idea.

For example, AFAIK there are currently only two such aircraft, and these are both in testing. The expectation (from early last year, no less) is that first flight is expected in the middle of this year, 2022. It was also expected to start entering USAF service c. 2026-2027, with current plans calling for ~100 aircraft minimum, and reaching IOC c.~2030 with the USAF. Given that the USAF might ultimately have a fleet of ~200 B-21 Raiders as they enter service and replace existing strategic aircraft, I could easily see it being a number of years before there might be any available production slots for a hypothetical RAAF order. One thing which is certain though, is that the RAAF could not reach IOC before the USAF.

Those who suggest otherwise are either already aware of this fact and putting forward an impossibility, or are existing in some other reality.

Thanks for better clarifying timelines. I was under the misapprehension that the USAF service date of 2026-2027 was actually their expected IOC date and I didn't recheck before posting. I certainly don't think the RAAF could reach IOC before the USAF.

Even with your clarified timelines, I believe that Australia having a strategic strike capability like this would be extremely worthwhile. Of course it would require proper capability and force structure definition. Could it be afforded? That becomes a question of political will. Could we convince the US to share? Isn't this sort of technology sharing the purpose of AUKUS which was the core of my original point (which seems to have been lost along the way).

 

[Boagrius]

I'm certainly not suggesting a B-21 and a SSN would perform the same tasks or fulfill the same capability role - that would be ridiculous! I was using this as a simple example of a technology transfer under AUKUS that I think would be more useful to us than nuclear submarines.

Why? Perhaps we agree that @Todjaeger laid out why this may not be as straightforward as you first thought...

With the potential for the PLA taking actions like "freedom of navigation" cruises of carrier strike groups down the east coast of Australia in the 2030's, would you rather have 8 SSNs or 12 SSKs?

Me personally? I'd go for the 8 SSNs (specifically an Astute or Virginia class) every time, for multiple reasons. Chief among them would be the fact that an SSN has the submerged speed and endurance to keep up with a PLAN CSG at will while an SSK (Attack Class or otherwise) is likely to struggle. It would also have a lot to do with the potential for PLAN SSNs and SSGNs (think Type 095's and derivatives thereof) to frequent our SLOC in the coming decades, potentially bypassing the archipelagic choke points that our SSGs (Oberon, Collins) have historically frequented while en route.

I also don't happen to think the F-35's were a good example of this: we entered the F-35 program as a "captain's call" decision by PM John Howard immediately after meeting LM execs, not as the result of a considered capability assessment. Would we have ended up selecting the F-35 under the AIR6000 project anyway? Probably, but we may have been able to go into the program with a better definition of the capabilities we needed instead of defining our capability requirements based on the JSF program sales pitch. And once again a political short-cut decision resulted in a capability gap that Defence needed to scrounge around to fill (yes, those the Super Hornets you mentioned). Regarding cost and availability, I did say this was my personal concern, not that it was indicated in the ANAO report, and there has certainly been a lot of discussion about this elsewhere.

I'm not sure I follow - do you think the F35 was the right choice but chosen/procured the wrong way? Was it the wrong choice and you believe there was a superior alternative? If it is the latter then I strongly disagree. The only possible alternatives to the Lightning for AIR6000 were 4.5 gen aircraft that would struggle to find relevance in the contested A2/AD environment that is the West Pacific (today) let alone what lies ahead in 10, 20, 30 years time...

 

[old faithful]

say 8 optimistically. With the potential for the PLA taking actions like "freedom of navigation" cruises of carrier strike groups down the east coast of Australia in the 2030's, would you rather have 8 SSNs or 12 SSKs

There were never going to be 12 SSKs in operation at any one time anyway. Probably best would have been 8-9. 1st boat being well and truly retired by the time the last boat was launched. 8 SSNs , (if we have well trained and available crews) would be of much more use.
The B21s , would be great to have, throw in some F22s as well.....

 

[alexsa]

Thanks for better clarifying timelines. I was under the misapprehension that the USAF service date of 2026-2027 was actually their expected IOC date and I didn't recheck before posting. I certainly don't think the RAAF could reach IOC before the USAF.

Even with your clarified timelines, I believe that Australia having a strategic strike capability like this would be extremely worthwhile. Of course it would require proper capability and force structure definition. Could it be afforded? That becomes a question of political will. Could we convince the US to share? Isn't this sort of technology sharing the purpose of AUKUS which was the core of my original point (which seems to have been lost along the way).

I suggest you go back and read some of the material on the decision to go with the SSN and the logic behind the need for a long range high speed submarine that lead to the Attack Class (as SSN's were not an option at that time) in the Australian context.

SSN's are a deterrent and an area denial capability. They occupy choke points, shadow potentially hostile task forces and escort allied ones ..... in addition to the strategic strike capability. The B21 offers just the strategic strike (and some AA self defence apparently).

On your comments with respect to the selection of the F-35, captains call, maybe .... but I understand it was fully supported by defence. Let's face it, what else was available that was not an evolution of a legacy design.

If you are going to argue against current programmes (as you appear to be doing) I suggest your research your subject matter and support it. This is better than simply putting things out there and looking for comment. It also means your posts add value to the discussion even if not every one agrees with your positions.