ADF General discussion thread

[StingrayOZ]

I happen to think @StingrayOZ is incorrect in his reasoning that a future war between the PRC and the US and its allies will be different to the WW2 Pacific War. My reasoning is that the geophysical features haven't changed and the same strategic problems that the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy faced in the Pacific still face the PRC. How to destroy or incapacitate the US naval, ground, and air forces in the Pacific. What is different is the technology.

BTW my views are not definitive. As with WWII there were multiple realistic vignettes or scenarios that could play out. A lot of people thought a direct attack from Japan on Hawaii was impossible/unlikely. Sometimes it came down to an individual choice, weather conditions or just blind luck that a particular scenario came to be.

It is possible to believe one scenario is more likely, but still find other opposite scenarios possible.

I think mainland bombing of Australia with conventional weapons as a regular occurrence is extremely unlikely. Perhaps a shock raid of a juicy target, as we saw with Sydney, and the occasional raids of far off locations like occurred with Darwin.

I agree with Molan. With the idea that Australia is unlikely to be the main target in a major conflict. Bases in the north may be a target, if they heavily used by the US. But the US has many, many bases and Australia, is still very, very far away. While US forces bring with them increase targeting priority, they also bring with them, increase capabilities. I'm not sure Australia needs to focus on simply becoming a fortress on the continent. I see value in our forces being about to be deployed forward and upwards.

Wars always start off as limited wars, and sometimes they end that way. Unlimited war in the modern situation involves global nuclear exchange, if that occurs, there there is very little we can do to stop it or survive it.

China's immediate aims are not global, they are local. Russia has different aims but historically will use any timing to its advantage.

IMO the greater danger for Australia is post a China/US conflict. Realistically that is what we are preparing for. If the next war is likely to happen in the 2025-2030 period, we have missed it for our planning of major items like submarines and frigates. But looking beyond that, the world could be a very chaotic place.

 

[ngatimozart]

@StingrayOZ I agree whatever comes after a US - PRC war conflict may be chaotic indeed. And that would be after a conventional war. Whether or not Australia had any operational naval combatants left would be subject to debate. You pays your money, you takes your chances.

 

[StingrayOZ]

@StingrayOZ I agree whatever comes after a US - PRC war conflict may be chaotic indeed. And that would be after a conventional war. Whether or not Australia had any operational naval combatants left would be subject to debate. You pays your money, you takes your chances.

I guess it depends on how it plays out.
Would there be a strike mostly on the US allies, and then the US? Or the other way around?

Australia is investing extremely heavily in submarines because of their ability to be survivable.

I think its quite probable that Australia would have some Naval combatants left, as most will serve in and around Australia and at the extreme of choke points such as the Malacca straits and in the Northern waters of PNG. IMO Australia is likely to survive at least the initial mass exchange and battles that will happen around China/Korea/Japan/Taiwan. Australia is likely to become a popular base outside of the immediate region, the area of operation is unlikely to extend down to Australia, and if it does it will be short lived and only the extremes of Australia (Darwin? Christmas Island?). There is a limit to the number of extreme ranged munitions fired at extreme range from long ranged platforms.

Australia has strategic depth. Korea, Japan, Taiwan etc don't have that. I would expect those areas to come under heavy attack and frequent bombing and shelling. As would be expected when your within visible distance of the enemy or within unrefueled strike distance.

 

[ngatimozart]

I guess it depends on how it plays out.
Would there be a strike mostly on the US allies, and then the US? Or the other way around?

Australia is investing extremely heavily in submarines because of their ability to be survivable.

I think its quite probable that Australia would have some Naval combatants left, as most will serve in and around Australia and at the extreme of choke points such as the Malacca straits and in the Northern waters of PNG. IMO Australia is likely to survive at least the initial mass exchange and battles that will happen around China/Korea/Japan/Taiwan. Australia is likely to become a popular base outside of the immediate region, the area of operation is unlikely to extend down to Australia, and if it does it will be short lived and only the extremes of Australia (Darwin? Christmas Island?). There is a limit to the number of extreme ranged munitions fired at extreme range from long ranged platforms.

Australia has strategic depth. Korea, Japan, Taiwan etc don't have that. I would expect those areas to come under heavy attack and frequent bombing and shelling. As would be expected when your within visible distance of the enemy or within unrefueled strike distance.

Whilst I say that we have to look at the history of WW2 PTO to see how a new Indo-Pacific conflict will most likely look, you have to remember that the technology available to the combatants is significantly different. Line of sight engagement is no longer as dominant as it once was with BVR capabilities enabling both the detection and accurate targeting of enemy targets. So I would advise caution in your assumptions that Australia will not be directly targeted beyond a limited number of attacks. Darwin was more than a series of random attacks. The Darwin raids weren't just a hit and run like the Sydney raid.

We cannot assume that any direct action against Australia will be in the form of random attacks on the periphery. We must assume that there will be a concerted series of attacks on the mainland by various means. To do otherwise would be a strategic mistake. It may not happen that way but we have no guarantee that it will.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Whilst I say that we have to look at the history of WW2 PTO to see how a new Indo-Pacific conflict will most likely look, you have to remember that the technology available to the combatants is significantly different. Line of sight engagement is no longer as dominant as it once was with BVR capabilities enabling both the detection and accurate targeting of enemy targets. So I would advise caution in your assumptions that Australia will not be directly targeted beyond a limited number of attacks. Darwin was more than a series of random attacks. The Darwin raids weren't just a hit and run like the Sydney raid.

By the time the Darwin attacks started to occur, the enemy was in Indonesia and PNG and building bases there. They had already knocked out all the other major regional powers. China, the US, UK, France, the Dutch. They had sea and air control in the pacific.

Making strikes against Australia until you have pushed out too it, is extremely high risk. It leaves open your supply lines and transits as easy targets. Australia isn't a densely packed target. By the time you have pushed out to it, you now have a huge amount of porous territory to administrate and control, before you even start wrestling with Australia.

I can foresee scenarios where that is possible. If the US makes some sort of agreement to leave the Pacific, then other countries would quickly capitulate. Or if the US is occupied elsewhere or internally with political or economic problems. Everyone will likely quickly try and strike their own deals, as soon as they can. Australia might be a longer, lone hold out.

Then we would be very much be wide open to attack. Very much on our own, and China might not be as distracted by the other powers as we had hoped.

In the end a mid level economy with ~25m people would very much struggle in pushing off the might of the worlds largest economy, a billion people and ~30%+GDP. Not with Australia spending ~2% GDP.

To become a nation that could seriously deter China on its own, defence spending would have to be sustained at ~5%.

Even with all the wacky high end defence procurement, Australia is barely keeping it above 2% and it might even slide backwards.

Defence budget climbs to $44.6 billion | The Strategist

The 2021–22 budget was a ‘no surprises’ one for Defence. The government set out its plan in the 2016 white paper, reaffirmed it in last year’s defence strategic update and is now providing Defence with ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Future spending seems likely to vary over different areas and new capabilities.

AUKUS sets a better direction for Australia’s defence | The Strategist

Amid the flags and fine words announcing the arrival of AUKUS, no one should mistake the reality that the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia each have their own desperate need for this quasi ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

White and others have outlined how Australia come become a much more difficult player.

ASPI chief counters with scathing response to White’s ‘How to defend Australia’

Debate is well and truly ablaze as ASPI Executive Director Peter Jennings has issued a scathing response to Hugh White's latest book 'How to Defend Australia' which identifies a stark shift in Austral

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Hugh White’s plan for defending Australia simply isn’t viable | The Strategist

How to defend Australia sets out four strategic objectives for Australian forces: defending the continent, securing the neighbourhood, supporting maritime Southeast Asia and preserving the wider Asian balance. To achieve this, Hugh White proposes a ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Australia isn't blind to the possibility to facing a fairly direct and focused attack from China. Its just that isn't our primary game plan at the moment. We are trying to bring everyone else along for the ride.

Certainly Australia sees itself as an essential political player in opposing China. As a nation that has deep connections to the US and very large connections to China, both see Australia as a key regional influencer.

Even if Australia does develop strong independent capability, that doesn't mean Australia will slip into the US's shoes and the world will operate the same way. Australia will have to change who it is, and a lot of regional countries may become very concerned at that. An ultra nationalist, nuclear armed, belligerent, aggressive, active, Australia. The umbrella of Pax Americana will end and it will be filled with a harder edge partisan provincialism.

Everything has a cost.

 

[ngatimozart]

I am not talking about Australia slipping into America's shoes etc. It's basic strategy. Australia is in a strategic location, is a major American ally and if the Americans are neutralised in the Western Pacific, then Australia will be a logical rebuilding and stepping off point for allied recovery of Western Pacific territorial losses. That makes you a prime target whether you like it or not. It's then old adage of preparing for the worse and hoping for the best.

I am not suggesting that you spend 10% of GDP on the defence of the Australian homeland, but I am suggesting that you don't ignore the possibility that you will be subject to attacks that may be destructive. You cannot bet your farm on wishfull thinking that they will be an annoying pinprick because you don't know that. What happens if it is a tactical nuclear strike? Or series of nuclear strikes? Do you have anything in your planning for that and dealing with the effects of it? Something like that will place an immense strain upon both the military and civilian authorities and infrastructure. Even a major strike using conventional weapons will do that. These are things that you have to think about because it's not just platforms and missiles, but also in what context and how they will be used. It's also about the possible impacts such attacks can have on the political, military, and civilian population and infrastructure, and how you are going to deal with it. What can you do to mitigate it? What defensive requirements do you need to do; strategically, militarily, politically etc. This is where a comprehensive National Security Strategy is vital.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Australia still has some cold war era planning and infrastructure in this space.

There is a huge bunker in the Sydney CBD, assessible through St. James station. Every high rise building in Australia has extensive underground carpark areas. Buildings in Australia are typically quite strong, with brick, or double brick being quite popular and steel frames and steel roofs. Australia high standards for flammability and bushfire preparedness probably are massive strengths in this area. Many homes have tank water. RFS/SES are exactly the sort of civilian organisations to deal with this on the ground. Our telecommunications networks are being upgraded to be more survivable of bushfires and outages. Older telecommunication infrastructure was very robust. Old exchanges etc were very solid buildings.

Older military facilities often have hardened aspects to them. Newer ones tend to be a bit more fragile. However, they are all designed to withstand bushfires and cyclones. Australia has a large network of widely dispersed bases. Melbourne is closer to Antarctica than it is to Darwin.

Most government buildings are overbuilt. Parliament house in Canberra is probably one of the most survivable places of government. With masses of steel, concrete, and built essentially underground.

In terms of active protection, its impossible to protect the entire continent. However, the continent has taken nuclear hits before. The reasons nuclear weapons testing was stopped at Emu fields was it was "too remote for nuclear testing". If they targeted JORN or the US communications base, few would know strikes have even occured.

Sydney would likely be protected from what ever was in FBE. Perth by FBW. There is talk about having some sort of fixed capability in Darwin.

https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/foi-log/foi-2017-262-redacted.pdf

Australia must prepare as China’s coercive capabilities draw closer | The Strategist

In a recent Lowy Institute paper, the Center for New American Security’s Thomas Shugart warns that China is building up its military capacity to coerce Australia directly, particularly in the event of US strategic retrenchment ...

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China’s new islands and missiles have changed our regional strategic balance.

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Either one Aegis ashore, or two or more THAAD. IMO If you were to put Aegis ashore in Australia, Darwin/Tindal are would be the location.
While I am not really into hardened aircraft hangars in Australia, Tindal is probably the only location that merits them, as its likely to become a very important hub in war time, and is the closest major base to China and her interests.

However, there is a lot of other base infrastructure to upgrade as well, all round the country. Typically that is how we have mitigated risk, through multiple bases far apart.

However, Australia is still very far away, very spread out and very low value targets. Very few missiles could reach Australia. Essentially no Chinese aircraft unless they are landing and refueling in Australia (even then its transport and similar). Most of the targets in Australia are further than continental US targets from China. Why target Sydney, when you could target the Boeing factory in Seattle? Why target Tindal when Guam/Hawaii is right there?

Australia is at that awkward range where its beyond most of their missiles, except their extreme range ones. Those extreme range missiles would be for high prize targets.

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The People’s Republic of China is in the process of building and deploying a sophisticated and modern missile arsenal, though one shrouded in secrecy due to intentional ambiguity and unwillingness to enter arms control or other transparency agreements. Beijing features its missiles most...

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While China has some longer range missiles there are 10's of them and are ICBMs. Some other long range missiles are in development DF-31 (some ~25 launchers of all types and mods operational).

Things may change, but for the moment, Australia has some strategic depth. Closer countries are not in that situation. Australia is physically as far away from China as western Europe is. Italy and Greece are easier targets for Chinese attacks that even Darwin is.

 

[StingrayOZ]

News.com.au has a fairly trashy story but some interesting elements..

‘Real concern’: Warning over China attack

There is “real reason for concern” over China’s growing threat to Guam, Hawaii – and Australia – the US deputy secretary of defence has warned.

www.news.com.au

Fortress Australia?

Mr Shugart says Australia’s most vital interests are likely to remain secure for the next five to eight years.

“This is because, for the most part, Chinese military power remains hemmed inside the First Island Chain, with other adversaries to worry about before it could reach and assault Australia’s vital interests,” he writes.

Any likely conflict would be to support like-minded Asian democratic partners and the United States,” he adds, conceding this would expose WA and Northern Territory bases and facilities to attack.

These would be limited, he states, due to distance and Beijing likely already having “its hands full with US and allied air and sea power within the region”.

But everything changes once the United States is removed from the equation.

“China appears to be building a force specifically intended to be able to eject the US military from the western Pacific by force, to stare it down in a crisis, or to encourage the United States to step away from its current commitments due to overstretch, defeatism, or frustration with allies,” Mr Shugart warns.

That, he says, could leave Australia and others open to coercion.

 

[spoz]

Interesting article here on AUKUS form the US perspective: Panel: Pacts Like AUKUS Agreement, Quad Key to Countering China in the Pacific - USNI News. Particularly interesting is Admiral Harris's comments three quarters of the way down that "AUKUS, on the other hand, emphasizes the military in the agreement. With that in mind," Harris added, “we expect to be able to put a nuclear submarine with Australian colors [to sea] within a decade." Harris, a former CINCPAC, may well have some insights not generally available.

 

[Boagrius]

“we expect to be able to put a nuclear submarine with Australian colors [to sea] within a decade."

What a win that would be. Here's hoping it comes to pass!

 

[ngatimozart]

Interesting article here on AUKUS form the US perspective: Panel: Pacts Like AUKUS Agreement, Quad Key to Countering China in the Pacific - USNI News. Particularly interesting is Admiral Harris's comments three quarters of the way down that "AUKUS, on the other hand, emphasizes the military in the agreement. With that in mind," Harris added, “we expect to be able to put a nuclear submarine with Australian colors [to sea] within a decade." Harris, a former CINCPAC, may well have some insights not generally available.

The other interesting point that Adm. Harris made was:

"The Biden administration made the correct move “right out of the chute” when it took office, putting new emphasis on alliances and diplomacy, Harris said during the panel discussion.​

​

“The Quad is not NATO, will never be NATO,” Panetta said. But like NATO, it can expand. Harris said the Quad’s size does not necessarily have to remain static at four members. “I liken it to American college football, the Big Ten with 14 teams, Big 12 with 10.”​

​

He suggested that the four agree on a secretariat to act as a gatekeeper as to who should be members."​

He's suggesting that the QUAD grow and he understands that a NATO type organisation will not work in the Indo-Pacific, but an organisational structure should be stood up to facilitate the development of the QUAD beyond its current membership.

This I believe is an excellent suggestion and would be an incentive for some countries who aspire to join the QUAD, to develop their defence and security capabilities to a minimum level that the QUAD would determine. The NATO requirement of 2% of GDP expenditure on defence could be on determinant with no exceptions.

 

[vonnoobie]

Interesting article here on AUKUS form the US perspective: Panel: Pacts Like AUKUS Agreement, Quad Key to Countering China in the Pacific - USNI News. Particularly interesting is Admiral Harris's comments three quarters of the way down that "AUKUS, on the other hand, emphasizes the military in the agreement. With that in mind," Harris added, “we expect to be able to put a nuclear submarine with Australian colors [to sea] within a decade." Harris, a former CINCPAC, may well have some insights not generally available.

I guess it depends on how in the know Harris is. If he has in depth knowledge of the back room talks and plans then maybe we will have a boat in the water within a decade however also possible he is speaking from US experience between their time of ordering and commissioning a boat.

As it is I think the time frame should be taken with a grain of salt no matter who says what, got one guy in the US saying a decade but GoA has publicly stated before 2040 so their is a decade gap between them. We may be able to theoretically get a boat in the water within a decade of ordering them but that would require plans to be fully hashed out and that's a few years yet so best case early/mid 2030's and that would be with greater US/UK content and gradually expanding Australian content but that is just conjecture on my part.

 

[hauritz]

There is a long game and a short game. Submarines and frigates are capabilities that are decades away. Submarines in ten years sounds optimistic and I think it is only achievable if we either lease, or the US give us their place in their production line. This doesn't really achieve much because it wouldn't really expand the overall allied submarine numbers. There is a chance that the US could increase its tempo of submarine production but I haven't really seen any evidence of that happening.

While submarines and frigates are obviously worth pursuing I think we need to look at what we can achieve in shorter time frames as well. I think projects like loyal wingman and manufacturing our own missiles are a good start.

 

[alexsa]

There is a long game and a short game. Submarines and frigates are capabilities that are decades away. Submarines in ten years sounds optimistic and I think it is only achievable if we either lease, or the US give us their place in their production line. This doesn't really achieve much because it wouldn't really expand the overall allied submarine numbers. There is a chance that the US could increase its tempo of submarine production but I haven't really seen any evidence of that happening.

While submarines and frigates are obviously worth pursuing I think we need to look at what we can achieve in shorter time frames as well. I think projects like loyal wingman and manufacturing our own missiles are a good start.

Yet again you assume the US submarine is the way the GoA will go. This not certain. There may be grounds for optimism but I doubt that we will hear any detail until they are good and ready.

For my own edification, just how do you see us leasing a US boat when you consider:
1. They are pushed to fill their own needs
2. The vessels you are looking to lease with be the USN fit and there is very likely to be gear on board that would not be available to the RAN irrespective of how close Australia and the US are.
3. Second hand LA's do not appear to be an option without a refuel ..... which is very expensive.

 

[hauritz]

Yet again you assume the US submarine is the way the GoA will go. This not certain. There may be grounds for optimism but I doubt that we will hear any detail until they are good and ready.

For my own edification, just how do you see us leasing a US boat when you consider:
1. They are pushed to fill their own needs
2. The vessels you are looking to lease with be the USN fit and there is very likely to be gear on board that would not be available to the RAN irrespective of how close Australia and the US are.
3. Second hand LA's do not appear to be an option without a refuel ..... which is very expensive.

Actually I don't see leasing as an option. I was merely responding to the idea of nuclear submarines within ten years. Personally I think Australia needs to accept that the nuclear submarine option is something that could be achievable in 20 years and instead we should focus more on what can be done to boost our capabilities over the next 5 years. I actually agree with all your points about leasing old nuclear subs and would recommend avoiding them like the plague.

To some extent I think nuclear subs are an unnecessary distraction at this stage.

 

[old faithful]

So if subs are 20 odd years away, frigates as well, then we t fill the gap in other ways.
Area denial. That to me means aircraft, like.more P8s, maybe a couple of MRTTs, , loyal wingman and long range stand off missiles. Maybe move the land based version along a bit quicker.
We need to maintain a credible deterent.

 

[Takao]

We have a credible deterrent?

Not a dig at you old faithful, Russell has the same issue. But who are we deterring, and how?

And with that in mind, what does a couple more aeroplanes do? Note that with the full compliment of conventional USAF + allies, the Taliban wasn't deterred by a single day. or action.

I get this is a trick question, after all we throw the term around but generally step on those who ask "what, specifically, does that mean?", but it's something I'd dearly like our 'think-tanks' to focus on instead of kit.

 

[hauritz]

Australia's most important role in any potential war against China will be to operate as a base of operations for the US. Area denial could be crucial in that sort of operation. More importantly though we should be building bases and ports. We would need to be able to provide facilities for hundreds of aircraft and ships and perhaps hundreds of thousands of troops.

 

[alexsa]

Actually I don't see leasing as an option. I was merely responding to the idea of nuclear submarines within ten years. Personally I think Australia needs to accept that the nuclear submarine option is something that could be achievable in 20 years and instead we should focus more on what can be done to boost our capabilities over the next 5 years. I actually agree with all your points about leasing old nuclear subs and would recommend avoiding them like the plague.

To some extent I think nuclear subs are an unnecessary distraction at this stage.

On what basis to you suggest 20 years when the utterances do not support this and our current submarine force would be lining up for a second LOTE if that was true. Area denial beyond the Australian coast requires a submarine force and requires it to be capable.

Your suggestion that 20 years is all that we can hope for (noting you have provided no evidence to back up why you assume this) and disregard of the impact submarines have in forward power projection and the utterances made by the GoA. Failure to maintain this capability would be the most significant defence failure in recent history and will reflect on those parties that permitted it to happen.

I would also note that Loyal Wingman and missile production are project are projects that are currently in place and being funded. Are you suggesting that funding for the frigate and SSN's be redirected there to expand this capability?

If that is the case I suggest that is a very poor option.

 

[ngatimozart]

Australia's most important role in any potential war against China will be to operate as a base of operations for the US. Area denial could be crucial in that sort of operation. More importantly though we should be building bases and ports. We would need to be able to provide facilities for hundreds of aircraft and ships and perhaps hundreds of thousands of troops.

Is it? What happens if the US isn't in a position to do all as you suggest? What does Australia do then? Think about it. The US isn't anywhere as capable militarily or industrially as it was 30 - 35 years ago.