I think you have to split being anti-defence with fear of big challenging risky projects. And if there is any money in the kitty.
Australia generally, has a project, then something gets acquired, or is attempted at being acquired. A purchase is signed off, and there is a serious attempt to actually get that capability. Doesn't always work, or work well, but there is a genuine attempt to actually get things.
Canada and NZ start to drift off IMO into the never never programs, where there are not serious acquisitions or extremely compromises acquisitions are made, and capability is quite happily left to evaporate. A program may be created, but there may not be any impetus to actually order and gain real capability out of it, or there is no momentum after a change of government. Sometimes a program just ties itself into knots and much much lower capability is perhaps eventually realized and sold as meeting the original intention.
Canada and NZ IMO can elect to be more insular. Australia that is harder to do, because ultimately the buck stops, and we either can't let it go, or it starts to concern Australia in different ways. Even during continental defence doctrine and being insular, Australia was heavily disappointing in finding out how and what that means in terms of the UN and what happens on the ground.
Most of Australia's defence acquisitions criticism, is:
- we are either not getting good value for money - This is a perpetual discussion and could be healthy. We should always strive for value and efficiency. Programs with vague or indeterminant outcomes result often in poor measures of value.
- They aren't happening fast enough. Which is somewhat connected to the former, but is a different point. Great value and capability are useless is there is a gap of capability, or late delivery. What capability sounded great 20 years ago, may be out of date by the time of FOC. Often this is based on poor planning/execution by the government, but can be managed through a project. The best time to plant a tree is 25 years ago. The best time to start a submarine program is 20 years ago and not stop it. Interim programs can cover gaps if you can see it early enough and have funds and resources to fix it in time.
IMO Australia needs to look at what it will be fighting the war in 2025-2030. Timeframe. Beyond that, sure plan and address and work towards, but the focused at some point needs to sharpen to the here and now. Keeping existing kit up to spec, sometimes you have to compromise a bit on your long term capability to get better here and now capability.
In many domains, technology is changing things, and its a guess at how fast. IMO the RAAF and the RAN have some programs that just not going to meet the threats we are likely to meet in the short term. The ADF might want to push other programs to improve the near future capability.
NZ, Canada and the EU nations generally seem to have a very low priority for defence issues. For the EU, the problem is complicated, there are nations far away from where threats are likely to come, and its layered under NATO, US, Franco/Anglo power. Questions about Germany handling its military threats. Canada has a similar problem, it doesn't feel there are threats it is likely to have to meet on its own, or even make significant contributions to, its role in NATO and NORAD is a bit confused or perhaps undervalued. NZ is small and far away, many feel any contribution would be limited at best.
The NZ thing I struggle the most to understand. From an Australian perspective, any NZ contribution is a game changer. A single platoon can make a difference and be significant. We are keen to develop capabilities in allies, or even mere acquaintances, because even a small contribution can have significant repercussions.
From Australia's perspective, China has our full attention and concern. I am not sure how other nations read the situation, but everything China does with Australia, it does get our total attention. It appears other countries have less intensive relationships and assess the threat very differently. All sides of politics in Australia basically acknowledge this, and voters acknowledge this.
Often this is assumed from outside observers that Australia will stand directly with the US, against China. This isn't quite the case. I think recent chaos in the US have Australians generally less pro about Australia being part of the solution here. While the alliance is strong, particularly with older Australians, realistically, in a Taiwan example, how and what will Australia contribute?
China’s aggressive stands and the sharp deterioration of the bilateral relationship are flowing through strongly to produce record negativity by Australians towards our biggest trading partner.
theconversation.com
Australians see a conflict brewing, but one that is far from Australia, but likely to involve our allies and trading partners. People like Jim Molan think its absolutely imminent. Its the chaos before, during and after people are worried about. I am curious that those in NZ and Canada aren't concerned about those aspects.
Given recent developments in the past few years, the hawks seem to have generally been right.
Almost on any given day you can find some pretty disturbing news on developments.
China is building a sprawling network of what appear to be intercontinental ballistic missile silos in its western desert that analysts say could change the equation for US military planners in Asia.
edition.cnn.com
I am always surprised such news does not seem to worry low spending western nations, like NZ and Canada.
