ADF General discussion thread

[StingrayOZ]

In 2000 Australia was effectively self sufficient in oil and petroleum production (we traded different oil products but over all it was about even).

We have since closed:
Clyde Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)
Port Stanvac Refinery - Wikipedia (SA)
Kurnell Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)

All that is left is in WA:
Kwinana Oil Refinery - Wikipedia (WA)

NZ also has one refinery.

Australia has a number of oil and gas fields (~4000 billion cubic metres) around it, and absolutely massive coal reserves, Australia also has significant shale reserves (58 billion barrels). We don't have much easy and cheap crude oil anymore.

Australia doesn't have to be oil deficient. Some countries have coal to oil capabilities (South Africa comes to mind). Its not just about transportation oil, but the whole petrochemical chain that comes with it, road tar, plastics, paints, thinners, fertilizers, lubricants etc. Once oil isn't used for personal transport these other uses will still have to be filled.

The only logical place for strategic fuel reserves currently is WA. However, It would seem logical to establish a coal to x capability on the east coast (which has tremendous amounts of coal) and have some small scale refining capability. Logical site for this is a ex-powerstation with attached coal mine. As electric, coal, water infrastructure would already be in place. While often energy expensive, solar/wind are very cheap sources and these could be used almost for free during peak production periods. This could also be located a significant distance from the coast, making it a more difficult military target. You could also then have some disperse storage/delivery capability connected by pipeline. IMO government should do an evaluation of this and either rule it in or out.

Military fuel use is fairly insignificant. Australia has a small military and a small number of high expense platforms. Particularly for the Airforce. Fuel security is a greater issue for the wider industrial and commercial and transportation sectors. In a crisis, you would imagine the government would reserve supply for the military and emergency services.

 

[Beam]

In 2000 Australia was effectively self sufficient in oil and petroleum production (we traded different oil products but over all it was about even).

We have since closed:
Clyde Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)
Port Stanvac Refinery - Wikipedia (SA)
Kurnell Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)

All that is left is in WA:
Kwinana Oil Refinery - Wikipedia (WA)

NZ also has one refinery.

Australia has a number of oil and gas fields (~4000 billion cubic metres) around it, and absolutely massive coal reserves, Australia also has significant shale reserves (58 billion barrels). We don't have much easy and cheap crude oil anymore.

Australia doesn't have to be oil deficient. Some countries have coal to oil capabilities (South Africa comes to mind). Its not just about transportation oil, but the whole petrochemical chain that comes with it, road tar, plastics, paints, thinners, fertilizers, lubricants etc. Once oil isn't used for personal transport these other uses will still have to be filled.

The only logical place for strategic fuel reserves currently is WA. However, It would seem logical to establish a coal to x capability on the east coast (which has tremendous amounts of coal) and have some small scale refining capability. Logical site for this is a ex-powerstation with attached coal mine. As electric, coal, water infrastructure would already be in place. While often energy expensive, solar/wind are very cheap sources and these could be used almost for free during peak production periods. This could also be located a significant distance from the coast, making it a more difficult military target. You could also then have some disperse storage/delivery capability connected by pipeline. IMO government should do an evaluation of this and either rule it in or out.

Military fuel use is fairly insignificant. Australia has a small military and a small number of high expense platforms. Particularly for the Airforce. Fuel security is a greater issue for the wider industrial and commercial and transportation sectors. In a crisis, you would imagine the government would reserve supply for the military and emergency services.

There was also a shale oil refinery at Glen Davis between Lithgow and Mudgee in NSW which supplied much of our ww2 oil needs. It closed in 1952. There's still plenty of oil shale there, it just became uneconomical.

The plant is in ruins, but I think it should be possible to rebuild it is the strategic situation warranted it.

 

[Wombat000]

I can see how at this time, and perhaps into a longer period, military applications need established fuel types.
I'm unsure whether present generation evolving fuel options are sufficiently reliable in the military context.

I also can see how in extreme events, govt will ration fuels to support the military & essential services.
But what is an 'essential service'?
Is it farmers that require fuel to harvest?
Is it truckers, who need to move the food so the population get fed?
Is it fuel required to move large amounts of coal to to a central location, to burn just to light a light bulb?
Is it the utilities services to maintain water infrastructure?
Thats additional to the emergency services & their staff movts.
What about pacifying rebellious citizens who now have to walk everywhere, is it essential to cater for them?

I'm unsure simply 'reactivating' industrial relics, or fashioning solutions on the fly, once pressure is already applied is realistic.
Lead times and logistics to active anything useful should be reckoned in many months/years, what happens in the meantime?
The nation is a similar size to continental Europe. Having a few old piecemeal sites won't have much impact as the product needs to be disseminated, that itself a drain on resources.
Quick solutions are fantasy.

Generally speaking, the wider and faster the population is weaned off fossil fuels the stronger the nation will be strategically.
If so,
The military will get greater lion share of the limited fuels, without disadvantaging the rest of society.
Instead of having power sites being centralised in a huge target box, power would be generated and stored in a diffuse network, much more resilient to interference.

Whilst the nation as a collective is tied to long supply chains, as an island nation we are in a tenuous bind.
It would be better if the biggest user of fossil fuels, in the interim, was predominately the military.

 

[ngatimozart]

How was the fuel rationing determined during WW2? Here in NZ most of the freight was moved by rail because it was a govt monopoly. I remember up until the late 1970s / early 1980s you couldn't move freight by truck more than 30 odd miles from a railway station without a special permit, and they weren't the easiest of things to get. Of course today it's different and both countries are far more urbanised with far more private vehicles per head of population. I do think that Australia does need to seriously reconsider its fuel reserve situation quickly and I think NZ the same.

 

[Wombat000]

Good question,
I think relatively speaking there will be so many scores more demands after a constant share of a greatly diminished pie.

In WW2, excepting in cities, stereotypically many still used horses. Even in cities, produce was not unusually moved by horses.
Many had vege gardens, many only had one wage earner going to one workplace, now there's typically two going to two places doubling the commuting burden. There's a sense that the population in WW2 were generally more self reliant, than is the case today, so unreliable fuel supply had less impact then.

We have had the luxury of unchallenged supply, downgraded stocks to supply-on-demand.
The widespread fossil fuel reliance is a strategic & societal liability.

 

[hauritz]

How was the fuel rationing determined during WW2? Here in NZ most of the freight was moved by rail because it was a govt monopoly. I remember up until the late 1970s / early 1980s you couldn't move freight by truck more than 30 odd miles from a railway station without a special permit, and they weren't the easiest of things to get. Of course today it's different and both countries are far more urbanised with far more private vehicles per head of population. I do think that Australia does need to seriously reconsider its fuel reserve situation quickly and I think NZ the same.

I used to talk to my grandfather about this. He owned a farm and fuel was expensive, rationed and in short supply. He started the war as a reasonably wealthy land owner and by the end, he had sold up most of his equipment and was back to using a horse drawn plough. Being a primary producer did mean he got petrol a lot cheaper than the private users but it was nearly always in short supply.

You had to buy your petrol ration tickets in advance and when they ran out you had to go through a fairly complex procedure to get new ones. Even if you could afford to pay for your fuel in advance there was no guarantee that it would be available when you needed it.

Given how much more reliant industry is today on petrol I imagine the effect of fuel rationing would be far more devastating to the economy than it was in WW2.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Many underground coal mines are powered almost exclusively by electricity. Moving wall, electric vechicles, conveyorbelts etc. I think of lithgow as a classic example.

In the late 30's Australia still had significant horse drawn transport/machinery. We hadn't yet completely industrialised, certainly cars etc, but not in the same way.. Coal and electricity were also in plentiful supply. Post WW2 we really saw a massive influx large liquid fuelled machinery. Sydney tore up the second largest tram network in the empire (1,600 tram cars, 405 million passengers per year in 1945) and millions went out and bought cars which we then made in Australia.

There was an expectation that electric cars would be a significant thing by now. Holden ECOmmodore - Wikipedia it was seen in perhaps 2000, that by now, we would have a significant number of plug in hybrids. But things didn't pan out this way. Hybrids generally aren't plug in, and electric cars are effectively nil, industry and commerce and agriculture are still very dependent on petroleum.

We have suffered from a belief that there isn't a long term future for fossil fuels, yet, we also don't embrace renewables or other alternatives.

So we end up with power shortage, high power prices, gas shortages, closure of heavy industry, manufacturing, advanced industry all at the same time. We equally have close down nearly all the oil refineries and yet have not electrified, converted to LPG, or built strategic storage or significant public transport infrastructure.

Probably the only thing we have done is embraced ethanol.

https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainap...fuels Annual_Canberra_Australia_8-15-2017.pdf

Most of our ethanol is produced in NSW from wheat waste. Most fuel is at most e10. So the actual volume of ethanol produced is still quite small.
Biodiesel is made from Australian Tallow, but we send it to Singapore for refining.

its also getting much worse.

 

[ASSAIL]

I can see how at this time, and perhaps into a longer period, military applications need established fuel types.
I'm unsure whether present generation evolving fuel options are sufficiently reliable in the military context.

I also can see how in extreme events, govt will ration fuels to support the military & essential services.
But what is an 'essential service'?
Is it farmers that require fuel to harvest?
Is it truckers, who need to move the food so the population get fed?
Is it fuel required to move large amounts of coal to to a central location, to burn just to light a light bulb?
Is it the utilities services to maintain water infrastructure?
Thats additional to the emergency services & their staff movts.
What about pacifying rebellious citizens who now have to walk everywhere, is it essential to cater for them?

I'm unsure simply 'reactivating' industrial relics, or fashioning solutions on the fly, once pressure is already applied is realistic.
Lead times and logistics to active anything useful should be reckoned in many months/years, what happens in the meantime?
The nation is a similar size to continental Europe. Having a few old piecemeal sites won't have much impact as the product needs to be disseminated, that itself a drain on resources.
Quick solutions are fantasy.

Generally speaking, the wider and faster the population is weaned off fossil fuels the stronger the nation will be strategically.
If so,
The military will get greater lion share of the limited fuels, without disadvantaging the rest of society.
Instead of having power sites being centralised in a huge target box, power would be generated and stored in a diffuse network, much more resilient to interference.

Whilst the nation as a collective is tied to long supply chains, as an island nation we are in a tenuous bind.
It would be better if the biggest user of fossil fuels, in the interim, was predominately the military.

The “Liquid Fuel Security Review” linked at post #738 provides answers to many of your queries. It’s a comprehensive discussion and well worth the time to read and leads to a better informed debate on this vexed issue.
For instance, if there was a disruption of supply which continued for some time the Govt would enact the Liquid Fuel Emergency Act 1984 and allocation would be made by the National Oil Supplies Emergency Committee (NOSEC) a COAG committee.
Under normal disruptions the system is quite capable of dealing with shortages such as occurred in WA during the search for the missing Malaysian airliner when jet fuel became critically short there. at any one time there are 45 tankers at sea on their way to Australian ports, enough to provide the refineries with 12 days supply. 90 tankers per month deliver fuel to Australian ports which only emphasises our strategic vulnerability.
The review also discusses the gradual decline of the share of fuel used by private motor vehicles as technology changes to alternatives, electric, biofuels, lpg etc

 

[Massive]

I think that this comment by Paul Dibb is quite a useful starting point for thinking about the differing views on Australian defence.



Planning to defend Australia in an era of profound strategic disruption | The Strategist

How these strategic priorities are weighted determines a lot as to how you view the required structure and capabilities of the ADF

Personally I place a 90-95% weight on Defence of Australia - the other commitments needs to be almost entirely met with the structure and capabilities built for that task.

However, there are a number of ways to skin that cat, and an approach that provides optionality for the lesser strategic priorities. For example - I take issue with Hugh White's proposal to significantly reduce the army to divert resources elsewhere. A more capable (and heavier) army makes any aggressor need to bring more stuff. And provides more optionality than a small army with resources transferred elsewhere.

Thoughts,

Massive

 

[Takao]

I think that this comment by Paul Dibb is quite a useful starting point for thinking about the differing views on Australian defence.

View attachment 46790

Planning to defend Australia in an era of profound strategic disruption | The Strategist

How these strategic priorities are weighted determines a lot as to how you view the required structure and capabilities of the ADF

Personally I place a 90-95% weight on Defence of Australia - the other commitments needs to be almost entirely met with the structure and capabilities built for that task.

However, there are a number of ways to skin that cat, and an approach that provides optionality for the lesser strategic priorities. For example - I take issue with Hugh White's proposal to significantly reduce the army to divert resources elsewhere. A more capable (and heavier) army makes any aggressor need to bring more stuff. And provides more optionality than a small army with resources transferred elsewhere.

Thoughts,

Massive

I disagree about 90 - 95% being DoA (DoA is more than just continental defence, which is what the DWP assumes), but as to the rest - you are spot on.

Trying to build a force that is meant to meet three priority one's is dumb. It's ironic that a SCDT would fail at RMC for that, but our seniors can do it in our strategic direction. It makes life neigh on impossible for the Force Design parts of service and ADF HQ, be it buying new kit, justifying new capabilities or forecasting the future. Dumb, dumb, dumb.

Personally, the second one is the hardest for the ADF to do, and should be the primary goal.

 

[Massive]

I disagree about 90 - 95% being DoA (DoA is more than just continental defence, which is what the DWP assumes), but as to the rest - you are spot on.

Fair enough.

Personally I see continental defence as dealing with the risk with the biggest impact so prioritise it.

Essentially a reflection of ergodicity and risk of ruin - very low probability but high existential impact.

That said, I accept your view as putting a different weight on these elements and consider it to be equally valid.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Takao]

Fair enough.

Personally I see continental defence as dealing with the risk with the biggest impact so prioritise it.

Essentially a reflection of ergodicity and risk of ruin - very low probability but high existential impact.

That said, I accept your view as putting a different weight on these elements and consider it to be equally valid.

Regards,

Massive

Oh, don't misunderstand me, we need to pick one and debate over which one is healthy!

My views for #2 over #1 is that #1 would have the full resources of the nation at hand, simplifying many of our logistic issues. We would also be operating within a familiar population with there being little chance of hybrid threats. I don not that #1 is actually the ADF's only no-fail mission though....

#3 is showing the flag - a soldier and a dog can fulfil that. Plus we can just plug into a US command and logistics system - look at the MEAO where we use US fires, health, ISR platforms and networks

#2 is the worse of both worlds. We may not be operating in a friendly population, and it's unlikely to be of a common culture or language. We would have to supply everything - effectively being the US to our allies. Indonesia, Fiji, Thailand - all are likely to be able to provide fighting elements easily with up to close logistics. But the command network will probably have to come from us. The AME and medical support from us. The general logistics support (including fuel and ammunition) from us. ISR - us. Fires - us. Some of our likely allies don't even have some of these capabilities.

If we can do that, #1 gets a lot easier for us. And #3 remains whatever we want. But focsuing on the others means we can't do #2...

 

[ngatimozart]

Oh, don't misunderstand me, we need to pick one and debate over which one is healthy!

My views for #2 over #1 is that #1 would have the full resources of the nation at hand, simplifying many of our logistic issues. We would also be operating within a familiar population with there being little chance of hybrid threats. I don not that #1 is actually the ADF's only no-fail mission though....

#3 is showing the flag - a soldier and a dog can fulfil that. Plus we can just plug into a US command and logistics system - look at the MEAO where we use US fires, health, ISR platforms and networks

#2 is the worse of both worlds. We may not be operating in a friendly population, and it's unlikely to be of a common culture or language. We would have to supply everything - effectively being the US to our allies. Indonesia, Fiji, Thailand - all are likely to be able to provide fighting elements easily with up to close logistics. But the command network will probably have to come from us. The AME and medical support from us. The general logistics support (including fuel and ammunition) from us. ISR - us. Fires - us. Some of our likely allies don't even have some of these capabilities.

If we can do that, #1 gets a lot easier for us. And #3 remains whatever we want. But focsuing on the others means we can't do #2...

@Takao just to clarify, I presume that:
# 1 is defence of Australia,
#2 is a secure nearer region and,
#3 is our global defence commitments
from the ‘three equally-weighted high-level Strategic Defence Objectives to guide the development of the future force’ that Paul Dibbs alludes to in the Strategist article above, are what you are discussing.

 

[Takao]

@Takao just to clarify, I presume that:
# 1 is defence of Australia,
#2 is a secure nearer region and,
#3 is our global defence commitments
from the ‘three equally-weighted high-level Strategic Defence Objectives to guide the development of the future force’ that Paul Dibbs alludes to in the Strategist article above, are what you are discussing.

Ahh yes...my apologies. #1 - #3 refer to the Strategic Defence Objectives. Sorry about that!

From page 71 of the Defence White Paper:

The Strategic Defence Objectives are to:
`Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approaches.
`Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security.
`Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order

 

[StingrayOZ]

There is wide talk about a Fijian Regiment in the ADF.

Pacific Minister Alex Hawke has flagged an expansion of the government’s “step up” military strategy, suggesting island-nation battalions could be integrated in an Australian Defence Force unit.

The Australian had a recent story behind a paywall, but also carried by some local news outlets.
Australian Defence Force could open doors to Pacific military allies

Engagement isn't just HDAR. All pacific forces suffer from lack of equipment, lack of funding, training, education, missions etc. They need to be connected to something bigger and stronger than themselves. Like we do with the US, which has capabilities we will never have and are globally significant. Look at all the sweet access Australia gets to US programs and capabilities. A lot of this actually comes down to training, officer courses, etc. We need to expand what we offer.
Its not just about going over there and offering HDAR, just like the US Australia relationship isn't just about the US offering HDAR to Australia. Its about networking and integration. Sourcing platforms. FMS. Training, exchange positions, experience etc.

 

[Massive]

There is wide talk about a Fijian Regiment in the ADF...We need to expand what we offer...Its about networking and integration. Sourcing platforms. FMS. Training, exchange positions, experience etc.

Definitely agree on the increased integration & support via all the levers you suggest - and extending this to ensure common weapon and systems.

However, the idea of a Fijian Regiment seems odd to me. No one has really explained why we would do this. Adding a Fijian (likely light infantry) regiment to the ADF seems an incredibly clunky, redundant, indirect and expensive way to achieve a goal of closer engagement with Fiji?

Thoughts?

Massive

 

[ASSAIL]

Definitely agree on the increased integration & support via all the levers you suggest - and extending this to ensure common weapon and systems.

However, the idea of a Fijian Regiment seems odd to me. No one has really explained why we would do this. Adding a Fijian (likely light infantry) regiment to the ADF seems an incredibly clunky, redundant, indirect and expensive way to achieve a goal of closer engagement with Fiji?

Thoughts?

Massive

Is it any different in principle to having a Gurkha regiment in the British Army? Yes there could be differences in detail dependent upon how they were integrated, and;
Yes there would be problems if they were fully integrated, sovereignty, jurisdiction re discipline and maybe more unforeseen obstacles but surely it would benefit both sides for all but full combat duties.
The strategic benefits would far outweigh any organisational difficulties.

 

[Sideline]

PEOPLE: I know a little of this is done, a low cost idea that might improve the military capabilities of all of the Pacific nations would be that ALL of those on a promotional track whether NCO or officer spent a year (or 2) in the Australian army as an exchange at one rank below their current rank. My thoughts is if you have ever been involved in any sporting or musical activity simply spending a year or two around people that are much more advanced than you you learn so much just by osmosis. This would significantly improve the professionalism and knowledge base within the Pacific Island army units and build links to Australia.

PLACES: What do you think of the idea of a small cyclone proof storage faculty, (think land based Strategic sealift ship) with disaster relief equipment/supplies being co-managed AUS & Locals in each of the Pacific nations. (a 2 year posting in Fiji would not be terrible)

ALSO I don't know if any of you have seen this U.S. Military Could Collapse Within 20 Years Due to Climate Change, a report commissioned By Pentagon says a combination of global starvation, war, disease, drought, and a fragile power grid could have a cascading, devastating effect. NOTE I can't find the source report.

 

[Massive]

Is it any different in principle to having a Gurkha regiment in the British Army?.

Not particularly - and just like the Gurkhas for the British Army they would create a problem - too much light infantry in a world where light infantry has less of a role.

Would they replace the light infantry battalion in the brigades?

I would prefer to be providing all infantry kit, weapons and training before standing up a regiment within the ADF structure.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Takao]

PEOPLE: I know a little of this is done, a low cost idea that might improve the military capabilities of all of the Pacific nations would be that ALL of those on a promotional track whether NCO or officer spent a year (or 2) in the Australian army as an exchange at one rank below their current rank. My thoughts is if you have ever been involved in any sporting or musical activity simply spending a year or two around people that are much more advanced than you you learn so much just by osmosis. This would significantly improve the professionalism and knowledge base within the Pacific Island army units and build links to Australia.

I love it. I'd tweak it two ways - put them at the current rank (that reinforces they are partners and exposes them to the actual job) and I'd have Australia's go there too. So you may have an Australian section commander in 1st Battalion, Fiji Infantry Regiment, a Tongan LT in 1 RAR and an Indonesian CAPT in 8/12 Regt. The only reason I say at the same rank is that there are lots of little bits that junior ranks don't see.

In 2017, we (my co-worker and I) tried to float the idea that RMC be rejigged so that II Class and the first three months of I Class are what you need to be a LT like now, but the last three months of I Class are studying and being assessed on Malaysian / Singaporean / Indonesian / etc doctrine and tactics. That way we are much more familiar with how regional coalition partners operate - especially their constraints. Those constraints may be things we can reinforce with later in careers or, even better, offer new ways of tackling problems that we can copy.

A bit too radical for AHQ unfortunately...