Sorry, came across this one a bit later. But I'd like to add my comment.
Firstly, the real danger to Australia from greatly increased power and wealth of the Asian giants is the change in the balance of influence. Our political class will pursue their own interests of securing their private wealth and status by using their role as national elites to gain a place of status in the higher social circles of the Asian giant political culture.
In fact this is already happening. The rent or sale of ports to Chinese firms while people like Andrew Robb build their post politic career. Another example of how the shift in influence can manifest is the current natural gas controversy. Imagine if it were food that became scare due to exports being more lucrative than the domestic market.
So I claim the greatest threat to Australian security in an enriched and empowered Asia comes not from the PLAN but rather from our own political class. Note other nations in our region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, S. Korea, all know what it is like to have one's nation dominated by a foriegn power. Initially this happens through the national elite identifying with and ultimately serving the interests of a powerful foriegn elite. This is why most nations in Asia can get quite uppity about any attempt over questions of leadership. But it is sensible for the people of a nation to be concerned about their nation elites selling them out. We should take a leaf out of their book and keep our own politic class worried about their continued political careers.
On a technical note regarding Ross's force, with or without the Americans, we will always operate as part of an alliance. He force capacity suggest seems to imply independent operations. Though I think we could use greater numbers of aircraft than currently planned, the numbers he suggests are too much. Someone has to pay for it. History is full of examples of sovereigns who sent their realm broke due to military expenditure. We to put the better portion of our national treasury into things like education and infrastructure (which ideally won't then be sold of by the rubbery figures in parliament). This stuff generates new wealth in future. No point having military power if you've got no income.
Just my 2 cents.
I am posting this here because it seems to involve all three services.
Medusa. Has any poster any info re same?
From my understanding we are taking on the Norwegian NASAMS and Australianising it, and mounting it on the Hawkii (which is the Australian bit I can see, plus CEA radar). I have read where they are going to be using Block ll Aim-9x short range AAM which will replace our current short range AAM, and AIM 120 AMRAAM which will give us a medium range missile. I have also read where we are going to use ESSM in the medium range area, but as I see it the AIM-120 has a range of 120km (air launched),
against the ESSM a range of 50km surface launched, which I imagine would be about the same, and as the ESSM is a bit dearer than the AIM-120, what is its advantage? Unless it is because it can be quad packed?
Also, the Army would get the short ranged missiles, would they also get the medium range missiles? And where does the RAAF fit in?
Medusa. Has any poster any info re same?
From my understanding we are taking on the Norwegian NASAMS and Australianising it, and mounting it on the Hawkii (which is the Australian bit I can see, plus CEA radar). I have read where they are going to be using Block ll Aim-9x short range AAM which will replace our current short range AAM, and AIM 120 AMRAAM which will give us a medium range missile. I have also read where we are going to use ESSM in the medium range area, but as I see it the AIM-120 has a range of 120km (air launched),
against the ESSM a range of 50km surface launched, which I imagine would be about the same, and as the ESSM is a bit dearer than the AIM-120, what is its advantage? Unless it is because it can be quad packed?
Also, the Army would get the short ranged missiles, would they also get the medium range missiles? And where does the RAAF fit in?
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You can't compare air-launched missile range to ground / surface launched missile range in any aspect, the effect of gravity and zero altitude / airspeed has to be overcome by the ground-launched missile, whereas the air-launched missile already has altitude and airspeed in it's favour.
The ESSM has a much larger missile body (ie: significantly bigger in diameter and length) translating to a far bigger rocket motor and vastly more propellant than any of the AMRAAM variants, recognising their differing employment modes. This is why the 'AMRAAM-ER' variant is using the ESSM missile body and the AMRAAM guidance, warhead and fusing system.
ESSM can be quad-packed in a strategic length Mk 41 VLS, but this won't be the launcher used by Army. I would suggest AIM-9X, AMRAAM and AMRAAM-ER will all be qualified for launch and will be employed on a mix and match basis by Army as required by the tactical situation.
As for engagement ranges, I would suggest something along the lines of up to 12k for AIM-9X, up to 25k's for AMRAAM and up to 50K's for AMRAAM-ER would be the upper limit of their envelopes.
As I understand it the intent is for Army to use NASAMS II for their short / medium ranged tactical air defence coverage needs with RAAF to (eventually) operate a Medium / Long ranged strategic air defence system (albeit they are 'only' calling it a 'medium ranged) system.
It seems as if something akin to Patriot / MEADS / SAMP-T / Arrow is envisaged for the RAAF requirement, with (I fully expect) over time some limited BMD capability to be added to the RAAF requirement.
Boagrius
Well-Known Member
We had a chat about this in the Aus Army thread. ESSM (and its GBAD "cousin" the AMRAAM-ER) probably has a longer reach than the AMRAAM when surface launched. Bigger rocket motor with more propellant is what it boils down to I imagine.
As a (very) rough rule of thumb you can probably think of AMRAAM as a ~25km missile when surface launched, with ESSM/AMRAAM-ER probably around twice that.
Edit: ADMk2 beat me to it ;-)
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Thanks for your replies boys. I had read where the ESSM had been enhanced with the AMRAAM guidance system, and I was aware that the airspeed etc would make the Air to Air Missiles shorter ranged with surface launch, but I did not have a clue as to how much it would effect them. I imagine the RAN would be watching this with interest, with a view to added the systems to vessels that up to now have no surface to air missiles. It would be a pretty cheap way to go, and easily fitted.
Boagrius
Well-Known Member
Yes, confusingly the AMRAAM-ER and ESSM Block II are extremely similar missiles.
AFAIK the AMRAAM-ER is a land based weapon that mates the propulsion section of an ESSM to the guidance section of an AMRAAM (~AIM120C?).
The ESSM Block II on the other hand will replace the guidance system from the Block I missile (needs illumination from launch platform up to impact) with an active seeker of its own. Whether or not this seeker will have any relationship with AMRAAM I am not sure - wouldn't surprise me to find out it is something larger and perhaps more capable.
I expect the RAN will go down the ESSM Block II path in due course given our experience with its predecessor.
t68
Well-Known Member
An interesting article on the many flashpoints in Asia
Are we sleepwalking to World War III? - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Are we sleepwalking to World War III? - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
the thing to remember is that RADM Barrie is also not a hawk, and was never driven to hyperbole. haven't had anything to do with him since 1999 - but he was always cautious and considered in his advice to Govt.
He's not an alarmist at all, so if he's exercising concerns then its not an impulsive thought bubble
Boagrius
Well-Known Member
Makes for sobering reading. That said I do wonder about the following:
Not sure exactly how/when/why he thinks this will transpire. Poetic license by the journo perhaps? Nevertheless the rate of change in the region from a strategic perspective is insane - would not surprise me to see a smaller regional issue go kinetic in our lifetimes... unfortunately.
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t68
Well-Known Member
I imagine more along the lines of mainland Australia raided or blockaded, we would be stuffed within a week if those fuel ships don't get thru
They laughed about it in '41 and '42 as well thinking the IJN and IJA would never get past the Phillipines. Were it not for a valiant stand in New Guinea by Australia's sons on the road to Port Moresby, which bought just enough time for the Yanks to get down there, Australia would have been invaded.
It was always Japan's main strategy, the move south. Luckily they thought with something other then their brains and they put way to much importance on a few B-25s dropping bombs that they changed their list of "must do's" and went to Midway Island instead. The rest is History.
Australia sits on one of the most strategically important pieces of real estate in the world. It straddles THE most important trade route in all Asia and probably the world. One way or another if China seeks Asian hegemony it will have to deal with Australia in one way or another.
And it probably won't be invasion. Invasions and occupations are costly, the Aussie's wouldn't go down easily, and it would end up being a bridge to far in China's defense perimeter. But "hegemony" doesnt automatically mean military attack. Look at how the Chinese have isolated Taiwan and peacefully taken over Hong Kong, or are able to impose their will on many S/E Asian countries with economic muscle.
Being able to influence Policy, no matter what way, IS a form of invasion.
They don't need to invade us, they bought us!
Add some SF to disrupt power supply (or just convince the state govts to go green energy) and it would be a bloodless job. They have made plenty of preps, bought cattle stations, mineral depoists and a Port....
Add some SF to disrupt power supply (or just convince the state govts to go green energy) and it would be a bloodless job. They have made plenty of preps, bought cattle stations, mineral depoists and a Port....
This is because they fully realised that until the USN's carrier fleet was destroyed or significantly degraded; Japan's sea lanes and its ability to sustain operations elsewhere would be at great risk. From Japan's perspective deciding to go after the USN's carriers was the right choice. Also, it was not only the Doolittle raid that convinced them of the danger posed by enemy carriers but also - albeit to a lesser extent - the battle fought at Coral Sea when USN carriers - which were undetected - caused them great damage.
That's right. It is amazing how quickly people forget the lessons of history. Many people today are comfortably complacent. They think the way things are will go on forever. When reality catches up with them, first they deny, then they panic....
Nothing lasts forever (except possibly diamonds). Australia surviving the 21st century can't be taken for granted. But that is the core of the problem, we are taking things for granted. It is the case that there is significant uncertainty about the future for any nation. Which of course is why nations have defend forces.
Admiral Barrie is right to express concern about the future. I am not that excited about what he says though as it is just a case of stating the obvious. Everyone needs to accept that we can't take our survival for granted. The sensible course of action is to identify contingencies we may face and prepare appropriately, as the ADF is doing and as any other nation is doing (well, apart from the UK, NZ and Canada).
We do need to recognise that the Indian Ocean is vitally important to China, as it provides access to the markets of Europe and the resources of Africa and the Gulf. To access the Indian Ocean requires transiting the waters to our north west, via eastern Indonesia. India has bases across the enterance to the Straits of Malacca, so PLAN vessels need another route, you see. So yes, Australia is valuable real estate for both China and anyone seeking to deny China's access to the Indian Ocean. The Cocos and Christmas Islands are particular interesting locations to guard those sea ways.
I also agree that the weakest link is our own elites, as I have previously mentioned.
A point I should make regarding neutrality, countries like Switzerland and Sweden were able to be neutral because it suited the major protagonists around them. Unless the country is powerful enough, it can't be neutral just because it chooses. The major protagonists in Asia are unlikely to accept a neutral Australia, or indeed a neutral Indonesia for that matter, as it won't suit them. So we are caught up with Thucydides trap also.
Anyway, I am not phased by any of this. We just have to be sensible and do the best we can, as the people of every other nation have to.
1942 shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone as Jellicoe, in his 1920 review of the defences of the Dominions, outlined exactly what Japan was likely to do to secure the resources they needed and what they perceived to be their rightful place in the world. His recommendations were completely disregarded, the Australian government of the day even complaining to the UK government about them, even though they were actually a considerable cut to the pre WWI plans that had been developed to counter Japanese aggression.
Short memories and a misremembering of what the RAN Fleet Unit had been created to do. Because the mere existence of the Fleet Unit had been the primary reason the German Asiatic Squadron fled the region history was effectively reinterpreted that it had done its job and was no longer needed. This completely overlooked the fact that defence plans for decades had been about countering Russian, then Japanese imperialism that would threaten Australian and British interests, especially that the Japanese threat was actually worsening thanks to primarily US attempts to contain them and the British financial restrictions post war.
One RAN Fleet Unit was not even a minimum force, there were meant to be six. Jellicoes review realised the financial constraints and cut this down to two in the RAN and a third, provided by the RN to be based in either Australia or Malaya (hence the Singapore base developments). The idea changed from being able to counter Japan regionally, to being able to hold, or at least delay them until the Mediterranean Fleet could be pivoted to the region.
End result was even a two thirds reduction in required forces didn't happen and the RAN shrunk to little more than a colonial station with a cruiser squadron, then that small force was sent to support a European war. On return to Australia the major fleet units were sacrificed piecemeal in failed attempts (some were little more than demonstrations we were trying to support our allies) to stem the Japanese advance. In hindsight, even Jellicoes much reduced plan, that also included a couple of carriers as well as a submarine force and local aircraft production, would have seen Australia much better able to defend itself in 1942, let alone the regional superiority, perhaps even successful deterance the pre WWI six Fleet Unit plan would have provided.
Interesting how much today is similar to a hundred years ago. Naval plans made to defend against a real threat were shrunk, if not cancelled, even the reduced plans failed to come to fruition, even as the very threat they were meant to counter grew and became more certain. And just like a hundred years ago, instead of mitigating the threat through diplomacy and trade, it was worsened by botched attempts of containment, as the forces expected to achieve containment withered.
Short memories and a misremembering of what the RAN Fleet Unit had been created to do. Because the mere existence of the Fleet Unit had been the primary reason the German Asiatic Squadron fled the region history was effectively reinterpreted that it had done its job and was no longer needed. This completely overlooked the fact that defence plans for decades had been about countering Russian, then Japanese imperialism that would threaten Australian and British interests, especially that the Japanese threat was actually worsening thanks to primarily US attempts to contain them and the British financial restrictions post war.
One RAN Fleet Unit was not even a minimum force, there were meant to be six. Jellicoes review realised the financial constraints and cut this down to two in the RAN and a third, provided by the RN to be based in either Australia or Malaya (hence the Singapore base developments). The idea changed from being able to counter Japan regionally, to being able to hold, or at least delay them until the Mediterranean Fleet could be pivoted to the region.
End result was even a two thirds reduction in required forces didn't happen and the RAN shrunk to little more than a colonial station with a cruiser squadron, then that small force was sent to support a European war. On return to Australia the major fleet units were sacrificed piecemeal in failed attempts (some were little more than demonstrations we were trying to support our allies) to stem the Japanese advance. In hindsight, even Jellicoes much reduced plan, that also included a couple of carriers as well as a submarine force and local aircraft production, would have seen Australia much better able to defend itself in 1942, let alone the regional superiority, perhaps even successful deterance the pre WWI six Fleet Unit plan would have provided.
Interesting how much today is similar to a hundred years ago. Naval plans made to defend against a real threat were shrunk, if not cancelled, even the reduced plans failed to come to fruition, even as the very threat they were meant to counter grew and became more certain. And just like a hundred years ago, instead of mitigating the threat through diplomacy and trade, it was worsened by botched attempts of containment, as the forces expected to achieve containment withered.
The key is making the risks out way the benefits. If the cost of doing something far exceeds any possible gain, why do it. This applied to Switzerland and Sweden but no the other neutral states, it has always applied and likely always will. For instance, as I understand the story, Phillip of Macedonia (Alexanders father) communicated to Sparta what he would do to them "if" they didn't swear fealty, Spartas response was to choose "if" and although Phillip knew he would win the cost would be too high so he let things be.
Its not about being the strongest, as that can result in being challenged in itself, but rather to be strong enough that the bully will choose to either leave you alone, or to negotiate for what they want, instead of just taking it.