ADF General discussion thread

[diggumsbang]

Might have been overlooked in the lack of detail in the DSR, but I found it interesting that for maritime, land and air domains that the headings reference “immediate investment priorities”. Why is this interesting? To me it reflects a recalibration, and the sense of urgency referenced in the DSR.

It’s not a white paper, so the detail in it shouldn’t be considered as such, hence the lack of it. The lack of detail is probably reflective of it being a public version, and not the classified version the Government has.

so it is not necessarily ruling out other investments set out in the latest white paper, but resets expectations and clarifies that the business as usual approach is not sustainable in the current strategic environment so it sets some clear parameters particularly in terms of procurement processes

 

[Bob53]

C-17 replacement, a distant project as no design has been finalized. KC30A and P-8s seem to be realistic. As for more F-35s, wait for a new engine that can handle the Block 4 upgrade.

If we distribute Army teams with long range fires across a theatre or archipelago how are they all getting their targeting data? This is where Drones or more P8s might come in. At an uneducated guess during any conflict 9-12 on rotation are required on station across all approaches which, with a fleet of 14 leaves little no capacity for deep maintenance or other tasks . Maybe wedge tails could perform this task?

 

[Stampede]

My take on the DSR is that it's about threat perspective, time, budget, response and difficult choices.

A post Covid world has left less dollars in the bank and comes with a major conventional war in Europe and continued sabre rattling in Northern Asia.
The world or 5 years ago seems distant and alien.
The replacement norm of replacing like for like as equipment ages is challenged by need and the reality of underfunding.
What do you do?
While the threat spectrum dictates increased defence dollars, the reality is that we cannot both fund replacement equipment and introduce new capability's while also providing good and balanced governance across the other government departments.
Ideally we could do everything, but we can't and we will not.

That's reality and It's probably not going to win the government any political points; but it just maybe the correct approach if gets the ADF a more robust deterrence capability in the short term.

129 IFV numbers are not set in concrete nor is a not getting a 2nd tranche of SPG's.. Its just what is mention for now...............Things may look very different in 2033.
But for now its about rapid capability that is achievable.
Now achievable = realistic.

Realistic is what can be done in the real world out to 2025.
2025 to 2030
2030 and beyond.

So yes I'm frustrated by the lack of detail.

What is the Navy going to look like.
What are the Army Brigades going to look like.
The RAAF will probably look roughly the same in the immediate years but if there are any weak links in delivering capability they will no doubt be addressed promptly................................looking at you Cocos islands and Northern bases.

Its about getting what is achievable in a very short time frame.

We cannot get a F35 or a destroyer or any one of many other major platforms this side of 2030.

The DSR is not talking about them, not because they are not potentially on the radar, but rather because the focus is about the next few years and why we are spending what we have on what we are getting now and also what we are forgoing to achieve this end in the immediate future.

In reality the DSR is a spectacularly dull and boring document that does not satisfy what many of us who have an interest in defence matters want to hear.

Most likely spectacular purchases of new equipment and beefed up acquisitions allocated to expanded Fleets, Squadrons and brigades.
On this level it disappoints..............................Oh well they were fantasy fleets anyway.

The 2016 DWP was of another era.
Time to bury it and move with the times.

The DSR deals with and addresses current reality
Time will tell if they got it right.


Cheers S

 

[buffy9]

It has been interesting to first watch the announcement and to watch the back and forth discussion on the meat or lack there of in the announcement and then the implications of the various recommendations and what have you. One recommendation that did jump out at me other than those that are related to the cyber domain, which is my personal area of expertise and interest was the recommendation related to future planning.

'Defence should move away from white papers to produce a
National Defence Strategy on a biennial basis. The first National
Defence Strategy should be delivered no later than Q2 2024.'
pg 99, Defence Strategic Review 2023

I admit that I am not well versed necessarily as to how things were done in decades past but I hope that moving to a more regimented analysis and response cycle to decision making might prove to be useful rather than what seemed to be a more ad hoc White Paper development and publication system and timeline that has been the norm in the last 30 plus years. Just my two cents.

It is probably one of the more significant things to come out of the DSR, which is ironic considering it isn't being talked about. Having a strategy updated every two years definitely gives a lot more direction than one every four of five years.

The National Defence Strategy, National Defence concept, a strategy of denial and a focused force are imho some of the more significant things to come out of the review. It was probably always going to be the case that new projects wouldn't be announced, considering alignment on Defence broadly between the Coaliation and ALP, with the Integrated Investment Program (in however many forms) existing since 2016.

But I digress. I'll wait until after Anzac Day to reflect on it properly.

They shall grow not old,
as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them,
nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun
and in the morning
We will remember them.

Lest we forget.

 

[John Newman]

You are older than me but I remember Moore, Ray, Reith, McLachlan, Sinclair. Scholes and others weren't super stars either.

During the first three Howard terms Defence was the departure lounge for clowns who had failed in other ministries. No real talent in the portfolio until it became politically important.

Sadly we have had very few talented defmins on either side.

I was actually surprised how happy many of the serving members at work were. Mind you these are people who have been dealing with a number of unseen issues for a number of years. Very glad to see the end or reduction of some nice to have but capability sucking (through opportunity cost) acquisitions.

As for climate, and adf support of civilian powers, that is one of the real plusses. Read it, it clearly states, that unlike recent decades, the ADF should not be used so extensively in these areas. This is a good thing. The over use of defence personnel and assets in non defence roles has been had a major adverse impact moral, mental health and retention, recognising this and moving to provide other funding and resources for it is brilliant.

V,

Mate, yes I’m older than you, but I think it’s clear we are both grumpy bastards, maybe I’m just a grumpier ‘older’ bastard, for what it’s worth?

I do agree completely regarding your list of other ‘dud’ ex-Def Mins, agree 100%, Scholes is a stand out for me, he was Def Min when the final nail was put in the HMAS Melbourne carrier replacement coffin.

But I still think Smith is my number one, he would easily be elected class clown, his participation in the 2013 Gillard DWP stands out.

If one compares the 2020 LNP DSU and the 2023 ALP DSR, a few things stand out, and not in a good way.

The 2020 DSU was a far more ‘complete’ document, it went into greater detail for the various services.

The 2020 DSU was also accompanied by the 2020 DIIP, which outlined (in very clear detail), the procurement plans for each branch of the services.

An overall budget outlay for each year from 2020-30, an individual budget allowance for individual projects from 2020-30 for each major project, and also projections well beyond 2030 too.

The 2023 ALP DSR doesn’t have an accompanying DIIP, there is zero indication of the plans for major projects, why??

It’s a piece of crap, big on words, short on detail.

My comment isn’t just a ‘kick the ALP’ comment, if the LNP has produced this document my opinion would be exactly the same.

Then there is the plans for the RAN, “oh that’s right! That tin can has been kicked further down the road!”

WTF!!

What else can I say? Other than WTF!

 

[Morgo]

V,

Mate, yes I’m older than you, but I think it’s clear we are both grumpy bastards, maybe I’m just a grumpier ‘older’ bastard, for what it’s worth?

I do agree completely regarding your list of other ‘dud’ ex-Def Mins, agree 100%, Scholes is a stand out for me, he was Def Min when the final nail was put in the HMAS Melbourne carrier replacement coffin.

But I still think Smith is my number one, he would easily be elected class clown, his participation in the 2013 Gillard DWP stands out.

If one compares the 2020 LNP DSU and the 2023 ALP DSR, a few things stand out, and not in a good way.

The 2020 DSU was a far more ‘complete’ document, it went into greater detail for the various services.

The 2020 DSU was also accompanied by the 2020 DIIP, which outlined (in very clear detail), the procurement plans for each branch of the services.

An overall budget outlay for each year from 2020-30, an individual budget allowance for individual projects from 2020-30 for each major project, and also projections well beyond 2030 too.

The 2023 ALP DSR doesn’t have an accompanying DIIP, there is zero indication of the plans for major projects, why??

It’s a piece of crap, big on words, short on detail.

My comment isn’t just a ‘kick the ALP’ comment, if the LNP has produced this document my opinion would be exactly the same.

Then there is the plans for the RAN, “oh that’s right! That tin can has been kicked further down the road!”

WTF!!

What else can I say? Other than WTF!

We’re two weeks out from a Federal Budget that is, presumably, going to have a ton of unpopular decisions in it. There was no way they were going to release detailed financials now.

I have no doubt that those costings exist. They’re just not in the public document.

The Budget Papers will have project by project costings over the forward estimates.

 

[hauritz]

My take on the DSR is that it's about threat perspective, time, budget, response and difficult choices.

A post Covid world has left less dollars in the bank and comes with a major conventional war in Europe and continued sabre rattling in Northern Asia.
The world or 5 years ago seems distant and alien.
The replacement norm of replacing like for like as equipment ages is challenged by need and the reality of underfunding.
What do you do?
While the threat spectrum dictates increased defence dollars, the reality is that we cannot both fund replacement equipment and introduce new capability's while also providing good and balanced governance across the other government departments.
Ideally we could do everything, but we can't and we will not.

That's reality and It's probably not going to win the government any political points; but it just maybe the correct approach if gets the ADF a more robust deterrence capability in the short term.

129 IFV numbers are not set in concrete nor is a not getting a 2nd tranche of SPG's.. Its just what is mention for now...............Things may look very different in 2033.
But for now its about rapid capability that is achievable.
Now achievable = realistic.

Realistic is what can be done in the real world out to 2025.
2025 to 2030
2030 and beyond.

So yes I'm frustrated by the lack of detail.

What is the Navy going to look like.
What are the Army Brigades going to look like.
The RAAF will probably look roughly the same in the immediate years but if there are any weak links in delivering capability they will no doubt be addressed promptly................................looking at you Cocos islands and Northern bases.

Its about getting what is achievable in a very short time frame.

We cannot get a F35 or a destroyer or any one of many other major platforms this side of 2030.

The DSR is not talking about them, not because they are not potentially on the radar, but rather because the focus is about the next few years and why we are spending what we have on what we are getting now and also what we are forgoing to achieve this end in the immediate future.

In reality the DSR is a spectacularly dull and boring document that does not satisfy what many of us who have an interest in defence matters want to hear.

Most likely spectacular purchases of new equipment and beefed up acquisitions allocated to expanded Fleets, Squadrons and brigades.
On this level it disappoints..............................Oh well they were fantasy fleets anyway.

The 2016 DWP was of another era.
Time to bury it and move with the times.

The DSR deals with and addresses current reality
Time will tell if they got it right.


Cheers S

I think the expectations people had for the DSR (myself included) were a little over the top. They forgot that the "S" stands for strategic. There was never going to be a shopping list of new equipment attached to it.

It is simply a guide to what capabilities will be needed over the next decade.

 

[Wombat000]

I think it would be pretty hard to justify to the public (that's assuming they are even this closely interested in Defence issues) why we are spending around a billion dollars on just 18 SPHs, of which only 12 will be in actual combat units.

they’re getting flak for NOT funding them.
costing are not just for that limited number, it’s to bring them into service, establish production and their longer sustainment.

issues of costings need to be made aware so as to avoid that confusion, & it’s not a hard sell for greatly enhanced capability.
They’ve simply shifted short term budget numbers.

 

[knightrider4]

It is probably one of the more significant things to come out of the DSR, which is ironic considering it isn't being talked about. Having a strategy updated every two years definitely gives a lot more direction than one every four of five years.

The National Defence Strategy, National Defence concept, a strategy of denial and a focused force are imho some of the more significant things to come out of the review. It was probably always going to be the case that new projects wouldn't be announced, considering alignment on Defence broadly between the Coaliation and ALP, with the Integrated Investment Program (in however many forms) existing since 2016.

But I digress. I'll wait until after Anzac Day to reflect on it properly.

They shall grow not old,
as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them,
nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun
and in the morning
We will remember them.

Lest we forget.

Buffy for one of the worlds most anaemic defence forces we sure have an awful lot of reviews. I find the story of Australian Defence almost like an unfolding Greek Tragi-comedy, up their with the best of Yes Minister/Prime Minister. It is really quite shameful. How does a wealthy country get itself in such a deplorable situation.

 

[John Fedup]

Buffy for one of the worlds most anaemic defence forces we sure have an awful lot of reviews. I find the story of Australian Defence almost like an unfolding Greek Tragi-comedy, up their with the best of Yes Minister/Prime Minister. It is really quite shameful. How does a wealthy country get itself in such a deplorable situation.

If Australia’s situation is deplorable (a bit of a stretch) then a harsher word than deplorable is needed to describe Canada’s situation!

 

[Takao]

I’m in agreement re reduced SPH numbers. I’d much rather HIMARs flown in to 100-200kms from the lines by C130 and its ability to rapidly move and fire multiple long range munitions than a SPH trucked to within 60-80kms of the lines.

The downside is can a HIMARS provide a volume of fire and the cost per shot of the SPH?

On the surface HIMARS appears to have a much lighter and potentially lower risk logistics tail so that again favours that system.

First off, a HIMARS and a SPH are like a screwdriver and a hammer - both put attachments into wood, but do so differently. And where you need a screwdriver, a hammer doesn't work - and vice versa.

HIMARS has range and, likely, accuracy. It is also expensive; a basic rocket costs ~$300k, a basic 155 mm shell costs ~$500. In a really crass matter, that's $3300/kg of HE for HIMARS, $73/kg of HE for 155 mm. Now, that's almost too basic. It ignores that a HIMARS shoots longer, has some impressive payloads and can be an unexpected attack. But... it's shock value is much shorter, it's danger zone is much larger (meaning fire has to lift while the assault force is further out), it's harder to resupply and, in your construct, you've added in the cost of a C-130 to an expensive mix. Which, when combined, means your comments about the logistic chain favouring the HIMARS is wrong from a strategic point of view and arguable from a tactical view.

As a quick example, despite the huge numbers of BM-8, BM-13 and BM-31 during WW2, the Soviets still persisted in large numbers of 122 mm and 152 mm guns. Even in the 1980s, The Divisional Artillery Group and Brigade Artillery Groups were mixed rocket and gun.

 

[Shanesworld]

If Australia’s situation is deplorable (a bit of a stretch) then a harsher word than deplorable is needed to describe Canada’s situation!

(NZ sits in the corner trying eat a coloured wooden block with a soiled nappy and no idea what defence is)

 

[Volkodav]

First off, a HIMARS and a SPH are like a screwdriver and a hammer - both put attachments into wood, but do so differently. And where you need a screwdriver, a hammer doesn't work - and vice versa.

HIMARS has range and, likely, accuracy. It is also expensive; a basic rocket costs ~$300k, a basic 155 mm shell costs ~$500. In a really crass matter, that's $3300/kg of HE for HIMARS, $73/kg of HE for 155 mm. Now, that's almost too basic. It ignores that a HIMARS shoots longer, has some impressive payloads and can be an unexpected attack. But... it's shock value is much shorter, it's danger zone is much larger (meaning fire has to lift while the assault force is further out), it's harder to resupply and, in your construct, you've added in the cost of a C-130 to an expensive mix. Which, when combined, means your comments about the logistic chain favouring the HIMARS is wrong from a strategic point of view and arguable from a tactical view.

As a quick example, despite the huge numbers of BM-8, BM-13 and BM-31 during WW2, the Soviets still persisted in large numbers of 122 mm and 152 mm guns. Even in the 1980s, The Divisional Artillery Group and Brigade Artillery Groups were mixed rocket and gun.

Will we be retaining the towed 155mm?

If not in reg army, perhaps reserves?

 

[Lolcake]

Army gutted? Tough crowd, i must say.

Latest Iteration M1s, AH-64Ev6 Apaches, HIMARS acquisition (with additional units on the cards), Blackhawks, Boxers, NASAMS 3 + the upcoming Patriot/MRGBAD aquisition (as per DSR), the local production of PRSMs and munitions. Christ, these assets were unthinkable not even 15 years ago.

We are setting up the local production capacity for the Land 400p3 program. Why all the doom and gloom? If additional units are called for, the army most likely will be obliged, case in point Bushmasters. Funding was not provided for many of these announced programs and someone has to pay the piper.

RAAF are upgrading all assets to the latest standard and funding + acquisition of programs are already underway for the state of the art battle management systems. Im sure these will suffice until NGAD assets come online

We are getting the ultimate asset in deterrence short of a SSBN, unforunately this entails massive funding and truckloads of personnel to achieve. We only have to look so far as Canada to see how lucky we are in this regard. Having 'at least' 8 Virginia/SSNR is the ultimate asset in what we are aiming to achieve here i.e. preventing war from ever occuring and getting this signed and sealed was nothing short of a miracle.

Yes this DSR was not your Italian white alba truffle but it addresses and priortises immediate deterrence build up as it should, addressing strategic shortfalls (Base hardening, logistic shortfalls, Sea mines etc) while focusing on the long term goal of putting into service some of the most complex and capable machines in existence.

 

[alexsa]

Good day folks. The discussion has been pretty clean so far and I note there is a fair amount of angst, which to be fair is understandable. My only request is please keep it moderate and interactive (i.e respect each others position)

It will be interesting to see what the budget figures are when released. These may provide some inkling of the funds to be spend and where. The reviews of the fleet composition is interesting noting the original decision was also the result of a review.

Alexsa

 

[Bob53]

First off, a HIMARS and a SPH are like a screwdriver and a hammer - both put attachments into wood, but do so differently. And where you need a screwdriver, a hammer doesn't work - and vice versa.

HIMARS has range and, likely, accuracy. It is also expensive; a basic rocket costs ~$300k, a basic 155 mm shell costs ~$500. In a really crass matter, that's $3300/kg of HE for HIMARS, $73/kg of HE for 155 mm. Now, that's almost too basic. It ignores that a HIMARS shoots longer, has some impressive payloads and can be an unexpected attack. But... it's shock value is much shorter, it's danger zone is much larger (meaning fire has to lift while the assault force is further out), it's harder to resupply and, in your construct, you've added in the cost of a C-130 to an expensive mix. Which, when combined, means your comments about the logistic chain favouring the HIMARS is wrong from a strategic point of view and arguable from a tactical view.

As a quick example, despite the huge numbers of BM-8, BM-13 and BM-31 during WW2, the Soviets still persisted in large numbers of 122 mm and 152 mm guns. Even in the 1980s, The Divisional Artillery Group and Brigade Artillery Groups were mixed rocket and gun.

You put it so well. Yes I agree the cost factor per shot is drastically different and that’s what I was referring to in volume of fire. Take the C130 out and let the HIMSRS drive there and the logistics tail seems much smaller. To transport a SPH and resupply vehicle …say Townsville to Darwin needs. 2 x Loaders. A Himars could drive there. But I understand what your saying.

Lets say it’s an island some 1000km away with a decent runway and the paradigm shifts somewhat In terms of logistics.

2 ways to do the same job depending on the requirements and one compliments the other. One better some times. The other better at other times.

 

[ngatimozart]

Naval News article from last year on HIMARS, PrSM etc. It also appears that HIMARS is able to fire the AIM-120 AMRAAM by using special racks. Think that is quite a nifty idea.

Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Information Update - Naval News

One of the greatest advantages of the U.S. Army's Precision Strike Missile PrSM is that it can hit moving land and maritime targets using a multi-mode seeker.

www.navalnews.com

 

[Takao]

Army gutted? Tough crowd, i must say.

Not gutted, but not as rosy as you make out.

Latest Iteration M1s, AH-64Ev6 Apaches, HIMARS acquisition (with additional units on the cards), Blackhawks, Boxers, NASAMS 3 + the upcoming Patriot/MRGBAD aquisition (as per DSR), the local production of PRSMs and munitions. Christ, these assets were unthinkable not even 15 years ago.

M1s were here 15 y ago, we've had MBTs since 196x
Attack helos were here 15 y ago, we've had them since 2004
HIMARs is new, but we have been asking for them for 10 yrs (and yes, why the hell we haven't got a unit yet is beyond me)
Black Hawks were here 15 y ago, we've had them since 1987 and transport helo's longer
A CRV we've had since 198x

Patriot won't be Army, and we've had the capability before with Bloodhound

The fact is nothing on your list is really new. It's a new integration, but not new. And with no real boos to the enabling arms/logistics it's at greater risk of failing. I don't think Army was gutted, but I also don't think there is anything positive for Army in this. At the very best it's neutral.

We are setting up the local production capacity for the Land 400p3 program. Why all the doom and gloom? If additional units are called for, the army most likely will be obliged, case in point Bushmasters. Funding was not provided for many of these announced programs and someone has to pay the piper.

You are 100% correct here. As long as the IFV and SPH factory are built then the DSR is okay. As you said, the inital order of Bushmaster was 299 - there'd be more than 300 in SE Qld alone right now.

We are getting the ultimate asset in deterrence short of a SSBN, unforunately this entails massive funding and truckloads of personnel to achieve. We only have to look so far as Canada to see how lucky we are in this regard. Having 'at least' 8 Virginia/SSNR is the ultimate asset in what we are aiming to achieve here i.e. preventing war from ever occuring and getting this signed and sealed was nothing short of a miracle.

A deterrence to who? A SSN is many things (and I think it's the best idea for the submarine arm of the RAN), but let's not fall for the hype. And this isn't all you, this is mainly no-one in any position of power explaining who we are deterring from what. If it's Beijing, will another 3 - 4 SSN in the region actually stop them from invading Taiwan? I don't believe you can deter without WMD (or huge mass); a handful of subs cannot do it.

And just to be cheeky... heavy armour (that we just 'gutted') is better at deterrence...

 

[Bob53]

Not gutted, but not as rosy as you make out.



M1s were here 15 y ago, we've had MBTs since 196x
Attack helos were here 15 y ago, we've had them since 2004
HIMARs is new, but we have been asking for them for 10 yrs (and yes, why the hell we haven't got a unit yet is beyond me)
Black Hawks were here 15 y ago, we've had them since 1987 and transport helo's longer
A CRV we've had since 198x

Patriot won't be Army, and we've had the capability before with Bloodhound

The fact is nothing on your list is really new. It's a new integration, but not new. And with no real boos to the enabling arms/logistics it's at greater risk of failing. I don't think Army was gutted, but I also don't think there is anything positive for Army in this. At the very best it's neutral.



You are 100% correct here. As long as the IFV and SPH factory are built then the DSR is okay. As you said, the inital order of Bushmaster was 299 - there'd be more than 300 in SE Qld alone right now.



A deterrence to who? A SSN is many things (and I think it's the best idea for the submarine arm of the RAN), but let's not fall for the hype. And this isn't all you, this is mainly no-one in any position of power explaining who we are deterring from what. If it's Beijing, will another 3 - 4 SSN in the region actually stop them from invading Taiwan? I don't believe you can deter without WMD (or huge mass); a handful of subs cannot do it.

And just to be cheeky... heavy armour (that we just 'gutted') is better at deterrence...

I was of a similar view. Nearly everything has previously been announced by Dutton and Sco Mo. Except cuts to the heavy army.

I was thinking more recon and surveillance assets for the airforce P8 and Wedge Tails, more refuellers, armed and recon drones to support the long range fires and possibly more growlers. All off the shelf

Navy I was hoping a decision on what is happening with the Hunters, Additional Hobarts and Arafura up arming but instead another review.

Army was thinking at least we would announce a winner of land 400P3. Disappointed in the reduction in numbers of IFV and SPH more on the basis of how unreliable the procurement has been over the last 15 years. Imagine being one of the companies tendering on a project. How disruptive these project cancellations/ changes would have me questioning why I would ever go into a tender with the ADF…SPH in, then out, then in, then numbers changed is probably the prime example… submarines, MQ9, IFV, I’m sure there is a few others.

 

[Stampede]

I was of a similar view. Nearly everything has previously been announced by Dutton and Sco Mo. Except cuts to the heavy army.

I was thinking more recon and surveillance assets for the airforce P8 and Wedge Tails, more refuellers, armed and recon drones to support the long range fires and possibly more growlers. All off the shelf

Navy I was hoping a decision on what is happening with the Hunters, Additional Hobarts and Arafura up arming but instead another review.

Army was thinking at least we would announce a winner of land 400P3. Disappointed in the reduction in numbers of IFV and SPH more on the basis of how unreliable the procurement has been over the last 15 years. Imagine being one of the companies tendering on a project. How disruptive these project cancellations/ changes would have me questioning why I would ever go into a tender with the ADF…SPH in, then out, then in, then numbers changed is probably the prime example… submarines, MQ9, IFV, I’m sure there is a few others.

Maybe naive, but I find it difficult to believe we would set a manufacturing facility to produce such a limited number of a fleet of vehicles, so suspect IFV's and SHG figures will grow with time.
I'm very confident that will be the case.
Lets not get to doom and gloom on this one

Re the RAAF
Agree, I was anticipating a modest growth in P8's over and above the 14 confirmed. Disappointing as this is an ideal platform for the ADF going forward.
Wedgetails will be replaced and hopefully in greater numbers down the track.
Maybe an opportunity to tie in with the RAF order.
Again disappointing that nothing was announced and additional platforms confirmed sooner rather than later.

Re Navy
Not to concerned re the RAN as the delay is realistically only around 5 months.
I'd speculate some very big changes. Certainly watch this space!
Just hoping big changes will not equal big cuts, but rather a growth in real fleet numbers and capability.
Fingers crossed

Re Army
Army is what it is for now, but we must remember the additions in capability not the current knock backs.
Growth to five brigades and a lot of new equipment and systems.
There is a lot of positivity that should not be over looked by some of the recent announcements.
Some perspective is needed.
Army heavy amphibious lift we be one to watch with a fast track of medium and heavy craft "Ships "
This is game changing for our littoral movement around both our coastline and the region.



Cheers S