A simple method to engage stealthy target

[weasel1962]

Re:

When and where? Last time i remember it was around Vietnam era, and i wouldnt call it "success against SAM".

I doubt if there were LO designs during Vietnam. But if one is referring to non-LO, there's also sidra '86 (SA-5s).

I think AD was referring to desert storm. The Iraqis had a non-degraded integrated air defence prior to commencement of hostilities. That would be the 1st employment of the F-117s.

Iraqi Air Defense - Introduction

 

[gf0012-aust]

I doubt if there were LO designs during Vietnam. But if one is referring to non-LO, there's also sidra '86 (SA-5s).

the US ran LO configured lightning bugs over the soviet union and over china.

these were the first non supersonic platforms that were deliberately RAM coated to mask their signature footprint and deliberately designed around low detection insertion.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

the US ran LO configured lightning bugs over the soviet union and over china.

these were the first non supersonic platforms that were deliberately RAM coated to mask their signature footprint and deliberately designed around low detection insertion.

And that triggers memory of the blackbird missions. Reduced rcs but still detectable by radar. Multiple missiles fired at it but not a single down.

 

[AegisFC]

Not sure which radars you are talking about. Aegis is L and X band (1GHz and up). Most of the others are also X band. The exception is the OTH radars used for launch warning, but those are HUGE.

The AN/SPY-1 series are S band radars.

 

[My2Cents]

The AN/SPY-1 series are S band radars.

You are correct, I miss typed. L and S are the correct bands [1GHz to 4GHz].

Thank you

Still no where near the 300MHz that lizs claims.

 

[lizs]

Can't really agree here. There are two different methods for geo-location at play here. The low-freq radar interrogates a "box" which has a much larger extent than the angular error of the radar. The ARM missile has the angular error from the ESM which remains constant; additionally the accuracy in ground coordinates improve as the ARM approaches the emitter. So they're not analogues.

Nice argument. If you are right, it seems you are telling a more direct method to accurately guide a missile to a stealth target. As contemporary stealth plane reflects signals from a low-frequency radar, the plane itself can also be considered as an emitter. If we use an ARM-like seeker as you described for terminal guidance on a surface-to-air missile, it should be able to overcome the large wave-length error and accurately hit a stealth target. But it just sounds like the conventional semi-active radar homing, isn't it? IR is not needed here.

 

[gf0012-aust]

If we use an ARM-like seeker as you described for terminal guidance on a surface-to-air missile, it should be able to overcome the large wave-length error and accurately hit a stealth target. But it just sounds like the conventional semi-active radar homing, isn't it?

That wouldn't appear to be a solution either.

there's documented evidence of inbound coalition aircraft wvr of VLO aircraft (on the same corridor and with less than 5000ft altitude separation) where none of their systems (weapons and sensors) could acquire those VLO's. This despite them being in eyeball range at convergence.

there's also the recent examples of RAAF exchange pilots who are in reticle range and can't get a lock on F-22's. They were using onboard sensors as well as attempting to get the wespons to supplement with their own seekers to acquire.

all targets can be killed at some point, its the degree of difficulty that counts. I'm not so sure that the above concept makes it easier as real life events show that it doesn't

 

[localhost127]

there's also the recent examples of RAAF exchange pilots who are in reticle range and can't get a lock on F-22's. They were using onboard sensors as well as attempting to get the wespons to supplement with their own seekers to acquire.

what is the policy regarding LO/VLO platforms and friendlies? the luneburg lens is deployed for ferry over friendly skies (air traffic controlled / civilian airspace) and also deployed during air shows over allied nations, right? i was under an impression that the full "ears down" is not deployed until time of war...

from all the photos ive seen of russian intercepts in alaska (or joint training missions with the bears), the luneburg lens has always been deployed (e.g. wouldnt want radar/elec sigs to be captured).

does the usaf ever practice will allies (raaf, raf, equiv /nato) with all LO capabilities engaged?

just curious, as ive read about possible electronic sig capturing when LO platforms were ferried over uk/france/etc for airshows...but curious if this is policy is also practiced when trainin with nato/allies. (e.g., do/have our allies tried to capture signatuers during training sessions with us --- almost behind usaf's back? (to an extent?))

 

[Bonza]

there's also the recent examples of RAAF exchange pilots who are in reticle range and can't get a lock on F-22's. They were using onboard sensors as well as attempting to get the wespons to supplement with their own seekers to acquire.

Supplementary article on the F-22 at Red Flag, with quotes from pilots flying against it, for those who are interested in the above:

Feature - Raptors wield 'unfair' advantage at Red Flag

 

[gf0012-aust]

what is the policy regarding LO/VLO platforms and friendlies? the luneburg lens is deployed for ferry over friendly skies (air traffic controlled / civilian airspace) and also deployed during air shows over allied nations, right? i was under an impression that the full "ears down" is not deployed until time of war...

its one of the things that I continually stress by citing USAF incidents involving F-117's entering Saudi space in GW1 and GW2

does the usaf ever practice will allies (raaf, raf, equiv /nato) with all LO capabilities engaged?

I'm not sure about whats in the public domain, so am loathe to comment - hwoever bear in mind that RAF and RAAF pilots on exchange with USAF units have either driven or engaged F-22's in 4I's engagements.

just curious, as ive read about possible electronic sig capturing when LO platforms were ferried over uk/france/etc for airshows...but curious if this is policy is also practiced when trainin with nato/allies. (e.g., do/have our allies tried to capture signatuers during training sessions with us --- almost behind usaf's back? (to an extent?))

You've no doubt seen me get frustrated when kids go and quote Rapier 2 systems acquiring LO's over farnborough and crotales and the like doing similar over Le Bourget. What they don't seem to understand is that those LO's are not going to be travelling around the most saturated sensor air space in the world (look at all the civil and military systems that are in that 1000km band over western europe). They deliberately go in loud. Again, I'd point out the failure of military systems to track manage and identify LO's over Saudi Arabia even though the SA's were incredibly nervous about Iraqui pre-emptive strikes and had everything up and listening. They did not even see the LO's until they were on short finals. The F-22 is a magnitude of success "better" in its sig management capabilities.

In the case of the F-117's they had 3 x retractable antennas, and it was one of the things that I struggled to educate one of the posters on SP when he didn't understand how much reflection even a "proud" rivet could generate on an aircraft., Again, look at the trouble that friendly pilots had in finding VLO's even when they were WVR and in the same tasking/flight corridor.

 

[localhost127]

thanks for the response

In the case of the F-117's they had 3 x retractable antennas, and it was one of the things that I struggled to educate one of the posters on SP when he didn't understand how much reflection even a "proud" rivet could generate on an aircraft., Again, look at the trouble that friendly pilots had in finding VLO's even when they were WVR and in the same tasking/flight corridor.

right - i noted this while reading sk0nk works regarding early testing of the f117 whose sig suddenly jumped --- and they nailed the increase down to a screw/rivet that had become undone. very precise --- and it all the more illustrates scrutiny regarding pak-fa's (and any future claimed LO platforms) exposed rivets/lack of airframe smoothing.




edit: also, regarding airshows / flying over public space --- this video maybe illustrates why supercruise (lack of afterburner) is imperative to IR masking....but im also curious if there were IR modes that were not engaged during this airshow (e.g. internal fuel pumped to cool the airframe edges, etc - if that can be disabled to appear 'hot') or if any of that data is publicly released. this question in regards to my earlier post, as you would think they would run the f22s 'hot' on purpose during the airshows so anyone with a flir like in this video couldnt get a sig

[nomedia]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58N6Plr17GU[/nomedia]

 

[gf0012-aust]

edit: also, regarding airshows / flying over public space --- this video maybe illustrates why supercruise (lack of afterburner) is imperative to IR masking....but im also curious if there were IR modes that were not engaged during this airshow (e.g. internal fuel pumped to cool the airframe edges, etc - if that can be disabled to appear 'hot') or if any of that data is publicly released. this question in regards to my earlier post, as you would think they would run the f22s 'hot' on purpose during the airshows so anyone with a flir like in this video couldnt get a sig

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58N6Plr17GU

I haven't seen anything in the public domain about USAF standard op procedures about flying around in open airspace, but it is possible to start doing the detective work when you read through publications such as Skunk Works and Bandits over Bagdhad. They''re written by first hand participants/pilots/engineers etc and invariably release some useful nuggets.

like any forensics, the catch is collecting and then piecng it all together

 

[lizs]

This pic is an effective Russian-style defense system against stealth targets.

http://oi56.tinypic.com/20qf2tg.jpg

Currently, three existing technologies are able to accurately trace stealth targets in the range of 6~10 miles: IR, advanced millimeter radar and ultra-board band radar. The long range meter wave radar are able to be locate stealth planes with an error of 1~3 miles and their emitters are highly mobilized. They can work as reliable initial and intermediate guidance for the air-defense missile. Then the missile on-board IR seeker or active millimeter radar as terminal guidance can find and accurately lock on the stealth target. After I happened to see this pic last week, I realized that this approach has been in military practice for years.

The unique geometry and special coating on stealth plane can only defeat centimeter and decimeter radars. So I am now wondering the stealth technology will be outdated very soon if they don't improve themselves.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Several problems (if not more) with your arguments.

But then again, your using an APA pic so this is not surprising.

1. No mention of SEAD activities

2. No mention of jamming from the F-35

3. You're making a lot of assumptions about the limits of the F-35's shape and coatings and how it affects the kill-chain.

4. The first step in that kill-chain assumes that it will pick up on some emission from the F-35.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The unique geometry and special coating on stealth plane can only defeat centimeter and decimeter radars. So I am now wondering the stealth technology will be outdated very soon if they don't improve themselves.

I suggest that you search through all the other threads on here re VLO/LO management. The above is just not true and refers to specific generations of VLO assets.

the US abandoned VLO based on geometrical passive management 30 years ago.

every publicly listed manned VLO asset thyat they have impressed into service has used different signature management concepts.. every publicly listed unmanned VLO asset shown to the public has also witnessed generational change within that release.

signal management and VLO are NOT fixed constructs.

 

[My2Cents]

This pic is an effective Russian-style defense system against stealth targets.

http://oi56.tinypic.com/20qf2tg.jpg

Currently, three existent technologies are able to accurately trace stealth targets in the range of 6~10 miles: IR, advanced millimeter radar and ultra-board band radar. The long range meter wave radar are able to be locate stealth planes with an error of 1~3 miles and their emitters are highly mobilized. They can work as reliable initial and intermediate guidance for the air-defense missile. Then the missile on-board IR seeker or active millimeter radar as terminal guidance can find and accurately lock on the stealth target. After I happened to see this pic last week, I realized that this approach has been in military practice for years.

The unique geometry and special coating on stealth plane can only defeat centimeter and decimeter radars. So I am now wondering the stealth technology will be outdated very soon if they don't improve themselves.

The pic is for a standard S-300 battery. All the radar systems are standard cm range types.

The ultra-broad band radar systems cannot be made highly mobile. A system capable of localizing current stealth aircraft would require a dish over 100 meters wide, too large to steer mechanically without a solid foundation like an astronomical radio telescope (many of which are capable of operating in the same range). Consequently these systems are all phased array types which must be disassembled for transport then re-assembled and calibrated before use. The systems are huge, covering several hundred meters, a week or more to set up.

Millimeter radar for short range terminal guidance works. Millimeter radar for long range detection does not because this frequency band is susceptible to atmospheric absorption. This means that signal strength drop exponentially with distance as well as range squared. So the missile can home on the target, if you can get it into detection range AND in the field of view. Ultra-broad band radar probably lacks the resolution to do this. It would also require a large missile for the ultra-broad band radar to be able to track it.

Still, it could be made to work if you launch the missiles in salvoes and guide them to simultaneously search a large enough area with their terminal seekers. You would need a lot more missiles and launchers, to avoid getting caught while reloading. And the system would be very susceptible to tricking into false launches.

 

[lizs]

Several problems (if not more) with your arguments.

But then again, your using an APA pic so this is not surprising.

1. No mention of SEAD activities

2. No mention of jamming from the F-35

3. You're making a lot of assumptions about the limits of the F-35's shape and coatings and how it affects the kill-chain.

4. The first step in that kill-chain assumes that it will pick up on some emission from the F-35.

1. This topic is solely about practical anti-stealth techniques, SEAD not necessarily related to this scenario. Many modern SAM radars, such as the S-300 PMU2, have the feature of low-probability-of-intercept which protects them from ARMs. And the passive radars like the VERA, as you can see a similar one in the picture, are 100% safe from ARM.

2. Modern radars are difficult to jam. Do you believe an EF-18G can successfully jam an APG-77? If a fighter jams, then it is an emitter, an easy and priority target.

3. I don't make assumptions by myself. All I talked about are general knowledge available in many websites.

4. I don't know where's the pic originally from. I think the "target" in the pic is a signal reflector rather than an emitter. You can find a radar in the lower center resembling a Czech VERA passive radar, which works in MHz and detects stealth targets. The signal can be from the environment such as radio broadcast and civil wireless communications.

 

[Bonza]

All I talked about are general knowledge available in many websites.

... and you don't think there could be any subtleties related to low observability and electronic warfare technology on a classified military aircraft that you might miss from deriving your information from general knowledge and public websites?

 

[SpudmanWP]

1. This topic is solely about practical anti-stealth techniques, SEAD not necessarily related to this scenario. Many modern SAM radars, such as the S-300 PMU2, have the feature of low detection rate which protects them from ARMs. And the passive radars like the VERA, as you can see a similar one in the picture, are 100% safe from ARM.

The topic is to "engage stealthy target", not just detect one, so the entire kill-chain is relevant. SAM radars are very detectable as they put out a tremendous amount of energy in a single band. The passive phase shown in the pic (steps A & B) is just the trip wire sensor. An active radar (step C) is still needed to engage the F-35.

2. Modern radars are difficult to jam. Do you believe an EF-18G can successfully jam an APG-77? If a fighter jams, then it is an emitter, an easy and priority target.

We are not talking about jamming a 77, but using an 81 or 77 to jam the engagement radar, datalink, or terminal seeker of the SAM. If modern SAMs were so difficult to jam then why are we investing in EF-18s or NGJ? If jamming did not work the entire world would not still be using it.

3. I don't make assumptions by myself. All I talked about are general knowledge available in many websites.

You made factual statements that all relate to shoddy research from APA. Many websites may talk about it, but if they are all using the same bogus source then they all are guilty of jumping on the anti F-35 bandwagon due to bad info.

4. I don't know where's the pic originally from. I think the "target" in the pic is a signal reflector rather than an emitter. You can find a radar in the lower center resembling a Czech VERA passive radar, which works in MHz and detects stealth targets. The signal can be from the environment such as radio broadcast and civil wireless communications.

Since the first stage in the kill-chain is a passive detector, the target has to be emitting not a signal reflector.

Passive radars (if they can be called a radar) only detect emmiters, not reflected energy from a 3rd party source. There have been white papers written about that ability but nothing has ever been built operationally.

Here is the original article from APA:

Warsaw Pact / Russian Emitter Locating Systems / ELINT Systems

 

[Aussie Digger]

This pic is an effective Russian-style defense system against stealth targets.

http://oi56.tinypic.com/20qf2tg.jpg

Currently, three existing technologies are able to accurately trace stealth targets in the range of 6~10 miles: IR, advanced millimeter radar and ultra-board band radar. The long range meter wave radar are able to be locate stealth planes with an error of 1~3 miles and their emitters are highly mobilized. They can work as reliable initial and intermediate guidance for the air-defense missile. Then the missile on-board IR seeker or active millimeter radar as terminal guidance can find and accurately lock on the stealth target. After I happened to see this pic last week, I realized that this approach has been in military practice for years.

The unique geometry and special coating on stealth plane can only defeat centimeter and decimeter radars. So I am now wondering the stealth technology will be outdated very soon if they don't improve themselves.

6-10 miles? Great.

JDAM has a standoff range of 12k's.

JSOW has a standoff range of 130k's.

AARGM has a standoff range of 80+ k's.

I hope these sensors can get out of dodge in a hurry. An ability to detect a JSF at 6-10 miles, means you WILL be killed every single time by this aircraft...