A new AA defense vehicle for US

[Rimasta]

The U.S. military doesn't seemed as concerned about defending against manned aircraft as it does about swarm UAV's and ballistic and cruise missiles.
In 2003, the Iraqi's fired 5 modified cruise missiles at coalition forces, and not only were none intercepted, it appears the coalition didn't even have the capability to reliably detect, track, and engage cruise missiles. One of the cruise missiles is reported to have barley missed U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Kuwait. It seems the experience was an eye-opener for the U.S. military, especially as missile technology proliferates around the world, to certain vulnerabilities.

And thank you Ranger25 for pointing out the M6 Linebacker was retired from U.S. service almost 10 years ago. The U.S. may not have the SAM inventories or doctrine that Russian forces have, but that doesn't mean enemy aircraft wouldn't suffer losses penetrating U.S./Allied airspace in trying to strike missile sites or other strategic or tactical targets. The F-15 is jokingly referred to as,"a flying SAM site" get a flight of 4 with AWACS support and they'll make their presence felt to any would be attacker.

 

[Ranger25]

The U.S. military doesn't seemed as concerned about defending against manned aircraft as it does about swarm UAV's and ballistic and cruise missiles.
In 2003, the Iraqi's fired 5 modified cruise missiles at coalition forces, and not only were none intercepted, it appears the coalition didn't even have the capability to reliably detect, track, and engage cruise missiles. One of the cruise missiles is reported to have barley missed U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Kuwait. It seems the experience was an eye-opener for the U.S. military, especially as missile technology proliferates around the world, to certain vulnerabilities.

And thank you Ranger25 for pointing out the M6 Linebacker was retired from U.S. service almost 10 years ago. The U.S. may not have the SAM inventories or doctrine that Russian forces have, but that doesn't mean enemy aircraft wouldn't suffer losses penetrating U.S./Allied airspace in trying to strike missile sites or other strategic or tactical targets. The F-15 is jokingly referred to as,"a flying SAM site" get a flight of 4 with AWACS support and they'll make their presence felt to any would be attacker.

More updates on US C-RAM. This is the ground based VLS style system I was looking into before

Addresses the cruise missile issue etc, ideal for the Isklander I believe the intent is to. Lunt the system on the same vehicle family as the HIMARS




CMDS IFPC2 Home

 

[barney41]

First I've heard of it but LM has developed an affordable Miniature Hit-to-kill vehicle that can be fielded in large numbers to help deal with swarming attacks. Basically a guided dart.

New Launcher to Deploy C-RAM, C-UAV and Counter Cruise-Missile Defenses by 2019 | Defense Update:
EAPS Miniature Missile Successful in the First Guided Flight | Defense Update:

 

[ngatimozart]

You know I realise that it is a doctrine issue and that the US military believe that with their technology and doctrine they can defeat most if not all IADS they may have to face and then destroy any hostile air capabilities. However given that they first did it in 1991 and twice since most, if not all, potential enemies have studied and analysed the methodology. Time has moved on and technology has rapidly advanced on both sides of the argument.

One argument that Tod presented was that the US would not go up against a nuclear power with similar capabilities because of the inherent danger of nuclear war. Whilst this may be accepted by some as a given, theoretically it is still possible that a low to medium level armed confrontation between say the US and China or Russia could occur where the outcome would not threaten the homelands of the participants. Secondly the US could be involved in an armed confrontation with a non nuclear combatant who has the ability to adequately protect their airborne assets, IADS and C4 nodes and nexus from significant destruction - sufficiently nullifying the effects of the initial shock and awe strikes. These are possibilities that have to be taken into account.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the US airwar experts determined that the days of dogfighting had passed and guns on fighters were anachronistic. So fighters were designed, built and flown without guns, having just missiles for air to air capabilities. The Vietnam War soon put paid to that theory and F4 Phanthoms had gun packs fitted. Now in my eyes the same argument is happening in US circles regarding ground based AA for the US Army and USMC. Because the USAF, USN and USMC are presumed to be able to obtain and retain control of the airspaces then little or no AA is required for ground forces. However I believe that this presumption is a fallacy and that such control of the air is not guaranteed and as such, ground forces should be provided with good short and medium range AA capabilities. For short range I believe a combination of SAM and light AAA up to say 40mm would be ideal especially if it is mobile. For the medium range a LAADS SAM system say out to 20 miles would be reasonable. These are my thoughts anyway.

 

[Todjaeger]

One argument that Tod presented was that the US would not go up against a nuclear power with similar capabilities because of the inherent danger of nuclear war. Whilst this may be accepted by some as a given, theoretically it is still possible that a low to medium level armed confrontation between say the US and China or Russia could occur where the outcome would not threaten the homelands of the participants. Secondly the US could be involved in an armed confrontation with a non nuclear combatant who has the ability to adequately protect their airborne assets, IADS and C4 nodes and nexus from significant destruction - sufficiently nullifying the effects of the initial shock and awe strikes. These are possibilities that have to be taken into account.

The above makes a different series of assumptions than I had, regarding US doctrine.

The first apparent assumption from above, is that the US would still commit ground troops, without having first established control over the airspace.

The second, is that the US would have no fighter(s) aloft which could intercept a hostile aircraft.

From my POV, you get more 'bang' for your buck if you dump developmental money into increasing the numbers and capabilities of multi-role fighter aircraft which can attack or defend, vs. fielding a dedicated air defence platform. Yes, the pun was intended,

Another consideration with for an IADS with a significant GBAD component, is the potential for blue on blue engagements and casualties. AFAIK, there is no sufficiently capable, CEC-type system in place so that a US/NATO GBAD platform can target hostile air, and advise allied aircraft that said hostile is already being targeted/engaged. There is no common operating picture in place so an AEW&C would know that an inbound hostile is about to be force-fed a pair of SAM's, and therefore the AEW&C does not need to task a fighter flight to 'deal' with the enemy aircraft.

Could such a system be developed? Potentially, yes. OTOH, would it not be money better spent on the air systems which can be used to attack and defend airspace and ground?

 

[barney41]

The Army is working on IBCS to network and achieve a unified Command and Control over it's disparate air defense systems. Concurrently, work is ongoing linking up with CEC and presumably with the other Armed Services. BIg Brothrer is coming to the battlespace.

Army Tests New Missile Defense Brain, IBCS; Navy, MDA Intrigued « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary
That first test will be a Patriot launcher and a Sentinel air defense radar, Verwiel told me. The ultimate goal is to mix and match freely: not just among Army missile defense systems, but between the four armed services, and not just among existing systems, but with easy plug-and-play for any future system, including exotica such as laser weapons. The program has already gotten IBCS to talk to the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) — albeit in a lab, not in a field test — and it will eventually link up to the Missile Defense Agency’s command network for continental defense, C2BMC (Command & Control, Battle Management, & Communications). Of course, just getting all the Army’s systems to work together will be challenge enough to start with.

That flexibility is what makes IBCS — not new missiles, not new radars, not even lasers — the “Number 1 priority” of the Army’s air and missile defense force, Space and Missile Defense Command’s Gen. David Mann said at a February conference.

“Many folks can just dismiss it as a network,” said Brig. Gen. Christopher Spillman, commander of the Air Defense Artillery School, at the same Association of the US Army conference. “It’s much more than that.”