It’s not simple at all. To load a half squadron of 6 F-35Bs and their required support and consumables onto a Canberra class LHD would have significant effect on the ship’s capacity to support the amphibious ready group. To support them for two weeks flying would require 1,000-2,000 tonnes of fuel alone. If our LHDs were 50% bigger like a USN LHD then this would be doable but they aren’t so this remains solely in the fantasy navy world.
A hypothetical carrier buy for the RAN?
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We do have some flexability with the LHD's in the fact they can "handle" a F-35B. That does not mean operate them like a carrier would, but it able to launch, land, refuel and rearm one.
If we wanted some Adhoc carrier training, inteligence gathering, deterant etc then if we could dig up some F-35B's that would be possible.
If something in our region when very bad very quickly, and the US flew a few squads of F-35B's then they could in theory be operated off our LHD for a limited time, or be stationed to take off very quickly. If the LHD's were already there, with say our troops deployed as peace keepers with a fairly well resourced base setup. I would imagine this state would only exist until they could move other assets into theater, and given the USAF even this would be an unlikely possibility.
I think there is a strong argument for a 3rd LHD on amphibious requirements alone. With 3 ships you might be able to surge all 3 into deployment and have some F-35B operating off them but its not going to be very effective for so many reasons. Instead of F-35B's, buying several more refueller aircraft might be much more effective at projecting Australia's airpower.
In the end we are better off spending money on making decent amphibious capability which is supportable regionally by our airforce than pushing into carrier land. If you do push into carriers, do it whole heartedly, by buying a cvf.
If we wanted some Adhoc carrier training, inteligence gathering, deterant etc then if we could dig up some F-35B's that would be possible.
If something in our region when very bad very quickly, and the US flew a few squads of F-35B's then they could in theory be operated off our LHD for a limited time, or be stationed to take off very quickly. If the LHD's were already there, with say our troops deployed as peace keepers with a fairly well resourced base setup. I would imagine this state would only exist until they could move other assets into theater, and given the USAF even this would be an unlikely possibility.
I think there is a strong argument for a 3rd LHD on amphibious requirements alone. With 3 ships you might be able to surge all 3 into deployment and have some F-35B operating off them but its not going to be very effective for so many reasons. Instead of F-35B's, buying several more refueller aircraft might be much more effective at projecting Australia's airpower.
In the end we are better off spending money on making decent amphibious capability which is supportable regionally by our airforce than pushing into carrier land. If you do push into carriers, do it whole heartedly, by buying a cvf.
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
Assuming 3 sorties per day, that's ~20 tons of fuel needed per F-35B or 120 tons per day for 6. Also could have an accompanying AOR eg Sirius with 3000+ tons of aviation fuel or the smaller Success with 1000+ tons to continuously fuel and replenishment munitions. With the Sirius, the LHD could even sustain 6 sorties per day which is the calculated surge rate for the F-35B.
@ 6 sorties per day for 14 days for 6 a/c = 504 sorties. Assuming 8 SDBs per sortie and all strike = 4,032 SDBs = ~523 tons. Alternatively, 4 x AIM-120D = 2,016 AMRAAMs = ~353 tons. Since no one has 2000 aircraft to shoot down nor fire 4000 targets with SDBs, a more realistic carriage of ~5-10% of that number to support ~300 sorties is justifiable. ~38 tons of SDBs (288) and maybe 100 amraams ~17 tons. Add maybe two dozen joint strike missiles @500kg each = 12 tons. Add 72 x 1000 lb JDAMs = ~33 tons. Total 100 tons. Worst case, carry a couple of Abram MBTs less and the weight is matched. Not significant and again replenishment vessels will carry far more.
Probably need only 8 x F-35Bs (with 75% serviceability) cos the a/c is transferable from ship to ship if only 1 vessel is required at any one time.
If this was not feasible, the joint standing committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade would not have recommended the F-35B buy for the LHDs.
That is potentially possible. A LHD operates ~18 medium sized helos. A helo like a NH-90 carries ~2 tons of fuel internal and another ton external. So the LHD could probably carry sufficient aviation fuel for 6 F-35Bs which has an internal fuel capacity of 6.4 tons. It will however have to sacrifice helos for planes.
Assuming 3 sorties per day, that's ~20 tons of fuel needed per F-35B or 120 tons per day for 6. Also could have an accompanying AOR eg Sirius with 3000+ tons of aviation fuel or the smaller Success with 1000+ tons to continuously fuel and replenishment munitions. With the Sirius, the LHD could even sustain 6 sorties per day which is the calculated surge rate for the F-35B.
@ 6 sorties per day for 14 days for 6 a/c = 504 sorties. Assuming 8 SDBs per sortie and all strike = 4,032 SDBs = ~523 tons. Alternatively, 4 x AIM-120D = 2,016 AMRAAMs = ~353 tons. Since no one has 2000 aircraft to shoot down nor fire 4000 targets with SDBs, a more realistic carriage of ~5-10% of that number to support ~300 sorties is justifiable. ~38 tons of SDBs (288) and maybe 100 amraams ~17 tons. Add maybe two dozen joint strike missiles @500kg each = 12 tons. Add 72 x 1000 lb JDAMs = ~33 tons. Total 100 tons. Worst case, carry a couple of Abram MBTs less and the weight is matched. Not significant and again replenishment vessels will carry far more.
Probably need only 8 x F-35Bs (with 75% serviceability) cos the a/c is transferable from ship to ship if only 1 vessel is required at any one time.
If this was not feasible, the joint standing committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade would not have recommended the F-35B buy for the LHDs.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
You seem to have made some assumptions which are not quite supported with fact. The 16-24 helicopters which the LHD is expected to carry will be in support of the troops the LHD lands. Any F-35B carried aboard a Canberra-class is going to be at the space/displacement expense of one (or most likely more) of those helicopters. Secondly, there is a limited amount of space/displacement available aboard for aviation fuels, IIRC the figure of 800 tons available for aviation fuel comes to mind, any fuel for F-35B's will be at the expense of fuel for the embarked helicopters. Thirdly, there is also a limited amount of space/displacement in the armoury available for munitions to equip any aircraft carried aboard, any weapons for the F-35B will also be at the expense of munitions for the helicopters.
Yes, a Canberra-class would have sufficient space to carry more fuel and munitions aboard once the vehicles are disembarked, or if one or more M1 Abrams tanks are not transported... Any space and displacement 'gained' this way would not be configured to safely carry explosive or combustible materials safely. This would be a dangerous and stupid situation to find oneself in in a benign environment, since serious damage and potential loss of the ship could result from a simple and common accident. In a high threat environment, such an operating condition would IMO be virtually criminal except in extremis, when a capability was required and there was absolutely no other way to arrange it.
Now, it would be possible to have the HMAS Success attached to the task force to provide additional fuel bunkerage for the F-35B's embarked, as well as a stockpile of munitions to arm them with... IMO such a solution is not desirable or really practical. For one thing, given the estimates used above about F-35B sortie rates and fuel consumption, the onboard aviation fuel stocks would be depleted in just under a week, and that is assuming that all the fuel carried and used was just for the F-35B's. Now, the Canberra-class LHD is currently expected to have a 50 day endurance before requiring replenishment, not a 7 day endurance, which I expect would seriously cut into operations. Not to mention I would expect that RAS would more likely need to be conducted every 4-5 days, given that likely no more than two-thirds of the aviation fuel aboard would be available for the F-35B's.
And this whole situation still ignores just how useful 6 embarked F-35B's would be to an amphibious task force. Just 6 F-35B's as discussed previously is really insufficient to maintain a CAP around the task force, given operational taskings and the minor little detail like how often the LHD would need to RAS and possibly preclude flight ops while doing so. If the intent is just to provide a strike or CAS capability, then six F-35B's is either overkill or significantly insufficient. In terms of being overkill, if the objective is just to have an airborne platform from which to fire a cannon, launch missiles or drop bombs with little or no opposing enemy air defence, then a LO fighter platform is not needed. In fact, the Tiger ARH might be a better alternative, and there would likely not be a large and hardened target which the ARH could not engage. OTOH, six F-35B's could also be insufficient if there was an IADS, and/or a significant number of protected and hardened targets, since even with the F-35B being a LO platform, a maximum six aircraft surge flight can only strike so many targets at once, and that small a number would not be in a position to sanitize an area quickly unless there was already little need to do so.
-Cheers
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
Your first and second point is repeating the last sentence of the 1st para. Your assumption is that the intensity of helo ops (at the tail end) will not exceed or is far less than the F-35B operations. Secondly, the numbers for F-35B fuel is assuming full internal fuel usage ie bingo. Its unlikely that occurs all the time in actual use is unlikely.
Your third point fails to take into account space reduction for less helos compared to 6 F-35Bs. The number of munitions suggested don't take up that much space.
Also appreciate the source pls for 800 tons figure. As to RAS, you should research how frequently RAS was performed in CV conflicts like Falklands before suggesting that once every 4-5 days is a lot. In many cases, nightly RAS is common to ensure that the CV is tanked up.
Your second para assumes that the LHD will not have sufficient space to place 100 tons or less of munitions. I can't comment as I've not seen the actual layout and space allocation. Rather than assuming everyone is dumb enough to place munitions in an unprotected place, consider how it can be made safe and perhaps you might find an answer. Each LHD needs to carry quite a lot of ammo to bring to a fight and its not just in the tanks and APCs.
The assumption of 50 days endurance is dependent on the role. If escort, its point A to point B. 14 days @ 15 kts = 5000 nm. Anything more is really a question of how many sorties the F-35B will fly. One can do 1 sortie a day for 50 days for 6 and still ends up with 50 days endurance. 1 sortie a day happens to be what land based fighters achieved in the desert storm.
The assumption of not having an AOR support a CVL is ridiculous. Everyone does it including for the super carrier groups (ie escort vessels for fuel & carrier for munitions etc). In fact, I think US does it every 10-14 days in peacetime.
The last para actually ignores all the arguments regarding how a small number of fighters can be utilised in arguments to date. Consider why catapult armed merchantmen were used in ww2, the impact on MPA detection, the inability of land based fighters to sustain air cover etc. All of which has not been rebutted. It also fails to consider the level of air forces in the region eg Indonesia.
And if one doesn't bother to re-read and still assumes that its insufficient, there is always the principle that insufficient fighters is always better than none-at all.
- Cheers in return!
As usual, can't argue when a person makes a generalised statement like everything is wrong or not factual. If it was not factual, the facts could have been easily pointed out.
Your first and second point is repeating the last sentence of the 1st para. Your assumption is that the intensity of helo ops (at the tail end) will not exceed or is far less than the F-35B operations. Secondly, the numbers for F-35B fuel is assuming full internal fuel usage ie bingo. Its unlikely that occurs all the time in actual use is unlikely.
Your third point fails to take into account space reduction for less helos compared to 6 F-35Bs. The number of munitions suggested don't take up that much space.
Also appreciate the source pls for 800 tons figure. As to RAS, you should research how frequently RAS was performed in CV conflicts like Falklands before suggesting that once every 4-5 days is a lot. In many cases, nightly RAS is common to ensure that the CV is tanked up.
Your second para assumes that the LHD will not have sufficient space to place 100 tons or less of munitions. I can't comment as I've not seen the actual layout and space allocation. Rather than assuming everyone is dumb enough to place munitions in an unprotected place, consider how it can be made safe and perhaps you might find an answer. Each LHD needs to carry quite a lot of ammo to bring to a fight and its not just in the tanks and APCs.
The assumption of 50 days endurance is dependent on the role. If escort, its point A to point B. 14 days @ 15 kts = 5000 nm. Anything more is really a question of how many sorties the F-35B will fly. One can do 1 sortie a day for 50 days for 6 and still ends up with 50 days endurance. 1 sortie a day happens to be what land based fighters achieved in the desert storm.
The assumption of not having an AOR support a CVL is ridiculous. Everyone does it including for the super carrier groups (ie escort vessels for fuel & carrier for munitions etc). In fact, I think US does it every 10-14 days in peacetime.
The last para actually ignores all the arguments regarding how a small number of fighters can be utilised in arguments to date. Consider why catapult armed merchantmen were used in ww2, the impact on MPA detection, the inability of land based fighters to sustain air cover etc. All of which has not been rebutted. It also fails to consider the level of air forces in the region eg Indonesia.
And if one doesn't bother to re-read and still assumes that its insufficient, there is always the principle that insufficient fighters is always better than none-at all.
- Cheers in return!
However in comparing cabilities 1 light carrier plus 20 F35bs (allowing 15 flight wing and training/spares) at a price of $4-6b would allow the equivalent purchase of another 2-3 collins or ANZAC II frigates/destroyers. Both able to conduct sea denial, anti-ship and land attack missions. Additionally the Anzacs could provide air defence for the fleet as well. the only mission they would struggle with would be CAS.
Both platforms would also be part of large established logistics chains, already in place (12 collins or 8 Anzacs) and would benefit from further scales of economy, while the carrier and F35bs would to an extent be orphaned assets.
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
A single collins carries a payload of just 22 (normally torps but may include a few sub-harps). The comparison cost of delivering each munition is way above and capabilities way below what a single CVL with just 6 F-35Bs can achieve or do. And again the assumption is that a CVL has to do sea denial, anti-ship and land attack missions as its primary role which is again an over-statement of the intended role of the ship.
An F-35B has not only a combat range of 900km, it adds another 240km with the JSM. The sub-harp has a range of 1XXkm. Not only that, the F-35B offers flexibility in deciding the kinds of munitions necessary for the target eg if I got a terrorist in sight, a pesky FAC or a pirate sailing ship, I don't need a $m harpoon and can use a cheaper $500 Mk-82 or $20k LGB.
The fallacy of ship-based only aerial air defence has been exposed in numerous wars and has not been validated in any recent war and this has been rebutted to death and re-surfaces like a zombie. The last time an aegis vessel shot down an aircraft which I can remember was in 1988 when it downed an Iranian airliner by mistake. Prior to that was the "brilliant" sea dart type 45s during Falklands.
The hobarts would have been a better example than the Anzacs but its not a panacea.
2 QEs cost US$6b. Yet a single CVL +20 F-35Bs cost $4-$6b? I'm not so sure. Consider how much Australia paid for the canberras.
A single collins carries a payload of just 22 (normally torps but may include a few sub-harps). The comparison cost of delivering each munition is way above and capabilities way below what a single CVL with just 6 F-35Bs can achieve or do. And again the assumption is that a CVL has to do sea denial, anti-ship and land attack missions as its primary role which is again an over-statement of the intended role of the ship.
An F-35B has not only a combat range of 900km, it adds another 240km with the JSM. The sub-harp has a range of 1XXkm. Not only that, the F-35B offers flexibility in deciding the kinds of munitions necessary for the target eg if I got a terrorist in sight, a pesky FAC or a pirate sailing ship, I don't need a $m harpoon and can use a cheaper $500 Mk-82 or $20k LGB.
The fallacy of ship-based only aerial air defence has been exposed in numerous wars and has not been validated in any recent war and this has been rebutted to death and re-surfaces like a zombie. The last time an aegis vessel shot down an aircraft which I can remember was in 1988 when it downed an Iranian airliner by mistake. Prior to that was the "brilliant" sea dart type 45s during Falklands.
The hobarts would have been a better example than the Anzacs but its not a panacea.
The real advantage of subs is the other guy doesn't know where they are, therefore that have to assume they could be somewhere very inconvenient, they are not only capable of operating undetected their potential presence can also tie up substantial opposing forces.
The advantage of a carrier is its flexibility and physical presence, however it can only be at one place at a time which makes it easier for an opposing force to compensate or counter.
A submarine capability has the potential to disperse an opposing force leaving it chasing shadows where a carrier will concentrate them on this one key objective / target. If you are confident / courageous enough you could use the carrier as a giant bug zapper and tie the enemy up that way. Use your subs and land based airpower to attrite the enemy that has deployed to engage your carrier.
The best option is to have both, having the enemy watching your carriers every move while also looking over their shoulder fearing what your subs are up to. In the mean time your fat ships can get on with their jobs relatively unmolested.
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
If I had to choose between subs or an escort carrier for escorting a convoy, I'd choose a carrier cos a sub can't defend air attacks whereas an escort carrier might still have ASW helos. A hobart can do both roles as well but imho the effectiveness will not exceed that of a carrier even one with only a few F-35Bs. Having said that, the RAN clearly thinks it is sufficient in the context of Australia needs.
Actually a non-nuclear sub esp without AIP is often limited by submerged range which does provide the aggressor with an indication of where to search. Any sub on the surface is exposed to visual, IR and radar detection. There is of course the argument that a collins would only need to snorkel a few minutes a day. But the person to best comment about this on this forum is probably gf.
http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/3828/1/DSTO-GD-0042 PR.pdf
The latest surface-search radars carried on helos and MPAs are very sensitive ie can pick periscopes at fairly good ranges. The access to such radars may of course be limited from potential aggressors but most already have access to APS-504s for their MPA (ie China & Indonesia). If used in defence, each 504 set provides quite a large area of coverage which forces the submarine to submerge at greater distance from their targets.
In simple terms, the aggressor may not know where subs are, but they know where they might strike.
Whilst cautioning against over-estimation, the assumptions mentioned in the above has not taken into account potential defensive subs, ASW patrols, underwater surveillance/defences, chokepoint mining etc. Even in the land-attack role, the subs are themselves facing greater risks. Its not exactly a free ride either.
I wouldn't send a single CVL to face China but SLOC defense is another matter.
If I had to choose between subs or an escort carrier for escorting a convoy, I'd choose a carrier cos a sub can't defend air attacks whereas an escort carrier might still have ASW helos. A hobart can do both roles as well but imho the effectiveness will not exceed that of a carrier even one with only a few F-35Bs. Having said that, the RAN clearly thinks it is sufficient in the context of Australia needs.
Actually a non-nuclear sub esp without AIP is often limited by submerged range which does provide the aggressor with an indication of where to search. Any sub on the surface is exposed to visual, IR and radar detection. There is of course the argument that a collins would only need to snorkel a few minutes a day. But the person to best comment about this on this forum is probably gf.
http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/3828/1/DSTO-GD-0042 PR.pdf
The latest surface-search radars carried on helos and MPAs are very sensitive ie can pick periscopes at fairly good ranges. The access to such radars may of course be limited from potential aggressors but most already have access to APS-504s for their MPA (ie China & Indonesia). If used in defence, each 504 set provides quite a large area of coverage which forces the submarine to submerge at greater distance from their targets.
In simple terms, the aggressor may not know where subs are, but they know where they might strike.
Whilst cautioning against over-estimation, the assumptions mentioned in the above has not taken into account potential defensive subs, ASW patrols, underwater surveillance/defences, chokepoint mining etc. Even in the land-attack role, the subs are themselves facing greater risks. Its not exactly a free ride either.
Again, those who advocate a carrier or using the LHDs as a carrier are all over the place how many aircraft it takes to do a cap, much less striking missions. Oh, the fuel bunkerage may last a week for six fighter jets, but would last only a third of a week for eighteen. But doing this consumes all of the fuel bunkerage leaving nothing for the helicopters the ship was designed for in the first place. If the RAN is going to have to top off the carrier every other day or even once a week, just how many replenishment ships does the RAN have? Just how many days will it take the replenishment ship to sail to refuel from a port with sufficient fuel reserves and back to the task force? Surely its very likely more than a few days, maybe a week or more... The RAN will need more replenishment ships to do this operation again and again for possibly months on end...
Anyone with any math knowledge understands the logistical problems. The carrier advocates continue to mock or show any understanding of logistics. Six fighter jets aren't enough, and if you bother to introduce carrier fighter jets, the more the better to undertake cap and striking missions. The RAN needs more replenishment ships and more escorts of the replenishment ships on top of using a LHD as a carrier, much less buy the fighter jets...
Finally, those who engage carriers for combat operations want two carriers to provide round the clock cap and striking operations seven days a week... Simply put the carrier advocates downplay the costs significantly, they make it sound as if its only the difference of buying six F-35Bs instead of six F-35As, and that is only for one LHD. To do both LHDs the RAN will need at least twelve F-35Bs, which aren't enough. Where are the more escorts and replenishment ships?
This is sounding more and more like a boondoggle of the greatest proportions... If the LHDs are to do both amphibious assaults and carrier operations, the LHDs will most likely have to be topped off very often, probably every day... All the carrier advocates see is a flat top on the LHDs, never mind logistics...
Anyone with any math knowledge understands the logistical problems. The carrier advocates continue to mock or show any understanding of logistics. Six fighter jets aren't enough, and if you bother to introduce carrier fighter jets, the more the better to undertake cap and striking missions. The RAN needs more replenishment ships and more escorts of the replenishment ships on top of using a LHD as a carrier, much less buy the fighter jets...
Finally, those who engage carriers for combat operations want two carriers to provide round the clock cap and striking operations seven days a week... Simply put the carrier advocates downplay the costs significantly, they make it sound as if its only the difference of buying six F-35Bs instead of six F-35As, and that is only for one LHD. To do both LHDs the RAN will need at least twelve F-35Bs, which aren't enough. Where are the more escorts and replenishment ships?
This is sounding more and more like a boondoggle of the greatest proportions... If the LHDs are to do both amphibious assaults and carrier operations, the LHDs will most likely have to be topped off very often, probably every day... All the carrier advocates see is a flat top on the LHDs, never mind logistics...
Please don’t mix the fantasy arguments of the six F-35Bs per LHD with those made for a proper carrier capability. As to the escorts and replenishment ships argument this is overstated. Injecting a single operational carrier into the RAN is not going to require additional escorts. The surface combatants are already there the deployment of a carrier will actually provide an ‘escort’ or layered protection around these ships. There would be the need for an additional replenishment ship (one per carrier) but considering the woeful state of the RAN’s fleet train any such boost should be very welcome.
You only need two carriers for 24-7 operations if it is a catapult/arrestor carrier due to the limitations of cyclic operations. A STOVL carrier has no problems providing a 24-7 capability by itself. This has been extensively proven by the RN and in combat operations.
Using the LHDs as carriers when they are supposed to be amphibious assault ships is not a rational argument for a carrier capability. The two shouldn’t be confused.
I am not going to talk now on the tankers ships that might need the Ran, with or without carrier.
But remember that Wasp has official configs of 6 jets, and also of 20 jets, and Wasp has just litle more than twice (if) jp5 than Canberras, so for 4 days instead of 2 wrt all jets in the air at the same time, for example.
So there are many things jets will be useful than to burn all the jp5, because Us Marines want some jets on their ships.
F35b has some problems but it is being developed, maybe some delay, but it´s normal as structural issues wrt thrusts are different in stvol than F35a or c, the previous reference they have on stvol is the Harrier, that is much ligther. It´s like they are in new domains of technique and need some time. But the need from Marines or their wish for F35b is big. And as the Us government takes care of the Marines and give them years of development of Osprey´s, years updating Harriers as well. And they want 340 F35b and budget previewed for it. Any delay of big difficullty might increase the F35b price but instead of 340 they will buy 300, for example, but if Marines need something like support then it is a preference for Us.
The 3rd sealift ship being another Canberra its great in so many things, just think in it as sealift, 46 tanks, 70 or 100 other vehicles in upper deck, Ran could pass some vehicles from the other 2 Canberras to this 3rd sealift ship and so have some more space in upper deck in the 2 Canberras, for:
-you´ve got 8 helos spots in one Canberra, and previewed in videos Ran´s config for each Canberra is like 2 Tigers, 2 Chinooks and 6 Nh90s, so 10 helos or 20 for 2 Canb., then you shouldnt have problems adding some of the helos of 1 of the 2 Canberras to the other Canberra.
So that you could have in 1 Can. like 16 helos (with 8 spots, or even 20 helos), and in other the rest 4 helos (with say 1 or 2 helos spots), and so able to have 4 or 5 spots runway for the F35b in this 2nd Canb., and also more garage space for the F35b´s. With similar type of capabilities as Us Marines have.
I hope i explain well, gain upper deck space in 2 Canberras transfering vehicles to the big 3rd sealift ship (big as 3rd Canb.), now move helos from 1 Canb. to the other, and appears the space for many F35b´s.
This supported by the fact that you have 3 flight decks in 3 Canberras, and they are modern ships and expected to have always a great avalability, so at least always you have 2 avalaible, if not the 3. And any of them can act as sealift, or mixed sealift-helo carrier, or mixed sealift-jet carrier.
But even if you have just 6 F35bs per Canberra, probably that doesn´t disturb much to have many helos also, because apart from having 2 or 3 helos spots permanently, you have the F35b runway free almost always as 6 jets also with big endurance ocupe little time the spots.
Now people can say that if you carry main battle tanks in the lower garage you cant carry F35b´s in the upper and operate them...sorry i don´t think so, as long as you dont exceed too much of the 27000 max displac. the only problem you will have is not reaching maybe the 24 knots or 23 but 1 or 2 knots less. Or say, ok let´s carry not main battle tanks with the F35b´s, but let´s carry lighter vehicles, then probably below the 27000 max. displac. Just thoughts.
The thing is jets complement very well with Aew helos, this see in the radar something, and don´t know exactly what is, then send at sea level the F35b, to enter a bit in the visual contact and the Iff identifications etc. I´ll post some more on other thing later.
But remember that Wasp has official configs of 6 jets, and also of 20 jets, and Wasp has just litle more than twice (if) jp5 than Canberras, so for 4 days instead of 2 wrt all jets in the air at the same time, for example.
So there are many things jets will be useful than to burn all the jp5, because Us Marines want some jets on their ships.
F35b has some problems but it is being developed, maybe some delay, but it´s normal as structural issues wrt thrusts are different in stvol than F35a or c, the previous reference they have on stvol is the Harrier, that is much ligther. It´s like they are in new domains of technique and need some time. But the need from Marines or their wish for F35b is big. And as the Us government takes care of the Marines and give them years of development of Osprey´s, years updating Harriers as well. And they want 340 F35b and budget previewed for it. Any delay of big difficullty might increase the F35b price but instead of 340 they will buy 300, for example, but if Marines need something like support then it is a preference for Us.
The 3rd sealift ship being another Canberra its great in so many things, just think in it as sealift, 46 tanks, 70 or 100 other vehicles in upper deck, Ran could pass some vehicles from the other 2 Canberras to this 3rd sealift ship and so have some more space in upper deck in the 2 Canberras, for:
-you´ve got 8 helos spots in one Canberra, and previewed in videos Ran´s config for each Canberra is like 2 Tigers, 2 Chinooks and 6 Nh90s, so 10 helos or 20 for 2 Canb., then you shouldnt have problems adding some of the helos of 1 of the 2 Canberras to the other Canberra.
So that you could have in 1 Can. like 16 helos (with 8 spots, or even 20 helos), and in other the rest 4 helos (with say 1 or 2 helos spots), and so able to have 4 or 5 spots runway for the F35b in this 2nd Canb., and also more garage space for the F35b´s. With similar type of capabilities as Us Marines have.
I hope i explain well, gain upper deck space in 2 Canberras transfering vehicles to the big 3rd sealift ship (big as 3rd Canb.), now move helos from 1 Canb. to the other, and appears the space for many F35b´s.
This supported by the fact that you have 3 flight decks in 3 Canberras, and they are modern ships and expected to have always a great avalability, so at least always you have 2 avalaible, if not the 3. And any of them can act as sealift, or mixed sealift-helo carrier, or mixed sealift-jet carrier.
But even if you have just 6 F35bs per Canberra, probably that doesn´t disturb much to have many helos also, because apart from having 2 or 3 helos spots permanently, you have the F35b runway free almost always as 6 jets also with big endurance ocupe little time the spots.
Now people can say that if you carry main battle tanks in the lower garage you cant carry F35b´s in the upper and operate them...sorry i don´t think so, as long as you dont exceed too much of the 27000 max displac. the only problem you will have is not reaching maybe the 24 knots or 23 but 1 or 2 knots less. Or say, ok let´s carry not main battle tanks with the F35b´s, but let´s carry lighter vehicles, then probably below the 27000 max. displac. Just thoughts.
The thing is jets complement very well with Aew helos, this see in the radar something, and don´t know exactly what is, then send at sea level the F35b, to enter a bit in the visual contact and the Iff identifications etc. I´ll post some more on other thing later.
I ridiculed the idea of six fighters jets being enough to sustain both CAP and striking capabilities... Your answer is to have three carriers and eighteen fighter jets... The RAN and RAAF can't afford a naval air wing... The RAN can't afford the aircraft, the schools, the spares, the air to air or air to ground missiles, the personnel, much less a third LHD....
The RAN may have sufficient escorts for two LHDs operating together although I am still concerned about the number of replenishment ships, but now you have added a third LHD and most likey a third replenishment ship along with another escort..
I got news for you, the RAN may be able to operate two LHDs together at times, but not all of the time.... Operating a third LHD with the other two LHDs at the same time will most likely NEVER happen...
Notice how much fuel is consumed by jets for one carrier, now you wish to have three LHDs operating together as carriers... Just how much JP5 does Success carry? And how much would three LHDs with fighter jets consume? You have not thought out your logistics train whatsoever...
So don't be so eager to add another LHD and more aircraft into the mix... LOGISTICS, LOGISTICS, LOGISTICS... The fuel, munitions, and food don't rise from the bottom of the sea into a ship's belly....
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
The above are self imposed assumptions.
- Assume continuous CAP required. Currently for the RAN, its actually zero CAP. Anything more is a bonus. Insufficient is still better than zero.
- Secondly, assigning too much roles to so few. If a commander is given just 6, you work with 6 and maximise it. Requirements will never be enough. 20 won't be enough. Neither will 60. Might as well get a super carrier then & the US thinks they need 11 carriers.
The argument that 6 isn't enough so let's live with zero would seem strange in the context of the RAN.
- Replenishment ships have to transit?
Maybe, maybe not. Why can't the replenishment ships follow the convoy? Isn't that why a minimum speed of 14 knots was prescribed for the westralia replacement ie Sirius @ 16 kts.
- Replenishment ships have to transit far.
Again, ignorant of history. Can you imagine Royal Navy having to transit all the way back to UK from the Falklands? Dumb right? I'll give a hint. BP tankers.
- Replenishment ships can't do frequent RAS.
Again read RN RAS ops in the Falklands. There's more than enough links out there.
The above are self imposed assumptions.
- Assume continuous CAP required. Currently for the RAN, its actually zero CAP. Anything more is a bonus. Insufficient is still better than zero.
- Secondly, assigning too much roles to so few. If a commander is given just 6, you work with 6 and maximise it. Requirements will never be enough. 20 won't be enough. Neither will 60. Might as well get a super carrier then & the US thinks they need 11 carriers.
The argument that 6 isn't enough so let's live with zero would seem strange in the context of the RAN.
- Replenishment ships have to transit?
Maybe, maybe not. Why can't the replenishment ships follow the convoy? Isn't that why a minimum speed of 14 knots was prescribed for the westralia replacement ie Sirius @ 16 kts.
- Replenishment ships have to transit far.
Again, ignorant of history. Can you imagine Royal Navy having to transit all the way back to UK from the Falklands? Dumb right? I'll give a hint. BP tankers.
- Replenishment ships can't do frequent RAS.
Again read RN RAS ops in the Falklands. There's more than enough links out there.
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
HMAS Sirius - Royal Australian Navy
5,486 CZ of aviation fuel = 5,486 cubic metre = 1,449,247 US gallon = 9,396,949 lbs = 4,271,340 kg = ~4,270 tons of aviation fuel.
Sufficient for naval air ops.
The balance is ~22,800 tons of "blue-water sea legs" for the fleet.
Assuming each CAP = 2 hours. 2 hours per sortie @ 4 sorties per day with 2 a/c per sortie = 24 hour continuous CAP. Only need 6 fighters. Aviation fuel requirement = ~150 tons a day.
RAS refuel rate = 2XX tons an hour.
HMAS Sirius - Royal Australian Navy
5,486 CZ of aviation fuel = 5,486 cubic metre = 1,449,247 US gallon = 9,396,949 lbs = 4,271,340 kg = ~4,270 tons of aviation fuel.
Sufficient for naval air ops.
The balance is ~22,800 tons of "blue-water sea legs" for the fleet.
Assuming each CAP = 2 hours. 2 hours per sortie @ 4 sorties per day with 2 a/c per sortie = 24 hour continuous CAP. Only need 6 fighters. Aviation fuel requirement = ~150 tons a day.
RAS refuel rate = 2XX tons an hour.
Just as a curiosity, if the RAN was to aquire a carrier and the F35B's were cancelled, this would obviously only leave the C's for carrier ops, would there then be an advantage to swap all the RAAF airframes to C's instead of A's ? Assuming of course we got a cat carrier of course
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Several points for consideration.
The first is that the RAN is currently slated to get only 2 Canberra-class LHDs. A third sealift ship is planned, with an in-service dates ~2015 IIRC. The third sealift ship is to replace the last of the two Kanimbla-class LPAs in service. It has not been announced yet what type or class sealift ship will be chosen, but the rumours suggest that it will NOT be a third Canberra-class LHD in part due to cost concerns. A class which has repeatedly mentioned as a potential contender for the role is a Bay-class LSD, particularly if an ex-RFA vessel in good condition becomes available for a reasonable price. Other designs which also come up frequently are the Rotterdam-class and the very similar Galicia-class LPDs. In short, it is extremely unlikely that there would ever be three Canberra-class LHDs, nevermind having all of them providing a fast jet force.
The second point, in terms of similarities between RN FAA ops in the Falklands and any potential fast jet ops from RAN LHDs, there is IMO only a limited similarity. This is because the RN task force air cover was coming from a Centaur-class CV/H (HMS Hermes) and an Invincible-class CVL/H. Since the vessels were themselves purpose-built as carriers, and with appropriate design features and modifications to operate Harriers from, they were correctly configured to sustain Harrier operations. This means that there were appropriate locations for Harrier maintenance and repair. There were on hand, and appropriately contained in the event of accident or damage, sufficient parts, munitions and fuel to sustain Harrier operations from the vessels.
Without significant modification work done in a dock to re-role one of the LHDs from an LHD into some sort of CHL/V, then the Canberra-class LHD is going to be limited in terms of space available to dedicate to supporting aircraft (fast jet and helicopter) operations. While I have been attempting to relocate where I recall seeing the figure of 800 tons aviation fuel available aboard the LHD, it is germane to note that the larger Wasp-class LHD in service with the USN can carry ~1,200 tons of JP-5 aviation fuel. A Wasp-class LHD also routinely operates ~23 helicopters of various types, and up to 6 AV-8 Harriers sometimes as well, depending on mission.
It is also worth noting that a Nimitz-class CVN carries ~10,000 tons (3 mil. gal.) of aviation fuel aboard, with supplies sufficient to sustain operations for 90 days. That is for a CVN which typically operates with ~64 fixed and rotary aircraft, but can operate up to ~100 total.
Lastly the argument that 6 F-35Bs are automatically better than none is not true. It becomes a matter of doctrine and the types of operations that are engaged in. That is part of the reason why a RAN carrier is at this point a, "nice to have, not something worth spending the money on yet..." sort of capability. A properly kitted out CV, with the approriate air group aboard and of course the other vessels and kit that the ADF already has planned, would certainly give Australia more options. At present, the RAN has doctrine for operating vessels in air threat environments, injecting six ADF fast jets (whether RAAF or RAN FAA) would just introduce additional complications to how area air defence would be managed around a task force. Or even worse still, it could result in ships or a task force being deployed to a threat environment where the air defences were insufficient or unsuitable.
OTOH, the LHDs under construction for the RAN are already planned to be purple assets, able to embark, deploy and support up to a battalion of troops. To do so, it needs to be able to support the aviation activities of up to ~24 helicopters. Including F-35Bs into that mix would come at the price of either some of the vehicles, or more likely some of the helicopters which the battalion is going to be relying upon for lift and recon, as well as the LHD for ASW & ASuW roles. Given that the RAN is only going to have two LHDs, and that they are the type of asset which is going to see regular use, and that they are really not suited for fast jet ops, can we inject some semblance of reality here and drop arguments to base F-35Bs off them?
Honestly, if I had to choose an aircraft capability to add to the air group of a RAN task force, a fast jet component would not be my first choice. I would rather the RAN get some form of organic AEW. A fast jet CAP without that is severely limited, and bomb trucks are most useful after the airspace has been sanitized. Which a small number of F-35Bs would not realistically be able to accomplish, unless there was already very little to sanitize. In which case there would most likely not be much worth using a bomb truck for. In other situations where the scenario has airspace which would require sanitization from ship-based aircraft, why would Australia be the 'lead' or not functioning as part of a coalition?
-Cheers
The first is that the RAN is currently slated to get only 2 Canberra-class LHDs. A third sealift ship is planned, with an in-service dates ~2015 IIRC. The third sealift ship is to replace the last of the two Kanimbla-class LPAs in service. It has not been announced yet what type or class sealift ship will be chosen, but the rumours suggest that it will NOT be a third Canberra-class LHD in part due to cost concerns. A class which has repeatedly mentioned as a potential contender for the role is a Bay-class LSD, particularly if an ex-RFA vessel in good condition becomes available for a reasonable price. Other designs which also come up frequently are the Rotterdam-class and the very similar Galicia-class LPDs. In short, it is extremely unlikely that there would ever be three Canberra-class LHDs, nevermind having all of them providing a fast jet force.
The second point, in terms of similarities between RN FAA ops in the Falklands and any potential fast jet ops from RAN LHDs, there is IMO only a limited similarity. This is because the RN task force air cover was coming from a Centaur-class CV/H (HMS Hermes) and an Invincible-class CVL/H. Since the vessels were themselves purpose-built as carriers, and with appropriate design features and modifications to operate Harriers from, they were correctly configured to sustain Harrier operations. This means that there were appropriate locations for Harrier maintenance and repair. There were on hand, and appropriately contained in the event of accident or damage, sufficient parts, munitions and fuel to sustain Harrier operations from the vessels.
Without significant modification work done in a dock to re-role one of the LHDs from an LHD into some sort of CHL/V, then the Canberra-class LHD is going to be limited in terms of space available to dedicate to supporting aircraft (fast jet and helicopter) operations. While I have been attempting to relocate where I recall seeing the figure of 800 tons aviation fuel available aboard the LHD, it is germane to note that the larger Wasp-class LHD in service with the USN can carry ~1,200 tons of JP-5 aviation fuel. A Wasp-class LHD also routinely operates ~23 helicopters of various types, and up to 6 AV-8 Harriers sometimes as well, depending on mission.
It is also worth noting that a Nimitz-class CVN carries ~10,000 tons (3 mil. gal.) of aviation fuel aboard, with supplies sufficient to sustain operations for 90 days. That is for a CVN which typically operates with ~64 fixed and rotary aircraft, but can operate up to ~100 total.
Lastly the argument that 6 F-35Bs are automatically better than none is not true. It becomes a matter of doctrine and the types of operations that are engaged in. That is part of the reason why a RAN carrier is at this point a, "nice to have, not something worth spending the money on yet..." sort of capability. A properly kitted out CV, with the approriate air group aboard and of course the other vessels and kit that the ADF already has planned, would certainly give Australia more options. At present, the RAN has doctrine for operating vessels in air threat environments, injecting six ADF fast jets (whether RAAF or RAN FAA) would just introduce additional complications to how area air defence would be managed around a task force. Or even worse still, it could result in ships or a task force being deployed to a threat environment where the air defences were insufficient or unsuitable.
OTOH, the LHDs under construction for the RAN are already planned to be purple assets, able to embark, deploy and support up to a battalion of troops. To do so, it needs to be able to support the aviation activities of up to ~24 helicopters. Including F-35Bs into that mix would come at the price of either some of the vehicles, or more likely some of the helicopters which the battalion is going to be relying upon for lift and recon, as well as the LHD for ASW & ASuW roles. Given that the RAN is only going to have two LHDs, and that they are the type of asset which is going to see regular use, and that they are really not suited for fast jet ops, can we inject some semblance of reality here and drop arguments to base F-35Bs off them?
Honestly, if I had to choose an aircraft capability to add to the air group of a RAN task force, a fast jet component would not be my first choice. I would rather the RAN get some form of organic AEW. A fast jet CAP without that is severely limited, and bomb trucks are most useful after the airspace has been sanitized. Which a small number of F-35Bs would not realistically be able to accomplish, unless there was already very little to sanitize. In which case there would most likely not be much worth using a bomb truck for. In other situations where the scenario has airspace which would require sanitization from ship-based aircraft, why would Australia be the 'lead' or not functioning as part of a coalition?
-Cheers
weasel1962
New Member
Re:
That's where the bean counters come in. The main driver is actually cost. With an almost unlimited budget, a fleet of Nimitz class carriers with escorting CBGs are preferred. With less, Wasp class or QEs are affordable. With maybe a $b, a CVL or less.
What people fail to appreciate in the context of the LHD suggestion is that the assumptions would be:
(a) It doesn't cost much to add a ski-jump to a canberra;
(b) Since the RAAF was going to get F-35As anyway, switching a few to F-35Bs would add flexibility without a lot of added cost.
If added flexibility = added complexity, then having no armed forces will be the simplest of all solutions. Strange contention. Seriously if Aegis can't handle a situation where 2 a/c out there are friendly, how can a CBG manage its air pic when multiple a/c out there are friendly?
The argument of doctrine can be defined as wagging the dog. Doctrine is often dictated by existing weapons. Making innovative use of existing weapons is equally part of doctrine. Instead, I appear to hear rationale that doctrine has become a limiting factor to decide the type of weaponry. Maybe justifiable in some cases, hardly in others. Not exactly a very convincing contention imho when lacking specifics in relation to the F-35B.
Its not a question of having several $billion to spend on a new carrier which some seem to suggest but driving innovative use of existing expenditure ie LHDs. Not part of Australian doctrine? I disagree imho.
I can understand conservative procurement practices which would rather wait until an aircraft has cleared proven testing or is at least risk of failure as credible rationale for not acquiring a carrier capability but complicated ops is definitely, no offence intended, not high on my list of credible possibilities.
An AEW without air cover is a white elephant. Once an aggressor is detected, nothing can be done until it comes within range of an escort vessel. Air cover without AEW is less effective but at least still potentially effective.
The LHDs are intended for transporting a battalion of troops. But let's be frank, its going to be transporting a battalion of troops without sustained air cover. It might be safe where the landing point is friendly in which case, a LST is just as efficient. But in the context of a hostile landing, the LHD's defences will fall primarily on the sea-based hobarts. In the context of ship vs air engagements without air cover, from the sinking of the repulse and the prince of wales to date, history has not been on the side of the ship.
That's where the bean counters come in. The main driver is actually cost. With an almost unlimited budget, a fleet of Nimitz class carriers with escorting CBGs are preferred. With less, Wasp class or QEs are affordable. With maybe a $b, a CVL or less.
What people fail to appreciate in the context of the LHD suggestion is that the assumptions would be:
(a) It doesn't cost much to add a ski-jump to a canberra;
(b) Since the RAAF was going to get F-35As anyway, switching a few to F-35Bs would add flexibility without a lot of added cost.
If added flexibility = added complexity, then having no armed forces will be the simplest of all solutions. Strange contention. Seriously if Aegis can't handle a situation where 2 a/c out there are friendly, how can a CBG manage its air pic when multiple a/c out there are friendly?
The argument of doctrine can be defined as wagging the dog. Doctrine is often dictated by existing weapons. Making innovative use of existing weapons is equally part of doctrine. Instead, I appear to hear rationale that doctrine has become a limiting factor to decide the type of weaponry. Maybe justifiable in some cases, hardly in others. Not exactly a very convincing contention imho when lacking specifics in relation to the F-35B.
Its not a question of having several $billion to spend on a new carrier which some seem to suggest but driving innovative use of existing expenditure ie LHDs. Not part of Australian doctrine? I disagree imho.
I can understand conservative procurement practices which would rather wait until an aircraft has cleared proven testing or is at least risk of failure as credible rationale for not acquiring a carrier capability but complicated ops is definitely, no offence intended, not high on my list of credible possibilities.
An AEW without air cover is a white elephant. Once an aggressor is detected, nothing can be done until it comes within range of an escort vessel. Air cover without AEW is less effective but at least still potentially effective.
The LHDs are intended for transporting a battalion of troops. But let's be frank, its going to be transporting a battalion of troops without sustained air cover. It might be safe where the landing point is friendly in which case, a LST is just as efficient. But in the context of a hostile landing, the LHD's defences will fall primarily on the sea-based hobarts. In the context of ship vs air engagements without air cover, from the sinking of the repulse and the prince of wales to date, history has not been on the side of the ship.
The LHDs already have Ski jumps fitted...
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I was going to point that out.
: The ski jumps were kept IIRC because the ship and fore structure would have to be re-designed to remove it, and there were concerns about both cost and risk in doing so. In the end it was felt that it less costly and risky to keep the ski jump, than to have it removed and have an extra spot for a helicopter to land.As for AEW being a 'white elephant', I find that a rather funny position. After all, an AEW like the E-2C Hawkeye AWACS has a radar detection radius of 200+ miles, and is able to track several thousand contacts. That sort of increase in a task force sensor footprint vs. air/surface search radars aboard ship is enormous.
At this point, I suspect the best we will manage is to agree to disagree re: viability of F-35B ops from the LHDs.
-Cheers
- Status