Taiwan Government Information Office,
Despite economic interdependence between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, Taipei's repeated pleas to Beijing to engage in dialogue have gone unheeded. Instead, over the past several years, Beijing has escalated its threats of annexing Taiwan by force, leading many countries to doubt its claims of pursuing a “peaceful rise.” David Lorenzo, professor of political science at Jamestown College in Jamestown, North Dakota, summarizes concerns of the United States in this regard, as reflected in a white paper recently released by the Pentagon.
Recent remarks by Major General Zhu Chenghu of the People's Republic of China that the PRC would have to utilize nuclear weapons if the United States came to the aid of Taiwan during a military confrontation provide insight into Beijing's strategic thinking. Contrary to most of its public rhetoric, which emphasizes the peaceful nature of its rise as a global power, many observers believe that Beijing is willing to use or threaten the use of military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives, and that it is deterred from actively using its military only by the threat of economic sanctions and military confrontation.
One such observer is the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Its recently released white paper, “The Military Power of the People's Republic of China,” analyzes the PRC's military modernization program, describes a number of its possible military strategies, and discusses the role of military and national strength in its foreign policy. The study's long-term assessments are unsettling.
While the study concludes that currently the PRC's “ability to project conventional military power beyond its periphery remains limited,” it notes that this judgment is based on incomplete information. As in the case of other observers, the DoD complains of Beijing's lack of transparency and makes the case that the PRC's military budget is several times larger than what it publicly acknowledges.
Given the information the report utilizes, its authors identify a trend of increasing power and capability of the military of a government that legitimizes itself by pursuing nationalistic goals. defencetalk The PRC's military is being built to conquer Taiwan and to at the least intimidate other nations in the region, they argue.
The report indicates that in the absence of internal reform, economic catastrophe or the determination of Taiwan and other countries in the region to continuously upgrade their deterrent forces, the PRC may have at its disposal within the next few years the capacity to reach those goals.
The DoD identifies a number of factors in the PRC's growing military power. Its growing economy is a major factor. Others include hardware purchases and technology transfers from abroad, the utilization of information technology, lessons learned from Western military experiences, and a developing capacity to use space.
Such findings underline the importance of maintaining the European Union's arms embargo and of continuing to pressure Israel to forgo assisting the PRC in modernizing its air defense systems. The report makes the important point that with Russia eager to maintain its status as the PRC's major source of military hardware and technology transfers, lifting the E.U. embargo would increase competition to sell such items to the PRC, thus allowing the latter to gain even more favorable economic and licensing terms.
In this connection, while the DoD report does not say so, one must note that Taiwan's contributions to the PRC's economy in the form of investment and technology transfers plays an indirect role in the latter's increasing military might, given the dependency of its military modernization on economic development.
The report's authors describe several scenarios in which the PRC's “peaceful rise” may turn into military adventurism. These include the pressures of nationalistic demands, a possible downturn in economic growth, the stresses produced by a market economy on its authoritarian political structure, inexperience in the role of a great power in the international arena, and pressures issuing from its military-industrial complex.
The report also underlines the fact that the People's Liberation Army now plays an important foreign policy role as part of an overall strategy of developing and projecting “comprehensive national strength.” Such strength is seen as composed of a variety of elements that can be interchanged and combined to focus power in any desired direction.
Thus, the PRC leadership views its economic development as enhancing its power not only by providing crucial materiel, but also by its capacity to provide economic leverage with other countries and the flexibility to convert resources from nonmilitary to military purposes. Conversely, the PRC's military strength is used to backstop its diplomacy, economic agreements and other foreign policy tools.
While the report argues that it is not likely that the PRC would use military force against Taiwan in the near future, it does survey a range of possible military options that the PRC could pursue. Central to all options is the capacity to quickly dispose of Taiwan's defenses and to deny the United States the ability to project military power into the Taiwan Strait.
To that end, the report argues, the PRC is continuing to build up its forces opposite Taiwan and to station its most modern weaponry in that location. Such a buildup could be used to support a limited attack by special forces to decapitate Taiwan's government and military or as part of a comprehensive military strike.
The PRC is also increasing its efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically with the hope of denying it outside aid or sympathy in the event of an attack.
Charts in the report detailing the balance of forces across the strait make for sobering reading. They underline the fact that Taiwan's deterrent forces are failing to keep pace with the PRC's ongoing military modernization program. Taiwan faces significant deficits in ground, air and naval resources.
Of course, Taiwan need not possess an overall superiority in any category to present a credible deterrence. However, the report indicates that if the present trend continues, the time will come when Beijing may feel strong enough to mount a military operation against Taiwan with confidence of being able to overwhelm the island so quickly that outside forces will be rendered helpless.
If other nations likewise believe it can do so, Beijing may not have to resort to force. Its mere threat of launching an attack, in conjunction with economic, diplomatic and other foreign policy weapons, may be sufficient to compel unification on its terms.
What is to be done? In the short term, bolstering Taiwan's deterrent force is absolutely necessary. Taiwan cannot depend solely on the United States for its defense. defencenews.info The latter has made it clear that it can be counted on to act only in conjunction with the maintenance of a robust defense capability on the part of Taiwan itself. Moreover, the United States can act effectively only if Taiwan possesses defenses capable of keeping the PRC at bay for at least a day, if not longer.
In the long term, however, military deterrence alone will not be sufficient. Even given a defensive capability that would deter a rational set of leaders, Taiwan cannot count on the leaders in Beijing to act in rational ways. Distressingly, there seems to be no way of persuading Beijing's present leaders to forego their current strategy.
Like Japan and Germany of the late 19th century, which were also highly nationalistic powers when they emerged as major international players, the PRC seems bent on achieving its goals through a combination of aggressive economic strategies and outsized military ambitions.
As a key conclusion of the report reads, “China does not now face a direct threat from another nation. Yet, it continues to invest heavily in its military.” Given its present political structure, it appears unlikely that the PRC will willingly play a constructive role in creating a peaceful East Asian region. Only an internal process of political liberalization and democratization offers hope for moderation from Beijing.
If Taiwan and other interested nations hope to deflect the PRC from its present course, they must make efforts to change the nature of its regime. This seems to be the only worthy strategic goal of further engagement with the PRC.
The implications of the DoD white paper are clear: Given the connection between economic development and military modernization in the PRC, economic engagement for its own sake without pressure for political reform is detrimental to Taiwan and the region.
As with American policy of detente with the Soviet Union, engagement must mean linkages, this time between economic activity and political reform. The PRC will undoubtedly be more durable than the Soviet Union, but a coordinated response must still be made in an attempt to create momentum for political change.
So, for example, if Beijing wishes to continue enjoying the inflow of foreign investment, it must be pressed to fulfill its obligations under the WTO to create transparency and the rule of law. And if it wishes to further develop economic ties with Taiwan and other countries, including the relocation of businessmen and factories, then they must insist that political liberties on the mainland be enhanced.
By pursuing this type of engagement, Taiwan and its friends may be able to reduce the military threat from the PRC that this report so clearly identifies.
