Defencetalk.com,
Part 1
The History and Design Philosophy
Confusion over the FC-1 exact origins has been abounded and persists even after over decade since its conception. What is known is that its intended roles and design have been subject to deliberate and unintended misinformation. However, the history of the project is clearer when dependable sources are relied upon. Unlike most Chinese fighter projects, the FC-1 has not been subject to strict silence. Like many fighters, it has suffered a torturous development because of technical, financial, political and other issues and only now is making its appearance.
The concept was pioneered by China's CAC (Chengdu Aerospace Corporation) which specialised at single-engine, single tailed fighters. The design was neither a single-engine variant of the MiG-33 (MiG-29ME) passed by Mikoyan nor was it a wholly original concept. Instead, it was a dramatic remodelling of the cancelled Sino-American Super 7 programme with Russian input (most obviously in the engine) where the Americans had left off. Some $550 million were poured into the project prior to its cancellation.
Early in the programme, PAC Kamra was courted about partnership in the programme. It is not clear who initiated the decision to commence the programme, but Pakistan (suffering from an acute shortage of high-performance aircraft) following the F-16 embargo was keen to join the programme. The attractiveness of technology transfer arrangements and a relatively modern fighter with low investment requirements ($150 million initially) seemed feasible enough.
The most important specifications for the PAF were that provision be made for a BVR combat capability, a FBW (Fly-By-Wire) control system, day or night, all weather availability. To facilitate the former requirement, a request for active radar, data-link equipped BVR-AAM was issued, with the favourite being the South African DARTER series. Among other things, a modern navigation system and a high performance pulse Doppler radar were also demanded and a RfP (Request for Proposal) was issued early in the genesis of the programme. Several offers have been forwarded mainly from European nations and Russia.
This has had several benefits including improving the aircraft's marketability to foreign clients as potential customers could tailor their aircraft to their own choosing. It has been rumoured that the 'Thunder' could also be offered with a Western soured engine, though it is still too early to determine whether this will occur. It could be that potential Middle Eastern clients such as Egypt would find this to be an attractive proposal. After, the F-404 and PW-1120 both share a high degree of commonality with the standard PW F-100-229 of the F-16A/B.
The FC-1 was designed from the outset as a lightweight, low-cost, medium technology fighter tailored to the requirements of the PAF. Although touted prematurely (especially at the early stages) as a possible F-16 replacement, the type has will replace the PAF's older Mirage III/5 and F-7P fighters. Significantly enough, the FC-1's intended performance was stated at 70-80% as capable as an F-16A. Quite how, has been subject to considerable speculation but this is presumably estimation based on weighted averages of field performance and not electronics.
These seemingly 'limited' specifications were intended to keep development, procurement, and deployment costs down while speeding up deployment. The initial plan was to deploy the FC-1 force around the Mirage 2000-5 fighter/bomber with the latter representing the higher-cost/high-technology solution to the PAF's fighter requirements. Selection of the Mirage 2000-5 was made following the US decision to embargo further F-16A/B deliveries to Pakistan and the expansion of India's MiG-29 force.
Although authorised to purchase 40 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft (then revised to 32) funding shortages (as well as corruption allegations) resulted in a cancellation of the planned acquisition and collapse of the Bhutto government, which endorsed the FC-1 project. Pakistan's financially crisis of the early and mid 1990s also stalled the FC-1 project. This meant delays in Pakistani funding and CAC's prioritisation of 'Project Ten' (the J-10) had many speculating on whether the project would whither this difficult period especially as China's PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) was candid about its disinterest in the type. Stagnation followed and the FC-1 was dormant for a prolonged period of time.
In mid-1998 as Pakistan's economy improved and the government of Nawaz Shariff approved the continuation of the project and delayed funding was released to make up for lost time and higher specifications. However, by 1999 the bloodless coup of General Pervez Musharaf again cast a doubt over the project's viability, especially as some were uncertain on Musharaf's own views regarding the venture. Chengdu remained cautious but development proceeded according to plan and no changes were made by General Musharaf who continued to support the project.
The most immediate disturbance was a threat by European bidders for the radar and electronics suite to embargo the transfer of technology to the PAF following the coup. South Africa joined the row and froze co-operation on the DARTER project which Pakistan was expected to be a major partner in the funding, testing and development phase. Subsequently the PAF declared its willingness to downgrade the type's electronic requirements including accepting a Chinese radar and electronics fit. However, the European embargo was lifted and bids continued shortly afterwards. Meanwhile Denel's Kentron branch (producers of the DARTER) subsequently followed.
By 1999 the project had gathered momentum. This was probably made possible by the PAF's purchase of the F-7PG aircraft from CAC, which definitely resulted in an injection of needed funds into the FC-1 project, and probably a greater Pakistani share in the type's financing. Despite this, the first flight was still delayed due to further development challenges faced. One such problem was the reluctance of Russia to clear the transfer of the Kilmov RD-93 engine to China due to Indian lobbying.
The cancellation of the Mirage 2000-5 plan and India's announcement that it intended to purchase the Su-30MKI aircraft forced the FC-1's requirements were upgraded again. These included the demand for an improved FBW system and that the type be able to pull 9g (however, 8.5g was probably a compromise for technical reasons). The BVR-combat capability was re-emphasised and Pakistan made its commitment clear. As such the FC-1's requirements at the present time are higher than its original requirements.
Cockpit mock-ups of the FC-1/JF-17 have been impressive and curiously similar to the Czech L-159 'Albatross' light attack/training aircraft. Featuring HOTAS (Hands On Throttle And Stick) controls and the usual HUD (Head Up Display), and a pair of colour HDD (Head Down Displays). Only the HUD is clearly different from the L-159A/B and does resemble that of the ROSE Mirage III/5 aircraft of the PAF and is probably a Ferranti design. Basic analogue equipment is retained in the left over space.
The HDDs have been smaller than those found in the F-16A/B or ROSE Mirage III/5 (which could be subject for re-evaluation). The general impression gleamed is that human engineering has been given high priority in all areas including pilot comfort. Overall cockpit visibility is impressive in all but the rear view, which is similar to the Mirage III/5 and not the 'bubble' style found in the F-16A/B or F-7P/PG owing to the design compromise. However, this design does entail a significant penalty on the F-16A/B creating more drag in exchange for a better rear view for the pilot.
Other PAF specifications include good rough field performance with the ability to take off and land on austere and short runways. From the outset it appears to have been decided that advanced aluminium alloys shall be used in the type's construction instead of composite materials. Though this reduces cost of the aircraft it will increase weight per size. However, this fits in with the requirement to be low cost design and it's probable that this is based on immediate requirements.
Unlike its intended ancestor, the FC-1 was redesigned incorporating elements from the famed F-16 fighter. It is unknown exactly to what degree what Chinese evaluation of the F-16 reached, but that there was co-operation is undisputed. It's probable that Chinese test pilots and engineers were able to gain considerable information on the type, which was definitely used in the J-10's development, and no doubt in the FC-1's design.
The FC-1 does clearly borrow many features from the F-16 including the sharp LEREXS (Leading Edge wing Root EXtentionS) and 'unwaisted' rear tails. Wings are clearly influenced by that of the F-16's and although slats have not been officially required, they appear to have been included. Unlike the Super 7, whose wings were to have been identical to the J-7C, the FC-1's wings were redesigned to incorporate wing-tip rails which could allow for the provision of a pair of close WVR (Within Visual Range) missiles or ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) pods.
However, although the fuselage of the aircraft borrows from the F-16 and departs from the pure cylindrical design of the earlier Super 7 (itself modelled heavily on the J-7C) the type has important differences. The most obvious difference being the layout on the front of the aircraft which feature V-shaped air intakes in the mould of the A-6 'Intruder' and a solid nose cone that can house a relatively large radar. These appear to be the only features inherited from the Super 7.
