Asia Times, BANGALORE – Following the bomb attack on a residential complex in Riyadh on November 8, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged “to strike with an iron fist whoever tries to violate the security of the country or its stability”. The announcement, far from reassuring Saudi citizens, has evoked concern; for in the name of crushing terrorism, the Saudi regime is said to be cracking down on activists demanding political reform as well.
The attack has underscored far more than the triple suicide attack on a housing complex in Riyadh in May, proving that al-Qaeda's jihad is targeting not just the West and Israel, but also the Saudi monarchy. Following the May attack, the Saudi regime took steps to break al-Qaeda in the country. Hundreds of Islamist militants were rounded up and taken into custody. Scores of imams (preachers) with “extremist links” and al-Qaeda “sympathizers” were arrested. Several of the “terrorists” who were rounded up were in fact political activists – secular and Islamist – who are demanding political reform.
It is likely that the measures the regime will now employ to crush the terrorists will be far more ruthless than those used over the past six months. There are fears that the “iron fist” that King Fahd has vowed to use could end up crushing the nascent movement for political reform in Saudi Arabia.
Since 1991, Saudi reformists have been calling on the ruling family to deal with the problem posed by Islamic radicals by curbing radical imams, modernizing education and so on. They have stressed that the monarchy must cede some powers to elected institutions, arguing that political reform and the strengthening of civil society is critical to curb the assertion of Islamic radicals. The Saudi royals have however paid little attention to the reformists, preferring instead to unleash repression to silence them or to exile critics of the regime.
Post September 11, under domestic and international pressure to usher in reform, the House of Saud sent out signals early this year that it was willing to consider some political reform.
In an article “Violence and the Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia” on the Middle East Report Online, analyst Toby Jones points out that the first sign of change was that talking about reform, if nothing else, was slowly becoming a part of public life. Unlike the past when any talk of reform or criticism, however mild, of the regime would be ruthlessly dealt with, editorials and opinion pieces in Saudi newspapers began debating political reform. A series of petitions calling for reform were submitted to Crown Prince Abdallah in January, April and September.
The petitions demanded public election of the consultative council (a supposedly autonomous body that in reality reflects the royal will), social justice, civil rights, an independent and reformed judiciary, and the creation of human rights institutions. The September petition was more impatient and confrontational than the earlier ones.
The signatories of these petitions have been described as non-Islamist liberals because of their broad secular outlook. They seek to work with the monarchy to bring about the change. Hajib al-Khunayzi, one of the signatories of the January petition, told the news agency Associated Press in February that change in Saudi Arabia would come “from above or below”. “It is better that it happens from above,” he added.
Unlike the liberals, who are looking to state-led political reform and who see themselves and the regime as allies against the radicals, groups like the London-based Movement for Islamic Restoration in Arabia (MIRA) have little faith that the royals will lead reform of the political system. MIRA's strategy is proactive. Its website states that “the people must not wait for freedom to be granted as a favor from the House of Saud, or come as a gift from the Americans who will pressure the House of Saud into liberalizing, as some dreaming liberals wish. They should not even wait for the reform movement to achieve liberation for them.”
MIRA is skeptical of the ruling family's attempts at introducing reform. The consultative council's announcement on October 13 that municipal elections would be held within the next 12 months – a historic step in Saudi history – was dismissed by MIRA's director, Saad al-Faqih, as nothing much. He likened the offer to “breaking the [Muslim Ramadan] fast with onions”.
Indeed, the Saudi rulers confirmed MIRA's suspicions of the genuineness of their commitment to reform within a day of the historic announcement. A demonstration called by MIRA to protest the slow pace of reform in the country was broken up by riot police who fired live ammunition at the protestors and arrested around 150 of them. The following week, MIRA called for demonstrations in nine cities across Saudi Arabia, declaring its right to continue protesting peacefully. Brutal tactics were used by the state against MIRA supporters to preempt the protests.
The huge turnout at the protest marches MIRA called for in October suggests that it does have popular appeal. Jones argues that MIRA's anti-US, anti-regime posture, together with its espousal of Islamic principles, has struck a chord among the Saudi masses. At the same time, it has eschewed violence, unlike Islamist extremist groups like al-Qaeda.
It is said that rivalry between the princes of the House of Saud is being reflected in the positions they are taking on the reform issue. It is said that while Crown Prince Abdallah has come around to accepting that some reform is necessary, he faces serious opposition on the matter from Prince Nayif, a bitter rival.
Prince Nayif is the Saudi Minister of the Interior, head of the intelligence services and chief of police. He has used the “threat of terrorism in Saudi Arabia” to rule out reform at present, arguing that “the current circumstances are not conducive to raising or speaking about such matters.” He has stressed that security is the most important issue before Saudi Arabia today and that change must not be achieved at the expense of stability.
Prince Nayif has used the terrorist attacks of May and November to give urgency and priority to the issue of security rather than political reform. He has interpreted the meaning of security to mean stability. In the process of cracking down on terrorist cells, he has ordered the arrest of scores of political activists who are demanding political reform and challenging the grip of the monarchy. He has unleashed the powers he has as chief of intelligence and police to undermine the reformist movement.
It is therefore likely that the current “threat from terrorism” and the aggressive security campaign that is under way in Saudi Arabia will further slow down the already glacial pace at which the royals were addressing the reform issue. This will only strengthen the hand of extremists like al-Qaeda.
The credibility of the secular liberals – already low because they are perceived to be taking the American line – will be eroded further if the House of Saud continues to drag its feet on reform. Going by the tone of their petitions, the liberals' patience seems to be running out. If they turn against the monarchy, the House of Saud will be isolated.
By arresting and unleashing repression on the Islamist reformists, the Saudi rulers are marginalizing the moderates among the Islamists. That would leave the opposition space wide open for radical Islamists and extremist groups like al-Qaeda to fill. Reluctance to initiate real reform immediately could result in the House of Saud slipping towards sinking sands.
