Moscow: An interview with Nikolai Zlobin, director of the Russia and Eurasia Project at the World Security Institute (U.S.) Mr. Zlobin, what do you think about Russian-Armenian political and economic relations?
I believe these relations reflect the current situation in the CIS and the character of the national leadership in both countries; their views on domestic foreign policy and their nations' role in the region and the world.
At the same time, we should consider that the whole world is in transition; the dynamics of international developments is vague and the domestic political struggle in Russia and Armenia is exacerbated by the forthcoming presidential elections.
Russian-Armenian relations and the Eurasian situation as a whole are affected by dangerous excesses of political improvisation, and too much emphasis on tactics at the expense of strategy. Eurasian foreign policy ideas are suffering from a tunnel mentality and relations between the regimes prevail over contacts between civil societies and at grassroots level.
Outwardly, Russian-Armenian relations look positive — they are free of hostility, antagonism and suspicion. But lack of suspicion does not make them trustworthy. Moscow thinks that it can effectively control Armenia and turn it into a regional strategic ally by manipulating energy and security issues.
In turn, Yerevan hopes that Moscow will side with it in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, grant it economic preferences, guarantee the domestic stability of the current government, help ward off any velvet revolutions and keep the opposition away from power.
Both parties indulge in wishful thinking. Their politically naive elites are suffering from arrogance. In effect, they are not a truly national political force capable of representing national interests in full measure. These come-by-chance elites are unable to rise above group interests and think in long-term categories of national development. I think neither Russia nor Armenia have finalized their major foreign policy priorities, although Russia has traveled much further along this road than Armenia.
I'm sure that in the next decade we will witness the birth of real national elites in both countries, a change in the ruling establishments, and revision of many views and solutions that seem so obvious today. Armenian-Russian relations and the entire South Caucasus will be no exception. Everything will be tested by real life, and the elites will come to understand better national interests, development strategy and their nation's role in the global arena. Bilateral contacts will change as well.
As neighbors, Russia and Armenia are predestined to good, long-term, productive, predictable and mutually advantageous relations. Both are interested in stability and peace in the South Caucasus. However, their current bilateral relations do not meet these objectives and criteria. Their domestic problems and incompetent elites (a problem in all of Eurasia) are the main obstacles on this road.
The faster Armenia becomes a true democracy and creates a sound national elite through political rivalry and nation-wide debate of ideas, the earlier it will correctly position itself towards Russia and find an optimal model of multi-vector foreign policy. If this does not happen, it may remain a puppet in the hands of big players, get into a quagmire of problems and conflicts, and settle for the role of a passive onlooker in its own region.
You spoke about the future revision of borders on post-Soviet territory. What could change in the CIS in general and the South Caucasus in particular?
It would be naive to think that the world's political geography is set in stone and will never change. Entire human history disproves such arrogance. Revision of national borders for different reasons is a natural element of global progress and is indispensable for the evolution of the international system.
In political geography, there is a rotation of periods of stability and instability. The Cold War saw a period of stability. Its end triggered changes in many national and regional borders. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fell apart, while two German states became one. Similar processes are going on in other parts of the world. It would be ridiculous to assume that the South Caucasus will be immune to this process.
We decided too early that the Soviet Union's collapse is over. This is not a single event. History shows that empires take a long time to die. This process has too many economic, political, social and psychological repercussions to be simple. It is still going on, and is far from complete.
Moreover, it would be naive to assume that the U.S.S.R. will fall apart into neat pieces delineated by the borders of its republics. Many of them were arbitrary and subjective, and for this reason further changes in Eurasian borders are even more likely.
The end of the Cold War and the growing economic globalization have produced a new alignment of economic and political centers of forces; new magnets for nations are being formed; new, attractive models of regional and inter-regional development are coming into being; and fewer countries remain aloof from global processes. All this makes the world even more dynamic and promotes evolution of its political geography.
Yerevan should understand that this process is accompanied by the progressive decline of sovereign national states, objective reduction in their competence and responsibility, and collapse of isolated economies. New political priorities and economic appeal will be increasingly tearing down administrative divisions.
We are bound to see these processes in Eurasia as well. New frontiers are likely to emerge in Central Asia, especially considering China's growing economy and ambitions, economic success of Kazakhstan and some of its neighbors, the continued division into energy producing and energy dependent states, active ethnic and religious processes, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There are three major territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus. Any version of settlement may produce new administrative borders that are also likely to be temporary and will be disputed by different political forces. I think that gradual development of Abkhazia as an independent entity will result in a new configuration of borders in the region. If both Georgia and Abkhazia become truly independent, the conflict between them will acquire a new quality and the border issue will be relegated into the background. The situation around South Ossetia is not so obvious. In any event, economic interests are prevailing over politics in the whole world and will also define the new political geography in the South Caucasus.
What are the most effective ways of settling regional conflicts?
I am absolutely against any military methods either in Nagorny Karabakh or the rest of the South Caucasus. Territorial conflicts are generated by petty ambitions of certain elites, politicians or career-motivated populists. This is totally impermissible. Such conflicts are drawing into their orbit tens and hundreds of thousands of innocent people who eventually are the only ones to suffer.
Any settlement should primarily enhance the living standards in the conflict zone, create the groundwork for a stable and safe life, restore justice for refugees, strengthen the economy and business, and streamline administration. Attempts to resolve any conflict should not aggravate the regional situation regardless of who makes them, and should never lead to more civilian casualties. Life and prosperity should not depend on political games of elites or individual politicians.
I'm against interpreting the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from simplistic positions of administrative divisions. The Earth does not have nationality or ethnic characteristics. Its properties are not affected by a national flag. It is much more important to answer the following questions -how do people live on these territories? Have they been treated unfairly or harassed? Can they live the way they want?
What has been done to guarantee their security and human rights, including the rights to education, medical care, religion and culture? Do they have the right to live as they see fit? Just to repeat, any settlement should make life better rather than lead to new tragedies and victims. Politicians who are placing their career interests above the interests of the people involved in a conflict should be ousted from the political scene. Those policy-makers who appeal to history and ignore reality should become professors of history.
Considering that military settlement is impermissible, all alternative solutions of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem lie in the socio-economic sphere. I believe that big powers and outside players, including Russia and the United States, will support the side that will offer a more effective settlement plan.
It should resolve the refugee problem, enhance the region's stability, improve living standards and the regional economy, guarantee the security of borders and law and order tailored to international norms; and ensure transparent administration and social programs. Much will depend on the national economy and its integration into global processes. It seems Armenia is noticeably lagging behind Azerbaijan in these criteria, which puts it into a vulnerable position.
Part II
In your opinion, neither the United States, nor Russia has a clear-cut policy in the entire South Caucasian region. They both tend to improvise. Is it a destabilizing factor?
I think that the South Caucasus has suffered from deteriorated Russian-U.S. relations. If they were strategic allies, as they planned to be just some time ago, it would be much easier to resolve many post-Soviet problems. But today the situation is directly opposite – the United States and Russia are aggressive towards each other in Eurasia; they are trying to oust each other from the region, and draw the local elites into their political squabbles. Settlement of any conflict is judged by one and the same yardstick – whose positions (Russian or American) will it enhance.
In effect, a mild version of the Cold War is taking place on post-Soviet territory. It differs from the traditional Cold War not only in geographic dimensions but also in its exclusively tactical character, lack of strategy, and vague interests and spheres of influence. Moscow and Washington are improvising – they are reacting to events and taking single steps. This is considerably compromising regional stability, formation of competent national elites and elaboration of independent national strategies.
I believe that in the next few years Russian-U.S. relations will continue worsening, which is bound to affect the situation in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the election campaigns that are being launched in both countries may involve the region in the domestic political struggle both in Russia and the United States; different political forces may be tempted to use the region for their ends. This may further rock the situation in the South Caucasus and encourage some of its forces to use the unpredictable election situation in major countries.
Are you saying that Russia is not likely to pursue a predictable policy?
Unfortunately, I am. There is a whole number of reasons for this. Russia has not determined its foreign policy strategy and has largely replaced it with tactical goals and plans. In many respects, its foreign policy is monopolized by narrow groups that are exploiting it in their interests.
Many of its important aspects remain frozen, for instance, its line on the U.S. Currently, Russia does not have an influential or even a numerically strong political or economic group that would be interested in upgrading these relations. As a result, they are not given proper attention.
Russia's policy towards former Soviet countries is largely determined by competition on the domestic market, attempts by big business to get access to new markets or keep their monopoly, as well as by the quality of Moscow's relations with the local governments. All these factors are temporary.
Is it possible that the United States or Russia may toughen their attitude to one of the parties in the Karabakh conflict under certain circumstances?
If any party tries to resolve this conflict militarily, Russia and the United States will strongly toughen their position on it. But with time such measures may lead to the adamant refusal to consider the refugee problem and restore justice in regard of innocent victims; both sides may be feigning their desire to resolve the problem.
The question of the Kosovo precedent has already become trite through frequent repetition. But still, could Kosovo become a model for settling post-Soviet conflicts?
Kosovo cannot be a model here. It will become a history lesson, a new experience but not a model. Moreover, I'm convinced that there will never be a common pattern for settling post-Soviet conflicts. Their character is different and they are all unique in some ways. They require different levels of involvement of outside players and international agencies. The more these conflicts exist in their current state, the more sophisticated and flexible the methods of their settlement should be. I think we will have to work out a fundamentally new legal, economic and political approach to the very idea of settlement — much more intricate than in the case of Kosovo.
Some politicians claim that the right of the Karabakh people to self-determination does not run counter to Azerbaijan's right to territorial integrity. Do you accept Karabakh's right to self-determination?
Here we have come to the old dilemma in international law and world politics – between the right of nations to self-determination and the right of a state to territorial integrity. I'm convinced that the right to self-determination certainly overrides the right of a state to territorial integrity. After all, any state is simply a formalized instrument of implementing the rights and interests of its people.
There is no doubt that their interests are above those of the state – unless the latter is simply a dictatorship that is suppressing these rights and interests. I believe that the priority of the right of nations to self-determination is universal and unconditional, and stems from world history, which boils down to the development of nations. As for states, their forms, borders, sizes or socio-political, economic and geographic characteristics have always been and will be transient.
Parliamentary elections in Armenia are just starting the big election marathon. The presidential race is ahead; it will be followed by the elections in Azerbaijan. Russia and the United States will also hold elections. What are the chances for Karabakh settlement in the near future?
If we talk about this period, I think there are none. Moreover, before elections serious politicians tend to avoid sudden steps, particularly in foreign policy, because they may destabilize the situation at home and have many unpredictable consequences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
