Asia Times, Emulating his boss's Thanksgiving Day venture, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sneaked into Iraq last weekend and promised on Coalition Provisional Authority's al-Iraqiya TV that the American military would fight on in Iraq until Saddam Hussein's reign of “terror” is history.
Of course, he had said back in May that it was history. But let that be. What's of concern now is how things will play out in the immediate period ahead and in the runup to the end of June next year when the US has said it will turn over sovereignty to Iraqi authorities. On present and the past several months' performance, the handover may have to take place under conditions in which Ba'ath Party and foreign jihadi resistance remain far from being uprooted. A continued large-scale US military presence – well beyond Rumsfeld's likely expectations as to size and duration – may be required to keep any new government in power.
I don't know the latest body count, though it now exceeds 190 Americans killed by hostile fire since US President George W Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1. I have no reason to doubt US military commanders' assertions that daily attacks on US forces personnel have diminished somewhat since mid-November, when a new strategy of pro-active “search and destroy” missions and fortification of American positions and convoys was adopted. What's worrying from a strategic perspective is that – also since mid-November – 19 Italian, seven Spanish, two Japanese, two South Korean and a Colombian member of the US-led coalition have lost their lives in precisely targeted guerrilla attacks. The pattern indicates degrees of centralized planning and intelligence, control and communications capabilities by anti-coalition militants hitherto assumed not to exist: As Americans become hardened targets and more aggressively take the fight to the enemy, the guerrillas switch to militarily softer targets, but of potentially higher political impact and payback.
That by itself is not all that surprising. The Italian compound in the southern city of Nassiriya may have been a soft target of opportunity for a suicide car bombing attack, much like the United Nations headquarters building in Baghdad. But scoping out the movements of Spanish intelligence agents or Japanese diplomats, traveling in unmarked vehicles at times and to places not exactly pre-announced with public fanfare, and ambushing them at pre-arranged locations are other matters entirely. They point to longer-term intelligence penetration of the affected coalition allies' plans and communications, significant logistics capabilities, well-qualified manpower, and political savvy. None of the perpetrators have been caught.
So, who are these guys? Who pays, equips and runs them? Who develops the plans and initiates their well-timed execution to maximum political effect? Not a man or group of men constantly on the run, hiding in one village one night, another the next, always just a few steps ahead of his/their would-be captors. Not Saddam, then. Alternatively, not a Saddam in the dire straits reported. I don't put much store in claims by tribal leaders introduced by go-betweens telling journalists that Saddam is in good health, living in the west of Iraq, and commanding military operations against American forces. Maybe; maybe not. It matters politically. Operationally, it is of secondary significance. What appears certain is that there exist primary and several secondary control centers planning attacks and deploying at least a hundred independently operating guerrilla units of two dozen or so members each. The controllers also arrange for logistics (weapons, communications gear, etc) and have developed a well-functioning intelligence network. The mastermind could be Saddam; but more likely he is the figurehead, carefully kept out of harm's way and protected for his political-symbolic value.
It is estimated by Middle East intelligence services sources that the guerrilla core units' head count is about 2,000. In addition, there exist hundreds of more loosely organized “freelance” units with several thousand members, for a grand total of 4,000-5,000 fighters. In their new pro-active stance, US forces have over the past several weeks killed or captured over 600 guerrillas, but the intelligence gleaned from prisoners has been sparse. The core units carrying out the most high-profile attacks have largely evaded capture and hide well in and behind the “noise” created by the freelancers and sympathizers.
I have described the core outfits' strategy of going after softer coalition targets when the going got tougher against the Americans, who are now moving in larger convoys, new, harder combat vehicles (“Stryker”), and with protective air cover – and have gone on the offensive employing such Israeli counterinsurgency tactics as enclosing whole villages in razor wire. A more ominous strategic shift of future portent by the insurgents observed recently is their geographical expansion of operations well beyond the Sunni triangle (from Tikrit down to Baghdad and points west) into mixed Sunni-Kurdish areas around Kirkuk and Mosul, and Shi'ite areas south of Baghdad. Not fighting the Americans head-on where they are strongest is the military logic. The political concern is one of being boxed in and ultimately having to face not just the Americans, but the two-thirds of the Iraqi population growing increasingly hostile to the guerrillas' methods and political aims.
The next three months will likely prove crucial in this regard. Should the insurgents be capable of extending their reach well beyond their Sunni home ground and be able to score military successes and political points in the south and northeast, their influence and longer-term threat potential would grow. Should they fail in that endeavor, one would have to place one's bets on Coalition Provisional Authority boss L Paul Bremer and Rumsfeld. Both sides' strategic plans have come into clearer focus. The outcome remains in doubt.
