The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

rsemmes

Active Member
the drought has dried the topsoil, but it has not made that stretch crossable



:D

User: Can someone pass me the butter please?

@rsemmes: You mean the butter that's been a staple since the 7th century Irish monks perfected the churn?
have you considered that European butter has 2% more fat than American butter?
You already pointed it out: "pass me the butter." But have you calculated the butyric acid ratios?
The former soil...
So no attacks...
A change in the soil...
Light motorized units...

A lot of butter... But yes, there is no butter ;) would have been faster.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Ukraine's counter-offensive north of Krasniy Liman is developing, with Ukrainian forces recapturing Stavki and threatening all Russian presence west of the Nitrius with encirclement. It remains to be seen whether Russia devotes additional resources to this, or withdraws. In my opinion this is a clear consequence of failing to secure the flanks around Krasniy Liman before attempting a big push into Krasniy Liman itself a few weeks ago. It's yet another clear example of Russia succeeding when they work the flanks and failing when they try to simply push on an objective. We saw this play out in Kupyansk and to some extent in Toretsk, though there the town was ultimately taken, Russia took many extra months to secure it. We saw the opposite of this in battles like Konstantinovka, Artemovsk/Bakhmut, Selidovo, and Avdeevka. And we saw both patterns play out in Ugledar where attempts to just storm the town failed repeatedly but the town was taken without much of a fight once Russia outflanked the 72nd Mech Bde defending it.
The NE approach to Sloviansk seems the most difficult terrain, but I guess any victory would do.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The NE approach to Sloviansk seems the most difficult terrain, but I guess any victory would do.
I don't think it's a terrain issue. I think the issue is the decision by Russian command to try and force a general assault on the town without completing work on the flanks. And now they've facing the consequences of that decision.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
I was reading this..
Alemania y otros cinco países exigen un recorte de “varios miles de millones” en el próximo Presupuesto de la UE
El canciller alemán y los líderes de Suecia, Dinamarca, Países Bajos, Finlandia y Austria buscan rebajar notablemente la propuesta de la Comisión Europea
Germany +5 demand deep cut to EU budget.

And then...
The EU's frugals gathered in Berlin to push for cuts. But they still cannot agree on how much as European budget talks enter key phase.
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden want to cut the EU’s proposed long-term budget for 2027–2034, but have yet to agree on how much.
That affects Spain, but then...

El creciente déficit presupuestario de Ucrania está poniendo bajo presión a la Unión Europea, que se ve cada vez más sola a la hora de asumir el coste del apoyo al país. La cuestión saltó a primer plano el lunes en una reunión de la Coalición de Voluntarios en Kiev, celebrada cuando Ucrania conmemoraba el 35º aniversario de su independencia.
El presidente Volodímir Zelenski afirmó que el Ministerio de Defensa de Ucrania se enfrenta a un agujero de financiación de 27.000 millones de dólares (23.100 millones de euros) que debe cubrirse para mantener el esfuerzo bélico.
The EU under pressure by Ukrainian growing deficit of $27.000 millions (Zelenski/Fedorov).

And..
German Defence Minister initially requested €15.8 billion for 2026 and €12.8 billion for 2027 to fund joint programs with Ukraine's defence industry. However, an internal Ministry of Defence document leaked via Bild revealed that the government capped the total approved allocation for those periods at just €9 billion.

So, how much will Ukraine hopefully get? And in 2027?
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
German Defence Minister initially requested €15.8 billion for 2026 and €12.8 billion for 2027 to fund joint programs with Ukraine's defence industry. However, an internal Ministry of Defence document leaked via Bild revealed that the government capped the total approved allocation for those periods at just €9 billion.
There's nothing "internal" about that, Klingbeil announced the 9 billion cap over a year ago (and that's already considerably more than was previously planned). All that Bild "found out" was that the Ministry of Defence completely ignored the cap and requested more. Like they've been doing every year since 2022 btw.

Also, we all know what this is about. State elections inbound, and Bild is trying to push opinions in favour of "reevaluating help to Ukraine" (as in cut it) like the ultra-right-wing AfD wants that "that paper" and their CEO supports.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
There's nothing "internal" about that, Klingbeil announced the 9 billion cap over a year ago (and that's already considerably more than was previously planned). All that Bild "found out" was that the Ministry of Defence completely ignored the cap and requested more. Like they've been doing every year since 2022 btw.

Also, we all know what this is about. State elections inbound, and Bild is trying to push opinions in favour of "reevaluating help to Ukraine" (as in cut it) like the ultra-right-wing AfD wants that "that paper" and their CEO supports.
Yes.

The article in Bild is from 2025, that is why I am asking how much money is actually going to get in 2026. Also, 2027 is going to be an "election year", less money for the EU budget is less money for Ukraine. Again, not how much money Zelenski expects, or hopes, but how much is he going to get for his growing deficit.
Different articles provide confusing (to me) information, but none seem to be good news for Ukraine.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
NYT:


Via the archive:


John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, made a secretive visit to Moscow this week to privately share his bleak assessment of the state of the Russian war against Ukraine, and to urge the Russians to cut a deal before their military and economic situation gets worse, current and former officials said.

Because:

C.I.A. analysts have long questioned whether Mr. Putin’s advisers have given him honest assessments of the war’s trajectory and toll.

But:

Mr. Ratcliffe delivered the message to Aleksandr V. Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s F.S.B. intelligence service[…]

And:

The C.I.A. has long maintained communications channels with the F.S.B. and Russia’s foreign intelligence service, which is known as the S.V.R.

So we have:
- CIA suspects that Putin does not get honest info about anything that is happening in the country and war in particular and his advisors lie to him;
- CIA has open channels with the FSB and SVR, where bleak assessments can be shared on “regular” basis;
- CIA director flies to Moscow to meet Bortnikov, the head of FSB, one of the main Putin’s advisors, to deliver a bleak assessment.

That sure makes sense. Furthermore,

Some officials said they hoped that Mr. Putin, a former intelligence officer himself, would see a message from the C.I.A. director as more urgent and credible than communications through normal diplomatic channels.

So we have a former intelligence officer, who perfectly understands how the system that was and the one he built works, yet being completely deluded about it, now expected to take a message from the head of an enemy’s intelligence service, that he believes orchestrated a coup in Ukraine, attempted doing the same in many other places, including Russia, fighting the proxy war against Russia, and so on, more urgently and give it credibility. All through an intermediary who lies to him all the time. That also makes sense. But to continue:

The private message that Mr. Ratcliffe delivered to Mr. Bortnikov about Ukraine echoed some of the director’s public statements.[…]

He noted that the life expectancy of a Russian soldier on the front lines was less than 35 minutes.


Very credible message, no doubt about it. I would expect Putin reaching to Ukrainians saying he is ready to make a deal at last.

Few days before that:


Three key points are currently on the agenda:
  • Ceasefire: The main and top-priority idea in the document that has been developed
  • Creation of a free economic zone: A US initiative that envisions a reciprocal withdrawal of forces. Ukraine and Russia would take equal steps back, creating a buffer zone under the control of a third party.
  • Security guarantees from the EU and NATO: A clear definition of actions by the European Union and the Alliance, and the steps Ukraine is prepared to take in return.
"Everyone is reacting positively to what has been proposed; no one has any objections. This is what is on the table today," Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized.

Beating an old horse, expecting a result… It’s like they are negotiating with each other. Success is probably close this time because of the urgent credible message and:

The president added that the ideas presented are not exclusively Ukrainian. They are a joint plan developed with US and European partners and finalized following contacts between the US side and Kyiv and Moscow.

I am sure Moscow has no objections and reacted positively (more on it in another post). A few caveats, of course:

As reported, while working to resolve funding issues for Ukraine's defense, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy outlined two major challenges the country faces: ballistic weapons and a lack of funding.

In particular, Ukraine expects its partners to provide 30 billion euros to cover its defense needs.


That would be $30B they were supposed to spend in the second half of 2026 but spent in the first. Flying hundreds of drones daily, including to well-defended targets where penetration is negligible at best and nonexistent otherwise, is not cheap. But partners will provide, they think they have no choice. In the meantime:

"Unfortunately, we have to accept it [mobilisation] as it is. We cannot do otherwise. We have to find the courage and honestly say: we cannot mobilise fewer than 30,000 people a month. This is the minimum number needed to maintain what we have."[…]

"Not much will change with Khmara taking office. Because the requirement is at least 30,000 people. And that is a huge number of people," Budanov said.

"So, no matter how we say that we are now going to recruit people differently, the numbers will not change. And that means the number of dissatisfied people will not change either. There is nothing we can do about it," he added.



So while Russians live for less than 35 minutes at the frontline, killed by buckets (over 40K (or is it 50K?) per month now), and still mobilize ~30K each month and push at the front, Ukraine, taking reported 1 casualty to every… I don’t know anymore, 5-20 plus Russians, needs to mobilize at least 30K every month to maintain the current situation. Forced mobilization is (obviously, as discussed previously) will continue regardless of who is in charge. Too bad they fired Fedorov because things would otherwise be completely different and none of this would be necessary. The guy, by the way, refused to take any role but the MoD to help the country, called for elections, said “it looks as though we're gradually, slowly losing”, and may now bail to Italy (I see it as a likely scenario):


Meanwhile, more UA MPs are accused of money laundering. This time, Budanov himself is implicated (in Ukrainian).

More next time.
 

rsemmes

Active Member

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
No desire to continue yesterday's post, maybe next time (or not). Just a few short notes today:

may now bail to Italy (I see it as a likely scenario):
IMG_6692.jpeg

On Arena-M:

IMG_6676.jpeg

On (reportedly) quickly failing Rassvet:

IMG_6693.jpeg

What does it mean “block Rassvet”? And what does the ITU have do with it? Imagine thinking anyone deploying capabilities actually cares about the ITU. On the subject of blocking (many grains of salt as TASS being cited, bit it certainly should not be disregarded):

IMG_6694.jpeg

Double-sided concern here on the part of Ukraine. I have fairly recently started seeing some people involved in the Ukrainian affairs, direct participation in hostilities on the ground, as well as analysts (and one or two politicians), expressing their concerns about “putting all eggs in one basket” regarding Starlink and not developing their own mesh networks as Russians do since Starlink is no longer an asset, as well as the other side of the equation - that is, blocking capabilities not being looked into. The former appears to be a much bigger concern at the moment from what I am seeing.
 

Deus Ex Machina

New Member
I don't understand. What alternative to Starlink would/could Ukraine have?

Things are going from bad to worse but Zelensky has burnt diplomatic bridges with Russia a long time ago. I find it curious that he has still so much political support. Is he actually popular with ukrainians? He has always seemed like he was steering the ship towards the rocks.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Things are going from bad to worse but Zelensky has burnt diplomatic bridges with Russia a long time ago. I find it curious that he has still so much political support. Is he actually popular with ukrainians? He has always seemed like he was steering the ship towards the rocks.
In case you hadn't noticed, Russia invaded Ukraine, & announced that its intention was to turn it into a puppet state with Russian control of its government. After that there weren't any bridges to burn. Russia blew them all up & dug out the foundations.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Russians are refusing to negotiate agan:

IMG_6695.jpeg

Russia will not use nuclear weapons:

IMG_6696.jpeg

While it is highly unlikely, in my opinion, the Chinese dude said anything of the nature (aside from everything else, they probably know that they have no real control over it), I find it cute that people would believe the fairly tale about China having any say in how Russia conducts their war effort, related to the use of nuclear weapons in particular. The main restraint is Russia’s own strategic interests. As I discussed previously, once the rubicon is crossed, no one will have any say in how Russia proceeds, but Russia. This should be clear as day and this willful self-delusion is not only counterproductive, but also dangerous.

Overall, these consistent repetitions of nontruths, while looking for ways to reinforce the opinion is very weird. I always wonder if these people truly believe what they are saying or just shape the narrative. If the latter, how does that help and what is the goal? If the former, we say that Putin is completely delusional and ill-advised, doesn’t it put us into a pot meets kettle situation? Two deluded sides expecting each other’s collapse or some such while getting closer to the point of no return with severe consequences for the future, shouldn’t it be concerning to everyone?

Furthermore, expecting Russian collapse and pushing for it, does anyone account for consequences of such an event? Why no one is publicly exploring the various scenarios that might follow? The general sentiment is that it is a good and desirable outcome. I don’t see how this can possibly be true for all scenarios.

Another prevailing general consensus is that it is cheaper to fight Russia in Ukraine. Versus what? Considering they will prevail in some form, what material difference are we expected to see? It is a clearly significantly more expensive scenario, in my opinion. The consensus is only true if either Russia loses (and I am not even sure this is true in this case either) or if they want to take over Europe or some similar hyperbole - that is, a direct kinetic confrontation involving Euro troops, etc because Russia decided to take over Poland, for example. Russia losing in the sense being predicted is far from a given and a low probability event. Russian desire of taking over some Euro countries is complete bogus, in my opinion. Then, how did we arrive to the conclusion that this is the cheapest way to proceed? The answer seems to be that it is nonsense.

Anyway, some Sunday thoughts.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Another prevailing general consensus is that it is cheaper to fight Russia in Ukraine. Versus what? Considering they will prevail in some form, what material difference are we expected to see? It is a clearly significantly more expensive scenario, in my opinion. The consensus is only true if either Russia loses (and I am not even sure this is true in this case either) or if they want to take over Europe or some similar hyperbole - that is, a direct kinetic confrontation involving Euro troops, etc because Russia decided to take over Poland, for example. Russia losing in the sense being predicted is far from a given and a low probability event. Russian desire of taking over some Euro countries is complete bogus, in my opinion. Then, how did we arrive to the conclusion that this is the cheapest way to proceed? The answer seems to be that it is nonsense.

Anyway, some Sunday thoughts.
There is another scenario. If European or American (or both) elites intend to fight Russia. Then bleeding Russia in Ukraine makes sense, not for Ukraine, but for other actors. For a potential future confrontation with the West, the current war definitely makes Russia weaker, and would have done so even if it had gone much better for Russia. It's yet another reason why Russia shouldn't have invaded.
 
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