Don't apologise W800i. I found this to be a fascinating post and I also found myself agreeing with practically every point you made.
Now I think we have to accept the reality that the RAAF is locked into the F35 but that it will almost certainly be late. The F111 will be retired before the F35 is in service. We need an aircraft to plug the capability gap that will be created and that aircraft will be the FA18F.
We can and should look at mistakes in the selection process and learn from them in order to reduce our chances of repeating them in the future. I think the process was hindered by funding issues that forced the RAAF to try and make too big a jump to a 5th generation aircraft, rather than making a decision 4/5 years earlier to replace the F111s and classic Hornets with a late 4th or a 4.5 generation combination before going to a truly 5th generation aircraft later. Funding issues probably also prevented the air force from replacing the F111 with one type (e.g. the F15E) and then looking at the Hornet replacement as a separate issue. IMO we also need to continue to develop a greater understanding of the problems associated with computer software integration.
I suspect that both the RAAF and the government will have learnt a huge amount from this project as well as other projects that have stalled (e.g. Wedgetail) or even failed (Seasprite).
The FA18F, if the procurement goes ahead as seems almost certain, will give valuable breathing space to re-evaluate what ought to support the F35 beyond 2020. Whether that be UCAVs to supplement the strike force or perhaps an air superiority fighter to establish air dominance, at least Australia will have bought valuable time to make properly evaluated decisions.
Cheers
Now I think we have to accept the reality that the RAAF is locked into the F35 but that it will almost certainly be late. The F111 will be retired before the F35 is in service. We need an aircraft to plug the capability gap that will be created and that aircraft will be the FA18F.
We can and should look at mistakes in the selection process and learn from them in order to reduce our chances of repeating them in the future. I think the process was hindered by funding issues that forced the RAAF to try and make too big a jump to a 5th generation aircraft, rather than making a decision 4/5 years earlier to replace the F111s and classic Hornets with a late 4th or a 4.5 generation combination before going to a truly 5th generation aircraft later. Funding issues probably also prevented the air force from replacing the F111 with one type (e.g. the F15E) and then looking at the Hornet replacement as a separate issue. IMO we also need to continue to develop a greater understanding of the problems associated with computer software integration.
I suspect that both the RAAF and the government will have learnt a huge amount from this project as well as other projects that have stalled (e.g. Wedgetail) or even failed (Seasprite).
The FA18F, if the procurement goes ahead as seems almost certain, will give valuable breathing space to re-evaluate what ought to support the F35 beyond 2020. Whether that be UCAVs to supplement the strike force or perhaps an air superiority fighter to establish air dominance, at least Australia will have bought valuable time to make properly evaluated decisions.
Cheers