Is China capable of crippling US CSF's in Chinese ses?

[tphuang]

The C-803 (YJ-83 (not C-803) ) doesn't fly at 5 metres for the whole of its journey - the SM-2 (later blocks) can engage targets as far as 167km away. There's no reason why US radar would not pick up and intercept any missiles before they entered their terminal flight stage.

Also there is no information (that I've come across) that specifically mentions what the lowest intercept height is, so it's impossible to comment either way on intercepts at such an altitude.

well, how many interceptions are made at the maximum range?
As for not flying 5 meter the entire way, that is true. It does fly at 20-30 meter for most of the flight, but even at 20 m, it seems pretty low for a long range SAM to intercept. For example, S-300 has a minimum altitude of 25 m.

Agreed but specific data is classified as you must know. Wouldn't seem very wise for the USN, PRC or anybody else to publicly state, "Our missile can only intercept above 5m". But I can provide evidence that mentions an improved capability against low altitude targets...

http://armed-services.senate.gov/sta...il/Balisle.pdf

...I think its reasonable to assume that includes YJ-83 since missiles like this are not exactly new in concept.

DA

Actually, some exporters do give the minimum altitude spec.
I'm not questioning that Aegis can pick up and intercept a bunch of YJ-83s fired at it, but rather that SM-2 will be intercepting it.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

well, how many interceptions are made at the maximum range?

A few, because there are different block varients. But the latest blocks currently in use (the older ones are gone AFAIK) have the longest range.

As for not flying 5 meter the entire way, that is true. It does fly at 20-30 meter for most of the flight, but even at 20 m, it seems pretty low for a long range SAM to intercept.

Aster missiles can apparently intercept at as little as 10 feet (just over 3 metres).

For example, S-300 has a minimum altitude of 25 m.

So? Since when was the S-300 some sort of "baseline" to compare with in this sort of scenario? Besides it's a land-based system - it doesn't have to deal with the sort of low-flying missiles SM-2, ESSM or Aster have to counter.

By the way, what do you mean "YJ-83 (not C-803)"? According to Sinodefence.com they're the same thing.

 

[goldenpanda]

...The J-10 is direct copy of the Israeli's Lavi...

If this is representative of USA information capability China has nothing to worry about.

...The PLAN kilo had previously penetrated the USS Kitty Hawk CSF and surfaced about 5 miles in the western Pacific...

Nor was it a kilo..

 

[Transient]

If I am not wrong the SM-2 Blk IIIB has demonstrated a capability to intercept USN targets used to emulate the Sunburns. And the Sunburn travels at 7m above water level in its terminal phase. Besides, the SM-2 is not the weapon of choice when facing the YJ-83. Those would be the ESSM and the RAM.

 

[Tasman]

If I am not wrong the SM-2 Blk IIIB has demonstrated a capability to intercept USN targets used to emulate the Sunburns. And the Sunburn travels at 7m above water level in its terminal phase. Besides, the SM-2 is not the weapon of choice when facing the YJ-83. Those would be the ESSM and the RAM.

I'm certain that SM-2s would be unleashed prior to any attacking missiles going into their terminal phase with the ESSM being used against any that got through and with RAM used as backup if ESSM failed.

I've noticed mention of decoys earlier in this thread and I wonder whether a decoy like Nulka would have any real chance of success against missiles like the Sunburn? I would have thought that this would be another important part of any layered anti missile defence system.

Cheers

 

[Galrahn]

If I am not wrong the SM-2 Blk IIIB has demonstrated a capability to intercept USN targets used to emulate the Sunburns. And the Sunburn travels at 7m above water level in its terminal phase. Besides, the SM-2 is not the weapon of choice when facing the YJ-83. Those would be the ESSM and the RAM.

I agree with this, except I wouldn't put the YJ-83 in the same category as the Sunburn. It has been proven time and time again a Sunburn launch is easily detected and even easier tracked. Sub-sonic launching boosters, which don't create enormous radar signatures that can be detected hundreds of kms over the horizon by todays modern, sophisticated naval radar systems are much more difficult to detect being launched, unlike the Sunburn which can be and often is described as anything, ...but stealthy.

While the YJ-83 would likely be above 7m in its approach, due to how the weapon works (very low signature) it would be much more difficult to detect and ultimately unlikely even be either detected if sub launched, and even if detected would unlikely be targeted by a Standard missile due to the difficulty in getting enough tracking data to guide an intercept without spot on guidance by an offboard asset (think Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) or any long range intercept variation of). While possible, I am intentionally using the word unlikely.

In other words, I would never assume a YJ-83 would be tracked at launch, rather I would only make the assumption the best case scenario is the weapon could be detected at launch.

Once the weapon goes terminal however, the likelyhood of tracking the missile would increase dramatically, and due to the range of detection it is much more probable interceptors would be ESSM or RAM/CIWS.

 

[Transient]

The problem is that missiles like the YJ-83 are sea skimmers, hence they cannot be engaged by missiles until they come over the horizon where target illumination can be provided. At that time, it would make more sense to use the ESSMs. The only excepton to this is when there is a forward picket AEGIS platform. In this case an SM-2 launched from a platform further behind may have its target illumination provided by the forward picket, which would allow for its longer range to be put to good use. Soon, the SM-6 would come online, now THAT would be something to behold. The E-2C would provide mid course guidance for the SM-6 while the SM-6 would home onto its target independently. That significant extension of the intercept envelope would make saturation attacks of ASMs extremely hard to succeed.

The Nulka is a next generation decoy meant to decoy radar guided ASMs. It would beggar belief to think that Sunburns and J-83s are not among the list of ASMs they are designed to be effective against.

 

[Galrahn]

SM-2 has the capability to intercept missiles at an altitude of 5m? I thought that was left for ESSM and RAM.

The SM-2 Block IIIB can do it but requires AEGIS Baseline 7 Phase II. The weapon requires the side-mounted infrared seeker to aid in endgame
guidance that is only available on the Block IIIB variant in order to hit very low altitude sea skimmers, and Baseline 7 Phase II which incorporated full integration of Black IIIB and sync'd tracking of low altitude targets OTH with CEC assets including an AESA equipped SH or CEC enabled Hawkeye.

For the vast majority of the AEGIS fleet, ESSM, RAM, and CIWS represent the only option for very low altitude missile systems.

 

[DarthAmerica]

I agree with this, except I wouldn't put the YJ-83 in the same category as the Sunburn. It has been proven time and time again a Sunburn launch is easily detected and even easier tracked. Sub-sonic launching boosters, which don't create enormous radar signatures that can be detected hundreds of kms over the horizon by todays modern, sophisticated naval radar systems are much more difficult to detect being launched, unlike the Sunburn which can be and often is described as anything, ...but stealthy.

While the YJ-83 would likely be above 7m in its approach, due to how the weapon works (very low signature) it would be much more difficult to detect and ultimately unlikely even be either detected if sub launched, and even if detected would unlikely be targeted by a Standard missile due to the difficulty in getting enough tracking data to guide an intercept without spot on guidance by an offboard asset (think Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) or any long range intercept variation of). While possible, I am intentionally using the word unlikely.

In other words, I would never assume a YJ-83 would be tracked at launch, rather I would only make the assumption the best case scenario is the weapon could be detected at launch.

Once the weapon goes terminal however, the likelyhood of tracking the missile would increase dramatically, and due to the range of detection it is much more probable interceptors would be ESSM or RAM/CIWS.

This is what I'm talking about when I say system. The CSF will have OTH targeting assets out on picket or in the air. In which case CEC would allow for a long ranged SAM like SM-2 to go after the YJ-83. Not only that, the Launching platforms themselves could have to contend with the CAP depending on how the picket is set up.

DA

 

[Galrahn]

The Nulka is a next generation decoy meant to decoy radar guided ASMs. It would beggar belief to think that Sunburns and J-83s are not among the list of ASMs they are designed to be effective against.

Again, a very good point.

There is a lot made about how CVNs are easily detected approaching China due to the extent of their surveillance networks in the Pacific. I tend to agree that it is very unlikely the US Navy would be able to hide carriers anywhere within 1000kms of the Chinese coast.

However, it has been suggested the Pacific fleet would instead choose to radiate every ship available with the same electronic signature of a CVN. In other words, if the US Pacific fleet deployed 50 ships within 1000 kms of the Chinese coast, all 50 would appear to be CVNs, making it more difficult for the Chinese to determine who is and isn't actually a CVN.

While it is relatively difficult to reduce a 100,000 ton CVN electronic signature to a modern radar 200kms away, it is relatively easy to make a 100 ton boat look like a 100,000 CVN to a modern radar system 200 kms away.

Alternatively, with all those bright targets that simply can't be ignored, when also accounting for offensive ECM by the US Navy, the assumption is those surface assets utilizing stealth would be even more stealthy due to the electronic barrage fouling up detection systems.

 

[Transient]

Galrahn, how widely fielded will the ESSM be in the AEGIS fleet? Will they be backfitted to the AB Flt I/II destroyers and the cruisers? Sorry, just that I couldn't find any info on this.

There is a lot made about how CVNs are easily detected approaching China due to the extent of their surveillance networks in the Pacific. I tend to agree that it is very unlikely the US Navy would be able to hide carriers anywhere within 1000kms of the Chinese coast.

I also disagree with this. I think you're over-rating the PLAN surveillance capability by quite a bit. While they have OTH radars to allow for detection of targets at long ranges, it is unlikely they will know what the blips on their screens are since the CSG has long adopted dispersed formations which are intended to make the strike group look 'non-distinct' from other traffic in the seas.

 

[Galrahn]

This is what I'm talking about when I say system. The CSF will have OTH targeting assets out on picket or in the air. In which case CEC would allow for a long ranged SAM like SM-2 to go after the YJ-83. Not only that, the Launching platforms themselves could have to contend with the CAP depending on how the picket is set up.

DA

DA I have been involved in too many studies and simulations, both virtual and real, to be convinced picket platforms will always be in the right place at the right time. It would be particularly true when you are talking about weapon systems more likely deployed by submarines from unknown locations. With virtually all CEC off board platforms being carrier based, I don't see the SM-2 Block IIIB + CEC being readily deployed enough to be weapon system of choice to counter the YJ-83 specifically.

The scenario described implies the weapon least likely to be available (SM-2 Block IIIB) requiring the assets least likely to be deployed along the threat axis (airbourn CEC platforms) intercepting the weapon least likely to be deployed along an expected threat axis (YJ-83).

Short ranged defense weapons (RAM, CIWS, ESSM), which are on a greater number of platforms more likely to be along an unexpected threat axis are more likely to the scenario described, and in my opinion, are also better suited to the intercept of the specific weapon system (YJ-83) being deployed.

While I may have reinforced your argument in a very limited way, I also want to make clear my position is that your scenario is the least likely scenario to actually occur.

 

[goldenpanda]

Alternatively, with all those bright targets that simply can't be ignored

I'm not an expert at this but this seems to be begging to lose your screens. Isn't it a valid strategy to begin by picking off the pickets, since by definition they do not have the strongest defense? If CSF is forced to retreat it is mission accomplished as far as protecting an invasion is concerned.

 

[Galrahn]

I also disagree with this. I think you're over-rating the PLAN surveillance capability by quite a bit. While they have OTH radars to allow for detection of targets at long ranges, it is unlikely they will know what the blips on their screens are since the CSG has long adopted dispersed formations which are intended to make the strike group look 'non-distinct' from other traffic in the seas.

I think this is a fair estimate because the combination of sophisticated electronic systems flown over Chinese coastal waters would make it possible for the Chinese to determine the large signature of CVNs. The most effective counter is to decoy by creating numerous large signatures, rather than try to reduce the large signature.

This was echoed as recently as the Jan 07 issue of Proceedings magazine in a wrap up article regarding the KH / Song incident.

Galrahn, how widely fielded will the ESSM be in the AEGIS fleet? Will they be backfitted to the AB Flt I/II destroyers and the cruisers? Sorry, just that I couldn't find any info on this.

While I hate Powerpoint Admirals, slide 4 in this does represent the most current plans for CG/DDG modernizations. Only the CG modernizations have been programmed, the DDG modernizations are subject of much debate and will be for a few years.

ESSM began with Baseline 6 Phase I, and nothing I have seen indicates backfitting ESSMs will happen for Flight I or Flight II DDGs, rather only Flight IIAs.

 

[Galrahn]

I'm not an expert at this but this seems to be begging to lose your screens. Isn't it a valid strategy to begin by picking off the pickets, since by definition they do not have the strongest defense? If CSF is forced to retreat it is mission accomplished as far as protecting an invasion is concerned.

Why? Who says you would need screens to decoy? An couple unmanned 11 meter craft could be towing a barge emitting decoy signals.

Why would you assume the decoys are warships, or even ships at all for that matter? It could be large helicopter, and as ASMs are launched and approaching the helicopter could simply switch off its emissions and bail to altitude once the missiles go terminal.

 

[Tasman]

Galrahn, how widely fielded will the ESSM be in the AEGIS fleet? Will they be backfitted to the AB Flt I/II destroyers and the cruisers? Sorry, just that I couldn't find any info on this.

Information I have gleaned through the web suggest that ESSM is seen mainly as a new construction fit for the DDGs, though it is to be backfitted to the first of the Flight IIA ABs temporarily fitted with Phalanx because of slippage of the ESSM program, but there are also reports that it will be fitted to AEGIS cruisers and CVNs.

Block I baseline 2 introduced further reliability upgrades and a muzzle restraint to decrease dispersion. Installed on multiple non-Aegis and Aegis ships, neither the original Phalanx Block 0 nor the subsequent Block 1 baseline 0, 1, or 2 upgrades are integrated with a ship self-defense system. A January 1992 Chief of Naval Operations decision requires replacement of Phalanx with the new ESSM system in new construction DDG ships. Though it initially appeared that DDG-79 would be the first new construction DDG to receive Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile in lieu of Phalanx, it now appears that, due to a slippage in the ESSM development program, DDG-85 will be the first. The Navy plans to install the Phalanx Block 1 baseline 2 configuration as temporary installations on DDG-79 through 84 until ESSM is produced.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/mk-15.htm

On January 12, 2004 the Honorable John J. Young, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, approved the Evolved SEASPARROW Missile (ESSM) to enter into full rate production. The ESSM is now being manufactured with the first U.S. rounds destined for the Aegis DDG community. USS Chaffee (DDG-90) was the first ship to receive tactical rounds in February and the USS McCampbell (DDG-85) will load out in March. Soon ESSM will also be employed aboard converted Aegis cruiser, CVs, and CVNs.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040301-navsea01.htm

Cheers

 

[gf0012-aust]

I'm not an expert at this but this seems to be begging to lose your screens. Isn't it a valid strategy to begin by picking off the pickets, since by definition they do not have the strongest defense? If CSF is forced to retreat it is mission accomplished as far as protecting an invasion is concerned.

How so? The screen in a war footing is huge - the disposition of a wartime fleet is considerably different from peacetime.

a wartime screen is well beyond the range of outside screen to centre target strike for an enemy missile.

the fact that there is still focus on USN defensive weapons systems rather than how the entire screen works indicates to me that the bulk of people focussed on "widget to widget" comparisons have no idea how prev defensive measures worked - let alone current defensive systems

in a situation that is a legacy of heading to open conflict the nature of the game changes completely. I would suspect that USN submarine posture would revert back to immediate cold war actions (hack the shad) - and that the primary role would be decapitation through LR-PGMs.

If this reverts to total war, then the US is between 6 and 13 minutes away from absolute strike options. China is nowhere near reciprocity.

No Fleet Commander is going to expose assets until apropriate decapitation and dislocation has taken place. Why anyone thinks that the USN is going to play to PLAAF/PLAN strengths and advantages of land based air is beyond me.

This missile to sensor comparison debate is so simplistic it beggars belief that we're having a serious discussion about it.

 

[Transient]

Thanks Galrahn and Tasman for the info.

I think this is a fair estimate because the combination of sophisticated electronic systems flown over Chinese coastal waters would make it possible for the Chinese to determine the large signature of CVNs.

I am under the impression that the PLAN doesn't have the requisite numbers of MPA and ELINT platforms to provide the sustained wide area coverage needed to locate a carrier, particularly if the carrier is operating under EMCON conditions.

 

[goldenpanda]

Why? Who says you would need screens to decoy? An couple unmanned 11 meter craft could be towing a barge emitting decoy signals.

Why would you assume the decoys are warships, or even ships at all for that matter? It could be large helicopter, and as ASMs are launched and approaching the helicopter could simply switch off its emissions and bail to altitude once the missiles go terminal.

Now you're talking about the effectiveness of decoys in general. Making everything look like CVN means giving everything, including the real screen ships the largest possible electronic signature. That's just silly.

 

[Galrahn]

I am under the impression that the PLAN doesn't have the requisite numbers of MPA and ELINT platforms to provide the sustained wide area coverage needed to locate a carrier, particularly if the carrier is operating under EMCON conditions.

I tend to agree with that. I also note the EP-3 they held in the summer of 2001 was a very, very sophisticated platform. While I doubt they have advanced the technology stolen from that incident much, I don't doubt they have been able to duplicate it.

When it comes to technology, as a general rule the Chinese have a gift for duplication, but also have a traditional lack for the gift of creativity that is required to expand on stolen technologies without source.

Bottom line, we don't really know. I wouldn't claim China has the ability to sustain tracking a carrier task force in the Pacific theater operating against China in wartime, but I would claim they have the ability to do it at least partially throughout a 24 hour period. A theory on this I have read and somewhat subscribe to is the day/night theory, that as an example during the day China 'could' potentially sustain a tracking capability, but that it could be disrupted effectively at night. I think day/night is being very general, and probably wouldn't be literal in accuracy, but I subscribe to the general idea of the theory.

This missile to sensor comparison debate is so simplistic it beggars belief that we're having a serious discussion about it.

I agree, and I really don't have a good reason why I even tried to participate.