Australian M1A1 Abrams technology

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
By the time Australia adopted the LAV, it had been a late adoption of a US vehicle, itself a late adoption of the European 1970s initiative.
As it happens, it coincided witht he post-Cold War adoption of new wheeled designs largely as an illustration that with a conflrontation with ex-USSR over, budgets could be cut, and the way they were cut with respect to AFVs was to put them on wheels.
Let's face it. Im major equipment purchases Australian Army has been consistently a generation behind for much of the late 20th century.
Personally, I don't see a problem with that. You make sure that you don't end up with all the problems associated with early adoption of potentially revolutionary technology, your doctrine is well prepared by seeing what mistakes others have made when they adopted it and above all, you're invariably at least one generation in front of your regional competitors.

Yes, but look at the OOB for Vietnam (only because it is more readily available). A plethora of platoons, 'units' and detachments for what was for most of the time a single infantry battalion.
Errr, depends upon which period you're talking about. After the first year, there were two and then three battalions deployed in a brigade sized Taskforce (which was at the time the official redesignation of the brigade formation BTW). Until 1969 when they started to drawdown the Taskforce, it then went down from three to two to one and associated units were withdrawn as well. I am unsure where you get this idea there was only ever one battalion in South Vietnam but I can assure you there was more than that.

Yes you do. So we agree on something.
So, the way to avoid that problem is, what exactly? :rolleyes:

Well, some people who feel insecure choose to become aggressive and abusive rather then identify their source of insecurity, and you display this even if you don't see it (an indication of the behaviour).
I am far from insecure and I haven't been particularly abusive, FT. If you wish to engage in pop-psychology, perhaps you should look up the word "projecting"?

If you believe in something, enthusiasm is the way to show you are passionate on the subject, nothing wrong there.
I didn't suggest there was. Enthusiasm though, can sometimes blind you to the faults in your own argument, FT. Doesn't mean you should avoid it, just temper it with a bit of sense, thats all.

True, I may lack in expereince, which is why I usually ask those that have, and always prepared to listen (and have been proven wrong before).
Good way to learn, keep it up.

Do you mind telling me when I displayed a lack of common sense?
When your thesis has obviously been shot down in flames you keep proposing it and trying to circumvent reality in order to make it work.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
By the end of WWII the Australian Army had 6 Divisions in the Field. Also My understanding was that the Australian Army had a brigade deployed, which included some NZ elements.

Also I would make the following statement regarding Australia's recent deployments. They have been in support of Multinational/Coalition operations. At no stage has Australia faced a situation that is reminiscent to what it faced in 1942, with a hostile conventional force on it's doorstep.

The current stage is IMHO set more around politics than national survival. There is an enemy to be fought, and while it has the ability to hurt Australia, in terms of terrorism, it does not warrant a massive build up either.
By end of WW2 there were six divisions available for field service by 1945. This is not to say that there were six divisions in the field, just like there were 12 divisions (and more) 'on paper' available in 1939 in Australia, including two armoured divisions. However, point taken.
Yes, in Korea the Australian brigade had a NZ battalion. However it was still an Australian commanded brigade.

'Terrorism' has become a euphimism for talking about decades long evolution of political ideology in the Islamic world against the West (and Israel is just a most obvious example of this).

Many (most?) Australians in general are largely ignorant of the views being promoted in many Islamic countries and cultures, and would be apalled if they knew of them. What the recently embarassed Sydney Islamic 'teacher' had been saying in his madrassa and on Egyptian TV is common fare in Islamic media, including Indonesia.

However I think the Australian governenmet is not so anaware as the rest of the population. Why else would they launch one of the most ambitious Defence financing programs in post-WW2 history? Surely we don't need M1 tanks for counter-'terrorism' operations?

The truth is that the region is very volatile (not having a history for stability), and although I do sincerely hope that democracy prevails, in talking to people from various countries in the region, that is not how they see their own countries 'operating'.

It is based on this that I think the future is less 'bright' then many paint it, and hence the ADF should (and does) prepare for larger operations, further from home.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Personally, I don't see a problem with that. You make sure that you don't end up with all the problems associated with early adoption of potentially revolutionary technology, your doctrine is well prepared by seeing what mistakes others have made when they adopted it and above all, you're invariably at least one generation in front of your regional competitors.
There is only one thing wrong with this, and that is that Australia is always the follower rather then the leader in developing technologies. OK, not always as many different technologies Australia DOES lead in (or at least on par with World leaders), but in the matter of AFVs, we CAN be leaders because we do have a significant talent in automotive and mechanical design in general. Yes, it is expensive and hard to be a leader, but there are rewards also.

Errr, depends upon which period you're talking about. After the first year, there were two and then three battalions deployed in a brigade sized Taskforce (which was at the time the official redesignation of the brigade formation BTW). Until 1969 when they started to drawdown the Taskforce, it then went down from three to two to one and associated units were withdrawn as well. I am unsure where you get this idea there was only ever one battalion in South Vietnam but I can assure you there was more than that.
No, the deployments always overlapped, but with one exception (Apr-Jul 66) there were only two battalions in SV, one preparing to leave and the other one taking over the AO.

So, the way to avoid that problem is, what exactly? :rolleyes:
As I suggested, IF all these secondments, detachments, independent platoons, etc. are going to be required by battalion when if goes overseas, why not integrate them into the battalion structure? This is how USMC does it because they DO expect to be deploying in non-Army like operations. Current brigade structure is very much on the NATO conventional forces model, which is fine if we expect to be conducting that sort of operations, but all indications are that we are not. In any case, if a brigade composed of such battalions does deploy as a whole, it will only find itself with more staff then it would require in conventional deployment, and this is a good thing. Administrative needs of the Australian Takforce in SV grew beyond expectations from day one, and required more staff then most Australian commanders in Canberra imagined. I doubt this will change. East Timor is a good indication with the number of civil relations, transition activities, supervised intitatives, etc. that had nothing to do with combat readiness requiring ADF members to be detached again and again.

I didn't suggest there was. Enthusiasm though, can sometimes blind you to the faults in your own argument, FT. Doesn't mean you should avoid it, just temper it with a bit of sense, thats all.
Ok.
But still, where did I show lack of common sense? Are you refering to the Leo turret transplant? It was a spurr-of-the-monent idea, but not so crazy considering it had been done before. It just didn't fit in with my own ides on LAND 400 on closer assessment.

When your thesis has obviously been shot down in flames you keep proposing it and trying to circumvent reality in order to make it work.
Ok, next time I'll just give up the first time I'm told it can't be done and keep quiet :cheers

Not...
I may be wrong sometimes, maybe every time, but I won't learn much by being a 'shrinking violet'.
 

Whiskyjack

Honorary Moderator / Defense Professional / Analys
Verified Defense Pro
By end of WW2 there were six divisions available for field service by 1945. This is not to say that there were six divisions in the field, just like there were 12 divisions (and more) 'on paper' available in 1939 in Australia, including two armoured divisions. However, point taken.
I think from memory that Australia has 6 Divisions on operations at wars end, I remember reading that at wars end all 6 divisions were in 'contact with the enemy' of course that enemy had been bypassed for all of a year. From memory it was the Aus CinC orders of the day. I have a feeling that there may have been more formations on active service earlier in the war '43-44 than at the end due to man power shortage. I know that is the case for NZ.


Yes, in Korea the Australian brigade had a NZ battalion. However it was still an Australian commanded brigade.
I think you are confused with Vietnam, in Koea NZ had an Arty regiment and no infanty, in Vietnam there was an Arty Battery and 2 rifle companies.

'Terrorism' has become a euphimism for talking about decades long evolution of political ideology in the Islamic world against the West (and Israel is just a most obvious example of this).

Many (most?) Australians in general are largely ignorant of the views being promoted in many Islamic countries and cultures, and would be apalled if they knew of them. What the recently embarassed Sydney Islamic 'teacher' had been saying in his madrassa and on Egyptian TV is common fare in Islamic media, including Indonesia.

However I think the Australian governenmet is not so anaware as the rest of the population. Why else would they launch one of the most ambitious Defence financing programs in post-WW2 history? Surely we don't need M1 tanks for counter-'terrorism' operations?

The truth is that the region is very volatile (not having a history for stability), and although I do sincerely hope that democracy prevails, in talking to people from various countries in the region, that is not how they see their own countries 'operating'.

It is based on this that I think the future is less 'bright' then many paint it, and hence the ADF should (and does) prepare for larger operations, further from home .
I think you are overstating the build up of the ADF to some extent. Yes they are being re-equipped, and there is some expansion of capabilities. But in general it is replacing new equipment for old, which is normal. The reason it costs so much now is a mixture of underspending in previous years (post cold war) and block obsolescence of platforms. This is actually pretty common across the militaries of the West.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
I think from memory that Australia has 6 Divisions on operations at wars end, I remember reading that at wars end all 6 divisions were in 'contact with the enemy' of course that enemy had been bypassed for all of a year. From memory it was the Aus CinC orders of the day. I have a feeling that there may have been more formations on active service earlier in the war '43-44 than at the end due to man power shortage. I know that is the case for NZ.
Ok, you could be right, although the measure of 'contact' may be a bit stretching it.

I think you are confused with Vietnam, in Koea NZ had an Arty regiment and no infanty, in Vietnam there was an Arty Battery and 2 rifle companies.
Yes, sorry, the Royal Australian regiment (3 battalions) was in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Korea.

I think you are overstating the build up of the ADF to some extent. Yes they are being re-equipped, and there is some expansion of capabilities. But in general it is replacing new equipment for old, which is normal. The reason it costs so much now is a mixture of underspending in previous years (post cold war) and block obsolescence of platforms. This is actually pretty common across the militaries of the West.
What of the recruiting drive to bring the Army in particular to larger number of battalions (and to fill out the existing battalions)?
Even if equipment becomes obsolete, one does not just replace it for replacement sake, but looks at the need for the capability in view of threat projections. It seems to me the ADF does not see these projections as being significantly reduced compared to those of the late 80s.
I hope you are right though.
 

Whiskyjack

Honorary Moderator / Defense Professional / Analys
Verified Defense Pro
What of the recruiting drive to bring the Army in particular to larger number of battalions (and to fill out the existing battalions)?
Even if equipment becomes obsolete, one does not just replace it for replacement sake, but looks at the need for the capability in view of threat projections. It seems to me the ADF does not see these projections as being significantly reduced compared to those of the late 80s.
I hope you are right though.
An increase for sure, but look at the budget 1.9-2% of GDP is not a 'war time' or even threat figure it is more situation normal.

Also taking into account the recent announced increase in the US Army and USMC the US will have 1.5 million regulars accross all 4 services, Australia will have 60k, Australia is 1/15th the population of the US. 1/15th of 1.5 Million is 100,000.

Also IMHO the US is not on a war footing, and is still smaller than it was in the late '80s.

Australia is better preparing itself to contribute to coalition operations IMO.

I guess I see it more as preparing to fight at a level it chooses to contribute to rather than fighting an all out conflict that forces it to take 'emergency' measures. This is also true of most of the other Western countries.

But that is just my opinion! :)
 

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
There is only one thing wrong with this, and that is that Australia is always the follower rather then the leader in developing technologies. OK, not always as many different technologies Australia DOES lead in (or at least on par with World leaders), but in the matter of AFVs, we CAN be leaders because we do have a significant talent in automotive and mechanical design in general. Yes, it is expensive and hard to be a leader, but there are rewards also.
We could be, no doubt about it. The question is do we need to be? Just as in WWII, when we produced the Sentinel, we are faced with hard choices, FT. We can build tanks or we can build other things. Our pockets aren't limitless, we do not have the resouces for both AFV development and production or ship production or etc., etc. We must make choices. Unfortunately AFV production is seen very much as a long way down the list of what is both economic and "sexy".

No, the deployments always overlapped, but with one exception (Apr-Jul 66) there were only two battalions in SV, one preparing to leave and the other one taking over the AO.
Yet in 67-69, we had three battalions in country. Further you've just admitted that you were mistaken in your claim that we only had one.

As I suggested, IF all these secondments, detachments, independent platoons, etc. are going to be required by battalion when if goes overseas, why not integrate them into the battalion structure? This is how USMC does it because they DO expect to be deploying in non-Army like operations. Current brigade structure is very much on the NATO conventional forces model, which is fine if we expect to be conducting that sort of operations, but all indications are that we are not. In any case, if a brigade composed of such battalions does deploy as a whole, it will only find itself with more staff then it would require in conventional deployment, and this is a good thing. Administrative needs of the Australian Takforce in SV grew beyond expectations from day one, and required more staff then most Australian commanders in Canberra imagined. I doubt this will change. East Timor is a good indication with the number of civil relations, transition activities, supervised intitatives, etc. that had nothing to do with combat readiness requiring ADF members to be detached again and again.
The USMC is a unique institution and there has been talk for about the last 10 years that the Oz Army should become the Australian Army Marine Corps - not necessarily through copying what the USMC is or even does but how it is employed. In the UK, there has been a dissolution of the Corps structure down to now basically a "Shooters" and a "Non-Shooters" Corps It isn't without merit but it isn't going to happen any time soon downunder. The entrenched Corps loyalities and inter-Corps rivalries are still too strong. Nor do I necessarily think its a great idea who's time has come. I for one would be very saddened to see the rich Corps' history dissolved.

Ok.
But still, where did I show lack of common sense? Are you refering to the Leo turret transplant? It was a spurr-of-the-monent idea, but not so crazy considering it had been done before. It just didn't fit in with my own ides on LAND 400 on closer assessment.
No, there are several other points, such as this continued pursuit of AFV design and production downunder. Its just not going to happen.

Ok, next time I'll just give up the first time I'm told it can't be done and keep quiet :cheers

Not...
I may be wrong sometimes, maybe every time, but I won't learn much by being a 'shrinking violet'.
There is a fineline between "shrinking violet" and "bloody fool", FT. Perhaps you need to look which side your feet are on?
 

Mick73

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Ft the overlapping of Bn in Vietnam were most likely the Advance Parties and Rear Parties. My Dad spoke of his time there and when he arrived in Nov of 67 there were elements of (I think) 6 Bns in Sth Vn. There were three Bns of the Regt in Vietnam in 67-68 because all of the Reg from 8RAR were sent to Woodside SA to make up the 3rd Bn for the TF (Surprise it was 3RAR) which deployed it main body by mid Nov of 67. It replaced I believe 5RAR. So in 65 you had 1RAR attached to the 173rd Airbourne Bde and then the TF was reaised to 2 Bns then in 67 it went to 3 Bns. I'm sure you can find the info on which Bns were deployed and when somewhere but the fact is we did have 3 Bns deployed by Nov67.

Now how is that M1A1 technology going?...Wil it go back on thread??
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
An increase for sure, but look at the budget 1.9-2% of GDP is not a 'war time' or even threat figure it is more situation normal.

Also taking into account the recent announced increase in the US Army and USMC the US will have 1.5 million regulars accross all 4 services, Australia will have 60k, Australia is 1/15th the population of the US. 1/15th of 1.5 Million is 100,000.

Also IMHO the US is not on a war footing, and is still smaller than it was in the late '80s.

Australia is better preparing itself to contribute to coalition operations IMO.

I guess I see it more as preparing to fight at a level it chooses to contribute to rather than fighting an all out conflict that forces it to take 'emergency' measures. This is also true of most of the other Western countries.

But that is just my opinion! :)
I pretty much agree with your opinion though not your statistics :)
Size of budget and national population in not way reflect personnel needs of the national defence forces.
For example we could significantly increase out border surveillance resources, and probably the strategic airlift component should be much larger considering Australia's position on the globe. However neither budget nor Australian population would suffice since we would need to build up the skilled personnel as well as the expereince of operating the aircraft gradually (such as the C-17s), so having the money for it doesn't help.

Same with the US. What does 1.5m regulars mean? A single B-2 flight with 9 pilots require 24 support personnel. and this is just an example of a regular COMBAT unit. It gets worse with all sorts of support, research and training commands as you know. The projected 47 Army brigades are only going to be about 200,000 in actual strength (IMHO). I estimate they need almost as many support personnel to keep then operational, and that again to provide Army infrastructure. For Australia this means that from 27,000 (desired) only 9,000 are actual combat troops.
I'm prepared to be told I'm wrong :(
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
We could be, no doubt about it. The question is do we need to be? Just as in WWII, when we produced the Sentinel, we are faced with hard choices, FT. We can build tanks or we can build other things. Our pockets aren't limitless, we do not have the resouces for both AFV development and production or ship production or etc., etc. We must make choices. Unfortunately AFV production is seen very much as a long way down the list of what is both economic and "sexy".
Yes, unfortunately, because in most cases the people on the 'sharp' end of any conflict (outside of SAS), are the infantry. The Australian Infantry Corps have a proven record of doing the impossible, and I think they deserve the best tools to give them every opportunity to do the best job they are expected to perform in. It's something every professional would take for granted. Not 'sexy' at all.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Yet in 67-69, we had three battalions in country. Further you've just admitted that you were mistaken in your claim that we only had one.
No, the 5 RAR and 6 RAR arrived in April 66 and left in July 67. Until July 66 the 1 RAR was still in Vietnam, and 2 and 7 RAR arrived in March/April 67 to replace them. You could say that at one time over a couple of summer months there were four Australian battalions incountry, but in fact this was a transfer of responsibilities as I understand it.

Also it seems that a good portion of the two battalions provided security for Australian combat support units and bases.
So in terms of offencive combat operations command it was a one battalion deployment.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
The USMC is a unique institution and there has been talk for about the last 10 years that the Oz Army should become the Australian Army Marine Corps - not necessarily through copying what the USMC is or even does but how it is employed. In the UK, there has been a dissolution of the Corps structure down to now basically a "Shooters" and a "Non-Shooters" Corps It isn't without merit but it isn't going to happen any time soon downunder. The entrenched Corps loyalities and inter-Corps rivalries are still too strong. Nor do I necessarily think its a great idea who's time has come. I for one would be very saddened to see the rich Corps' history dissolved.
When did I suggest disollution of the various Corps!!!:shudder
All I'm saying is, keep the battalions, regiments, Corps, the history and ethos, but change the structure and operational doctrine. The realities are that of all the developed countires in the World, Australia's Army most resembles in it's modus operandi the USMC, so why not take the advantage of its expereince?
With the new LPDs for the RAN, I think any deployed taskforce built around an infantry battalion will 'naturaly' resemble an MAU (except a lack of fixed wing aircraft :()
 

FutureTank

Banned Member

FutureTank

Banned Member
Now how is that M1A1 technology going?...Wil it go back on thread??
Yep, so does anyone know anything more on the Mid Range Munition Chemical Energy (MRM-CE) guided projectile with digital semi active laser sensor tested from the M1 SEP late last year?
 

rickshaw

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
When did I suggest disollution of the various Corps!!!:shudder
Effectively that is what you are proposing, I believe.

All I'm saying is, keep the battalions, regiments, Corps, the history and ethos, but change the structure and operational doctrine. The realities are that of all the developed countires in the World, Australia's Army most resembles in it's modus operandi the USMC, so why not take the advantage of its expereince?
You cannot do one without doing the other, FT. The core of the infantryman's life is literally "the battalion". If you listen to them talk for five minutes, you will find that out. Suddenly you want to bring into their cosy little family all these non-infantry types and dilute its esprit de' corps.

Nor have you answered the obvious question about how you would administer all these diverse subunits and their needs within a battalion structure, away from their specialised workshop facilities. What you're proposing will have long term ramifications and drive up costs. You don't appear to have considered that.

Nor have you answered the problem of "penny-packetism" which is the enemy of armour's proper deployment en-masse'

With the new LPDs for the RAN, I think any deployed taskforce built around an infantry battalion will 'naturaly' resemble an MAU (except a lack of fixed wing aircraft :()
Of course it will. Expeditionary forces tend to resemble each other if they are combined arms because they fulfill a similar function.
 

FutureTank

Banned Member
Effectively that is what you are proposing, I believe.
No, the units do not terminate their identities, particularly the infantry battalions. Only the personnel that would be operationally attached to battalions would 'live' with the battalions (though retaining unit and Corps affilitations). This only reflects their deployment status.

You cannot do one without doing the other, FT. The core of the infantryman's life is literally "the battalion". If you listen to them talk for five minutes, you will find that out. Suddenly you want to bring into their cosy little family all these non-infantry types and dilute its esprit de' corps.
Not at all, and quite the opposite. As a matter of fact I had listened to more then a few infantrymen, in one cese for 3 hours straight (5 RAR), and I only knew his first name!
The infantry can not function without the non-infantry 'types', and these in turn have noone to support without the infantry. I'm not suggesting they even have to parade together, but it seems to me the relationships already exist at brigade level now, so why not go one better and integrate at battalion level?

Nor have you answered the obvious question about how you would administer all these diverse subunits and their needs within a battalion structure, away from their specialised workshop facilities. What you're proposing will have long term ramifications and drive up costs. You don't appear to have considered that.
On deployment all these costs eventuate anyway, with all the individuals and their equipment and the mobile part of the workshops DO need to integrate. Administration is not so difficult given that all the staff already exist within the brigade HQs.
What costs would be incurred? All brigades have permanent assigned subunits anyway. I may be missing something, so if you have examples, plese give them. In the ccase of M1s for example, the squadrons have their own service workshops I believe, or has it gone back to regimental service troop?
Nor have you answered the problem of "penny-packetism" which is the enemy of armour's proper deployment en-masse'
Of course it will. Expeditionary forces tend to resemble each other if they are combined arms because they fulfill a similar function.
Yes, so why not embrace this? I can see battalions rotating through afloat deployments anyway just as they do now when they train with the RAN.
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
The problem with fitting many small units together is maintenance, support, etc.
For example your idea of splitting the Tiger squadrons and attach lonely flights to the units they have to support.

This means you have to have the support facilities and staff needed for operating Tigers at every barrack they are stationed at.

You are also much more flexible when it comes to personal and equipment exchange when you operate at bn level. I think you would be surprised how much equipment and personal is rotated from one company to another when for example one mech inf company deploys to a training area.
 

Smythstar

New Member
$$$

Would it have cost any extra to have the Europack Diesels?

I read MTU have a v12 1500 hp diesel 35% smaller than the Europack or can make a v16 the same size with 2000 hp!

It sort of worries me that in the rush to jump on the American bandwagon we have compromised our own interests somewhat, for example if we are after an infantry tank with a phone on the back could it be a worry that the gas turbines 1000 degree exhaust is feet away let alone the massive target it presents to a TI or the fact its the only engine of its type in the whole army with additional maintenance costs as well as three times the fuel costs etc etc.

Anyway i have no fear that eventually we will sort it all out after a little cash down the drain and all will be good again, at least we have the biggest baddest chunk of ceramic on the block.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
. The Ghan railway isn't designed to carry them - the axle loadings on the flatbed railtrucks are too high. The same for the road bridges in the NT - as it is, civvie road-trains have to be uncoupled to cross many of the roadbridges in the NT. How are you going to get a tank across? Swim it, when the rivers are in flood? :rolleyes:

.
You sure about this. The axle laod for the North south rail link is a 21 tonnes for the worst stretch. this should not be confused wiht the flat bed carrying capicity or any rail cars carrying capacity as the bogey arrangment has a lot to do with it. The flat beds are designed to take multi stack TEU loads which would exceed the mass of a single M1A1.

The track also support ore cars each of which again exceeds the mass of an M1A1.

The track has areay been used to moved armour to an from Darwin with mulitple light armoured vehicles on each flat bed.
 
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