How to counter stealth plane?

[noves]

As the title suggest,can anyone of u give an idea how to How to counter stealth plane?I have my own idea but let see others idea first.

 

[merocaine]

countering stealth

try this on for size

http://www-tech.mit.edu/V121/N63/Stealth.63f.html

it posits using micro wave transmitters (mobile telephone masts) as a dense network of radar sites giving all round coverage of the stealth aircraft.
Rather than one or two radar sites.
This would probobly only work in an industralised country though.
Interesting stuff, the article reakons that aganist large advanced countries stealth may have a short shelf life(in its current form anyway) but considrubly longer aganist 2nd & 3th world countries.

 

[old faithful]

probably use tactics that would minimise the advantage of air supieriority.small groups of highly trained soldiers, operating in an unpredictable way. slow down the pace of the conflict,whilst maintaining a nuisance to your enemy. all the stealth fighters in world wont help much in a low intensity conflict. not the answer you were looking for i bet...

 

[Snayke]

How does stealth technology work in air warfare? Like, if a fighter was right behind a stealth plane, could it lock on or is it unable to recognise it, so to speak?

 

[mikehotwheelz]

Got to keep 'em dry

From what I've read, the radar absorbant material painted on to stealth planes can be seriously degraded when wet. Suddenly they go from being matt to nice and shiney.
It's interesting to note that the only recorded loss of a stealth fighter was over the rainy skies of Yugoslavia as opposed to the dry, desert conditions found in Iraq (or Edwards or Nellis Air Bases, for that matter!)

 

[RubiconNZ]

Slippery when wet

Thats right I remember that did they not fix that on the B2's I can't remember exactly what...
The f117 wasn't that just a one in a million flak shot? thats what I thought i don't know for sure though.

 

[merocaine]

Pulled from Wikipedia

One F-117 has been lost in combat, to Serbian/Yugoslav forces. On March 27, 1999, during the Kosovo War, the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade under command of colonel Zoltán Dani, equipped with the Isayev S-125 'Neva-M' (NATO designation SA-3 'Goa'), downed F-117A serial number 82-806 with a Neva missile. According to Wesley Clark and other NATO generals, Yugoslav air defences tracked F-117s with old Russian radars operating on long wavelengths. This, combined with the loss of stealth when the jets got wet or opened their bomb bays, made them highly visible on radar screens. The pilot survived and was later rescued by NATO forces. However, the wreckage of the F-117 was not promptly bombed, and the Serbs are believed to have invited Russian personnel to inspect the remains, inevitably compromising the US stealth technology. [2]

A second F-117A was also damaged during a raid in the Kosovo War, and although it made it back to its base, it never flew again.

Yugoslav air defences tracked F-117s with old Russian radars operating on long wavelengths.

does anyone know if this is really the case or mere soposition

 

[merocaine]

sorry for the double post
but heres some more info on the battery commander who scored the kill

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20051121.aspx

 

[gf0012-aust]

From what I've read, the radar absorbant material painted on to stealth planes can be seriously degraded when wet. Suddenly they go from being matt to nice and shiney.

that only applies (no pun intended) to the B2's where a different process was used for coating.

thats also been changed in the last month. DID ran an article recently where it talked about how the B2's were now maintained by Robots to pick up the bulk of the re-seaming and masking.

It's interesting to note that the only recorded loss of a stealth fighter was over the rainy skies of Yugoslavia as opposed to the dry, desert conditions found in Iraq (or Edwards or Nellis Air Bases, for that matter!)

see above

 

[Giblets46]

More radars the better, and in obscure positions too. Stealth does not make an aircraft invisible, just harder to 'see'. If a modern aircraft witha decent radar can see another at 100miles, then it is likely to be able to 'see' a stealth aircraft at maybe 30miles, by which time it will be dead (if an F-22), but very likely to never have seen it if an F-117 or B-2.

 

[noves]

My idea is suitable for small militans group because it's cheap.The think is just take a telescope and modified it a lilttel bit then instal a night vision to it because stealth fighter always strike at night then make alot of them and put them like 2 or 3 kilometers from each others so that it's easier to detect stealth plane.Then used a mobile anti plane weapon or inform the sam crew and air force to be ready or just used a anti plane missille such as starbust(i'm not very sure if it can catch the plane)

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

My idea is suitable for small militans group because it's cheap.The think is just take a telescope and modified it a lilttel bit then instal a night vision to it because stealth fighter always strike at night then make alot of them and put them like 2 or 3 kilometers from each others so that it's easier to detect stealth plane.Then used a mobile anti plane weapon or inform the sam crew and air force to be ready or just used a anti plane missille such as starbust(i'm not very sure if it can catch the plane)

This idea would be cheap but i'm not too sure how usefull it would be. Each teliscope would only be able to see a tiny part of sky. And you would need really well trained people to operate the system, have you ever looked through a pair of binoculars at something moveing? Its damn hard on a clear day when you know what your looking at, try looking for an aircraft painted black in a pitch black sky that you dont know is there. it would be bloody impossible. If you spent a bit more cash and used a computerised electro optical system it might be a bit more succsessfull. But i wouldn't bet my ass on it if i was osamma!:eek

 

[noves]

This idea would be cheap but i'm not too sure how usefull it would be. Each teliscope would only be able to see a tiny part of sky. And you would need really well trained people to operate the system, have you ever looked through a pair of binoculars at something moveing? Its damn hard on a clear day when you know what your looking at, try looking for an aircraft painted black in a pitch black sky that you dont know is there. it would be bloody impossible. If you spent a bit more cash and used a computerised electro optical system it might be a bit more succsessfull. But i wouldn't bet my ass on it if i was osamma!:eek

What you say is right but if we learn from history,the Serbia army did shoot down a sthealth bommer and they spot the plane by just using a binocular.

 

[gf0012-aust]

What you say is right but if we learn from history,the Serbia army did shoot down a sthealth bommer and they spot the plane by just using a binocular.

Please think before posting. The F-117 involved a tad more than just "binoculars". In fact the details of that shooting has been discussed at length in here.

Don't dumb down answers to cement your arguments - especially when they fail the "rigour test"

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

What you say is right but if we learn from history,the Serbia army did shoot down a sthealth bommer and they spot the plane by just using a binocular.

Sounds like one damn lucky shot. And i thought that F117's stealth was comprimised by bad weather (radio-obsorbing materials loose their integrity when they get wet) and a standard search radar picked it up. Anyway it doesnt sound like anything close to a reliable detection system, anything that relies on human scensors cant be reliable. And what about bad wether, the system would be useless in cloud cover or aginst high flying stealth aircraft like the B2.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Sounds like one damn lucky shot.

It was a well planned shot assisted by a number of factors. All of which have been discussed before in here.

And i thought that F117's stealth was comprimised by bad weather (radio-obsorbing materials loose their integrity when they get wet) and a standard search radar picked it up.

No, it was the B2 that was effected and it was due to a masking process. That was resolved this year by using new robots which were not only more efficient, but cut the maint time by 75%.

All 3 US stealth profiled platforms are based on different signature management technologies.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I should have read the previouse posts! Low frequancy radar on the old SA-3 eh? Sounds like the serbs might not want want new for old?

gf, i heard that JOHRN had anti-stealth capability? How does it work? low frequency radio waves or the angle that they hit the aircraft?

 

[DoC_FouALieR]

As the title suggest,can anyone of u give an idea how to How to counter stealth plane?

Easy. Don't mess with countries owning stealth planes ;-)

 

[killbill2]

That mit article is interesting but those systems they speak of are not without their problems.

While it would be close to impossible to destroy them all, they are susceptible to jamming just like conventional radar.

http://www-tech.mit.edu/V121/N63/Stealth.63f.html

these systems are pretty sensitive. the more sensitive something is the more suseptible it is to jamming. You can always use EA 18G growlers and standoff jamming paltforms to render these systems useless.

s cellphone -- based radar a true threat to national security? John Shaeffer, co-founder of stealth consultants Marietta Scientific and co-author of the standard textbook on radar detection, has doubts. "I'm not sure," he says, "that there's a real pony in there." Shaeffer points out that a bistatic radar system has the best chance of defeating stealth when the receiver is on the opposite side of the airplane from the transmitter, which means the airplane is already inside enemy territory before the radar has a chance of picking it up.

An even bigger question has to do with power. Conventional monostatic radars focus hundreds of kilowatts into a pencil beam, like a bright searchlight. Cellphone towers, by contrast, put out only tens of watts, and in all directions, more like a household lightbulb. Like ripples on a pond, the radio waves lose energy as they spread, and they scatter farther when they hit a target, so the signal at the receiver is weak. Although TV and FM radio signals are stronger than those from cellphones, they are still much weaker than those emitted by a focused radar transmitter.

In a March 2000 report on critical military technologies, the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency wrote that TV-based bistatic radars like Silent Sentry have some potential against stealth targets. Even so, the Pentagon's Low Observables/Counter Low Observables Executive Committee, or Excom, which controls the export of any technology that could compromise stealth, does not mention bistatic radar in a long list of potential counter-stealth techniques. And the Pentagon has permitted Lockheed Martin to go public with its Silent Sentry system, which the company is pitching as a way for one nation to keep a discreet eye on another's airspace, perhaps to stop smuggling or other illegal traffic.

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/printe...2b86d4d03cb84010vgnvcm1000004eecbccdrcrd.html

Another problem si power a conventional radar sesnds out a highly foucsed radar beam ofa few megawatts. In comaparison cell phne tower signals are int he tens of watts and although TV/FM signals are stronger they're still much weaker and get weaker the farther thy go. they alos scatter when they hit the target.Combine that with jammers,supercruise, and high altitude where the signals aren't that strong. Another problem is coordination

However, bistatic radars, while simple in concept, have many fundamental technical and operational issues to overcome, according to John Shaeffer, RCS engineer at Marietta Scientific in Georgia. The receiver antenna beam must intercept its companion transmit beam and follow the transmit pulse which is moving at the speed of light. Unless the transmitter and receiver pulses are synchronized, distance measurement is impossible. Even a workable bistatic radar must then address the problem of how much volume of airspace it can scan at a given power setting in a given time. When the receiver, transmitter, and target are located on a straight line, the receiver can be overwhelmed by the transmitter pulse, which hides the target's radar return. As Shaeffer put it, "This is similar to looking into the Sun for light scattered from Venus."

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Feb1999/0299radar.asp

The current system uses GPS to synchronise signals but that only helps for short ranges. Bistatic radars also have range limitations , you will need a lot of receivers to detect something at long range whixh is cost rpohibitive and as more recievers are added the algorithms become more complex and more computing power demanding.For exmaple silent sentry is only at an airport and not a big network.Ask Highsea for more info he knows more than i do about multistatic systems and can give you more detail.

long wave Radar although it wworks has some setbacks.

1.) Not accurate enough for fire control(miss bya few miles).
2) Only the long wave radars with big wavelengths will work for detection such as VHF or HF.
Long wave radar bands are HF,VHF, And UHF. Most people mistake these bands as higher than the x band in frequency,they are not they have a lower frequency and larger wavelength
3.) Immobile and easy to destroy. Will always be targeted by standoff weapons inthe beginning of a war. look what happened to iraq's EW network in the first day of war(cruise missiles and low flying apache's).

The USAF have openly conceded that the B-2 is detectable by high power low band VHF surveillance radars, therefore it follows that the less sophisticated F-117A will also be detectable by such systems. HF radar such as Jindalee or VHF radar such as many geriatric Soviet systems uses wavelengths comparable in size to the aircraft itself, hence the scattering mechanism which occurs (Rayleigh) is different and a solid return is seen. VHF radars are however generally considered to be inaccurate and very poor performers against low altitude targets of any kind, therefore the sanctuary of low altitude is clearly available to the stealth aircraft.

In practical terms the ability of a low band radar to detect an inbound stealth aircraft may be of little real value, as the radar cannot be accurate enough to target anything but a nuclear armed SAM. SAM, AAM and fighter radars all operate in the upper G-J bands where they are effectively defeated by the stealth aircraft's unique capabilities. A stealth aircraft penetrating at low level can defeat VHF radar by terrain masking and all other radar with its airframe design. The use of the RHAW to detect threats at several times the detection range by the threat makes avoidance of radars a fairly straightforward exercise.

http://www.ausairpower.net/Profile-F-117A.html

F117 shhotdown was mere luck and atrocious planning

By way of example, they noted that even a standard turning maneuver could increase the aircraft’s radar cross section by a factor of 100 or more. Such turns were unavoidable in the constricted airspace within which the F-117s had to fly.15 Another unconfirmed report suggested that the RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft monitoring enemy SAM activity may have failed to locate the SA-3 battery thought to have downed the F-117 and may not have relayed timely indications of enemy SAM activity to the appropriate C2 authorities. Lending credence to that interpretation, Gen Richard Hawley, commander of Air Combat Command at the time, commented that “when you have a lot of unlocated threats, you are at risk even in a stealth airplane.”

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html

Although the Air Force has remained understandably silent about the confluence of events it believes occasioned the F-117’s downing, according to press reports, Air Force assessors concluded, after conducting a formal postmortem, that a lucky combination of low-technology tactics, rapid learning, and astute improvisation had converged in one fleeting instant to enable an SA-3 not operating in its normal, radar-guided mode to down the aircraft. Undoubtedly, enemy spotters in Italy reported the aircraft’s takeoff from Aviano, and IADS operators in Serbia, as well as those in Bosnia and along the Montenegrin coast, could have assembled enough glimpses of its position en route to its target from scattered radars to cue a SAM battery near Belgrade to fire at the appropriate moment. The aircraft had already dropped one laser-guided bomb (LGB) near Belgrade, offering the now-alerted air defenders yet another clue. (The Air Force is said to have ruled out theories hinging on a stuck weapons-bay door, a descent to below 15,000 feet, or a hit by AAA.)17

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html

Allegedly, at least three procedural errors contributed to the downing.18 First, ELINT collectors reportedly could not track the changing location of the three or four offending SAM batteries. Three low-frequency Serb radars that could have detected the F-117’s presence, at least theoretically, were not neutralized because US strike aircraft had earlier bombed the wrong aiming points within the radar complexes. Also, F-16CJs carrying HARMs and operating in adjacent airspace could have deterred the SA-3 battery from emitting, but those aircraft had been recalled before the F-117 shootdown.

The second alleged procedural error entailed an EA-6B support jammer that was operating too far away from the F-117 (80 to 100 miles) to offer much protection. Furthermore, it was out of proper alignment with the offending threat radars, resulting in inefficient jamming.

Last, F-117s operating out of Aviano had previously flown along more or less the same transit routes for four nights in a row (because of SACEUR’s ban on overflight of Bosnia) to avoid jeopardizing the Dayton Accords. That would have made their approach pattern into Yugoslav airspace predictable. Knowing the direction the F-117s would take, Serb air defenders could have employed low-frequency radars for the best chance of getting a snap look at the aircraft. Former F-117 pilots and several industry experts acknowledged that the aircraft is detectable by such radars when viewed from the side or directly below. US officials also suggested that the Serbs may have gotten brief, nightly radar hits while the aircraft’s weapons bay doors opened fleetingly.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html

One was shot down not all of them plus no B-2 was ever shot down.it was clearly not a stealth problem that night. In Iraq they had the same defenses and in a tighter concentrion and the F117's weren't even scratched. The difference was we used good mission planning(not flying the same flight path).Mission palnnign is always a crucial elemnt of the technology.Forgive any spelling errors i'm late for my dentist appointment.

 

[XEROX]

But dont a/c like F-22 raptors generate x amounts of electromagnetic fields around them, by this rationale wouldnt it be able to develop missile seekers that can pick up such signitures.