Nighthawk.NZ
Well-Known Member
Japan is putting their own builds behind schedule to build the three Aussie ones
Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Sort of like the Brits with the T26 Norway deal albeit the reasons may be different. Japan is looking for an export success, the current UK government likely sees the Norway order as budget relief.
Nighthawk.NZ
Well-Known Member
Agreed... But I believe the Japaneses could still expand more and quicker than the Brits could
Just some opinion points, by observation....
Relevant and insightful comments everyone.
One general theme that shows through, is the simple lack of long term planning and competence of governments to manage the affairs of nations especially in NZ and here in Australia generally and in this forum, military.
Example is the pending arrival of the last of the fuel tankers from before the USA Iran war. Fuel supplies are going to get much tighter very soon now and could last a year or more because of the amount of infrastructure that has been destroyed. So much for good fuel security.
One of you commented a couple of pages ago about sourcing oil from Canada. I have heard they have the 4th largest reserves in the world.
Oil from a stable nation and a little more expensive is better than no oil.
I saw a YouTube interview with a retiredl US admiral. I think he was over one of the fleets. Asked about his view on the two Trump battleships he said if you don't have 3 you have nothing.
He also commented on the under utilisation of the LCS saying they are versatile and cheap to run and make good work horses. (Aware of the structural issues etc)
The commander over Canadas navy, forget his name sorry, said that Harry de Wolf class was the most requested ship for tasking in his fleet, because of versatility and being able to do almost anything that's needed.
Both mentioned in those interviews the recognition of the vital need for the high end of the fleet.
So there needs to be balance as much as possible.
I agree with the comments about Australian yards being incapable of getting the ships built. This is really just basic mathematical calculations but are often, sadly, distorted in spin.
Warhawk, I find I agree with your general perspective based around type 31.
1 type, 3 high end, 3 OPV, 3 with high level multiple drone capability, useful for mines ASW etc where possible.
I'm inclined to not replace the Canterbury with 2 ships or even an upgrade. Put it into the type 31 class hulls.
Again, from a couple of months ago, so this may have changed now, but apparently there were slots available for hulls in Britain in 2030. So that could be almost 10 years ahead of Australian builds of Mogami for NZ.
If the type 31 hulls and the P8 do their job you should not need to have army or ground forces more than what already exists.
More port visits to the pacific islands in general, great PR to bring those nations along with you. Also good personnel retention incentives etc.
Final comment today...just get on with it, you are 10 years behind already.
Relevant and insightful comments everyone.
One general theme that shows through, is the simple lack of long term planning and competence of governments to manage the affairs of nations especially in NZ and here in Australia generally and in this forum, military.
Example is the pending arrival of the last of the fuel tankers from before the USA Iran war. Fuel supplies are going to get much tighter very soon now and could last a year or more because of the amount of infrastructure that has been destroyed. So much for good fuel security.
One of you commented a couple of pages ago about sourcing oil from Canada. I have heard they have the 4th largest reserves in the world.
Oil from a stable nation and a little more expensive is better than no oil.
I saw a YouTube interview with a retiredl US admiral. I think he was over one of the fleets. Asked about his view on the two Trump battleships he said if you don't have 3 you have nothing.
He also commented on the under utilisation of the LCS saying they are versatile and cheap to run and make good work horses. (Aware of the structural issues etc)
The commander over Canadas navy, forget his name sorry, said that Harry de Wolf class was the most requested ship for tasking in his fleet, because of versatility and being able to do almost anything that's needed.
Both mentioned in those interviews the recognition of the vital need for the high end of the fleet.
So there needs to be balance as much as possible.
I agree with the comments about Australian yards being incapable of getting the ships built. This is really just basic mathematical calculations but are often, sadly, distorted in spin.
Warhawk, I find I agree with your general perspective based around type 31.
1 type, 3 high end, 3 OPV, 3 with high level multiple drone capability, useful for mines ASW etc where possible.
I'm inclined to not replace the Canterbury with 2 ships or even an upgrade. Put it into the type 31 class hulls.
Again, from a couple of months ago, so this may have changed now, but apparently there were slots available for hulls in Britain in 2030. So that could be almost 10 years ahead of Australian builds of Mogami for NZ.
If the type 31 hulls and the P8 do their job you should not need to have army or ground forces more than what already exists.
More port visits to the pacific islands in general, great PR to bring those nations along with you. Also good personnel retention incentives etc.
Final comment today...just get on with it, you are 10 years behind already.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Canada's pipeline capacity to the Pacific is limited to the Trans-mountain line. It is unlikely a line from Alberta to Prince Rupert, BC will ever happen even if the NDP fools running BC are turfed out of office
WRT to LCS, versatile and cheap to run, I think not. See my post 3968 in the USN thread.
This is true but I would add the De Wolf class is the RCN's most modern class and being 30 years newer than the Halifax or Kingston classes they offer greater reliability and for sailors much better accommodation,
[QUOTE="K in Oz, post: 466630, member: 46981"I agree with the comments about Australian yards being incapable of getting the ships built. This is really just basic mathematical calculations but are often, sadly, distorted in spin.[/QUOTE]
Not sure how much different Canadian yards are compared to Australian yards. Both suffered for years with minimum orders and investment. Irving did a reasonable job with the De Wolf which hopefully will bode well for the River class. SeaSpan in Vancouver has done ok with smaller CCG ships and the JSS 1 is nearing completion so we shall see soon how they are doing.
In the early days of Australian shipbuilding, pomp and ceremony often filled the gaps left by a lack of genuine skill. As those skills refined focus shifted, steel gave way to aluminium, and advanced technology was crammed into high-end pleasure crafts. Eventually, we stopped calling them "warships" entirely, hiding behind buzzwords like “increased lethality", “survivability", and “situational awareness". But a naval industry is like a furnace—you can’t just flip a switch. Once those fires go cold, good luck getting them started again.
As Australia truly matures as a shipbuilder, its reputation will be defined by its consistency and the value of its output. History shows that every successful builder needs a solid export market, and admit that the first ship off the line is going to be a disaster. Tech that passes land tests often fails the moment it hits salt water. It doesn’t take long to realise that "cost-saving" threads are useless compared to double clamps, even if the marketing team tries to spin it otherwise.
Ultimately, building a warship requires three things, heat above 1,200 degrees, raw steel, and a crew with the will to fight.
For a long time, Defence was treated as a sandbox for social, economic, and environmental policy. That’s a luxury afforded to benign strategic environments. But as we realise the days of cheap oil and easy security are over, the ceremony is wearing thin. It’s time to get back to the core business.
I can’t predict which way the New Zealand government will lean. Everyone involved has their own biases. However, history is a clear teacher. Over the last 200 years, the U.K. hasn't exactly done Australia or New Zealand any favours.
As Australia truly matures as a shipbuilder, its reputation will be defined by its consistency and the value of its output. History shows that every successful builder needs a solid export market, and admit that the first ship off the line is going to be a disaster. Tech that passes land tests often fails the moment it hits salt water. It doesn’t take long to realise that "cost-saving" threads are useless compared to double clamps, even if the marketing team tries to spin it otherwise.
Ultimately, building a warship requires three things, heat above 1,200 degrees, raw steel, and a crew with the will to fight.
For a long time, Defence was treated as a sandbox for social, economic, and environmental policy. That’s a luxury afforded to benign strategic environments. But as we realise the days of cheap oil and easy security are over, the ceremony is wearing thin. It’s time to get back to the core business.
I can’t predict which way the New Zealand government will lean. Everyone involved has their own biases. However, history is a clear teacher. Over the last 200 years, the U.K. hasn't exactly done Australia or New Zealand any favours.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Exporting naval ships is not easy, many countries insist on local builds. The situation is even more difficult for commercial builds (unless vessel cost is subsidized by government, eg ferries for example). I reluctantly accept that domestic naval construction will always be more expensive, the price for sovereignty IMHO. A reasonable drumbeat of production can mitigate the cost somewhat. This applies to a lesser extent to army kit which should be more cost effective as export potential is better. Military jets, for many customers import is the only option along with negotiating industrial offsets.
As we've seen with supply chain disruptions, being able to repair and modify and even provision our own ships in a crisis is a must have that doesn't show up on the balance sheet until we really need it, and cost spikes occur when specialised workforces vanish. A continuous build strategy is the only way to flatten the curve. Though it is going to require political commitment from both nations which is rare anywhere in the world.
It's going to be a tough pill to swallow but in the defence world "cheap" and "sovereignty" rarely exist in the same sentence.
The contract price also doesn’t tell the whole story.
A significant proportion of that contract price returns to government in corporate, GST and income taxation from the builder and their supplier.
So while the cost to the defence budget may be higher, the cost to the overall government balance of payments may actually be less then an overseas build.
A significant proportion of that contract price returns to government in corporate, GST and income taxation from the builder and their supplier.
So while the cost to the defence budget may be higher, the cost to the overall government balance of payments may actually be less then an overseas build.
This is true but I would add the De Wolf class is the RCN's most modern class and being 30 years newer than the Halifax or Kingston classes they offer greater reliability and for sailors much better accommodation
Exactly, fit for purpose.
And it was good to see your commander so pleased to be able to get there.
But why did it and is it taking 30 years to get there?
Jennifer Parker in her Maritime Matters podcast of April last year said that NZ, because it is small, is and will have issues with critical mass. She could see that problem applying into mid level fleets as well.
It seems that is visible here now in Australia with the retirement of anzacs before replacements are available.
This again is a leadership and planning issue. The capacity to construct should have been in place 10 years ago and the desire for it 20 years ago.
NZ ships could have then just entered into the available slots.
My reference in the earlier post of a fleet of 3+3+3 ships based around type 31 was not to rush out and get 9 ships, never would happen for NZ.
But rather simplify classes around a single modern hull as much as possible. Order a new hull every 3 years and spread the financial load over the 27 years in this case, instead of a single order for each class.
Crews would generally know the ships and extra training needed for the specs-fit outs etc of each ship as required. So hopefully simplify that part of the process if possible.
Is that ideal? No, but for a small fleet there will always be some compromises. But at least it should help to also keeps things up to date to a degree and therefore more relevant.
Just a thought, may or may not have value.
Thanks.
PS hopefully I got the above copy and paste done correctly for you. Apologies if not.
Exactly, fit for purpose.
And it was good to see your commander so pleased to be able to get there.
But why did it and is it taking 30 years to get there?
Jennifer Parker in her Maritime Matters podcast of April last year said that NZ, because it is small, is and will have issues with critical mass. She could see that problem applying into mid level fleets as well.
It seems that is visible here now in Australia with the retirement of anzacs before replacements are available.
This again is a leadership and planning issue. The capacity to construct should have been in place 10 years ago and the desire for it 20 years ago.
NZ ships could have then just entered into the available slots.
My reference in the earlier post of a fleet of 3+3+3 ships based around type 31 was not to rush out and get 9 ships, never would happen for NZ.
But rather simplify classes around a single modern hull as much as possible. Order a new hull every 3 years and spread the financial load over the 27 years in this case, instead of a single order for each class.
Crews would generally know the ships and extra training needed for the specs-fit outs etc of each ship as required. So hopefully simplify that part of the process if possible.
Is that ideal? No, but for a small fleet there will always be some compromises. But at least it should help to also keeps things up to date to a degree and therefore more relevant.
Just a thought, may or may not have value.
Thanks.
PS hopefully I got the above copy and paste done correctly for you. Apologies if not.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
As an outsider (living in neither Oz or NZ) but with ties to both I have perhaps a slightly different perspective. Unfort there has been issues of both political will, as well as willingness to spend the coin needed, when and where needed, to actually establish and maintain a fleet. That has been an issue in both Oz and NZ.
In Oz, there were prolonged gaps in the order books, which has repeatedly led to the expensive facilities and workforces being forced to wither before then needing to be re-established, often at a new site, all over again.
In NZ, it has often been that gov't and Treasury do not see the value in a properly resourced NZDF and therefore have been only willing to allocate minimums. By only funding minimum capabilities, NZGov has unfortunately funded a NZDF that can only function effectively in peacetime (and it can be questionable how well it can conduct high tempo peacetime ops)
As for the idea of having a common hull for replacement warships and patrol vessels... there are problems with this idea IMO. The role of the vessel dictates what capability requirements the vessel has, which can in turn impact hull design and construction. By trying to go with a common base hull design, then it is distinctly possible that either role, or IMO more likely both roles, will end up with features built into the design which are actually counterproductive for the role, as well as increasing overall complexity and cost, for no end benefit.
An unfortunately classic example of trying to get too much into a design can be seen in the RNZN's HMNZS Canterbury, which was supposed to be a Multi-Role Vessel covering sealift, patrol, and limited Antarctic patrolling roles. In order for have a better ability to approach Antarctica, the hull itself was also ice-strengthened. Unfortunately though, the characteristics of a vessel which can provide sealift impact how a vessel handles when it does not have cargo and/or vehicles embarked. Trying to get a design which can do both things... did not work out. The addition of the ice-strengthened hull also did not really add value since that was primarily so that Canterbury could also patrol around Antarctica, when it turned out that the vessel required significant ballasting when cargo and vehicles were not embarked.
Trying to get a common hull design for RNZN patrol and combat vessels could lead to either ice-strengthened warship hulls, which increase displacement and likely draught, whilst requiring more power for propulsion and being less fuel efficient, or a lack of ice-strengthened patrol vessels that are supposed to patrol to/around Antarctica. Neither option are particularly good IMO.
I believe it would be better for NZ to layout and then plan for what capability needs exist for various required and desired roles for RNZN vessels and then place orders for vessels which at a minimum meet the requirements. I would also be quite hesitant about trying to combine different requirement sets into one vessel to try and give it a multi-role capability simply cause unless the roles are adjacent, some of the requirements will likely clash. An OPV hull for instance would have little need for hull quieting and machinery isolation/rafting, but a warship which would be used for ASW ops would benefit from a reduced acoustic signature.
Ngatimozart’s information regarding Irving Shipbuilding’s ability to meet New Zealand’s Southern OPV requirements is bang on. Specifically, the Harry DeWolf-class AOPV hull stood out as the premier candidate. A very number 8 wire solution proposed by Ngati involves installing flanges on the service line exhausts, allowing the vessel to transition seamlessly between the different environmental demands of the Southern and Pacific Oceans.
Furthermore, as Ngati points out the SOPV must be armed in strict accordance with the Antarctica Treaty, which limits weapon calibres. However, Pacific-oriented versions of the hull could potentially be "up-armed" by pulling through technology and weaponry from the Anzac-class frigates.
While the core hull design is solid, two major factors have evolved over the last decade: the critical need for communications commonality and the integration of an Australian-aligned sensor array between the RNZN and RAN. While the DeWolf-class offers the most competitive pricing and fits the immediate SOPV brief, New Zealand must eventually align with Australia’s SEA 3000 program to ensure regional interoperability. The DeWolf could serve as a vital "bridge" capability in the interim.
Reflecting on New Zealand’s naval history, the 1990s shift from a three- or four-frigate fleet of ANZACS to the Protector-class and HMNZS Canterbury reflected a now-obsolete "benign strategic environment" narrative. That era of cheap oil and easy security is dead. Three frigates are no longer sufficient, and while OPVs lack the "high-end" teeth for modern surface warfare, New Zealand desperately needs the SOPV’s presence and as much ASW capability as can be mustered.
For an island nation like New Zealand to ignore ASW and the rapid integration of AI would be an operational failure of the highest order. History offers a stern warning: during WWII, Imperial Japan prioritised escort carriers and "super-weapons" like the Yamato at the expense of their submarine fleet, which allowed American subs to decimate their merchant navy.
In the dawning age of AI, the specific technical details of NZDF’s future may be best kept quiet, but the government must act decisively. The Harry DeWolf-class is the right tool for the Southern Ocean, but it must be part of a broader, more aggressive maritime strategy.
Furthermore, as Ngati points out the SOPV must be armed in strict accordance with the Antarctica Treaty, which limits weapon calibres. However, Pacific-oriented versions of the hull could potentially be "up-armed" by pulling through technology and weaponry from the Anzac-class frigates.
While the core hull design is solid, two major factors have evolved over the last decade: the critical need for communications commonality and the integration of an Australian-aligned sensor array between the RNZN and RAN. While the DeWolf-class offers the most competitive pricing and fits the immediate SOPV brief, New Zealand must eventually align with Australia’s SEA 3000 program to ensure regional interoperability. The DeWolf could serve as a vital "bridge" capability in the interim.
Reflecting on New Zealand’s naval history, the 1990s shift from a three- or four-frigate fleet of ANZACS to the Protector-class and HMNZS Canterbury reflected a now-obsolete "benign strategic environment" narrative. That era of cheap oil and easy security is dead. Three frigates are no longer sufficient, and while OPVs lack the "high-end" teeth for modern surface warfare, New Zealand desperately needs the SOPV’s presence and as much ASW capability as can be mustered.
For an island nation like New Zealand to ignore ASW and the rapid integration of AI would be an operational failure of the highest order. History offers a stern warning: during WWII, Imperial Japan prioritised escort carriers and "super-weapons" like the Yamato at the expense of their submarine fleet, which allowed American subs to decimate their merchant navy.
In the dawning age of AI, the specific technical details of NZDF’s future may be best kept quiet, but the government must act decisively. The Harry DeWolf-class is the right tool for the Southern Ocean, but it must be part of a broader, more aggressive maritime strategy.
Is the Harry de Wolf class icebreaker large enough to service the requirements of McMurdo Sound As we are aware the POLAR STAR i s a much larger and more powerful vessel and Australias icebreaker even larger again. The chilean icebreaker is also sizeable.
After reading Ngatimozarts information on this subject in these forums I can confirm that the AOPV Wolf fits New Zealands SOPV brief.
RSV Nuyina is a proper Polar Class 3 ice breaker though, not an OPV.
RRS David Attenborough has a hull rated at Polar Class 4, but Machinery at Polar Class 5 which seems a bit odd.
Polar star is also a purpose built ice breaker.
Harry De Wolf is rated at Polar Class 5 which should be more then sufficient for normal duties.