The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[rsemmes]

The positive effect is more neutralized russian soldiers

You don't even read the article that you post, this is another philologist=scientists. You are feeding your fairy tale with rumours.

First of all, no need to “neutralize” anything, Russian soldiers are killing Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian soldiers are killing Russian soldiers. It's a war, the business is killing. You should have read...

“The reality on the front line is different” Yes, for Russian units and some Ukrainian units. Nothing new there.
“The ISW sees a direct connection... the Russian defence appears to...” Ukraine was counter-attacking successfully in Kupiansk while Russia had access to Starlink. Russia is still in Kupiansk and attacking successfully without Starlink; even if not that smoothly.
Then, only in Ternuvate and Primorske, Ukraine has no troops or that “tactical disaster looms” is part of the fantasy; it is a fantasy.
“was reportedly able to recapture about 300 square kilometers of territory“ The same unicorn again...

Then it sends you to another link...
“a trap, as one of the hackers anonymously reported.” Great, now we have an anonymous report, do you need anything else?
“They immediately forwarded this to the Ukrainian artillery. In addition to the military damage, the operation had a massive psychological effect.” What artillery, how many shells, what damage? There is nothing, just an “anonymous report”.
"Russian soldiers are said to have expressed... They were reportedly concerned...” All based on what “intercepted radio communications”? Two of them? Even then, it is hinting, not stating. At least, he is honest.
“Added to this is the indirect admission that its own military infrastructure is barely capable of meeting the demands of a modern networked war without Western technology.” The admission that Ukraine cannot fight this war without NATO. Russia is still buying western technology, it will be inefficient not to use it; and more expensive, like the new Zorky.

Also, balloons:
“This would allow the aerostat to function as a high-altitude relay node, performing a role similar to Starlink in providing wide-area connectivity. A Barazh-1 system equipped with a 5G NTN terminal could enable Russian frontline units to communicate with forces further in the rear, where data could then be relayed to higher echelons through terrestrial networks. Given the strong line-of-sight advantages inherent to elevated, air-based platforms, Russian soldiers would effectively gain a system with functionality similar to Starlink.
A video was posted on social media that shows the initial test launch of the system on February 13, 2026, approximately one week after the Russian military lost access to Starlink. The social media post emphasizes that the platform is almost entirely built from domestic components, which would allow rapid scaling while avoiding supply chain constraints associated with sanctions and embargoes.”
https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikram...based-5g-terminal-as-alternative-to-starlink/

I was reading another article by theguardian, a huge pile of imagination. Do not mention anything that doesn't fit in your fairy tale and do not compare it to anything else, because it will only show that it has nothing to do with reality. Just keep adding fantasy to the fairy tale you already want to believe.

 

[personaldesas]

How Russia’s fatalities compare with Ukraine’s

https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/02/23/how-russias-fatalities-compare-with-ukraines

Summary:
After four years of war, the conflict has produced very high casualty figures, with The Economist’s modelling estimating Russian losses at 1.1–1.4 million total casualties, including about 230,000-430,000 dead, meaning roughly 1 in 25 Russian men aged 18-49 may have been killed or severely wounded. For Ukraine, one cited estimate (CSIS, January 2026) puts total casualties at about 600,000, including 100,000–140,000 dead, which is lower in absolute terms but proportionally higher relative to population size, equivalent to about 1 in 16 Ukrainian men aged 18–49. The article notes that Ukrainian losses were heaviest earlier in the war, whereas Russian losses have increased over time, with some estimates suggesting roughly 1,000 Russian soldiers lost per day. Despite these costs, Russia’s territorial gains have been limited, with only about 0.83% of Ukrainian territory captured in 2025, and no major city falling since Mariupol in May 2022.

 

[rsemmes]

with only about 0.83% of Ukrainian territory captured in 2025

(No subscription)
Ukraine will be extremely interested in recovering any territory that gets Russia closer to Jarkiv (even when it's not using this Starlink doomsday to counterattack there), something useful for the negotiations: Ukraine wants, Russia has.
Does it mention any % for Donbas? That Russia is uninterested in conquering "Ukraine" as a territory is clear.

 

[personaldesas]

That Russia is uninterested in conquering "Ukraine" as a territory is clear.

At least earlier in the war, they appeared to aim at holding much more territory, so I’m not sure Russia’s limited gains are merely a lack of interest.

 

[Feanor]

(No subscription)
Ukraine will be extremely interested in recovering any territory that gets Russia closer to Jarkiv (even when it's not using this Starlink doomsday to counterattack there), something useful for the negotiations: Ukraine wants, Russia has.
Does it mention any % for Donbas? That Russia is uninterested in conquering "Ukraine" as a territory is clear.

I think Russia is absolutely using territorial gains as a way to pressure Ukraine to accept a political settlement not to their liking. So if they could gain more territory fairly easily, I'm confident they would. I'm fairly certain Russia doesn't want to annex Kiev or Vinnitsa, but they probably wouldn't mind Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov.

 

[personaldesas]

I think Russia is absolutely using territorial gains as a way to pressure Ukraine to accept a political settlement not to their liking. So if they could gain more territory fairly easily, I'm confident they would. I'm fairly certain Russia doesn't want to annex Kiev or Vinnitsa, but they probably wouldn't mind Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov.

Controlling Kiev, for example, could still have significant strategic and political value even without the intend to annex it.

 

[Feanor]

Controlling Kiev, for example, could still have significant strategic and political value even without the intend to annex it.

Absolutely true. If Russia could take over Kiev they would. But I suspect they wouldn't want to keep it. I think if they had managed to overrun Ukraine in '22 the way they overran Georgia in '08, they would have done regime change but only parted LNR and DNR as well as getting the new regime to recognize the annexation of Crimea. Now they would likely have recognition of the annexation of all 5 regions if they could.


EDIT: The fighting in eastern Zaporozhye remains fluid. Both Russia and Ukraine are gaining ground in different areas. Ukraine has taken Russian positions where the Yanchur meets the Gaychur taking Andreevka, Bratskoe, Ostapovskoe, Gerasimovka, and Zarechnoe. On the other hand Russian forces are recapturing ground north of Gulyaypole gaining Alenokonstantinovka, and pushing back into Kosotsevo.

 

[rsemmes]

Hard to find data.

That 0.83 (of Ukraine) could be 9% of Donbas.
Russia controls 18% of Ukraine including all of Crimea, just over 80% of Donbas.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-advances-ukraine-fast-pace-moving-into-kurakhove-analysts-say-

2024-11-26/
Summarized accurately today: 11% of the Donbas region (which is 22% of the oblast of Donetsk) remains under Ukrainian control. December 23, 2025

Clarifying Territorial Disputes in Ukraine | Russia Matters

www.russiamatters.org

 

[Beltrami2005]

@rsemmes @KipPotapych

This here is the Kaleykino Oil Pumping Station in Almetyesk yesterday.

Is this supposed to look like that?



Its completly out of controle, firefighters have retreated.

 

[KipPotapych]

Looks like Ukraine finally has a victory plan:

Zelensky does not seem to be overly inspired by the said plan and strongly believes that Putin had started the third world war and wonders how to stop him. Yet, he also strongly believes that “they” are currently preventing Putin from starting the third world war.

“Analysts” talk out of the future, a year from today:

I know that math is generally hard for a great deal of the world population, but six minus two should be manageable, especially for an “analyst”.


A UN vote on the resolution on the war in Ukraine took place. The UN described it as a record vote. Seems to be an anti-record as far as the UA post-22 resolutions are concerned. Talking about lack of influence and whatnot, out of the 12 (Balts aside) ex-Soviet republics, only Georgia and Moldova voted in favour.

Since nothing is easy, Ukraine decided to go back to the show of fireworks and making stuff up for the sake of the victory in the lemming eye. Imagine thinking that Ural oil is a mixture of various oils to begin with and then, to top it off, propose that the “cocktailing” takes place in some “huge tanks” and no more “cooking” is going to happen now. Russia’s oil exports are definitely doomed now. Personally, I really do not get the desire behind spreading idiotic ideas that are not only easily proven wrong to begin with, but also having proved to have little to no desired affect over and over again. They say that goldfish has a 3- (or 5?) second memory and, while it is 100% wrong for goldfish, it appears to be the case for the lemmings. Someone should run a study on the subject.

Past fireworks had backfired hard, reportedly. I was going to talk about it back then, but don’t think I did in the end. The strikes on Novorossiysk, while had relatively little impact on the Russian operations, Kazakhstan (and, hence, US interests) suffered dramatically (about 90% of KZ oil exports goes through that very port and alternatives are limited to nonexistent).

The guy who watches way too many brutal videos (that without a doubt affect the psych and overall metal state of an individual) keeps spreading UA propaganda and insisting on things that in all likelihood (a certainty at this point) had never happened.

To be honest, I always saw him as a lemming (or a clown, if you will), he just keeps proving it to be right. This refers to the early days UA propaganda of the epic massacre of the Russian forces (VDV in particular) at the Hostomel airport that has zero evidence behind it and everything today suggests it had never happened. But here we are; kind of weird to stick with nonsense when clear actual victories were plentiful at the time.

 

[Hoover]

o be honest, I always saw him as a lemming (or a clown, if you will), he just keeps proving it to be right. This refers to the early days UA propaganda of the epic massacre of the Russian forces (VDV in particular) at the Hostomel airport that has zero evidence behind it and everything today suggests it had never happened. But here we are; kind of weird to stick with nonsense when clear actual victories were plentiful at the time.

Massacre is exaggerated, but the VDV were hit very hard during the Kyiv-operation. It was a failure by the Russian invaders, with horrible losses at Hostomel and Irpin. Some of the VDV units were not seen again until refitting in spring 2023.
I wouldn´t call it massacre, but nothing to celebrate either.

 

[personaldesas]

Massacre is exaggerated, but the VDV were hit very hard during the Kyiv-operation. It was a failure by the Russian invaders, with horrible losses at Hostomel and Irpin. Some of the VDV units were not seen again until refitting in spring 2023.
I wouldn´t call it massacre, but nothing to celebrate either.

Careful with these nuanced takes. In discussions about this war things are usually are either stated as absolutely true or total nonsense, and the opposite side is usually only blinded by propaganda. /s

 

[Hoover]

Careful with these nuanced takes. In discussions about this war things are usually are either stated as absolutely true or total nonsense, and the opposite side is usually only blinded by propaganda.

You can correct me.
1. Would you call it a massacre?
2. Were the VDV units hit hard? With heavy losses in material and soldiers?
3. Were the Russian units refittet and out of the line for 3/4 year until seen in the area of the failed Ukrainian offensive near Robotyne?
(the replacements partly were former penalty unit memebers)
4. Would you celebrate that?

That were my comment. Nothing more or less.

 

[Feanor]

Massacre is exaggerated, but the VDV were hit very hard during the Kyiv-operation. It was a failure by the Russian invaders, with horrible losses at Hostomel and Irpin. Some of the VDV units were not seen again until refitting in spring 2023.
I wouldn´t call it massacre, but nothing to celebrate either.

Arguably Gostomel' was a success, casualties notwithstanding, with Russian forces grabbing the position and managing to hold it until the arrival of the main force. The bigger problem is that Russia's main force failed to knock over Ukrainian forces quickly, the way they needed to, in every direction but the southern one. In the Kiev area this was a particularly problematic situation, they even tried to bypass Sumy and go at Kiev from the east to take it, but that also failed. And after failing it, Russia then spent way too much time trying to fight the war within a very limited scope while Ukraine mobilized on a massive scale.

 

[personaldesas]

You can correct me.
1. Would you call it a massacre?
2. Were the VDV units hit hard? With heavy losses in material and soldiers?
3. Were the Russian units refittet and out of the line for 3/4 year until seen in the area of the failed Ukrainian offensive near Robotyne?
(the replacements partly were former penalty unit memebers)
4. Would you celebrate that?

That were my comment. Nothing more or less.

I was being ironic there (which rarely works well in writing), I actually appreciated the nuanced take you had, and would agree with it.

 

[personaldesas]

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/opinion/russia-ukraine-drone-war.html

Summary – “Time Is Not on Russia’s Side” (NYT / Michael Kofman interview)

Overall state of the war:
- The war remains largely positional and attritional after four years.
- Front lines move slowly; no major breakthroughs.
- Drones increasingly shape the battlefield.
- Russia advances incrementally but at high cost.
- Ukraine remains resilient despite heavy strain.

Casualty estimates cited:
- Russia: ~1.1–1.4 million total casualties, including ~230k–430k dead (Economist estimate).
- Ukraine: ~600k total casualties, including ~100k–140k dead (CSIS estimate).
- Ukrainian losses are lower in absolute numbers but higher relative to population.

Russia’s situation (according to Kofman):
- Offensive operations are costly and inefficient.
- Gains are slow and limited.
- Recruitment rates are increasingly close to unrecoverable losses.
- Economic pressure is growing (low oil prices, deficits, export pressure).
- Russia can continue fighting but sustaining current offensive intensity may become harder.

Ukraine’s situation:
- Defensive posture easier to sustain.
- Effective use of drones.
- Front line not collapsing.
- Continued Western support.
- Manpower shortages and fatigue.
- AWOL/desertion issues.
- Limited reserves.
- Heavy dependence on external aid.

How the war is being fought now:
- Small infantry assault groups and infiltration tactics.
- Heavy drone usage guiding movement and targeting.
- “Drone kill zone” (~20 km each side of front) often decides initiative.
- Increasing casualties among support/logistics units rather than frontline infantry.

Political / strategic points:
- Russia still pursues ambitious political goals despite limited military progress.
- Putin appears to believe Russia can outlast Western support.
- Russian system has adapted economically and politically to long war.
- Ukrainian public is tired but not willing to accept unfavorable terms.

Main conclusion:
- Russia is not close to decisive victory.
- Ukraine is strained but stable.
- No obvious “game-changing” weapon or technology exists.
- If 2026 resembles 2025, time may increasingly work against Russia.

 

[Hoover]

@perso: Overall a good summary

 

[KipPotapych]

You can correct me.
1. Would you call it a massacre?
2. Were the VDV units hit hard? With heavy losses in material and soldiers?
3. Were the Russian units refittet and out of the line for 3/4 year until seen in the area of the failed Ukrainian offensive near Robotyne?
(the replacements partly were former penalty unit memebers)
4. Would you celebrate that?

That were my comment. Nothing more or less.

Was it a massacre? According to the Ukrainians, and Andrew, yes, absolutely:

To defend the airfield, Ukraine sent its most experienced reconnaissance special forces operatives.

On the same morning, a group of about 30 people decided to engage the enemy to buy time. The Russian paratroopers numbered over 300, but their main problem was that, despite their numerical superiority, they were not prepared for resistance from the Ukrainians.

The HUR special forces had only Kalashnikov rifles, a few grenade launchers, one armored personnel carrier, and grenades. They shot down a Russian helicopter, and a few more were downed by National Guardsmen. In total, all special services and armed formations destroyed about 500 paratroopers who were supposed to advance on Kyiv.

HUR’s Top 5 Most Audacious Special Operations

As Ukraine celebrates the Day of Military Intelligence, Kyiv Post has compiled the top five daring operations of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine (HUR).

www.kyivpost.com

Were VDV units hit hard and incurred heavy losses at the airport? No, none of it happened. It is all propaganda. And that is my point.

Celebration? Only one dude here, that I see, celebrates random stuff he posts, mostly disconnected from reality. Personally, I haven’t seen many/any reasons to celebrate since the invasion began.

If interested, here is a good (and relatively short) read outlining the events that took place at the Hostomel airport, based on evidence (it is in Polish, so you would have to use a translate of some kind):

W sieci ukraińskich kłamstw. Bitwa o lotnisko koncernu Antonow w Hostomelu, 24-25 lutego 2022 r.

Konflikty zbrojne, Geopolityka, Armie Świata, Syria, Rosja, Ukraina, Wojna na Ukrainie

thorkillblog.blogspot.com

Actual VDV losses, among those who landed (2 helicopters were shot down and I do not know the fate of the occupants), range in estimates from 0 to 5. Ukrainian side had estimated 3 permanent causalities. The whole epic fairytale told by the UA (and RU, for that matter) officials had never taken place.

Furthermore, the discovery of the UA uniforms by the Russian troops at the airport, potentially led to a whole bunch of Ukrainians in Kyiv (and elsewhere) being killed by Ukrainians, as Russian infiltrators. I had already commented on it previously. Here is a short thread on it from yesterday in Ukrainian:

Thread by @EuroMaydan on Thread Reader App

@EuroMaydan: Рівно чотири року тому стався один із чорних днів війни - трагедія з розстрілу військових ЗСУ своїми на Оболоні. В пам'ять про загиблих бійців люди повинні знати правду. Все почалося з заяви тодішньої з...…

threadreaderapp.com

Translated screenshots (hopefully, in right order):

People in comments asking Grok if this is true (the answer is yes, of course), but what they should be asking if “several dozen people” is the final count because the number is much higher. But again, I had already discussed it previously. Of course, people in the comments also accuse the author of working for Russia, spreading nonsense, etc. I have little doubt that some here will think the same.


I, personally, have no idea why people still do not treat everything said by either side (though RU side is not overly advertised in our parts), and that especially applies to the Ukrainian stories from the early days, as complete rubbish until proven otherwise. Usually, it is proven to be exactly that - rubbish. Which is why I asked previously, what is going to happen when people realize that they have been living in a fairytale environment for years now. Especially relevant for Ukrainians living in Ukraine and their exposure to propaganda is significantly higher than that of the rest of the world.

 

[KipPotapych]

Not that long ago, I said I was wondering what Gen. Hodges was up to these days. Well, I wonder no more. The guy talks about disinformation, while also saying that on the day of the NATO summit, the roof of the train he was on exploded and that happened in 5 different places in Netherlands on that day. Imagine keeping that a secret! Not sure what the hell is wrong with people - should qualify as mental illness at this stage, no?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2027018492495442392

 

[rsemmes]

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/opinion/russia-ukraine-drone-war.html

Summary – “Time Is Not on Russia’s Side” (NYT / Michael Kofman interview)

Overall state of the war:
- The war remains largely positional and attritional after four years.
- Front lines move slowly; no major breakthroughs.
- Drones increasingly shape the battlefield.
- Russia advances incrementally but at high cost.
- Ukraine remains resilient despite heavy strain.

Casualty estimates cited:
- Russia: ~1.1–1.4 million total casualties, including ~230k–430k dead (Economist estimate).
- Ukraine: ~600k total casualties, including ~100k–140k dead (CSIS estimate).
- Ukrainian losses are lower in absolute numbers but higher relative to population.

Russia’s situation (according to Kofman):
- Offensive operations are costly and inefficient.
- Gains are slow and limited.
- Recruitment rates are increasingly close to unrecoverable losses.
- Economic pressure is growing (low oil prices, deficits, export pressure).
- Russia can continue fighting but sustaining current offensive intensity may become harder.

Ukraine’s situation:
- Defensive posture easier to sustain.
- Effective use of drones.
- Front line not collapsing.
- Continued Western support.
- Manpower shortages and fatigue.
- AWOL/desertion issues.
- Limited reserves.
- Heavy dependence on external aid.

How the war is being fought now:
- Small infantry assault groups and infiltration tactics.
- Heavy drone usage guiding movement and targeting.
- “Drone kill zone” (~20 km each side of front) often decides initiative.
- Increasing casualties among support/logistics units rather than frontline infantry.

Political / strategic points:
- Russia still pursues ambitious political goals despite limited military progress.
- Putin appears to believe Russia can outlast Western support.
- Russian system has adapted economically and politically to long war.
- Ukrainian public is tired but not willing to accept unfavorable terms.

Main conclusion:
- Russia is not close to decisive victory.
- Ukraine is strained but stable.
- No obvious “game-changing” weapon or technology exists.
- If 2026 resembles 2025, time may increasingly work against Russia.

- Russia advances incrementally but at high cost.
A high cost compare to Ukrainian cost? What cost is that exactly, our biased estimates? When we provide the money and the weapons, how unbiased are our estimates?
- Offensive operations are costly and inefficient.
"Costly" is an interestimg term, what military operations are not "costly"? "Inefficient" is even more interesting, is defending fixed positions (so, offering a fixed target to the enemy "efficient"? Only movement brings victory. You are not going to achieve results without offensive operations, you certainly have to reach "superiority" (fire, drones, EW, surprise) to achieve cost/effective results. Could an Ukraine without electricity or a front line without troops be considered "results"? Is he expecting to win a war with one battle?
- Recruitment rates are increasingly close to unrecoverable losses... current offensive intensity may become harder.
According to our estimates. Defending may become harder and offensives easier just as well: Even less troops in the front line and no electricity to build drones.
- Front line not collapsing.
The front line never collapses... Until it does.
- Small infantry assault groups and infiltration tactics.
So, no one is trying major breakthroughs. So, they don't fail. Anyone is trying to deploy such a superiority in resources to achieve that breakthrough?
- Drone kill zone (~20 km each side of front) often decides initiative.
The initiative is Russian. Or, until (if) one side achieves drone supremacy.
- Russia still pursues ambitious political goals despite limited military progress./Ukrainian public is tired but not willing to accept unfavorable terms.
Very subtle there. So, Russia is winning (progress) and it keeps it maximalist position; well, there are no real negotiations after all. There has been no collapse, that means that they are willing? How much "public" is included in the Ukrainian negotiating team? Considering its situation, are Ukrainian goals ambitious, to say the least?
- No obvious game-changing weapon or technology exists.
I still disagree. Nothing has been deployed in such an overwhelming number as to change the game. It still may fail, it may prove ineffective, but it has not being tried yet; I haven't seen any actual report of it anyway.
- Time may increasingly work against Russia.
I completely disagree with that. Cannot Russia implement more economic sacrifices? Russia is not sending conscripts (Algeria/Vietnam) to fight in Ukraine. Ukraine is killing Russian children with NATO missiles, that sells pretty good as propaganda; increasing the hate so, increasing the "willingness". The Ukrainian front may collapse, Ukraine's home front is getting worse and Ukraine does not depend on itself for this war; we are scratching the bottom of the barrel for SAM, are we not.

It seems that Russia is infiltrating Ternuvate again.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1V8NzjQkzMOhpuLhkktbiKgodOQ27X6IV&ll=47.82493022089275%2C36.152576716246706&z=14

Congratulations Beltrami2005, you were able to find one picture of this year (or not, because there is no link). Your mum will be so proud.
Keep the good work.