Exactly. People keep throwing around imaginary ships and modifications. Guess what, that's not the project.
The competition is now between the A200 as is and the Mogami 30 as is. With German/Japanese health and safety, ammo storage, fueling, fire fighting etc... and no Australian standards or modifications. No CEA radar system, no increased number of VLS (16 max), no Saab 9LV, etc...
This is a Tier 2 combatant. Its job is to defend itself, monitor air, surface and subsurface and patrol while the Tier 1's go and protect the maritime approaches, support amphib ops etc... It clears up the space for those operations. And because you want them quick and "cheap", changing the design will add cost and time. Australia can do that later when they eventually refit. They need the ships sooner than later. Enemy of good enough is perfect.
Wrong, that's what some, including some of those in parliament may think and say, but it is not how it works.
The reason it doesn't work like that is because they and their predecessors decided the RAN had to comply to external requirements and processes.
Those external requirements and processes add complexity and design requirements that have nothing whatsoever to do with capability, let alone adding or incorporating existing systems that will improve capability.
I have seen many a principle engineers face turn purple as transverse requirements are explained to them. The best PEs, or in the old days, Chief Engineers, were the ones who understood this and ensured this work was done before steel was cut, not chasing it around at the last minute.
If you doubt me, just look at the Arafuras compared to the Capes or Armidales.
The Arafuras where an established, in service, overseas design, built by an experienced builder (first pair) to a high standard, and yet have suffered serious delays, not because of the build or the combat system integration, but because nobody was paying attention to transverse requirements, because it was an existing design.
The Capes and Armidales have both had serious performance, quality and safety issues, but had a very easy path into service because they were designed and built to class.
None of this was the RANs choosing.
Now we have armchair experts saying we should follow the project model, less the parts that worked, used on a project of concern, on a highly complex GP frigate and it will all be fine?
The more design input you have, the more aligned the designer, builder and operator are, the fewer miscommunications and surprises.
Simple as that.
The problem has never been the integration of different systems, it has always been lack of communication, lack of trust and change adverse decision makers, who lack the required information to make informed decisions.
The delays with the Hobart's weren't due to Australian changes, they were due to an incomplete, out of date design that was being updated by the builder as work was underway. Things improved dramatically when the designer was brought into the project proper instead of being a disinterested contractor.
The problems with FFGUP were because a third party, who was neither the designer or the builder, was selected to do the design and implementation work.
Ever heard of Dunning Kruger?
The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly overestimate their knowledge or ability in a specific area. This tends to occur because a lack of self-awareness prevents them from accurately assessing their own skills.
www.psychologytoday.com
I'm not saying the decision makers are stupid, I am saying their lack of knowledge, experience and aptitude is leading them to make incorrect decisions with impacts that continue for decades.
This is why we need to look in detail at old projects, not just the headlines and gut feelings. We need to look at what was done, but also what was not done.
There are no simple answers, and anyone who thinks there is, is deluding themselves.
